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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the role of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in the rule-making of 21st 
century global governance. If offers a critique of existing accounts on the transnational 
capitalist class (TCC) and the WEF, as a site of this class, that are based on an artificial 
differentiation between state and market actors. Such artificiality assumes a power relationship 
that allows market actors to discipline state managers and shape the state’s policy-making along 
their accepted principles and norms. Thus, the involvement of the state in the WEF’s activities 
is viewed as a manifestation of this disciplinary power. The thesis argues that the state 
participates in such activities in response to the imperative of managing capital-labour relations 
at a global level necessary to reproduce the capitalist social relations of production within its 
jurisdictions. From an Open Marxist perspective, it argues that the state is a political 
manifestation of class struggle and an inherent feature of the social relations of capital 
accumulation. Whilst this indicates that state managers pursue policies that favour the 
reproduction of the social relations of production, this imperative is not deterministic or a 
reflection of the disciplinary power of the market. This thesis shows that the argument that the 
WEF has an influence over the state’s social and economic policy-making is not supported by 
evidence. It presents a substantial, archive-based, re-assessment of the influence of the WEF’s 
discourse of international competitiveness over the state. It shows through studying the 
institutionalisation of competitiveness in the UK how the country has responded selectively to 
the imperative of state competitiveness. It demonstrates that the engagement of state managers 
with the discourse of competitiveness is an attempt to secure the circulation of global capital 
within the economy in order to help reproducing capital accumulation that drives economic 
growth, employment and living standards.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Background to Research 
 
Although the 1970s is considered as the decade of fundamental state restructuring, this process 
has never ended, is still in continuation today and will most likely remain so into the future. The 
impact of such a process is felt every day by ordinary people, politicians and businesses alike. 
Each is affected differently and, accordingly, each has a different role to play in relation to it. 
What is of great interest in this regard is the relationship drawn in most of the International 
Political Economy (IPE) literature between this process of state restructuring and an external 
global force that shapes its contours, that is named as ‘globalisation’. Hence, all the social, 
economic and political changes in our life become presumed to be determined by an external 
force. Our quality of life, living standards, rates of economic growth and employment are said 
to be conditional upon the nature of our relationship to this external force.  
Recently, however, fields outside of IPE have unravelled the nature of this external force shaping 
the state restructuring process. In the Sociology and Network Analysis fields, scholars identified 
the core engine driving capitalist globalisation. They argue that there exists an emergent 
Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) that governs the world today. It is a class that dictates to 
everyone in all positions and level of power their task and role. Specifically, capitalism has 
become a global system and its traditionally national capitalist class has become a transnational 
class that rules the global economy and determines the nature of change within each and every 
nation-state. Nonetheless, this class is arguably different from anything that capitalism has 
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experienced before, it constitutes a qualitative and quantitative change. It is an all-encompassing 
class, one to which all figures of power in a given society gravitate towards, thus serving to 
maintain its hegemony. In addition to the capitalist owners of the means of production, the 
structure of this class includes politicians, and the professional and cultural elites of the society. 
Most importantly, today they all identify with this class and work to uphold its interests that are 
presented as identical to the interests of the society as a whole. Thus, our survival, well-being 
and prosperity become presented as conditional upon the dominance of this class and the role 
each of its components perform in contemporary capitalism.   
Moreover, TCC scholars have taken their research a step further1. They have argued that this 
class has developed its own global sites where it conducts its power and constructs its policies 
as well as the discourses that help to channel these policies into everyday politics around the 
globe. These are sites where all members of the class come together to coordinate and 
communicate their ideas and roles and devise strategies that serve the interests of the class itself. 
These interests are centred on the smooth functioning of the global system of capitalism and the 
removal of any blockages from the path of capital accumulation, the engine of economic growth 
and the source of the prosperity of the society. Global organisations such as the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), the Trilateral Commission, Bilderberg, the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the World Business 
Council of Sustainable Development (WBCSD) are the active agents of the TCC. Given their 
structure and the role they play as global policy groups, and most importantly the involvement 
of state actors in their activities, they form the “political organisation of capitalism on a 
                                                          
1 Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (Oxford: Blackwell LTD, 2001), William I. Robinson, A 
Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World (Baltimore and London: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 2004), William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class: 
Corporate Power in the 21ST Century (London: Zed Books, 2010). 
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transnational basis”2. These groups represent the locus where the concentration and 
centralisation of influence in the global capitalist economy materialises, they are believed 
to be of such great power that, today, they are shaping the nature of the 21st century global 
governance and, more specifically, state policy-making from above. Yet, surprisingly, little 
analysis has been conducted by the TCC scholars, and others, on the role of global policy 
groups, their transformative effect on the state restructuring process, and the channels 
through which they project their influence. Although these policy groups are believed to be 
integral to solidifying the hegemony of the TCC, they have so far been mentioned merely 
as examples of the manifestation of the existence of the TCC.     
It is the magnitude of such developments, which date back to the 1970s, that precipitated my 
interest in conducting this research. The power ascribed to this class and the implications of 
its emergence is significant with regard to the structure and effectiveness of corporate and global 
governance. Although the TCC is attracting increasing attention as a subject of interest to 
academic research, IPE has so far distanced itself from a critical and thorough engagement 
with this development. Except for few studies conducted by Neo-Gramscians such as Gill and 
Van der Pijl, no systematic analysis has been conducted to examine the power of this class 
and its multiple agents of global policy groups, or to map out the extent of its influence on 
national social and economic policymaking3. What is more is the fact that the research of the 
Neo-Gramscian scholars who engaged with the topic have not reached different conclusions 
from those of the Sociology and Network Analysis Scholars. Accordingly, we are left with 
                                                          
2 Jean-Christophe Graz, “How Powerful are Transnational Elite Clubs? The Social Myth of the World 
Economic Forum”, New Political Economy, 8:3 (2003), pp. 322-4, The ongoing, however, not entirely 
established global system of capitalism as a project of the TCC depends largely on the efficiency of what Clarke 
terms ‘corporate-government collusion‘, Tony Clarke, “Taking on the WTO: Lessons from the Battle of 
Seattle”, Studies in Political Economy, 62 (2000), p. 12. See also Robinson, William I. and Harris, Jerry, 
“Towards A Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class”, Science & 
Society, 64:1 (2000), pp. 1-30. 
3 Kees Van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso, 1984); Stephen Gill, Atlantic 
Relations: Beyond the Reagan Era (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony 
and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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nothing but to believe that our present and future have slipped away from our hands; that the 
agency of change is only an elitist property; that power is imposed upon us from the global 
level with only a narrow window for escaping it, which in turn depends on us realising the 
fatality of the situation and developing our consciousness to pursue change. However, even 
this window seems to be depicted as shrinking as we live every day because the hegemony of 
the powerful is viewed as being cemented by our own actions and our own passive attitude 
and submission to it.  
Such a representation of reality is magnified when considering most writings on neoliberal 
capitalist globalisation. The recent rise and embeddedness of the neoliberal discourse of 
competitiveness has been considered as the surest sign of the power of the TCC. The fact that 
most states have engaged with the discourse and adopted it as the modus operandi of social 
and economic policymaking encouraged many IPE scholars to jump to the conclusion that the 
external restructuring of the state is now being operationalised through competitiveness. 
Competitiveness has become a word that has been socialised into our everyday life. It has 
instant visceral appeal; a word that defines the social, economic and political dynamics of the 
21st century; a word that also has become the key legitimising tool of the social and economic 
re-engineering that is arguably necessary to achieve higher economic growth, employment and 
living standards; it has arguably defined the global recovery from the 2008 economic crisis. 
Our social welfare, quality of life and very survival have become conditional upon enhancing 
our competitiveness. Therefore, since every change in society is ascribed to the power of the 
TCC and its agents of global policy groups, IPE has yet to provide a more theoretically 
convincing and empirically rich account of the TCC structure and its political and economic 
role in the policymaking of the state.   
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The Research Puzzle and Objectives  
The debate surrounding the power of the TCC over state restructuring, the role of global policy 
groups, and the influence of the neoliberal discourse of competitiveness has yet to answer a 
set of very important questions in order to provide a more coherent and critical analysis of 
contemporary changes in the global economy and their impact on the role of the state in 
society. Adequate theoretical and empirical foundations must be constructed in order to 
supplement the current research on the TCC with further clarity and comprehension.  
Therefore, the questions that this research seeks to answer in order to account for the gap in 
the debate on the TCC and its global policy groups and to help examine its power over the 
state restructuring process are the following: First, how has capital become concentrated in 
TCC configurations? Answering this question is important for various reasons. It will enable 
a broader understanding of the emergence of the TCC and of the factors, conditions and forces 
that have driven the crystallisation of the capitalist class at the transnational level. This, in turn, 
will help identify the agency that made such a capitalist development possible in the first place. 
Most importantly, such an endeavour will show us who in fact constitutes a member of the 
class. IPE has not responded yet to the representation of state officials as members of the TCC 
and as agents of its hegemony.   
Second, to what extent are global policy groups powerful today and how is their power 
projected?  As depicted in the literature these groups are powerful because they draw on 
economic, political, social and cultural forms of capital. But what the literature has failed to 
establish is the nature of the relationship between these components of the groups’ capital. To 
be able to make sense of the proclaimed power of the WEF for example, this question is 
important in order to highlight the rationale behind the involvement of each component of the 
TCC in its activities and the interests they seek to serve.    
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Third, how does the structure and role of global policy groups impact on the functioning of 
capitalism and the structure of capital accumulation? Assuming that all the components of the 
TCC do indeed identify with the class and its interests, we need to examine the spheres within 
which they operate and the ways in which their roles are executed. Since the interests of the 
TCC are served by the complementarity of the tasks performed by all components, the 
dynamics of the process need to be further elaborated.     
Fourth, what is the nature of the state’s relationship with the TCC and its policy group agents? 
This question is of fundamental importance to the theorisation of the state and its role in 
contemporary capitalist society. The literature, both on the TCC and the global policy groups, 
offers an instrumentalist structuralist and/or a reductionist account of the role of the state in 
relation to the TCC. Its assumptions are based on a separation of the state from the market in 
the sense that the latter can always manipulate the former to function in its interests. What 
undermines such a depiction is its lack of consideration of the dynamic relationship between 
social forces that essentially shape the role of the state in a capitalist society, which essentially 
ascribes agency to one social force at the expense of others. Hence, when depicted as such, 
answering the question of how and why the state has adopted the neoliberal competitiveness 
discourse as its modus operandi becomes a straightforward one. Simply, the state does so in 
order to serve the interest of global capital and the TCC. This simply draws a one sided 
analysis that leaves no space for the impact of the national socio-economic conditions in 
determining the nature of change in state policymaking. A departure from such 
straightforwardness become possible when we implement an Open Marxist framework that 
allows an analysis free from reductionism, structuralism and instrumentalism. This will be 
explained in further detail in Chapter One of this thesis.  
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Moreover, after having laid out an adequate theoretical framework through which to analyse 
the structure of the TCC and the role of the state in a capitalist society, the implications of 
adopting the neoliberal discourse of competitiveness for the functioning of the TCC and global 
capital accumulation will become clearer and the agency driving the development of 
capitalism will become more visible. In doing so, this research will offer an alternative 
perspective for comprehending the state restructuring process.   
In order to achieve these objectives, this thesis will critically engage with the TCC literature 
from an Open Marxist perspective in order to map out the structure of this class in such a way 
as to present an analysis that is not deterministic, structuralist, or instrumentalist as is mainly 
the case in the literature. The analysis will be supported with a case study in order to enhance 
its clarity and test the relevance of the arguments made in the debate in relation to one of the 
global policy groups. This will be the WEF, one of most renowned transnational private 
organisations today. As is argued in the literature the WEF shapes the rule-making of 21st 
century global governance. Since it incorporates the main components of the TCC in its 
structure and activities, it represents a good case study to be examined especially in relation to 
the state and its restructuring process. This thesis will therefore examine the discursive power 
of the WEF. It will engage critically with its competitiveness discourse as a channel through 
which it seeks to project its power and influence over the state’s social and economic 
policymaking. Furthermore, in order to assess such power, the thesis will investigate the 
relationship between the WEF’s discourse of competitiveness and the competitiveness 
standards put in place within the UK, both in discourse and in practice.   
By so doing, this thesis aims to contribute to the field of IPE through: first, offering an 
alternative perspective to the study of the TCC that overcomes the separation between the state 
and the market and provides a more sophisticated account of the emergence, structure, and 
power of the TCC. Second, it will contribute to the study of global policy groups through 
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analysing the structure, activities and influence of the WEF, an organisation that has so far 
received little attention. Third, it will critically analyse the impact of the discourse of 
international competitiveness as a carrier of the neoliberal ideology of globalisation. As a 
result, this research will offer an original account of the operationalisation of competitiveness 
within the nation-state. Specifically, by investigating the institutionalisation of the discourse 
within the UK, it will provide a critical analysis on a topic that has become the centre of a 
heated debate among political parties and on a discourse which has become gradually 
embedded within society.    
 
The Argument  
 
This thesis argues that the weakness of the TCC literature lies in its lack of a proper concept of 
class and a theory of the state. Thus, the claims the literature makes regarding the state, class 
and the relationship between the national and the global; between globalisation and the state; 
between labour, capital and the state, are inadequately founded. Through Open Marxism 
(OM) and a Marxist concept of class, the thesis deconstructs the current theorisation of the 
TCC. I argue that such a theoretical framework allows us to look at the role of the state 
differently, that is, without economic determinism or instrumentalising the state by capital, 
and/or labour, as is the case in the TCC literature. As “circuit managers” I argue, states’ 
relation to the TCC should be seen as a manifestation of the consciousness of their role in 
managing class relations, which are global in nature, within their national boundaries4. In 
that sense, what seems to be an imposed discipline of competitiveness on states by the TCC, 
                                                          
4 Peter Burnham, “Marx, Neo-Gramscianism and Globalization”, in Andreas Bieler, et al, eds., Global 
Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour: Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006b), p. 192. 
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is in reality a product of the management of capital-labour relations characterised by 
antagonism, and by struggle in and against domination in order to sustain the continuation 
of global capital accumulation.  
Therefore, the state’s involvement within the structure of the WEF should be seen in relation 
to the reproduction of class relations and antagonism; the reproduction of capitalism on national 
and transnational levels. When states accept standards of competitiveness produced by the 
Forum as a way of channeling its power, this should not be considered as evidence of their self-
identification with it. On the contrary, it should be perceived of as an acceptance of their 
responsibility for managing capital-labour relations on a national level5.   
Thus, the hegemony of the discourse of competitiveness has to been seen outside of the 
prism of the cultural hegemony of the TCC, as Neo-Gramscians would argue6, but rather as 
a manifestation of the form of containing labour within capital and maintained by the state. 
The penetration of competitiveness into national policymaking evident today is the form 
class struggle has taken politically. Therefore, adopting competitiveness standards is not a 
tool for achieving or enforcing the hegemony of the TCC in a neoliberal globalising age as 
much as a nationally modified form of capital-circuit management by the state.   
The thesis argues that the academic debate on international competitiveness lacks the empirical 
depth necessary to solidify its findings. That is, rather than basing the discussion on how much 
influence the competitiveness discourse has on the state’s policymaking, an adequate analysis 
                                                          
5 The nation state isn’t “the container out of which” the transnational emerges but it is one political node within 
the transnational. The transnational, political and economic are “initially and continually mutually constitutive to 
the production and reproduction of social relations”. Huw Macartney and Stuart Shields, “Space, the Latest 
Frontier? A Scaler Relational Approach to Critical IPE” in Stuart Shields, Ian Bruff, Huw Macartney (eds.), 
Critical international political economy, pp. 29-30.  
6 In this respect, the state is seen as “the entire complex of theoretical and practical activities” with which the 
ruling class not only “maintains its dominance, but manages to win the consent of those over whom it rules”6. 
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith) 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), p. 244. See also, Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist States in 
their Place (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), p. 341.  
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requires a closer engagement with the discourse itself as produced by its agents. Specifically, 
after investigating the engagement of the UK with the discourse, the thesis argues that although 
there seems to be an increasing use of the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) as supporting 
evidence underpinning the policymaking process in the UK, it is evident that the WEF figures 
only as one discourse among many, national and transnational, in the national policymaking of 
the UK. This should be understood as a reflection of national needs and conditions of capital-
labour relations. The British state is only one political node in the global system of capitalism, 
a node that is not identical to other nodes given its specific relationship to capital. Its 
involvement in the activities of global policy groups such as the WEF is a form of management 
of this specific relationship. It originates from the need to reproduce capital and its exploitation 
of labour within its jurisdictions. What’s more, while it is true that politicians have become 
place sellers through the discourse of competitiveness, their practice is derived from the 
conditions of their national environments that dictate a specific form of management of capital-
labour relations and a specific relationship with global capital.  
Therefore, the evidence found does not support the argument that state restructuring is an 
external imperative imposed by global capital or intended to maintain its hegemony over the 
state and its citizens as argued in the debate on the TCC, WEF, and the debate regarding the 
influence of the discourse of international competitiveness. Neither does it yield much support 
for the argument made in the TCC literature that politicians are part of the TCC and work to 
maintain its hegemony. Rather, the evidence found is enough only to suggest an overlap 
between national and transnational discourses of competitiveness which has to do, perhaps, 
with the global nature of capital rather than the far-reaching power of global policy groups. 
This is, however, not to suggest the absence of the influence of the WEF as a discursive 
formation, but to draw attention to the importance of building arguments in the competitiveness 
debate on more robust evidence.   
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Methodology  
The main research methods used in this thesis are the analysis and interpretation of a wide 
range of primary documents from the WEF and from government archives in the UK, as well 
as the analysis and interpretation of a wide range of secondary sources such as government 
publications, newspaper articles, interviews and the critical analysis of tertiary literature.  
The majority of the primary sources consulted are the relevant public and private records held 
at the WEF in Davos. Some of the documents consulted were released from the years beginning 
in late 1989. However, given the confidential nature of the WEF documents before then, some 
of the publications were provided to me by the WEF as a way of demonstrating their interest 
in my research and upon an agreement signed with the Forum that obliges me to secure the 
confidentiality of the document provided. That is, the agreement states my freedom to use and 
quote the content of the reports provided in my research, but not to share the documents with 
a third party. Yet, not all the WEF’s documents useful for this thesis were accessible which 
constitutes one of the limitations of this research.  
With regard to the other government archives consulted, they were obtained from the public 
records held at the National Archives (TNA) in Kew, which were released under the thirty-year 
rule in January 2007. I have consulted a wide range of documents that include government 
white papers, various publications of state departments such as the Business Innovation and 
Skills Department (BIS), previously known as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and 
later the Department For Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), Office of 
Public Sector Information (OPSI) and other departments involved in social and economic 
policymaking in the UK. In addition to these sources and in order to incorporate the broadest 
views possible in the analysis, I have consulted online archives such as the British Political 
Speech Archive and The Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive in order to make use of 
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documented political speeches relevant to my analysis, which date back to 1961. Both of these 
archives offer free access to all interested users.  
Although the use of archival materials have been very beneficial to my research, I have been 
aware of the likely shortcomings of conducting an extensive documentary analysis in relation 
to credibility, representativeness and meaning. Moreover, I have realised how the focus on 
public records can include a “top-down bias” type of analysis7. Therefore, I have tried to 
minimise the weight of such a possibility through consulting a wider group of public and 
private archives. Furthermore, in order to respond to the issue of credibility and interpretation 
of the documents which are considered important challenges when engaging with public 
records8, I have contextualised my analysis of the archival materials within the social, 
economic and political conditions within which these materials were produced in order to make 
greater sense of the objectives of their authors9.    
Additionally, for the purpose of supplementing the analysis with more recent views, I have 
conducted a set of semi-structured interviews with public and private figures at institutions 
most relevant to the research scope such as the WEF itself, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), 
Cardiff Centre for International Competitiveness, and Belfast Centre for Competitiveness as 
well as at LSE Enterprise. The participants in my interviews were made aware of the content 
of my research and the questions it seeks to tackle. In doing so, I ensured that the participants 
were not deceived and that my research covered the ethical standards required in academic 
research10. On this basis, the interviewees authorised the use of the content of the interviews to 
the benefit of my research and granted their consent to be explicitly identified by name. The 
                                                          
7 Peter Burnham et al, Research Methods in Politics, 2nd Edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 
211.  
8 Ibid. p. 212.  
9 John Scott, A Matter of Record: Documentary Sources in Social Research (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 
31.  
10 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2004), pp. 514-516.  
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interviews were transcribed and stored confidentially. Thus, the participants in my interviews 
were treated as “intelligent beings” capable of deciding the manner in which the information 
supplied by them “is used, shared and made public”11.       
 
Structure of the Thesis  
 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter Two attempts to deepen the foundation of the 
TCC literature by considering other academic works that have flagged up the development of 
a class configuration outside the state, although from a different perspective and with a more 
bounded focus. It will do so through reviewing the neo-Gramscian literature on the Atlantic 
Ruling Class and will argue that this constitutes a legitimate ground upon which to establish a 
TCC literature. After that, the core TCC literature will be surveyed so that the underpinning 
theoretical and empirical foundations of the TCC can be analysed. It will be shown how the 
literature has hitherto portrayed the TCC, its formation, structure and role in the contemporary 
world economy. The chapter will address the theoretical gap in the literature through providing 
a theory of that state that will help to better our understanding of the position of the state within 
this transnational formation. It will draw upon Open Marxist theory and will demonstrate the 
benefits of approaching the topic from this perspective.  
Chapter Three will shed light on the process of the transnationalisation of the state in the second 
half of the past century through focusing on the relationship between the state and global 
capital. It will highlight the conditions of the global market and class struggle by 
contextualising it, first, within the Keynesianist form of regulation of the relations between 
                                                          
11 Oral History Project, “Is Your Research Legal and Ethical?: Practical Steps”, Oral History Project. 
http://www.oralhistory.org.uk/ethics.php, (Accessed June 1, 2015).  
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capital and labour managed by the state. After that follows an analysis of the shift from 
Keynesianism to Monetarism and the deregulation of the global market and how such a shift 
has impinged upon capital, labour and the state. Moreover, the chapter will develop an Open 
Marxist account of the role of neoliberal ideas in such shifts and how this relates to the role of 
state officials as circuit Managers. It will attempt to offer an account of the role of discourse in 
the (re)production of the social relations of production; its role in the production of class 
antagonism by the state in a capitalist society as a way of managing capital-labour relations 
within its jurisdiction. It will argue that what has become a conventional, and convenient 
argument, for many academics and non-academics ˗˗ namely that the WEF projects its power 
over the states involved in its activities at the expense of their own citizens ˗˗ is weakly 
established and lacks a thorough and systematic analysis of the means through which this 
power is channelled. I argue that an analysis of the WEF’s competitiveness discourse is 
important in order to properly examine its influence over state’s policymaking. Discourse is 
not a form of domination as argued by Neo-Gramscians, rather it is one site upon which class 
struggle is conducted and through which the state manages capital-labour relations. 
Chapter Four will focus on the WEF as an active and influential global policy group 
representative of the TCC. It embodies one among other policy groups of the TCC as will be 
outlined in Chapter One. Specifically, the WEF signifies a case in which the TCC materialises 
in its most explicit way. The Forum’s transnational class composition, and its engagement with 
state officials, professionals, ideologues and the media make it an interesting case study. 
Moreover, it constitutes an adequate target for analysis given its role in the making of the 
current discourse of competitiveness prevailing in today’s global governance and national 
policymaking as a means for managing states’ national economies.  
Chapter Five seeks to establish what international competitiveness is by looking at the work of 
prominent globalising professionals such as Garelli’s and Porter who are considered authorities 
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on the subject and, most importantly, have established the WEF’s competitiveness discourse 
in the GCR, although they differ greatly in their accounts. Using Open Marxism, the chapter 
will engage critically with the debate on the discourse of international competitiveness in order 
to highlight its limitations and propose an alternative approach on how to assess the impact of 
the competitiveness discourse on the state. It will be argued that the latter task is conditional 
upon a thorough analysis of competitiveness reports published by global, and other, policy 
groups in order to offer a perspective that is not based solely on rankings and the political 
debates it generates. The overall argument underlying this chapter is that states adapt 
competitiveness standards to their own national environments because their relationships to 
global capital are not identical as they are defined by the conditions of social relations of 
production characteristic of their own economies.  
Chapters Six and Seven intend to analyse the (re)configuration of the role of the state within 
the WEF’s GCR competitiveness discourse throughout various historical stages. The 
timeframe of this endeavour will be 1979-2014. In order to do so I will, first, place the GCR 
within the historical context of its emergence and examine the imperatives leading to its 
publication. Second, I will shed light on the main components of the report and the 
developments it has undergone in terms of coverage and methodology. Third, I will narrow 
down the focus to mainly map out the way in which the state has been attributed certain 
responsibilities within such discourse. In doing so, identifying the role ascribed to the state 
within the competitiveness discourse produced by the WEF itself and, thus, differentiating 
between what the discourse entails specifically and what the academic debate has made of it 
thus far, will become possible. This chapter argues that the WEF’s discourse clearly draws a 
framework for state action that is considered necessary for maintaining its international 
competitiveness. However, it will be demonstrated that its discourse has shifted from the 
orthodox framework, which is macroeconomic-oriented, to another that is based on embedding 
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competitiveness within the society through emphasising the need for microeconomic reforms 
as the source of the nation’s prosperity. As a result, it will be shown how the welfare state 
becomes the target of the WEF’s discourse. It is portrayed as an obstacle to the international 
competitiveness of the country through its distortive impact on the macro and microeconomic 
foundations of competitiveness. Hence, transforming the welfare state constitutes a second 
phase of strengthening the basis of international competitiveness.  
Chapter Eight will analyse the embeddedness of the competitiveness discourse in the UK with 
specific attention paid to the influence of the WEF’s discourse on state policy-making process 
and policy debates. It will argue that while it is true that state policy-makers have internalised 
the discourse and become “place sellers”, as argued in the literature, the engagement of the 
British state with the competitiveness discourse has been conditioned by specific needs of the 
economy originating from its national class relations and from the need of the state to manage 
these relations in such a way as to sustain the reproduction of capital within its jurisdictions. I 
will show that the UK’s competitiveness discourse has effectively been constructed as a 
response to the national conditions of capital-labour relations that reached their crisis limits 
towards the mid-1970s. The economic recession of the 1970s led to a decline in productivity 
to the extent that capital could not reproduce itself effectively due to the increasing power of 
labour obtained due to rising growth and employment rates in post-war Britain.  
In Chapter Nine, I offer my conclusions. I argue that regarding the state restructuring process 
and national social and economic policymaking, the evidence yields little support to the 
argument that the power of the TCC has become visible in relation to the state. Although the 
power of global policy groups as sites of the TCC have increased within the global economy 
overall, their influence is conditioned upon the national conditions of class relations and the 
form of state management of the economy and capital accumulation directed at reproducing 
labour, capital and the antagonism between the two. Every state engages with the 
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competitiveness discourse made at the global level selectively because its relationship to global 
capital is not identical to that of other states. The state’s involvement with WEF activities is a 
response to the imperative of managing class relations at a global level given that through them 
capital and labour are reproduced nationally. Competitiveness has become a strategy for the 
government in most states and each has adopted to a specific national environment and has 
specific characteristics. This fact warrants perhaps speaking of discourses of competitiveness 
rather than one discourse, be they global or national.  
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Chapter Two 
The Transnational Capitalist Class, Open Marxism and the State 
 
A number of International Political Economy (IPE) scholars have recently drawn attention to 
a powerful capitalist class (TCC) emerging at the transnational level. Although Sklair, 
Robinson and Carroll have offered valuable, and varying, studies that account for this 
development, it is only fair to say that the literature on the TCC is still at an immature stage12. 
This is striking considering that, according to the understanding of the authors of this debate, 
the rise of this class dates back to the 1950s with the creation of the Bilderberg Group. This 
lack of engagement from IPE with such a significant phenomenon can be probably ascribed to 
the fact that the political power of the so-called global policy groups that are representative of 
the TCC is not yet fully-fledged and visible. It may also simply be that IPE was (and is) 
reluctant to critically engage with researching capitalism as a global system rather than as an 
international system that is centred on, and orchestrated by, inter-state relations13.  Indeed, the 
still-primitive debate on the TCC opens up new doors for critically examining, not only its 
emergence and structure, but also its power and influence, and presents the state-market core 
of IPE with a new area of investigation and development.  
The recent, rapid and global rise of neoliberalism poses the challenge of directing the research 
towards a new area of study that has been thus far mostly overlooked or, at best, under-
                                                          
12 Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (Oxford: Blackwell LTD, 2001), William I. Robinson, A 
Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World (Baltimore and London: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 2004), William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class: 
Corporate Power in the 21ST Century (London: Zed Books, 2010). This is not an extensive list of contributions to 
the TCC literature but it represents the most comprehensive ones to date.   
13 See Stuart Shields, Ian Bruff, Huw Macartney, “Introduction: ‘Critical’ and ‘International Political Economy’”, 
in Stuart Shields, Ian Bruff, Huw Macartney (eds.), Critical International Political Economy (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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researched14. By bringing new actors, such as global policy groups, into systematic analysis 
that takes into consideration their centrality to the politics of 21st century global governance, 
IPE would gain invaluable insights into new spaces of analysis with the advantage of building 
up a new approach that can explain the power of the TCC more adequately. The current 
approaches to the existence, structure and power of the TCC, both within and outside of IPE, 
are still incomplete in that the vast majority of the analysis has managed to proceed without 
studying the most salient manifestation of the transnational capitalist class, global policy 
groups such as the WEF, Bilderberg, WBCSD, International Chamber of Commerce, etc. The 
secretive nature of these groups, especially the first two, have surprisingly attracted mainly 
media attention and given academics in IPE and other fields little motivation to put them under 
more thorough examination. This fact is evident also, after a thorough review of the literature 
which is provided below, in the lack of a proper theorisation of how different elements of the 
transnational society came together to form a transnational class that occupies the apex of the 
power structure in the global economy.  The literature has so far avoided bringing a theory of 
the state into a structure in which it forms a significant element and from which a substantial 
part of the power of the TCC originates.  
To fill in the gap in IPE and in the TCC literature, this thesis examines the power of the TCC 
through focusing on the role and influence of global policy groups in the making of national 
policies. It seeks to explain why the state has become involved in the activities of such groups 
and to map out the nature of the relationship established between the two. In doing so, it seeks 
to account for the role of the state in the global economy and to bridge the divide entrenched 
in IPE between analysis of transnational and national levels of policy making. The core 
                                                          
14 The definition of neoliberalism adopted here is that by Harvey who defines it as “a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such 
practices”. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 2.   
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research questions of this thesis include: How can we explain why so many states have adapted 
their national policies and strategies to common global standards of competitiveness? And, 
what significance does this development have for the existing research on neoliberal global 
governance and process of restructuring the nation-state?  
The first section of this chapter attempts to deepen understandings of the foundation of the 
TCC literature by considering other academic works that flagged up the development of a class 
configuration outside of the state, although from a different perspective and with a more 
bounded focus. It will do so through reviewing the neo-Gramscian literature on the Atlantic 
Ruling Class developed primarily by Kees Van der Pijl and Stephen Gill and will argue that it 
constitutes a legitimate ground upon which to establish a TCC literature. After that, the core 
TCC literature will be surveyed so that the underpinning theoretical and empirical foundations 
of the TCC can be fully analysed. It will be shown how the literature has hitherto portrayed the 
TCC, its formation, structure and role in the contemporary world economy. This would help 
us to grasp a sense of where power lies within such a transnational actor, as well as which 
members assume what role and what constitutes its agency for power projection. In the third 
section, the theoretical gap in the literature will be addressed through providing a theory of that 
state that will help to better our understanding of the position of the state within this 
transnational formation. It will draw upon an open Marxist theory of the state most suitable to 
present an analysis that is not deterministic, structuralist, or instrumentalist as is the case in the 
much of the wider TCC literature.   
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2.1. The Atlantic Ruling Class  
 
Theorising the formation of the TCC as the latest form of the development of the global 
capitalist system, or as William Robinson describes it the “maturation of global capitalism”15, 
can be traced back to several attempts devoted to exploring the emergence of the capitalist class 
and the capitalist relations of production in social, political, and economic spaces that transcend 
the state’s territory. More specifically, the literature focused on here is concerned with the 
social, economic and political space of the advanced capitalist states north of the Atlantic. This 
space should be seen as the locus from which capitalism in its current structure as a global 
system has emerged and from which the TCC has arisen, and towards which it continues to 
gravitate.  
Van der Pijl’s the Making of An Atlantic Ruling Class, and Stephen Gill’s Atlantic Relations: 
Beyond the Reagan Era and his American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission embody 
a comprehensive accounts of theorising capitalism and the formation of the capitalist class 
beyond state’s borders. Both authors analyse the emergence of the capitalist class on a 
transnational level with an emphasis placed on its centralization in the North Atlantic region. 
For our research, this represents a legitimate and an adequate point of departure from which to 
move forward and build a coherent account of the emergence, structure and power of the TCC. 
Although these accounts base the analysis of the emergence of a capitalist class within a state-
centred framework and explain its formation as an imperative to manage inter-state relations 
in a Cold War context marked by American hegemony, they nonetheless offer a useful 
background against which to understand any possible distinctiveness from later attempts. 
                                                          
15 William I. Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism, p. 41.  
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Moreover, it shows the extent to which IPE has advanced the analysis of the TCC and the 
theoretical tools used and the gaps left unaddressed.    
From a neo-Gramscian perspective, Van der Pijl’s argument stresses the importance of taking 
into consideration the post-war hegemonic position of the United States in the world economy 
in forging a sort of capital alliance between European and American Business. For him, the 
“history of Atlanticism, as both ideology and an actual process of class formation” must be 
understood in light of the development of American capitalism16. That is, in the post-war period 
there developed three US strategic policies aimed at bringing this ‘Atlantic Unity’ into life. The 
first was “Atlantic Universalism” designed at the end of WWII in order to facilitate the 
expansion of the circuits of US capital to Europe. The second was “Atlantic Union” manifest 
in the Marshall Plan which is complementary to the first strategy. The final strategy was the 
“Atlantic Partnership” initiative that sought to restore the unity of the “Atlantic world” after a 
period of conflict between American and European MNCs in Europe in the 1960s due to 
Nixon’s domestic economic orientation.  
Thus, these three grand strategies of the US gave grounds to the process of economic and 
financial integration across the Atlantic and allowed a further internationalisation of capital. 
By doing so, he believes the grounds were furnished for the bourgeoisie on both sides to 
“regroup and develop a series of comprehensive concepts of control” (outlined below) which 
allowed the enforcement of its legitimised hegemonic position nationally and internationally 
and set the foundation of the Atlantic ruling class17.  These concepts of control, Van der Pijl 
explains, serve as projects of conducting public affairs and social control in a way that is seen 
                                                          
16 Kees Van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso, 1984), p. xvii.  
17 Ibid. p. xiii, p. 7. In his view, the configuration of the Atlantic ruling class and the interests it represents have 
varied through each level of the internationalization of capital. Its formation passed through three main stages of 
capital internationalization. The first stage had taken place with the American railway rapid prosperity; the second 
was that of inter-war period and extended to the late 1940s as national productive capital had dominated, and the 
final stage has occurred as a result of the spread of the American transnational firms. Ibid, p. Xiv.     
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to be legitimate in the eyes of the dominant class as well as the society. However, these 
concepts are never fixed but constantly reconfigured to accommodate varying interests within 
the class, he maintains18.   
For Van der Pijl, the structure of the Atlantic ruling class has varied according to the prevalent 
concept of control. Characteristic of the Atlantic Ruling Class formation and hegemony are 
two primary concepts of control. The first he calls the “liberal-internationalist” and its 
hegemony commenced with the development of an “Atlantic circuit” of financial capital led 
by the money-capital bourgeoisie in early 20th century. It resurfaced again from the 1980s 
onwards after a relative decline in the face of another concept of control which he calls the 
“state-monopoly” concept.   
The “state-monopoly” concept of control reflects the position of productive capital that 
dominated the bourgeoisie in the inter-war years and again after the war until the mid-1970s19. 
In other words, it is an embodiment of the corporate liberalism forming the basis of Keynesian 
economics that is construed to synthesise free market tendencies, representative of the liberal 
internationalists, and state interference which materialised as a manifestation of labour power 
and the larger needs of industry in the post-war period20. It was associated with the 
intensification of finance capital in the 1960s, representing organised labour and productive 
capital. It eventually collapsed when the economic power of money-capital, and some fractions 
of productive capital such as oil capital, increased in the late-1960s and early-1970s against the 
background of economic recession and crisis. Thereby, the old liberal-internationalist concept 
                                                          
18 Ibid. pp. 2-3.  
19 It is worth noting here that the productive-capital concept of control sought to protect the national and the 
regional industry. With state monopoly it was perceived to be in the general interest of all classes of society.  
20 This corporate-liberal synthesis that was built on flexible labour relations that was imported to Europe from the 
US and played a key role in developing later concepts of control. Ibid. p. 10.  
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of control underpinning the hegemony of the Atlantic Ruling Class was brought back in 
response to the new economic realities of the 1970s21.  
Generally speaking, Van der Pijl sees the process of the ruling class formation and the 
consolidation of its power as entailing “a formula of reconciliation or compromise” between, 
on the one hand, the interests of competing capitalists, and on the other hand between the latter 
and the interests of wider society. This was seen as a prerequisite in order to reinforce desirable 
social conditions of production. For him, a concept of control “is potentially hegemonic if it 
combines a mutually compatible blueprint for both the conduct of labour relations and for the 
handling of relations between the various fractions of capital”22. This should be seen as deriving 
from the intense competition underpinning the accumulation of capital in a globalising 
economy marked with technological innovation and, hence, the challenges facing the capitalist 
system and its classes. Hegemonic agency is solidified through “pre-existing and 
simultaneously reproduced cultural and political patterns”, he notes23.  
The arrival of Thatcher and Reagan into power in 1979 and 1981, respectively, put an end to 
the corporate liberalism that had led to economic instability throughout the 1970s and early 
1980s when economic growth stumbled and unemployment rocketed in the Atlantic sphere. To 
Van Der Pijl, this represented a crisis in the hegemony of the ‘compromise’ in place and 
questioned the adequacy of the Keynesian model of policymaking, both for capital and for the 
society. According to Gill, this development was precipitated by the changing US perception 
of its position in the world economy that in turn altered the positions of both Europe and 
growing Japan. The economic, especially monetary, stability which has come under pressure 
since the mid-1970s and intensified in the 1980s, the new international division of labour, the 
                                                          
21 Ibid. p. 272.  
22 Ibid. p. 31. 
23 Ibid. pp. 7-8. 
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globalization of production, exchange, and capital, which was augmented with the 
liberalisation process, signalled a change in the structure of the global economy24. Yet, far from 
meaning a breakup in the circuit of capital accumulation established earlier, these 
developments signalled further extension to the Pacific region. Such a transformation has 
strengthened with the growth of the international economic integration pioneered with the rapid 
capital accumulation by transnational corporations, Gill argues. 
In order to restore the cohesion of the Atlantic Ruling Class in the new context of capital 
circuits of accumulation, Van der Pijl argues that the creation of the Trilateral Commission 
(TC) in 1973 was inescapable if the interests of the capitalists at the three corners of triad are 
to be accommodated and secured25. The TC has sought to consolidate the weak ties across the 
Atlantic and to reinforce a pattern of Trilateralism. For Gill, the catalyst that pushed for the 
creation of the TC was the ‘strong opposition’ from Europe and Japan to the US economic and 
political policies in the early 1970s that harmed the interests of its allies, making the world 
more dependent on the American market. At the elite level, a lack of congruence between the 
economic and political spheres existed where the latter became fragmented whereas the former 
became more integrated. Therefore, the TC came as a response to the needs of both sides; the 
need of Europe to shield itself in the face of expansionary policies of the USSR and the need 
for the US to support their TNCs in the global market26.  
Largely consistent with Van der Pijl, Gill’s analysis of the emergence of the Atlantic Ruling 
Class and its extension to the Pacific through the TC goes beyond a temporary reading of these 
                                                          
24 Stephen Gill, Atlantic Relations: Beyond the Reagan Era (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), p. 8. The 
transnationalization of the world economy in the 1970s and 1980s, spurred by the rise and supremacy of the 
internationally-mobile money-capital has been a consequence of the neoliberalism doctrine domination in the 
aftermath of the crisis of Keynesianism in the 1970s.   
25 Van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, p. 274 
26 The consensus on this strategy between the Americans and Europeans was mainly rested on two important 
interests: protecting the Western European countries against potential threat from the USSR as well as from each 
other and restoring economic growth and monetary stability through American aid and maintenance of the a 
system based on US dollar. Ibid. p. 18.  
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developments. He argues that it was set up as a strategic forum to manufacture a “common 
vision of how the politico-economic world works” and how its problems can be solved27. 
Furthermore, he conceives the establishment of the TC as an attempt to stabilise the political, 
economic and military structures in the three regions in order to provide the necessary 
framework for continuous internationalisation of capital and expansion of capitalism. Only the 
elite of each region can identify their common interests and only then can “complex 
interdependence’ be managed ˗˗ whether coordination in monetary policies, general 
macroeconomic policies or in strengthening the role of international organizations like the 
World Bank, OECD, IMF, and the WTO in achieving economic growth and trade 
liberalisation28. An institutional structure such as the TC would help in preventing the 
“communication breakdowns” responsible for the 1970s’ crisis. As stated by Gill, the mandate 
of the TC would make such an aim possible since it facilitates reaching common approaches 
to national problems, be it political, economic or military29.  
Gill emphasises, as does Van der Pijl, the importance of the historical context within which the 
relations of Trilateralism were strengthened at the expense of Atlanticism. To him, it was the 
declining hegemony of the US that gave birth to such transformation in addition to the 
increased integration of the US into the global economy30. In the 1980s, the American Atlantic 
orientation of post-WWII had started to shift towards the Pacific which reflects the shift in 
economic power towards the Asian region31. The US perceived such economic and political 
re-steering to be integral to the maintenance of its hegemony at the expense of Europe. 
                                                          
27 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), p. 124. 
28 Ibid. p. 174 and p. 176. 
29 Ibid. p. 143, and p. 202. 
30 Ibid. p. 2, p. 12, and p. 14. 
31 Gill perceives the policies of the Reagan administration as a return ‘to a series of traditional axioms about the 
international system, in a broad offensive to reassert American ideological, political, economic, and military 
dominance. In this offensive, the interests of the west European allies were seen as very much as secondary to 
American prerogatives’. Stephen Gill, Atlantic Relations, p. 26. 
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Nevertheless, that should not blind us, he asserts, from realising the importance of the 
transnationalisation of capital and its flexible mobility taking place against the background of 
reduced trade barriers as a result of liberalisation policies engineered by WB, IMF, and 
GATT32. He points out that developing the formation of the capitalist class along the lines of 
Trilateralism was an endeavour by the major capitalist states to form “an organic alliance” to 
serve their dominant interests that involve “a commitment to a more-or-less liberal 
international economic order”33. The period from 1945 to 1971 that saw the development of 
the “transatlantic ruling class” was announced to be over when the US dropped its commitment 
to the gold standard and with this corporate liberalism was proclaimed dead. This gave way to 
a new compromise according to which capital flies in a context of which the Atlantic is only a 
subset34. Van der Pijl contends that such a context forced the state back to be a night-watchman 
state that intervenes only when the market fails35. 
 
While within corporate liberalism the interests of the working class were relatively taken into 
consideration alongside those of the capitalist class as part of the “organic alliance”. The 
neoliberal doctrine of the new concept of control, money-capital, “was committed to the 
destruction of the working-class power” in order to overcome the contradiction of the previous 
                                                          
32 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony, p. 216. 
33 Many members of the Trilateral Commission have served in a high government positions in finance and 
economics, foreign policy, as well as in international institutions, Ibid. p. 2 and p. 4. 
34 While from 1945 to mid-1970s, transnationalization of capital took the form of capital flows from the US to 
Europe, it has increasingly flown from Europe and Japan to the US since then. Kees Van der Pijl, ‘Restructuring 
the Atlantic Ruling Class’, in Stephen Gill, eds., Atlantic relations, p. 6. For Gill, the increasing spread of the 
monetarist-liberal free-market ideas, which reflects the view and interests of the international mobile capital, 
mainly international banks, on a global scale tend to create the latter’s transnational hegemony and domination 
over the interests of productive capital and nationalist and mercantilist ‘modes of thought’. Stephen Gill, 
American Hegemony, pp. 50-1.  
35 Neoliberalism was founded on two principal factors: first, monetarism which became ’part of a wider and more 
global process of class formation and elite realignment, second, the minimal role of the state. Kees Van der Pijl, 
‘Restructuring the Atlantic Ruling Class’, p. 63 and p. 66.      
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system stemming from compromising with powerful unions in an era of high employment 
levels36. 
 
Therefore, with the money-capital concept of control in hegemony, the process of capital 
accumulation has extended its reach and a new transnational class has started to surface in the 
late 1980s. As Gill puts it, a ‘transnational’ fraction of capital, as opposed to national capitalist 
interests, was “developing its hegemony” then and was destined to expand beyond the Triad 
region due to the globalisation of production and technology. He contends that what cements 
the hegemony of this fraction goes beyond its complementary material interests and institutions 
to include a “highly developed consciousness”37. Once capitalism transnationalised in finance, 
production and exchange, which was made possible since the 1980s, Gill believes capital 
penetrates everywhere and creates “webs of international materialist interests”38. It is then 
specifically, Robinson argues, that the “Transnationalization of classes and the rise of a TCC” 
take place39.  
 
This transnational class has interests that are tied to the world economy rather than individual 
national economies. Big corporations and banks, such as those listed on the Fortune 500, 
develop their own “transnational networks, partly through business transactions” and partly 
through their interactions through forums such as the TC and the WEF40. The shared interests 
that bind them together, and the hegemonic concepts of control they employ, have pushed them 
to “the centre of an emerging transnational historic bloc, one with a wider leadership than in 
the era of transatlantic hegemony”. That is, the new bloc includes owners and CEOs of 
                                                          
36 Ibid. p. 66. 
37 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony, pp. 89-90. 
38 Ibid. p. 30 and pp. 36-7. 
39 William I. Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism, pp. 33-4.  
40 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony, pp. 89-90. 
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multinational corporations (MNCs), international bankers, prominent government politicians 
and bureaucrats from advanced and some developing countries41.  
The new hegemony embodied in the transnational historic bloc, replacing the American one, 
cannot be sustained without global policy groups, Gill argues. Reconciling any potential 
conflict between “national and international capital, and associated elements of labour” 
warrants such a move. For example, the TC can be seen as mechanism of politically controlling 
market forces and “undertrained anti-Sovietism” in western countries so that they don’t 
destabilise the emerging transnational hegemony. What’s important here, says Gill, is the 
acknowledged role of these institutions in facilitating the growth of TNCs and, most 
importantly, its TCC core and developing its shared identity and consciousness, and the impact 
this has on its identification of common interests42.  
As pointed out by Gill, these developments were concomitant with changes in the structure of 
state management. The transnationalisation process in the 1970s and 1980s has given more 
importance to finance and economic departments relative to other divisions “as the competition 
for foreign capital intensified amid recessionary conditions”. While freeing and empowering 
market forces, neoliberalism, he contends, did not signal the complete retreat of the state as 
much as it gave rise to certain parts of the state at the expense of others.  The power of this 
transnational capital fraction is derived from its “cumulative capacity” through the operation 
of market forces to constrain national governments and labour organizations43.  
In this sense, TC can be seen as a medium for its members to form a “strategic consciousness” 
on patterns of thinking that match the shift in the understanding of the functions of the state, or 
what Gill calls “the transnationalization of the state”44. The transnationalisation process 
                                                          
41 Ibid. pp. 50 and p. 94. 
42 Ibid. pp. 51 and p. 54. 
43 Ibid. pp. 94-5, p. 97 and p. 112. 
44 Ibid. p. 113 and p. 1.  
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allowed capital to “shake off the constraints that nation-state capitalism had placed on 
accumulation; to break free of the class compromises and concessions that had been imposed 
by working and popular classes and by national governments”. Robinson agrees with Gill’s 
portrait of the change and claims that the new compromise was built on a different basis, one 
that is centred on the “deunionization” of labour and the deregulation and flexibilisation of 
work conditions45. 
The attempts made by Van der Pijl and Gill to theorise the formation of the Atlantic and 
Trilateral Ruling Class, although it does offer a great sense of the historical context within 
which the roots of a TCC matured, it is embedded in more an international relations approach 
to the emergence of the TCC. It is heavily focused on the nature of inter-state relations as the 
decisive factor in the making of the Atlantic Ruling Class than on the structure of the capitalist 
system and the role of the state in class-based capitalist society. Both Gill’s “Transnational 
Hegemony”46 and Van der Pijl’s hegemonic concept of control account for the active agency 
of global capital which captures the state whose interests become then identical to those of 
fractions of capital and opposite to those of labour. It is an account that is built on somewhat 
unquestioned hegemony of the footloose global financial capital that triggers a restructuring of 
the state from outside. Even when they analyse the formation of the TCC, they view the concept 
of control on which this class is constituted as a result of the rivalry between production and 
money capital more than capital-labour relations.  However, their work remains helpful in order 
to establish the historical context and the theoretical basis from which to depart in developing 
more sound grounds from which to trace the emergence of the TCC and from which to 
                                                          
45 William I. Robinson, ‘Global Capitalism Theory and the Emergence of transnational Elites’, Working Paper: 
United Nations University, (2010/02), p. 4.  
46 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony, p. 209.  
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crystallise an adequate framework of analysing the power of such a class. In the next section, 
a full review of the TCC literature will be elaborated.  
 
 
2.2. The Transnational Capitalist Class  
 
Although the literature on the TCC is still relatively undeveloped in terms of its scope and 
depth, increasing studies have been developed in the last two decades, which have contributed 
to enhancing its theoretical and empirical foundations. This section will shed light on the 
contributions made by scholars who, specifically, speak of the emerging ‘transnational’ 
capitalist class. It seeks to provide an overview of their work and to examine the extent to 
which it represents a more sophisticated account of the formation, structure, and power of the 
TCC.   
In his book The Transnational Capitalist Class, Sklair sets out the foundation for a 
comprehensive analysis of the influence of the TCC. Similar to Van der Pijl’s ‘Atlantic Ruling 
Class’ and Gill’s ‘transnational historic bloc’, he argues that a TCC “is in the making” as 
capitalism has taken a global shape. However, what Sklair adds to the argument goes beyond 
van der Pijl’s and Gill’s state-centric account. Rather than being driven by state intervention 
on behalf of corporate interests, Sklair’s TCC is an agency in and for itself at the heart of which 
lies powerful MNCs and policy groups, such as the WEF and Bilderberg, which are expressions 
of its existence47. More specifically, Gill’s historic bloc, for example, derives its influence 
                                                          
47 Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 2. As commonly believed by other authors in this 
chapter, Robinson and Harris consider the “internationalization of capital and the global integration of national 
productive structures” as the main reason of the emergence of the TCC. See also Robinson, William I. and 
Harris, Jerry, “Towards A Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class”, Science & 
Society, 64:1 (2000), p. 1.  
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directly from an active, somehow external, political agency that functions under hegemonic 
global capital. On the other hand, Sklair’s class incorporates the state as a main component that 
functions simultaneously and equally efficiently with other components. It is the totality of the 
TCC agency in Sklair’s explanation that makes his account different. It is this totality that 
“pursues people and resources all over the world” for profit maximization and, therefore, it is 
considered the primary force stirring capitalism and maintains the hegemony of global 
capital48.  
As stated by Sklair, the structure of the TCC is composed of four main components: the major 
TNCs; globalizing bureaucrats and politicians or what Jorge Dominguez terms 
“Technopols”, for Van Apeldoorn they are “politicians and civil servants occupying key 
positions in transnationalizing state structures”49; globalizing professionals; and the elite 
consumerists, merchants and the media50. These four fractions symbolise the material and 
intellectual foundation of the TCC. While three of them seem to have identical interests to an 
extent that would permit their integration into one class, how politicians belong to it too is left 
unfounded.  
 
In Sklair’s view, such a configuration of the TCC reflects “the different types of capital that 
must be mobilized to further the direct interests of the global capitalist system”51. This is the 
                                                          
48 The TCC can be considered as a consequence of the transnational orbit through which the accumulation of 
capital, and the realization of profit, passes. The global system theory introduced by Sklair is based on the concept 
of “transnational practices”, practices in the economic, political and cultural domains that are performed beyond 
and across the political boundaries of the state and are not led or invented by the state or international institutions. 
Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 4. 
49 Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan, “Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the 
European Round Table of Industrialists”, New Political Economy, 5: 2 (2000), p. 159. 
50 Leslie Sklair, “Democracy and the Transnational Capitalist Class”, The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 581: 1 (2002), p. 144. The fact that Sklair admits a remaining role of the state has to 
do with his take on globalisation as transnationalization where the state is an actor among others that has a role to 
play in global governance, see Leslie Sklair, “The Transnational Capitalist Class and the Discourse of 
Globalisation”, in J. Timmons Roberts, Amy Bellone Hite, Nitsan Chorev  (eds.), The Globalization and 
Development Reader: Perspectives on Development and Global Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 2015), p. 305.  
51 Leslie Sklair, ‘Globalizing Class Theory’, in Sinclair (ed.), Global Governance: Critical Concepts in Political 
Science Volume 4 (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 144 (pp. 137-161); Leslie Sklair, “Social movements for global 
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argument that he uses in order to justify the inclusion of globalising politicians into the TCC. 
Sklair defines the emerging transnational capitalist class as “those who own and control the 
major means of production, distribution, and exchange through their ownership and control of 
money and other forms of capital”. In his TCC, everyone is aware of the ‘transnationality’ of 
the system and its requirements, politicians in the same way as CEOs of TNCs, the media and 
ideologues. In his words,  
 
Some Marxist scholars may object that only those who actually own the means of production can properly 
be called capitalists and be members of the capitalist class, local or transnational. However, the 
globalization of capitalism can only be adequately understood when ownership and control of money 
capital is augmented with ownership and control of other types of capital, notably political, organizational, 
cultural, and knowledge capital52.   
 
This is quite a problematic point to make from a Marxist perspective. It only portrays a narrow 
picture of reality and overlooks the dynamics of the drive for change in contemporary global 
economy. In his view, the task of globalising politicians who hold the political form of capital 
is only complementary to other tasks performed by the remaining members of the TCC. That 
is, they create “the political conditions for diverting state support of various types (financial, 
fiscal, resources, infrastructure, ideological)” toward TNCs operating within their state’s 
territories. Hence, it is through the regulation of the national economies in the interests of the 
TNCs that the state fraction plays its role within the TCC53. For example, adopting and 
implementing competitiveness standards, benchmarking, and global best practice systems is a 
                                                          
capitalism: the transnational capitalist class in action”, Review of International Political Economy, Published 
online: 4:3 (1997), pp. 314-5.  
52 Leslie Sklair, “Democracy and the Transnational Capitalist Class”, p. 17         
53 Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, pp. 7, 114, 298-9. See also Leslie Sklair account on the 
relationship between the state’s adoption of competitiveness and democracy in Leslie Sklair, “The Transnational 
Capitalist Class and Global Politics: Deconstructing the Corporate–State Connection”, International Political 
Science Review, 23: 2 (2002), pp. 171-2.   
 34 
 
reflection of how states would serve the interests of the TCC in preserving global capitalism. 
This task, nevertheless, is only complementary to that of globalising professionals who design 
these practices and standards in the first place. Moreover, for him, these are only seen as world 
‘best practice’ because politicians and professionals alike adopt them as “a technique of social, 
political, and ideological control in the global capitalist system”. Beside this technical role of 
designing these systems, globalising professionals perform an ideological role when they sell 
these systems of benchmarking to businesses as well as governments as “the best way to 
measure competitiveness at all levels” and, most importantly, “to sell competitiveness as the 
key for” for their success54.  
The argument emphasised in Sklair’s work and by other TCC Scholars is that although TNCs 
own and control immense economic resources which put them in a position to further their 
interest they “require help from other groups” if they are to “carry out their work effectively”. 
It is through these concerted and collaborative processes that the TCC materialises its being in 
a structural sense55.  
Sklair rightly argues that the role of globalising professionals is of great importance to the 
hegemony of the TCC and the sustainability of the capitalist system. He notes that the TCC’s 
hegemony rests on its “ideological persuasion at the global level”. That is, the TCC 
“consumerist visions” are “daily transmitted” to the society56. As will be elaborated in 
Chapters, Five, Six and Seven of this thesis, this can be seen clearly in the competitiveness 
standards of the WEF. The culture-ideology of consumerism performs a significant task to the 
                                                          
54 Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 141. In this manner, Marx’s and Engels’s idea of how the 
possession of the “material force of society” turns the ideas of the ruling class into “ruling ideas” and turns the 
capitalist class into a “ruling intellectual force” when the class itself becomes global and includes more than their 
traditional elements (the capitalist), Marx, Karl and Engels Frederick, The German Ideology (London: Lawrence& 
Wishart, 1965), p. 60.For an interesting article on the role of the four components of the TCC in the architecture 
of ‘world cities’, see Leslie Sklair “The Transnational Capitalist Class and Contemporary Architecture in 
Globalising Cities”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 29: 3 (2005), pp. 485-500.  
55 Leslie Sklair , The Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 288 
56 Ibid.  
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extent that the existence and functioning of the TCC is conditioned upon its role. The 
sustainability of capitalism as a global system thus becomes conditioned upon convincing 
everyone that competitiveness would lead “to happy lives for all”. The hold this ideology has 
over society is the reason why the TCC successfully exerts control over the global economy57. 
Indeed, this side of his argument makes perfect sense when one considers the term 
competitiveness and its pervasiveness into everyday life today, in society, in politics, and in 
economics and business.  
Although not entirely distinct from Sklair’s account, in his Theory of Global Capitalism 
Robinson adds another layer to the analysis of the TCC. He defines the TCC as a group of 
“elites” composed of “dominant political, socioeconomic and cultural strata”, they are 
capitalists but also state managers, and leaders of the major social institutions in society such 
as technicians and intellectuals who are “in the service of the TCC” ˗˗ such as the Chicago 
school economists. What can been seen as a break away from Sklair’s account is the logic that 
holds together the members of the TCC for Robinson. While Sklair groups together the four 
fractions without distinction of their position in relation to the means of production, Robinson’s 
TCC is a class of capitalists and non-capitalists. However, this is not to say that Robinson’s 
theory is less problematic. Robinson’s capitalists are those “elites who own or manage means 
of production as capital” while his non-capitalists are those who “occupy key decision-making 
positions in institutions, whether in private corporations, the state, political parties or cultural 
industries”58.  
                                                          
57 Despite the fact that the long-term coincidence of interests and unity of the fractions of the TCC does not 
preclude shorter-term and local conflicts within each fraction and between one fraction and another, the inner 
circle of the TCC, based on the culture-ideology of consumerism, preserves the cohesion and unity of the system. 
Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 255.  
58 William I. Robinson, ‘Global Capitalism Theory and the Emergence of transnational Elites’, Working Paper: 
United Nations University, 2010/02, p. 3. What made Robinson make such a distinction in his analysis is the fact 
that he drew on Marx’s concepts of class-in-itself and class-for-itself. These are explained by Robinson as follows: 
A class-in-itself ‘is a group whose members objectively share a common position in the economic structure of 
society independent of the degree to which they are aware of their collective condition or to which they 
consciously act on the basis of this condition’. A class-for-itself ‘is a class group whose members are conscious 
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More fundamentally, however, Robinson notes that it is the inner circle of the TCC that is at 
the centre of global capitalism. This inner circle of a “class-conscious elite” is perceived to be 
represented in groups such as the WEF and the ICC59. Given that his account of membership 
extends to all the loyalists of the TCC and the supporters of its agenda, global capitalism, then 
it is only logical to see the WTO, IMF, World Bank as also part of his inner circle since 
membership isn’t conditional upon the ownership of the means of production. It should be 
noted that Robinson’s capitalists are also only fractions of the capitalist class, his TCC attracts 
only “the leading elements among national capitals” and fuses them into a transnational class60.  
 
The primary assumption made in the TCC literature thus far is that class formation has become 
today “less bound to territory and to the political justification of nation-states”61. Sklair 
confirms this point and explains that the transnationality of this class is evident in many 
respects. It is transnational because: its members identify their interests as being global given 
the transnational reach of the activities and ownership of the TNCs; the influence this class 
exerts, be it economic, political and/or ideological knows no boundaries, it is manifest at the 
national and international levels, in politics as well as the workplace and the every-day life of 
the society62; the orientation of its members is not territorially specific but global in all fields63; 
                                                          
of constituting a particular group with shared interests and would be expected to act collectively in pursuit of those 
interests’ William I. Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism, William I. Robinson A Theory of Global 
Capitalism, p. 38. 
59 Ibid. p. 48 and p. 85. 
60 p. 47. 
61 Ibid. p. 34. 
62 In the workplace this is manifest in the demand for workers’ flexibility in terms of working hours, wage cuts 
and mobility. Sklair argues “while this not new ... its global scope is unprecedented’. Leslie Sklair, The 
Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 19.   
63 For Sklair, the increasing weight and number of TNCs, the prominence of free market at the international 
institutional level, and the privilege export has taken in the circles of economic policies of most of the developing 
countries since the 1980s have been driven by ‘members of the TCC working through government agencies, 
business professionals, elite opinion organizations, and the media’. Ibid. p. 20. 
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similar lifestyles, education, and consumption patterns are shared among its members; the TCC 
members tend to view, and show, themselves as world citizens64.  
Moreover, Carroll’s approach to the study of the TCC offers an alternative view of its formation 
and trans-nationality. In his empirically-rich study, he investigates the “social organization” of 
the TCC through social network analysis that focuses on a “global network of directorship 
interlocks”65. In particular, he looks at the interlocks between the directorships of TNCs, the 
interlocks between the directorships of the global policy groups and the interlocks between the 
latter and former. The argument he poses is that at the end of the twentieth century, there have 
been an increasing number of transnational corporate interlocks, which although still coexisting 
with national ties, have resulted in forming a broad network and created “trust” among 
transnational businesses66.  
The directorship interlocks between TNCs gradually bring corporate leaders closer into a 
“transnational community”67. The main attributes of such a community are: it is composed of 
the elite, it is “cohesive” and it is relatively detached from nationality and has shared identity 
interests and common perspectives on how to secure them. This corporate strategic project 
serves to entrench TNCs in a transnational body, consolidate the cohesion of the community 
and preserve and express unity of interests among the capitalists centred on securing preferable 
                                                          
64 Ibid. p. 21. As explained by Robinson, the main difference between the TCC and the national fractions of capital 
is that the former runs global production and distribution system that makes their concern more global than 
domestic, William I. Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism, p. 47. This type of cosmopolitanism evident in 
the behaviour of a transnational capitalist was touched upon by Marx. He says “Just as money develops into world-
money, so the commodity owner develops into a cosmopolitan. The cosmopolitan relation of men is originally 
only a relation of commodity owners. The commodity as such rises above all religious, political, national and 
language barrier”, Marx, Karl, A Contribution to the Critique of the political economy, Translated by N.I. Stone, 
(Chicago; the international library publishing co, 1904), p. 207.   
65 The term transnational capitalist class becomes more viable if ‘there are structural conditions that reproduce a 
transnational corporate community’ with a ‘transnational identity’ shaping their practices rather than a national 
one. William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 19.  
66 Ibid. p. 20, p. 22, and pp. 33-4, see also Domhoff, G. William, Who Rules America Now? (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1983).  
67 Nollert, Michael, “Transnational Corporate Ties: A Synopsis of Theories and Empirical Findings”, Journal of 
World-Systems Research, 2 (2005), p. 293.  
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conditions of capital accumulation68. It is this project, Kentor and Jang argue, that makes them 
act as “unified actors in the global economy”69.  
What’s more, corporate interlocks, enable capital to exercise economic, political and cultural 
power given the significance of the tasks they fulfil. They, first, carry out an “instrumental” 
function that involves capital’s exercise of economic power through coordination, control and 
allocation of resources in the race for capital accumulation. Second, they accomplish an 
“expressive” function that encompasses building “cultural relations [...] solidarity among 
corporate directors, and underwriting a certain class hegemony – a cultural-political power”. 
Consequently, interlocking boards are “key nodes” in webs of economic as well as cultural-
political power, as the community expands to interlocking carried out by lawyers, consultants, 
university presidents, which has become a common practice in corporate governance. 
Therefore, increasingly the social integration of the community becomes stronger which allows 
it to “reach into civil and political society”70.   It must be noted, however, that Carroll realised 
the limited geographical scope of corporate interlock. He emphasises the “Euro-north 
                                                          
68 William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 224. Nollert, Michael, “Transnational 
Corporate Ties”, p. 294. For a similar account see also William K. Carroll, and Meindert Fennema,  ‘Is There A 
Transnational Business Community?’, International Sociology, 17 (2002), pp. 394-415. 
69 Jeffrey Kentor and Yong Suk Jang, ‘Yes, There Is a (Growing) Transnational Business Community: A Study 
of Global Interlocking Directorates 1983 -98’, International Sociology, 19: 355 (2004), pp. 355-66. Kentor and 
Jang see the practice and power of this TCC as materialised in its involvement in the process of transnationally 
organising the activities of production, marketing, financing, and capital accumulation. Jeffrey Kentor and 
Yong Suk Jang, Different Questions, Different Answers, International Sociology, 21 (2006), pp. 604-5 
70 Carroll ascribes the increase and diversity of corporate interlocks to changes in corporate governance enforced 
by neoliberal globalisation, William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class, pp. 8, 23. For 
an account of the importance of the centrality of firms within this business community and the resultant more 
visible power they enjoy within the state, see Joshua Murray, “Evidence of a transnational capitalist class-for-
itself: the determinants of PAC activity among foreign firms in the Global Fortune 500, 2000–2006”, Global 
Networks, 14: 2 (2014), pp. 230-250. Staples also presents a critical analysis of the work of Carroll, Carson, 
Fenemma and other scholars who focus only on the interlocking between corporations and argues that the analysis 
should also consider the increasing interlocking and connectedness within corporations themselves, Clifford L. 
Staples, “Board Interlocks and the Study of the Transnational Capitalist Class”, Journal of World-Systems 
Research, xii: 2. (December 2006), pp. 309-319.  
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American” character of this elite which reflects the global power of the “North Atlantic ruling 
class”71.  
The stage where Carroll’s TCC become visible is when its social structure extends past 
corporate directorships. It becomes a class “in the making” once corporate networks overlap 
with policy groups’ foundations72. The importance of such overlap derives from the fact that it 
provides businesses with the opportunity to interact and discuss their common interests and to 
come up with “strategies for action” for reaching their objectives. For him, the corporate-policy 
interlocks are “relationships of class hegemony, of solidarity and coordination, more than 
domination”73. The new interlocking represents the “leading edge” of the TCC which increases 
its capacity to act as “a class-for-itself”74. 
Hence, global policy groups, while they are comprised mainly of corporate interlocking and 
networking, they are the locus where elements of business and the state come, to use Gill’s 
account of the TC, to “know and influence each other” and build consciousness of the 
appropriate economic models of managing the global economy. And as Gill perceived the TC, 
these groups are also “part of a much wider international process of elite familiarisation and 
fraternisation, mutual education and, broadly speaking, networking” 75. When global policy 
groups promote dialogue between social, political, corporate, and professional elites, they 
facilitate “the formation of a moving elite consensus”. According to Carroll, these groups 
“educate publics and states on the virtues of the neoliberal paradigm” from the position of 
political, economic, and cultural leadership76. Its consensus-building role makes it possible for 
                                                          
71 Nevertheless, he notes that the network of global corporations is, increasingly, becoming of a global reach. 
William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class: Corporate Power in the 21ST Century 
(London: Zed Books, 2010), p. 224; see also  
72 William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 36. 
73 Ibid. pp. 36-7 and p. 130. 
74 Ibid. p. 201. Nollert argues that the transnational interlocked directorates with group policy affiliations are 
‘expected to constitute a global upper class that will lose its national base and integrate the core sectors of the 
national economies‘. Nollert, Michael, “Transnational Corporate Ties”, p. 294.  
75 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony, p. 122. 
76 William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 55. 
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business power to be more effectively projected in the political and cultural spheres of the 
society77.  
The fairly globally-inclusive nature of these bodies apparent in the membership of increasing 
numbers of TNCs from, and increasing political involvement with, the capitalist south 
represents an “explicit attempt to articulate global political-economic interests”, Carroll 
argues78. Yet, that is not to say that all the members have the same degree of importance and 
influence within the private foundations of the TCC. On the contrary, although the power of 
the members from the global south is increasing, those who originate from the capitalist core 
are dominant79.  
 By bringing corporate elites together into an environment within which their behaviour 
becomes shaped by their transnational identity that makes them act in the interest of global 
capitalism, global policy groups become “agents of business activism”. They mobilise 
capitalists and various strata of intellectuals around visions and policies that enunciate the 
common interests of global capital. Therefore, politicians and the wider society, arguably, 
perceive those interests as “universal in scope”. This development, Carroll argues, is one of 
“the surest signs” that a TCC is, in fact, “in the making”80. Thus, policies of liberalisation, 
                                                          
77 Nollert, Michael, “Transnational Corporate Ties”, p. 294 
78 William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 5, p. 179 and p. 225, Carroll and Carson 
describe these groups as “collective intellectuals” that manage the externalities in the system within which they 
global capital operates,   William K. Carroll and Colin Carson, “The network of global corporations and elite 
policy groups: a structure for transnational capitalist class formation?”, Global Networks, 3: 1 (2003), p. 32.  
79 Regarding the active agent of the TCC: 80% of the biggest multinational corporations are based in the western 
core of the TCC, in the United States and the European Union. Besides, the US and the EU are the dominant 
trading powers in the world “and have a publicly stated commitment to promote their commercial interests by 
opening up markets in developing countries through the WTO”, Eagleton, Alex, “Under Influence: Exposing 
Undue Corporate Influence over Policy-Making at the World Trade Organization”, Actionaid International, 
January 2006, p. 2. 
80 For Carroll, ‘perhaps the strongest evidence for TCC formation lies in the further elaboration of an elite 
corporate-policy network, part of a transnational historic bloc of capitalists and organic intellectuals that builds 
consensus and exercise business leadership in the global arena’, William K. Carroll, The Making of A 
Transnational Capitalist Class, pp.54, 232, 228.  
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openness, deregulation and competitiveness are merely a reflection of this universality of 
interests81.  
The assumption made explicitly in the TCC literature that states’ politicians are members of, 
and identify themselves with, the transnational capitalist class is highly problematic. Among 
other things, it merely connotes that, inherently, politicians support and reinforce the interests 
of the TCC in order to maintain its hegemony in a capitalist system. The state, then, is reduced 
to an agent that functions in favour of capital and the capitalist class in a manner that detaches 
it, the state, from any other interests. Or at best the state acts as if its interests are identical with 
the interests of the TCC as they represent the interests of the society as a whole, assuming that 
the latter also subscribes to a hegemonic agenda of a hegemonic class. Sklair’s argument, for 
example, presumes that the state is part of the TCC without introducing a conceptualisation of 
the state that would help to explain its classification as a ‘capitalist’ or part of the capitalist 
class, let alone a proper concept of the class. Although he realises how controversial such an 
argument is from a Marxist perspective, this fact changes nothing in his analysis to adequately 
address such weakness. On the other hand, the work of Carroll shows the state as powerless 
and subject to the will of the capitalists. Its non-class nature, for him, does not prevent its 
politicians from aligning their interests with those of the capitalists. It suggests that the form 
and role of the state are mere reflections of the economic structure and that the involvement of 
the state in global policy groups is a manifestation of the structural power of capital which, 
through ideology, expertise, and economic power, influences and controls the state.  
Such a problematic assumption is evident also in Robinson’s definition and conceptualisation 
of the TCC aforementioned. For him, as for Sklair, the TCC, through its organised inner circle 
                                                          
81 See Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, “European unemployment and transnational capitalist class strategy: The rise of 
the neo-liberal competitiveness discourse” in Henk Overbeek (ed.), The Political Economy of European 
Employment (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 113-134.  
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of global policy groups, is “class conscious [and] conscious of its transnationality” and of its 
project of maintaining capitalist globalisation82. However, from a Marxist perspective, it is only 
the capitalist members of the TCC that could be regarded as constituting a “class-in-itself” 
since members of a class in a capitalist society, by definition, share a similar position in the 
mode of production, which the state does not, simply put. Also it is only the capitalist members 
of this class who could be seen as forming a class-for-itself given their consciousness of the 
interests they have in common and the ways in which they exercise their power towards 
achieving and advancing these interests in national and transnational spheres. Therefore, 
employing a theory of the state in the analysis of the power of the TCC would help in the task 
of developing a more appropriate conceptualisation of the position of the state within the 
structure of the TCC before analysing its role within this structure. It would provide an 
important tool that allows us to make more sense of why and how the state is involved in the 
activities of the TCC to an extent that its policies and strategies are seen as a reflection of the 
needs of the TCC itself. Therefore, one intention of this research is to overcome this problem 
by situating the formation of the TCC and its assumed overarching influence within a 
framework that is based on a Marxist conceptualisation of the state which would help by 
enriching the literature with more comprehensiveness and clarity. It would also help to map 
out the political structure of the TCC and the relationship between the political and other 
structures that the TCC arguably occupies. Moreover, instead of viewing the state as part of 
the capitalist class or an instrument in the hands of the capitalists because it is more convenient 
to assume so, this thesis introduces a conceptualisation of the position of the state within the 
capitalist system that would illustrate its involvement in the activities of the TCC without 
depicting it as part of the capitalist class or dominated by it, but rather as part of the global 
system of capitalism.   
                                                          
82 William I. Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism, p. 48.  
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The analysis of the power of the TCC is not a straightforward one. Such an undertaking 
necessitates, at least, a brief concept of class and, equally important, an adequate 
conceptualisation of the state and its role in the capitalist society. Addressing the first necessity 
would help us to situate the TCC within a more legitimate context, and one that is not arbitrary 
and ambiguously founded. It would make it easier to determine who belongs to the TCC and 
thus who contributes to its hegemony and power projection. This endeavour has the potential 
of mapping out where the power of the TCC originates from and who indeed constitutes its 
inner circle. Since our problem with the above conceptualisation of the TCC descends from its 
placement of state officials within the configuration of the class-in itself and, by extension, 
making it an agency of a class-for-itself, the analysis will firstly briefly touch upon the Marxist 
concept of class then will outline an open Marxist account of the state. To this task we turn in 
the next section.  
 
2.3.The TCC, the State and Solving the Class Enigma 
 
2.3.1. Wright’s Contradictory Class Locations? 
From a Marxist perspective, classes in a capitalist society are those who own the means of 
production or the means of survival (labour power) − the capitalist and the worker respectively. 
Classes, according to Marx, are constituted upon their economic conditions of existence which 
divides their mode of life, interests, and culture, from those of other groups and “put them in 
hostile contrast to the latter”83. Based on this, to accept the arguments made in the TCC 
literature is to confirm that state officials are in a class position that makes them hostile to the 
                                                          
83 Marx, Karl, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, Translated by Daniel de Leon, Socialist Labor 
Party of America, December 2003 [1897], p. 106. Marx, Karl, A Contribution to the Critique of the political 
economy, Translated by N.I. Stone, (Chicago; the international library publishing co, 1904).  
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rest of the society, everyone outside the TCC. Wright maintains that state managers are 
“outside of capitalist production […] neither possess nor are separated from the means of 
production and therefore occupy no class position at all. They are ‘outside’ of economic class 
relations altogether”84. Therefore, state officials do not constitute part of a class in relation to 
the economic relations of production simply because they perform activities that seem to 
benefit the capitalist class. State officials, hence, have no material interests identical to the rest 
of the members of the TCC in the very specific fashion implied in the literature. Sklair’s 
argument, for example, indicates otherwise. As outlined above, the members of the TCC 
constitute a class-in-itself because they hold the same relationship to “the means of production, 
distribution, and exchange”; they are a capitalist class as they “own and/or control, individually 
or collectively, the major forms of capital” and finally they are a transnational one because 
their activities are confined to no political borders and their goal is to secure the interest of 
global capital in global accumulation “rather than any real or imagined nation-state85.  
The TCC analysis yields the following conclusion: state officials are conscious of the interests 
of global capital only, at the expense of the rest of the society and other fractions of national 
capital. It is obviously not the state that is the producer, the labourer, or the exploiter, but it is 
the agency which, through regulations of, and intervention in, the economy, preserves the 
existence of the exploiter and the exploited, the capitalist and the labourer. The state sustains 
the system of production of which exploitation and antagonism are persistent logics. As will 
be demonstrated in our research, although operationalising competitiveness standards at a state 
level does facilitate the global accumulation of capital, the state does so in order to manage the 
capital-labour relations within its national boundaries. Thus, state officials have no 
consciousness identical to those of the capitalists. State officials are conscious only of their 
                                                          
84 Erik Olin Wright, ‘Varieties of Marxist Conception of Class Structure’, Politics Society, 9: 3 (1980) , p. 337 
85 Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 295.  
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interests in managing capital-labour relations. Based on that, their involvement in the activities 
of the WEF, for example, is an embodiment of this specific consciousness86. Through their 
position in relation to class struggle, state officials tend to acquire a certain form of existence 
and, to borrow Eyerman’s words “a being in the world”, a being in the capitalist world87.  
In their study of the tenacity of classes in contemporary capitalism, Mike, Brooks and Manza 
note that a class “refers to a person’s relationship to the means of production and/or labour 
markets”88. From this one can infer that the nature of the state’s relationship to classes stems 
from the effects its policies has on the accumulation process and the conditions of labourers in 
the labour market, hence, its position is neither one of a capitalist nor one of a labourer. 
According to Block, in a capitalist society, state officials are “forced to concern themselves” 
with conserving the “social order” in order to uphold their own existence which “rests on the 
maintenance of the political and economic order”. On the contrary, the capitalist class, for 
example, is conscious only of its interests rather than of “what is necessary to reproduce the 
social order” in a changing world89.  
At a corporate level, preserving the order is a task executed by Managers. A Marxist 
conceptualization of class that could speak to the TCC literature, and to Sklair’s and Robinson’s 
work in particular, is the concept of “contradictory class locations” coined by Wright in order 
to locate corporate managers within the class structure.  In addition to the petty bourgeoisie 
                                                          
86 As stated by Ollman, class consciousness “is essentially the interests of a class becoming its recognized goals”, 
Bertell Ollman, “Towards Class Consciousness Next Time: Marx and the Working Class”, Politics Society, 3: 
1(1972), p. 2. According to Landecker, class consciousness is “derived from the “actual position” of a person in 
the class system of the society and “his relations to others who share that position”, Werner S. Landecker, “Class 
Crystallization and Class Consciousness’, American Sociological Review, 28: 2 (1963), p. 221.  
87 Eyerman, Ron, “False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory”, Acta Sociologica, 24:1/2 (1981), pp. 
52-4.  
88 Mike Hout, Clem Brooks, and Jeff Manza, “The Persistence of Classes in Post-industrial Societies”, 
International Sociology, 8; 3 (1993), p. 261.  
89 Fred Block, “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: State Managers, Capitalists, and the Working Class in Capitalist 
Democracies”, in Eva Etzioni-Halvey (eds.), Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization: A Collection 
of Readings (London: Garland Publishing, INC, 1997), p. 260.  
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and the middle class90, Wright argues that “some locations in a class structure might be in two 
or more classes simultaneously”. For him, corporate managers have characteristics that warrant 
their classification into both the working class and the capitalist class. They are in the working 
class “insofar as they had to sell their labor power in order to obtain their livelihood”, they are 
in the capitalist class “insofar as they dominated workers within production”91. However, 
contradictory class locations are ones that have no direct ownership of the means of production. 
Its members contribute simultaneously to capital accumulation and to managing labour in the 
workplace. What makes them fundamentally different from state Managers is that they 
“simultaneously share the relational characteristics of two distinct classes” and, therefore, they 
“share class interests with two different classes but have interests identical to neither” 92. State 
Managers share no interests with either classes although they function out of an imperative to 
manage capital-labour relations at national levels.    
 
Managing capital-labour relations through preserving capital accumulation and regulating the 
labour market in a way that protects labourers’ existence as a commodity is an example of how 
Wright’s managers perform similar tasks within corporations to those of state officials as 
“circuit managers”93 although for different purposes and from different positions. However, 
the state shares no particular interest with the capitalist or the labourers. The seemingly 
contradictory locations of state officials is perceived regarding what appears to be contradictory 
                                                          
90 Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, in Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels (eds.), 
Selected Works Volume 1 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House), pp. 34-44 and pp. 56-7. See also V. 
I. Lenin, Lenin Collected Works Volume 9 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), pp. 438-446.  
91 Given the contradictory and antagonistic interests of the working and the capitalist classes, “a dual class location 
that combined these two classes was dubbed a ‘contradictory location within class relations’”. Erik Olin Wright, 
“Rethinking Once again, the Concept of Class Structure”, in Erik Olin Wright, (ed.), The Debate on classes, 
(London: Verso, 1989b), pp. 301-2. For Lukács, corporate managers seeks only to mediate the relationship 
between the two classes, Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, 
Translated by Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1968), p. 59.  
92 Erik Olin Wright, “Varieties of Marxist Conception of Class Structure”, p. 395.  
93 Peter Burnham, “Marx, Neo-Gramscianism and Globalization”, in Andreas Bieler, et al, eds., Global 
Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour: Contesting Neo-Gramscian Perspectives (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006b), p. 192.  
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political practice within the capitalist system. These are practices directed towards the 
reproduction of the social relations that characterise the system; the reproduction of domination 
and exploitation, of the dominant and the dominated, and of the exploiter and the exploited. 
Hence, the point to be made here is that they are located in a contradictory position in relation 
to the process of the reproduction of those economic class relations rather than in the system 
of production94.  
Building on that, despite the fact that state policies could imply an alignment with the interest 
of the capitalist class more than the working class, it should be emphasised that the state always 
works to contain the antithetical interests of the two classes. According to Marx, it seeks to 
“transform them into a harmonious whole”95. During this process, attempts will be made by 
both classes to tie the interests of the state to their own interests. A manifestation of this is seen 
in the involvement of the state in the WEF’s activities96. When Schwab, president of the WEF, 
addressed the participants at the 1987 Davos annual meeting, he addressed them as “a global 
community”97. The involvement of politicians in the activities of such a community should be 
seen as a sign of the consciousness of state managers of their mandatory role of mediating the 
interests of this community and everyone outside it, primarily labour, at the national level98.  
                                                          
94 The social relations of production “impose a set of practices” on people related to those relations. “Those 
common practices systematically generate common experiences, which in turn are the basis for a common set of 
understandings about the world, Erik Olin Wright, “Rethinking Once again, the Concept of Class Structure”, pp. 
288-9.  
95 Marx, Karl, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, p. 42. 
96 In 2009, the participation of state officials was unprecedented, where forty heads of state or government, most 
of the leaders of the major international organizations, and over 100 ministers attended the annual meeting besides 
the world’s leading experts and academic thinkers. This degree of political participation showed the need to 
establish necessary cooperation channels to manage capital-labour relations in a context of financial and economic 
crisis.  
 97 Schwab, Klaus, quoted in The World Economic Forum, The World Economic Forum: A partner in Shaping 
History (Cologny: The World Economic Forum, 2009) p. 72.  
98 See for example, Ronald Reagan’s speech in 1982 at the Forum in The World Economic Forum, A partner in 
Shaping History, pp. 44-5. The forum’s annual meeting was described by an official document by the WEF in 
1983 as “one of those increasingly rare international events where formality can be dispensed with, where personal 
contacts can be made, where new ideas can be tried out in complete freedom, where people are aware of the 
responsibilities involved in belonging to an international community”, European Management Forum, “Highlights 
of the Symposium and Summary of the Programme”, Davos Symposium 1983, in the World Economic Forum 
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In order to develop this understanding of the role of the state within the global economy and in 
relation to the TCC, the thesis employs an open Marxist (OM) approach. Explaining the role 
of state officials as “circuit managers” and clarifying their relationship to both capital and 
labour will help address the weaknesses in the TCC literature discussed above. To this end, the 
next section will provide an OM account of the role of the state.  OM provides credible 
analytical elements that assist in the understanding of the form and role of the state at both 
national and transnational levels and in relation to the TCC. Moreover, it will provide answers 
to questions of why, and how, the state participates in the WEF, representative of the TCC? 
Why does the state adopt competitiveness polices? What implications does this have for the 
functioning of the TCC and for capital accumulation and global capitalism in general? 
 
2.3.2. The State and the Market through an Open Marxist lens 
OM differs from most Marxist theories of the state in that it evades portraying the state in a 
structuralist\deterministic or instrumentalist manner. It does so by taking the social relation of 
production as the point of departure. Its primary assumption is that the separation between 
state, capital and labour is ‘illusive’ and that the relations between the state and civil society 
are forms of the social relations of production, as Burnham argues99. He explains that the view 
of politics and economics as separate “distorts the relationship between the state and 
globalization” and, consequentially, leads most IPE and IR scholars to draw “external linkages” 
between the two instead of realising that nation-states live as “moments within the global flow 
of capitalist social relations”. Contrary to the neo-Gramscian analysis prevalent in the TCC 
                                                          
(ed.), A partner in Shaping History, p. 47. For behaviour and belief as qualifications to a class membership, see 
Centers, Richard, 1949, The Psychology of Social Classes: A Study of Class Consciousness (New York: Russell 
& Russell, 1949), p. 211.     
99 Peter Burnham, “Globalisation, Depoliticisation and ‘Modern’ Economic Management”, in Werner Bonefeld 
and K. Psychopedis (eds.) The Politics of Change: Globalisation, Ideology and Critique (London: Palgrave, 
2000), p. 10.  
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literature, OM perceives of the changes in the way capital exists globally as a reflection of the 
“changing contradictions between capital, the state and labour”100 rather than domination of 
capital over the state’s management of labour.  
The state and market are far from being two separate bodies where either of them is dominant 
over, or determinant of, the form and role of the other as structural Marxism supposes101. 
Rather, they prevail in a way that reflects the social relations that establish them102. 
Accordingly, capitalism develops as a reflection not of the political restructuration imposed by 
global capital, but of the development of class struggle. In particular, the state does not 
“correspond to, or reproduce, economic relations”. The state is the political entity that 
“complements the economic as, together, different forms of the same fundamental class 
antagonism”103. The state is the agent which keeps the struggle intact. It is “a form of capitalist 
social relations” and only “an aspect of the social relations of production” that is founded upon 
reproducing the conditions of antagonistic and exploitative relations within the capitalist 
system104.   
 
The main critique OM makes is that by treating politics and economics as separate entities, the 
changing form of the state towards transnationalisation is understood in abstraction from class 
relations. As pointed out by Burnham, class struggle is perceived as isolated from triggering 
                                                          
100 Andreas Bieler and Adam D. Morton, “Globalization, the State and Class Struggle: A Critical Economy 
Engagement with Open Marxism”, in Andreas Bieler, et al, (eds.), Global Restructuring, State, Capital and 
Labour, pp. 158-60.  
101 Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, translated 
by G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2014); Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, 2nd edition, 
translated by Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1977); Louis Althusser, ‘Lenin and Philosophy’ and other Essays 
(New York: Monthly, Review Press, 1971).  
102 The political and economic spheres constitute a ‘contradictory unity…a movement of contradiction’, Werner 
Bonefeld, ‘Social Constitution and the Form of the Capitalist State’, in Werner Bonefeld, Gunn, Richard, and 
Psychopedis, Kosmas, eds., Open Marxism: Volume l Dialectics and History (London: Pluto Press, 1992), pp. 98-
100.    
103 The political and economic spheres constitute a ‘contradictory unity…a movement of contradiction’, Ibid. p. 
113. 
104 Andreas Bielerand Adam D. Morton, “Globalization, the State and Class Struggle”, p. 159.  
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the restructuration process in national states. As is mostly the case in the TCC literature, both 
the state and labour are perceived as “powerless” and “passively” answering to the dictates of 
transnational money-capital105. Burnham rejects the assumption made by neo-Gramscians that 
the state acts as a “transmission belt from world to domestic economy” and that the state “has 
become ‘internationalised’ from the ‘outside-in’”. For the neo-Gramscians, the state is 
subjugated to “something greater than the state, orchestrating ‘governance without 
government’”106. In particular, Cox views the impact of the “global centralisation of influence” 
upon the national state as a result of what he calls “the internationalising of the state”.  It mainly 
leads to remaking the state into “an agency for adjusting national economic practices and 
policies to the perceived exigencies of the global economy”. From this perspective, explaining 
how the discourse of competitiveness of the WEF, as a site of the TCC, becomes adopted by 
national governments seems rather simplistic.  In this sense, the state “becomes a transmission 
belt from the global to the national economy” and the power within the state “becomes 
concentrated in those agencies in closest touch with the global economy” such as finance 
ministries and central banks107.  
 
The central issue Burnham takes against this stand is that class relations exist on a world level 
rather than on national levels. He rejects the assumption that class relations exist only in 
national contexts and that its influence gets projected within the government that, by its 
political nature, has a role outside its borders. He notes that “the state itself is a form of the 
class relation, which constitutes global capitalist relations”108. On this basis, OM rejects the 
                                                          
105 Peter Burnham, “The Politics of Economic Management in the 1990s”, in Andreas Bieler, et al, eds., Global 
Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour, p. 94.  
106 Ibid, p. 93, see Cox, Robert W., ‘Global Perestroika’, in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, , (eds.), The Socialist 
Register: New World Order?, (London: Merlin Press, 1992), pp. 30-31. 
107 Ibid. pp. 30-31.   
108 Peter Burnham, ‘State and Market in International Political Economy: Towards a Marxian Alternative’, Studies 
in Marxism, 2 (1995), p. 149, quoted in Andreas Bieler and Adam D. Morton., 2006, “Globalization, the State 
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assumptions that portray the state as manipulated by global capital as neo-Gramscians would 
explain the power of the TCC. It also discards the argument made by structural Marxists that 
the state is losing power to market forces, in such a way they would explain the context of the 
1980s that signalled the demise of the Keynesian state.  
 
Thus, the state should be understood in terms of its relation to the global market and global 
capital. Its class character is “entailed in its form-determined purpose” intended to uphold 
capitalist ownership and property. Thereby, it preserves labour’s freedom in relation to the 
means of production and it does so by maintaining the existence of wage-labour as – “a living 
commodity”. Upholding labour in such a manner is the precondition for the existence of capital; 
this process attains “political existence in the form of the state”. To be precise, it is in this sense 
that the state appears as a “capitalist state”109.  
 
The reproduction of capitalist social relations of production “from the overseer, to the 
managing director, state managers, international agencies and alliances between states” 
depends on capital’s ability “to harness and contain the power of labour within the bounds of 
the commodity-form”. Thus, the struggle in everyday capitalism is a struggle “in and against 
the dominance of the commodity-form” which sometimes take the form of economic crises. 
Building on this, Burnham argues that Marx’s approach “sees relations between national states 
in terms of the social relationships, which constitute states as moments of the global 
composition of class relations”. States are aspects of the social relations of production who, 
                                                          
and Class Struggle: A Critical Economy Engagement with Open Marxism”, in Andreas Bieler, et al, (eds)., Global 
Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour,  p. 191.  
109 Peter Burnham, “Marx, Neo-Gramscianism and Globalization”, p. 192.  
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Burnham argues, intervene in the society in the form of the “management of labour and 
money”110.    
 
The fact that states act as “regulative agencies” concerned with the reproduction of global 
capital through maintaining its continued accumulation should not be taken to mean they 
represent the interests of national capitalists of any other form of capital or that they are 
controlled by them. Rather, the state’s role is centred on eliminating whatever comes in the 
way of capital accumulation when capital flows through its borders. Hence, the state works to 
consolidate the continuous accumulation of capital within and outside its borders111. In most 
of the advanced capitalist states and especially in response to the 1980s crisis, Carter contends, 
states have become “managerial states” due to the imperative of depoliticising the management 
of the relationship between capital, labour and the state. A manifestation of such strategy of 
the state is delegating power to “managers” in less political departments such as central 
banks112. Consequently, governments have become able to “‘externalize’ the imposition of 
financial discipline on labour and capital”. Hence, the government has enhanced its power in 
relation to labour “since it can be argued forcefully that price stability really is the crucial 
determinant in the GPE and lack of ‘competitiveness’ translates directly into a loss of jobs and 
profits”, Burnham notes113.  
 
Furthermore, with the intensive development of the world economy and capital markets, state 
Managers tend to restructure their practices using market mechanisms to “‘depoliticise’ the 
                                                          
110 Peter Burnham, “The Politics of Economic Management in the 1990s”, p. 97. This is in accordance to Marx’s 
and Engel’s view of class struggle and the development of the capitalist system: “The history of all hitherto 
existing society is the history of class struggles”, Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist 
Party”, in Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels (eds.), Selected Works Volume 1, p. 34.   
111 Peter Burnham, “The Politics of Economic Management in the 1990s”, p. 194.  
112 Bob Carter ‘Restructuring State Employment’, Capital & Class, 21: 3 (1997), pp. 65–85) 
113 Peter Burnham, “The Politics of Economic Management in the 1990s”, in Andreas Bieler, et al, (eds.), Global 
Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour, pp. 102-3 
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management of difficult aspects of public policy”. As affirmed by Burnham, the antagonistic 
class relations make changes in the global capitalist system always a possibility as the state and 
capital aim to eradicate any obstruction in the way of capital. Essentially, state managers “are 
above all circuit managers”114. Therefore, contrary to the neo-Gramscian belief, what 
globalization actually does is that it merely magnifies the already existing capital circuits and 
expands the mandate of the state as a “regulative” agency beyond its borders in order to manage 
“the rotation of capital”115. 
 
As a result, the structures that the state in the capitalist society have taken are an outcome, 
forced both on the state and capital, of the “historical development of class struggle which 
compelled the state to reconstruct the way in which labour is contained within the context of 
the expanded reproduction of value”116. The state seeks to normalise the “bourgeoisie society” 
through safeguarding property rights. In doing so, the state, practically, enforces “the 
substantive guarantee of exploitation” which transforms the state into a principal agent in the 
capital-valorisation process117. Hence, for OM, the state can be seen as a “political organizer 
of the republic of market”. However, it enforces only “formal freedom and equality as a mode 
of existence of exploitation”. Thus, the political guarantee of the right to property “determines 
the state as a strong state” that mitigates the class antagonism in society through orchestrating 
                                                          
114 Peter Burnham, “Marx, Neo-Gramscianism and Globalization”, in Andreas Bieler, et al, (eds.), Global 
Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour, p. 192.  
115 Ibid. 
116 More specifically, the working class has a “constituting power” which ‘inverts into the power of capital insofar 
as capital is able to contain labour as a moment of its own social existence. The power of capital is hence a 
historically specific form of social command that appropriates the determining power of labour as a moment 
within the process of capital as self-valorizing value’. Thus, the dominate position of capital   “is a process of its 
own self-contradictory mode of existence. Thus, given that the state is a mode of existence of class struggle 
(relations), the state becomes a ‘self-contradictory form’ “.Werner Bonefeld, “Social Constitution and the Form 
of the Capitalist State”, in Werner Bonefeld , Richard Gunn, , and Kosmas Psychopedis, (eds)., Open Marxism: 
Volume l, pp. 101-2, p. 104, and p. 114.  
117 Ibid 
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an artificial rationality upheld by law118. As a result, exploitation and profit-making take the 
shape of political domination. The state acquires existence as “the political concentration of 
social normalisation, organisation and domestication of social conflict in forms conforming to 
formal rights and the safeguarding of these rights through coercion”119.  
 
The development of the state and its role needs to be seen as “one in which the contradictory 
unity of surplus value production is processed in a political form”; it needs to be seen as “a 
moment of the same process of class struggle: social reproduction as, and in and against, 
domination”120. Namely, the form and role of the state do not develop as reflections of “political 
and ideological changes”, they do not develop as results of “economic crisis”, as it is assumed 
by structural Marxism, they develop as modes of “motion of the self-contradictory form of the 
capitalist state in the face of the crisis-ridden development of accumulation”121. 
 
Strictly speaking, seeing the state in this way means that the state cannot be manipulated by, 
or dependent on, capital as structural and instrumentalist Marxist approaches contend. The state 
works to preserve “the reproduction of the social form of social reproduction”122 within which 
capital is dominant. Therefore, as noted by Bonefeld, “One cannot derive the historical 
development of the state from the specific interests served by particular policies”.  He affirms 
that the form of the state needs to be seen as “a mode of existence of the class relation which 
                                                          
118 “Instead of privileges, the state sets rights; instead of relations of will and power, the state sets the relations of 
legality; instead of despotism, the state concentrates coercion as law and order; instead of relations of conflict, the 
state sets contractual relations of social interaction”. Ibid. pp. 116-7 
119 Ibid. p. 117, The process of “legalisation (as well as political supervision) of the relations of production means 
the ‘statification’ of these relations that purpose of which is to develop them in ‘politically supervised, legally 
controlled, non-conflictual forms”. Ibid. pp. 118.   
120 Ibid. 119 
121 Ibid. 121 
122 Ibid. 
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constitutes and suffuses the circuit of capital”. Subsequently, the state is a political form of 
existence of labour within capital123. 
 
Hence, the state should be perceived in relation to the “global character of capitalist 
accumulation” since it is by nature a “form” of class relations that are global in reach124. States 
exist as “political ‘nodes’ or ‘moments’” within the global accumulation of capital, the 
antagonistic nature of the latter impinges on the state and influences the development of its 
form. For that reason, the state improves its position in the global economy by “increasing the 
efficiency of capitalist exploitation operating within [its] boundaries”125.  
  
Whether capital has a dominant position because of the economic power it has to manipulate 
the state and force it to always act in its favour at the national and transnational levels; or 
whether it is the fact that the natural role of the state is to keep the system working through 
preserving the conditions of its reproduction; both logics do not eliminate the necessity of 
securing the dominance of class antagonism and domination which appear in the form of capital 
global hegemony.   
 
 
                                                          
123 It is through the power of money “as form of value that the imperatives of capitalist social reproduction make 
themselves felt to the state. The displacement of the antagonism of capital and labour in the form of monetary 
pressure involves the state because of the state's responsibility for national currency (state as central banker)” Ibid, 
pp. 122-4 
124 Peter Burnham, ‘State and Market in International Political Economy: Towards a Marxian Alternative, Studies 
in Marxism, 2 (1995), p. 149. 
125 Peter Burnham, “Marx, Neo-Gramscianism and Globalization”, in Andreas Bieler, et al, (eds.), Global 
Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour, pp. 190-1, The world economy affects national economies through the 
“movement of money capital [...] that polices the effectiveness of the ‘domestic’ exploitation of labour” Bonefeld, 
Werner, 2006a, “Social Constitution and the Spectre of Globalization”, in Andreas Bieler, et al, (eds.), Global 
Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour, p. 51. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented the various literatures proposing the emergence of the TCC 
and its growing clout in the global economy since the early 1970s suggesting that the 
formation of class structure in the contemporary capitalist society has transcended state 
borders and power and now takes place at the global economy level. The new developments 
in the global economy commencing in the 1970s-1980s and coinciding with the rise of 
neoliberalism, represented most importantly in the globalisation of production, exchange 
and distribution, have arguably reflected the domination of financial capital over other forms 
of capital which took shape in the demise of the Keynesian state and destruction of labour 
power. For neo-Gramscians such as Gill and Van der Pijl, the role of the state has been quite 
detrimental in the rise of such a class. Throughout their analysis, they noted the non-
autonomous nature of the state which has been captured by capitalist forces that assumed 
hegemony as a result of these changes. Although their account contextualised the 
development of a “transnational historic bloc” within the conditions of American capitalism 
and hegemony, their analysis presented its development as being led initially through the 
management of inter-state relations in the Triad region and, eventually, beyond.      
For the TCC scholars, its rise has manifested in the growing power of TNCs accompanied 
with capturing state officials from their national interests to a stage where they acquire only 
transnational interest and identities. Whether state officials were seen as capitalists (Sklair), 
non-capitalist (Robinson), or neither (Carroll) the conclusion is one: the power of the TCC 
has become visible and manifest in national policy-making. Global policy groups such as 
the WEF, TC, ERT, ICC, and WBCSD are sites at which the influence of the TCC is 
concentrated and centralised. Their role is to bring TNCs, globalising politicians, mostly 
from the advanced capitalist core, globalising professionals and neoliberal intellectuals 
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together to develop a common agenda of managing the global economy and the global 
accumulation of capital.    
I have also demonstrated through briefly touching on the Marxist concept of class and 
introducing a theory of the state, which the TCC literature lacks, the weaknesses of such 
theorisations of the TCC and the claims made regarding the state, class and the relationship 
between the national and the global; between globalisation and the state; between labour, 
capital and the state. The chapter argued that such a theoretical framework allows us to look 
at the role of the state differently, that is, without economic determinism or instrumentalising 
the state by capital, and/or labour. As “circuit managers”, I argue, states’ relation to the TCC 
should be seen as a manifestation of the consciousness of their system-determined role in 
managing class relations, which are global in nature, within their national boundaries. In that 
sense, what seems to be an imposed discipline of competitiveness on states by the TCC, is 
in reality a product of the management of capital-labour relations characterised by 
antagonism, and by struggle in and against domination in order to sustain the continuation 
of global capital accumulation.  
Thus, the hegemony of the discourse of competitiveness has to be seen outside the prism of 
the cultural hegemony of the TCC, as Neo-Gramscians would argue126, but rather as a 
manifestation of the form of labour contained within capital and maintained by the state. The 
penetration of competitiveness into national policy-making evident today is the form class 
struggle has taken politically. Therefore, adopting competitiveness standards, designed by 
globalising professionals, is not a tool to enforce the hegemony of the TCC in a neoliberal 
globalising age as much as a nationally modified form of capital-circuit management by the 
                                                          
126 In this respect, the state is seen as “the entire complex of theoretical and practical activities” with which 
the ruling class not only “maintains its dominance, but manages to win the consent of those over whom it 
rules”. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks. (edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G. N. 
Smith) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), p. 244. See also, Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the capitalist 
States in their Place (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), p. 341.  
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state. As Bonefeld emphasises, even though the global economy has become the force that is 
structurally determinant, the state “remains central” given that it still controls the labour force, 
it provides the “cultural, political and social conditions that capital, however, requires for its 
reproduction”127. It is the state’s involvement within the structure of the WEF and other policy 
groups that is significant in the reproduction of class relations and antagonism; the reproduction 
of capitalism on national and transnational levels. When states accept standards of 
competitiveness, this should not be considered as an evidence of their self-identification with 
the WEF128. On the contrary, it should be perceived of as an acceptance of their responsibility 
in managing capital-labour relations on a national level129.   
In the next chapter we will develop an OM account of discourse and the role of ideas that we 
consider important to OM accounts of states as “circuit managers”. It will help us understand 
in what way the discourse of competitiveness forms an integral part of the management of the 
state-capital-labour relation in contemporary global capitalism ˗˗ reproducing the relations of 
production.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
127 Bonefeld, Werner, “Social Constitution and Critical economy”, in Andreas Bieler, et al, (eds.), Global 
Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour, p. 176.  
128 For an account of how class consciousness relates to the capitalist and working classes see Glantz, Oscar, 
“Class Consciousness and Political Solidarity”, American Sociology Review, 23; 4(August 1958).  
129 The nation state isn’t “the container out of which” the transnational emerges but it is a one political node within 
the transnational. The transnational, political and economic are “initially and continually mutually constitutive to 
the production and reproduction of social relations”. Huw Macartney and Stuart Shields, “Space, the Latest 
Frontier? A Scalar Relational Approach to Critical IPE” in Stuart Shields, Ian Bruff, Huw Macartney (eds.), 
Critical international political economy, pp. 29-30.  
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Chapter Three 
Assessing the Power of the TCC: Open Marxism and Discourse Analysis   
 
In the previous chapter we argued that the state figures as a moment in the global accumulation 
of capital; a moment in the social relations of production whose role is to manage the 
relationship between capital and labour through the management of the global circuit of capital, 
within which the state represents only a politically and geographically bounded ‘node’. The 
role of state officials as “circuit managers” is inherently conditioned by class antagonism and 
struggle within the crisis-ridden development of capitalism. Moreover, we established that the 
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relationship between the state and the TCC, and its global policy groups, should be viewed in 
light of the state’s interests in managing capital-labour relations within its economy. Its class 
character is derived from its purpose of preserving capitalist ownership and labour as a 
commodity contained within capital. This is in contrast to the TCC literature that presents state 
officials as part of the TCC or perceive of the state as being captured by the TCC and its 
interests. The only consciousness state officials hold is one that is focused on maintaining the 
reproduction of class antagonism and the capitalist social relations of production. It in this 
context that state officials’ involvement in the WEF and the operationalisation of its 
competitiveness discourse should be understood.     
Given that the TCC developed essentially in the second half of the 20th century and gained its 
momentum in the 1980s, it is necessary to understand the global political and economic 
developments that accompanied, and led to, its emergence. The supremacy of money capital, 
its relation to the labour market, and its increased concentration and centralisation are important 
aspects that should be taken into consideration if we are to adequately comprehend the 
formation of the TCC and its evolution, and how the state figures within this context. The 
collapse of Keynesianism and the shift to monetarism in the early 1980s, the deregulation of 
the global market, and the re-composition of the relationship between the state and society are 
important elements for such a comprehension. Through an Open Marxist analysis of this 
historical context, we would able to provide an alternative reading to that adopted by neo-
Gramscians such as Van der Pijl and Gill.    
The first section of this chapter seeks to shed light on the process of the transnationalisation of 
the political in the second half of the past century through focusing on the relationship between 
the state and global capital. It will highlight the conditions of the global market and class 
struggle by contextualising it, first, within the Keynesianism form of regulation of the relations 
between capital and labour managed by the state. After that follows an analysis of the shift 
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from Keynesianism to Monetarism and the deregulation of the global market, and how such a 
shift has impinged upon capital, labour and the state.  
 
In the second section, the analysis will be cemented by developing an Open Marxist account 
of the role of neoliberal ideas in such shifts and how this relates to the role of state officials as 
circuit managers. It will attempt to offer an account of the role of discourse in the (re)production 
of the social relations of production; its role in the production of class antagonism by the state 
in a capitalist society as a way of managing capital-labour relations within its jurisdiction. I 
argue that what has become a conventional, and convenient argument, for many academics and 
non-academics ˗˗ that the WEF projects its power over the states involved in its activities at the 
expense of their own citizens ˗˗ is weakly established and lacks a thorough and systematic 
analysis of the means through which this power is channelled. We argue that an analysis of the 
WEF’s competitiveness discourse is important in order to properly examine its influence over 
policymaking within the state. The reminder of this chapter is that OM needs to be able to 
account for the role of ideas in the reproduction of the capitalist social relations if the role of 
the state in managing capital-labour relations is to be fully comprehended. As will be shown, 
an account of the role of discourse does not contradict with OM’s theoretical underpinnings. 
Rather, it adds to explanatory power by considering the discursive and ideological, as a form 
of class struggle as well alongside the political. Discourse is not a form of domination as argued 
by Neo-Gramscians, rather it is one site upon which class struggle is conducted and through 
which the state manages capital-labour relations. 
 
 
3.1. Keynesianism and Monetarism: ‘Real’ and ‘Speculative’ Reproduction of the Social 
Relations of Production 
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With the deregulation of the global market that began, extensively, in late 1970s in most 
western countries, global capital became enormously dominated by money-capital replacing 
productive-capital, as discussed in Chapter Two. This shift has laid significant pressure on the 
state and pushed for a transformation and the restructuring of its form and role at the national 
and transnational levels. More specifically, the political development of the state has become 
conditioned by “the movement of money on the world market”130. However, this is not to say 
that money capital only came into existence in the 1970s. Rather, the point to be made here is 
that although money has always been “a dominant form of power relations in capitalist 
society”, in recent years “it has assumed a new quality, acquired a new brazenness”, as 
Bonefeld and Holloway note131. Therefore, as argued before, globalisation should be conceived 
of as simply a process of augmenting the existing circuits of capital and expanding the role of 
the state as a regulative agency of the global accumulation of capital within and outside its 
borders given that the relations that constitute its form are global in nature132.  
 
Contrary to the neo-Gramscian argument that the growth in the influence and size of the money 
capital market made the state “accountable to a nébuleuse personified as the global 
economy”133, or as Bonefeld calls it “invisible world” economy134, the state regulates capital 
accumulation and class struggle at the transnational level  provided that capital is essentially 
global and that the function of the capitalist state has always been to secure the “‘common 
interests’ of a capitalistically organized form of social reproduction: capital accumulation”135. 
                                                          
130 Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway, “Introduction: The Politics of Money”, in Werner Bonefeld and John 
Holloway, (eds.), Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (New York: Macmillan Press, 1995), 
pp. 1-2. 
131 Ibid.  
132 Peter Burnham, “Marx, Neo-Gramscian and Globalization”, p. 192. 
133 Robert W. Cox, “Global Perestroika”, p. 27. 
134 Werner Bonefeld, “Social Constitution and the Spectre of Globalization”, p. 53. 
135 Ibid. pp. 64-5. 
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According to Burnham, the most important feature of the global capitalist system is “the 
national political constitution of states and the global character of accumulation” [Emphasis 
in original]136. He maintains that states are best conceived as “differentiated forms of global 
capitalist relations”137.  
 
In particular, while governments directly manage national labour markets, they also have to 
manage the relationship between labour and capital at the transnational level138. That is, within 
its jurisdictions the state provides the national political conditions for a globally mobile capital 
but in the world market, which falls outside these jurisdictions, the state seeks to institutionalise 
the basis for progressing capital accumulation through international property rights and 
contracts manifest in the role of international organisations such as the WTO. Thereby, the 
state maintains the existence of labour as a living commodity within the limits of capital 
accumulation. Namely, the state is only accountable to the imperative of regulating class 
struggle and capital accumulation on the transnational level. As affirmed by Burnham, this 
imperative is derived from the fact that the national market and its industries “acquires its 
livelihood as capitalist industry only through the world market” where the latter is “posed as 
the ‘categorical imperative’ of capitalist production” within, across and beyond the state139. 
Hence, the productivity, and flexibility, of national labour also acquires its livelihood through 
the world market. As noted by Bonefeld, it is the world market that “suffuses, confirms and 
contradicts the ‘domestic’ exploitation of labour” and it is in, and through, the world market 
that labour is defined as “socially necessary labour”. Consequentially, the national regulation 
of labour “subsists” through the global management of labour140. The development of the role 
                                                          
136 Peter Burnham, “Capital, Crisis and the International State System”, in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway, 
(eds.), Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money, p. 103.  
137 Ibid. p. 104 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. p.50. 
140 Ibid.  
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and form of the state is a manifestation of its management of these transnational capitalist 
relations of production.   
 
States’ regulation of their domestic markets necessitates improving “their position in the 
hierarchy of the price system”. As argued earlier, in order to mitigate the effects of crises and 
recessions, states have to increase the return to capital accrued from labour exploitation. For 
this purpose, at the top of states’ agenda is the need for “political reorganisation” arising from 
“the dynamic forces of capital accumulation”141. This reorganization of the political is not to 
be understood as a reflection of the crisis of the economic but both, the political and the 
economic, as forms of the restructuring of the social relations of production that results from 
the inherent contradiction of capital accumulation.  
 
The imperative of “political reorganisation” has its importance in the role assumed by the state 
in “the "mobilisation" [...] of the counter-tendencies to the falling rate of profit”. When capital 
faces difficulties of accumulation as a result of its own contradictions and intensified class 
struggle, it becomes “less and less able to reproduce directly its own existence as class rule”. 
It is here specifically that reproduction becomes mediated by the state throughout all its 
institutions142. Supposedly, through this restructuring the state becomes able to reproduce 
“capitalism within its boundaries” where it becomes attractive to mobile capital and able to 
“immobilise capital within its territory”143, thus maximising its economic growth, employment 
and living standards. Implementing the standards of competitiveness should be seen as an 
attempt in this direction, reproducing capital within state boundaries. However, it is worth 
noting here that the relationship between global capital and the national state is not the same 
                                                          
141 John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, “Capital, Crisis, and the State”, Capital &Class, 1: 2 (1977), p. 92. 
142 Ibid. p. 94. 
143 John Holloway, “Global Capital and the National State”, in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway, (eds.), 
Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money, p. 127.  
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for all states because although all states “are constituted as moments of a global relation, they 
are distinct and non-identical moments of that relation”144. Such variance should be expected 
to result in different state approaches to competitiveness and varying degrees of the penetration 
of its discourse within state institutions.   
 
In the following section, we will look at how the shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism and 
global market de-regulation impacted upon the state given its responsibility in managing class 
struggle and addressing the question of labour.     
 
 
3.1.1. Management through Adjustment: Welfare and the Capital-Labour Relations 
 
The welfare and interventionist state as a form taken by the political sphere was born out of 
increased competition in the world market, increased concentration of capital and social 
consolidation after WWII. These factors led to an expanding role for the state in regulating, 
managing and monitoring the economy145. In class terms, Keynesianism was “a mode of 
domination, a mode of containing the power of labour”146. According to Bonefeld, by the mid-
1970s, Keynesianism started to appear as “a spent force” since “the spectre of a socially 
reformed and economically vibrant capitalism” came under pressure due to mounting 
unemployment, hyperinflation, balance of payments deficits, depressed rates of profit and 
economic recession147. The inadequacy of the Keynesian mode of domination was felt when 
                                                          
144 Ibid. p. 125. 
145 Joachim Hirsch, “Fordism and Post-Fordism: the Present Social Crisis and its Consequences”, in Werner 
Bonefeld and John Holloway, (eds.), Post-Fordism and Social Form: A Marxist Debate on the Post-Fordist State 
(London, Macmillan Academic and Professional, 1991), p. 17. 
146John Holloway, “The Abyss Opens: the Rise and Fall of Keynesianism”, in Werner Bonefeld and John 
Holloway, (eds.), Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money, p. 8. 
147 Werner Bonefeld, “Monetarism and Crisis”, in Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway, (eds.), Global Capital, 
National State and the Politics of Money, p. 35.  
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the welfare system, which absorbed increasing amounts of state spending, became a reason for 
the fiscal crisis of the state, and when the Fordist structure of accumulation had “begun to 
become a barrier to the valorisation of capital”148.  
 
Distinctively, the Keynesian form of managing capital-labour relations became a factor of crisis 
not simply because “it institutionalises certain standards of material reproduction for the 
working class” but rather because of the limits this form of regulation have in terms of the 
state’s ability to “pursue a ‘structural policy’ which can promote a socio-technological process 
of modernisation”, argues Hirsch 149. As a result, class struggle reached the point where labour 
could no longer be contained by capital due to its institutionalised inflexibility. Therefore, 
capital responds by seeking to resolve such pressure through overaccumulation on a global 
level. Building on this, the state experienced the global crisis of accumulation in a national 
form150.  
 
The expansionary policies of the Keynesian state allowed for the exploitation of labour to be 
underpinned by credit rather than real exploitation, assuming that the state can secure people’s 
ability to get their credit translated into money. Consequently, Keynesianism contained labour 
into production through “speculative” means, the credit issued was not matched by production. 
What followed then was an inflation and fiscal crisis of the state since the latter finances the 
deficit in balance of payments mainly from its reserves and revenues but also at a certain point 
by borrowing from Eurodollar banks which meant an “accumulation of debt”151. In order to 
avoid severe economic crisis and recession, which is usually accompanied with a political 
                                                          
148 Joachim Hirsch, “Fordism and Post-Fordism”, p. 18 and p. 20. 
149 Ibid. p. 20-22. 
150 Peter Burnham, “Capital, Crisis and the International State System”, p. 109.  
151 Werner Bonefeld, “Monetarism and Crisis”, p. 42. 
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crisis, deregulation of income, employment and welfare security becomes inescapable152. As 
explained by Bonefeld, capitalism under the sponsorship of the welfare state was “living 
beyond its means”153. 
 
Therefore, as was the case in many advanced economies, politicians chose to suppress 
“anything remotely resembling a revolutionary threat”, notes Holloway. The state rolled back 
its extended arm that accompanied Keynesianism and oppressed trade unionists and excluded 
them from participating in policymaking which was the hallmark of welfare corporatism154.  
Eventually, monetarism was adopted in the 1980s as a means to tackle inflation through 
deflationary means. Monetarism sought to make workers bear the cost through intensified 
exploitation, low wages, cuts in services, and through breaking up the relationship between 
public spending and wages while capital was relieved through fiscal incentives. Thus, the state 
had to prioritise the management of social control - through removing any guarantee on 
economic and financial security - over easing the impact of unemployment - through further 
welfare spending155. In consequence, work had to be imposed on the labour army reserved 
under the benefit scheme as a condition for economic recovery. Moreover, most of the old 
guarantees associated with the old model had to be abolished.  Monetarism is a vote for “market 
freedom and a natural rate of unemployment” in the Smithian sense156. What this meant for the 
working class is that it had to put limits to its expectations. In Bonefeld’s words, the working 
class expectations had “to conform … to the limits of the market, without the state meddling 
                                                          
152 Ibid. p. 43. 
153 Ibid. p. 52. 
154 John Holloway, “The Abyss Opens: the Rise and Fall of Keynesianism”, p. 12.  
155 Werner Bonefeld, “Monetarism and Crisis”, p. 52 and pp. 36-7. Poulantzas stresses the importance of 
productive capital as having a decisive role in the development of capitalism which is to be ascribed to its direct 
relation to the exploitation of labour; the “only real source of value”155.  Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in 
Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 110-115.  
156 Werner Bonefeld, “Monetarism and Crisis”, pp. 36-7. 
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in the market through policies designed to guarantee employment and income”157. The UK is 
a prime example of such a shift and will be explored in detail in Chapter Eight.  
 
To recap, monetarism promised to be an effective means of servicing debt and avoiding further 
draining of surplus value as the rate of debt would be higher than the rate of surplus value 
produced. Otherwise, capital accumulation and profit would stand under massive pressure and 
would lead to “bad debt and financial crisis”158. In other words, expansionary policies 
generated “a massive claim on the future exploitation of labour” rather than exploitation of 
labour in the present159. To resolve this problem, tight monetary policy would push the labour 
market towards corresponding to the needs of accumulation and profitability. According to 
Holloway, this takes place effectively through “the decomposition of the working class into a 
profitable labour force”160. With Bonefeld, he maintains that Monetarism represented a “re-
shaping or re-composition of the antagonism between labour and capital” which is a 
reoccurring development throughout the history of capitalism161. As a result, continued and 
smooth accumulation becomes the rule if the power of the working class is to be contained and 
fragmented which essentially means re-imposing and restructuring capital domination162.   
 
Once in practice, monetarism and the deregulation of the world market opens the space for 
capital to accumulate freely which enables the state to “fragment working-class resistance” 
through allowing capital to fly freely in search for better investment environments163.  For the 
purpose of achieving economic recovery and growth, states deregulated the world market to 
                                                          
157 Ibid. p. 37. 
158 Ibid. pp. 40-1. 
159 Ibid. p. 40. 
160 John Holloway, “The Abyss Opens: the Rise and Fall of Keynesianism”, p. 47. 
161 Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway, “Conclusion: Money and Class Struggle”, in Werner Bonefeld and John 
Holloway, (eds.), Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money, p. 211.  
162 John Holloway, “The Great Bear: post-Fordism and class struggle. A comment on Bonefeld and Jessop”, in 
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allow the transnationalisation of capital and started to reconstitute their institutional structures 
to enhance their competitiveness164. States began adjusting their economies to the dynamics of 
an unregulated global economy in which capital is footloose. This changing role for states has 
turned them towards structuring their economic policies along competitiveness standards. 
Competitiveness has become the eventual goal of these policies necessitated by the changing 
structure and conditions of class relations.   
  
However, Holloway argues that the shift to austerity policies achieved its purpose in effectively 
exploiting labour but only in the short-term where the decreasing rates of inflation were 
followed by the liberalisation of the financial system which brought the question of labour back 
up to the surface again. To tackle recession, governments shifted to deficit financing policy 
which “reintroduced an integration of labour on the basis of deficit financing of demand”165. 
As a result, from 1982 on, the international financial system had started to become unstable 
which led monetarism to be dropped and replaced by a “policy of fiscal redistribution and credit 
expansion, containing labour through a renewed speculative deferral of overaccumulation and 
crisis”. Ironically, the failure to contain labour through a tight money policy led to reinstating 
the same policies that the New Right who advocated a free enterprise, such as those of the UK 
and the US, had protested against ˗˗ the expansionary policies of the Keynesian state166. The 
difference is that from the late 1980s it has become up to the central bank to decide the 
appropriate monetary and fiscal policies. This policy change essentially means the 
depoliticisation of the management of state-capital-labour relations as outlined above; it was 
seen as the only effective way of removing all obstructions affecting the flow of capital and its 
accumulation transnationally. This unregulated market brought about a synchronisation of 
                                                          
164 Peter Burnham, “Capital, Crisis and the International State System”, p. 109. 
165 John Holloway, “The Abyss Opens: the Rise and Fall of Keynesianism”, p. 49. 
166 Ibid. p. 50. 
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crisis tendencies among states, which was evident in falling rates of profits, balance of payment 
difficulties and instability of the business cycle167. 
 
To sum up, since the late 1960s, there existed a gap between the rates of productive 
accumulation and monetary accumulation of capital where the latter surpassed the former. A 
temporary balance was struck when austerity policies were adopted in the 1980s but later was 
undermined by the liberalisation of financial banks that gave momentum to further speculation 
as opposed to the production of surplus value. However, Holloway stresses that monetary 
speculation was significant as it allowed “the avoidance of a direct relationship with the 
working class”, it “does not meet with the same resistance that capital encounters in the 
factory”168. Thus, Fordism and post-Fordism should be understood as both patterns of capitalist 
social relations, patterns of class struggle; as “historically distinct forms of labour 
subordination and capital organisation”169. Then, the debt crisis of 1980s, the crash of the 
financial system in 1987, the recession of the 1990s, and the financial crisis of 2008 should be 
all seen as crises of the “capitalist domination over labour”170. Political regulation of the world 
market is a form of regulation that derives from the contradictions of the system rather than 
being representative of any class interests. Deregulation policies embedded within 
competitiveness standards, therefore, are centred on the disciplining of the labour market 
through imposing flexibility171. Hence, what appears as state restructuring along 
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171 See Johannes Agnoli, “the Market, the State and the End of History”, in Werner Bonefeld and Psychopedis, 
Kosmas, (eds.), The Politics of Change: Globalization, ideology and Critique (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 
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competitiveness standards is in fact a restructuring of the relationship between the state, capital 
and labour ˗ the disciplining of both capital and labour. It should be noted here that analysing 
the state as a moment or a political node in the capitalist relation of production is, in Holloway’s 
words, “the only way in which the development of the state can be analysed as part of the 
overall development of the capitalist mode of production”172.  
 
Having analysed the social and economic developments of the world economy beginning in 
the 1970s within an Open Marxist framework, it becomes clear that the rise of neoliberalism, 
at the expense of Keynesianism, reflects the rise of a new state method to manage the 
relationship between capital and labour at national and transnational levels. Intense competition 
and technological change made it hard for capital to accumulate given the lack of labour 
flexibility necessary for accumulation and profit. Thus, the rise of the competitiveness 
discourse should be analysed bearing in mind these facts. In the next section, we present an 
attempt at developing an initial Open Marxist account of the role of discourse in the 
management of capital-labour relations in a context of the global accumulation of capital. As 
outlined above, the neoliberal discourse that has accompanied the state restructuring process is 
as important as the policies adopted themselves. They represent sites where class struggle is 
conducted alongside the political and economic sites.  
 
 
3.2. Open Marxism and the Puzzle of Discourse Analysis 
 
                                                          
172 John Holloway, “The state and Everyday struggle”, in Simon Clark, (ed.), The State Debate (London, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1991), p. 207.  
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There is no doubt that the WEF’s discourse of competitiveness is designed for someone and 
for some purpose173. A thorough reading of its Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), a task 
which we undertake in Chapter Six, strongly suggests that it deliberately attempts to convey a 
specific message to the states regarding the ‘best way’ for the management of their national 
economies in order to secure the interest of transnational capital. Particularly, the discourse of 
competitiveness, carried within the GCR, is intended to influence state policies in a certain 
manner, and explicitly warns against ignoring standards of competitiveness as it will make 
states uncompetitive in a context where competitiveness is defined as the rule of the game. 
Consequentially, states will fail to achieve higher economic growth, employment and living 
standards. Among other things, as I will discuss in Chapters Four and Five, the discourse 
presents standards of competitiveness as necessities imposed by the structure and conditions 
of the global economy in which competition is the main driving force for economic and social 
progress.  
The central point here is that it is not unthinkable that the Form’s discourse of competitiveness 
can influence the state’s social and economic policies to some extent given that the discourse 
constitutes a part of class struggle within and beyond state borders. However, the fact that many 
state participants in the WEF have started perceiving competitiveness as the rule of the game 
˗˗ the condition of survival, does by no means indicate a direct influence by the Forum’s GCR. 
This is the argument made in Chapter Eight. Realising the price of being uncompetitive in the 
world economy, in terms of slow economic growth and high unemployment, is not precipitated 
by the Forum. That states adopt competitiveness standards when formulating national policy-
making has to do mainly with the management of capital-labour relations within their 
                                                          
173 Robert Cox, “Social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory”, Millennium: 
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jurisdictions. The lack of competitiveness is, thus, perceived as a threat to preserving social 
order within the state.  
Many critics of the WEF have argued that its discourse of competitiveness directs national 
policymaking and helps to manipulate the state to serve the interest of the TCC at the expense 
of its own citizens174. Nevertheless, no systematic analysis has been conducted in order to 
properly account for how much influence the WEF’s discourse of competitiveness has on the 
state restructuring process and national economic and social policy-making. There has been no 
account of how states view the Forum’s discourse and how have they responded to it thus far. 
These issues are crucial to any account of the power of the WEF as one institutional 
materialisation of the TCC. Therefore, an investigation of the relationship between the TCC 
and the state through the discourse of competitiveness is vital to our understanding of its 
influence.  
The argument that will be made later in this thesis is that the discourse of competitiveness 
produced by the WEF is not identical to the discourse implemented by the state through 
national economic and social policies. This is not to suggest, however, that there is no overlap 
between the two discourses. Rather, it is to point out that each state has its distinctive 
relationship to the global flow of capital based on different conditions of class struggle which 
dictates the form of the management of capital-labour relations within its jurisdictions. 
However, OM, one may argue, offers no appropriate tool to undertake such a task given its 
lack of engagement with the role of ideas. For this reason, in this section we will establish an 
account of the role of discourse in the production of the social relations of production through 
                                                          
174 See Tore Fougner, “The State, International Competitiveness and Neoliberal Globalisation: Is There a Future 
Beyond ‘the Competition State’?”, Review of International Studies, 32: 1 (2006), pp. 165-185; Nikolas S. Rose, 
Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
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standards of competitiveness. Such an account will enhance the explanatory power of OM and 
will be in line with its theoretical underpinnings.   
 
3.2.1. An Open Marxist Approach to Discourse Analysis 
 
OM is mostly silent on the role of discourse in the dynamics of the social relations of the 
capitalist society. This could be regarded as a weakness within OM given the importance of 
discourse as an integral form of class struggle175. As stated by Williams, despite the great 
influence that Marxist historical thought has had on language, it requires only little effort to 
see that Marxism “has contributed very little to thinking about language itself”176. Therefore, 
OM needs to have a say on where its theoretical premises and methodological underpinnings 
stand in relation to discourse. It has to define its position on how the role of discourse should 
be accounted for in the reproduction of capitalist social relations of production. An OM analysis 
of the rise of neoliberalism cannot be complete without an examination of the discourse through 
which neoliberal policies are conveyed and the language by which it is signified. The 
ideological domain should be recognised as constituting one part alongside the political and 
the economic in the reproduction of class antagonism through neoliberal politics. As we will 
see later, Marx provided an account, although not at length, of how ideas, discourse and 
language figure in the critique of the political economy of capitalism.     
Having said that, two Open Marxist scholars have touched upon the role of discourse in 
understanding the dynamics of capitalism, although only briefly, Simon Clarke and Heide 
                                                          
175 For a critique of open Marxism, see Andreas Bieler, Ian Bruff and Adam David Morton, “Acorns and Fruit: 
from Totalization to Periodization in the Critique of Capitalism”, Capital and Class, 34: 1 (2010), pp. 25-37. 
176 For every field of social study, Williams states, the separation of the language from the studied topic should 
be perceived in relation to the intention of the social analyst to do a “relational inquiry” within a “particular system 
of thought”. Marxism should concern itself with language because language has become emphasised as “activity” 
and its history has gained significant attention, Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), p. 21.  
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Gerstenberher. In fact, Clarke makes a case against ascribing any importance to the role of 
discourse in any critical account of political economy. In his seminal book The State Debate, 
he rightly critiques Poulantzas for depicting the ideological and the political dimensions of 
class struggle as dominant over the economic dimension in analysing the dynamics of capitalist 
development and the state’s forms and policies. Placing ideology and discourse in privileged 
positions, Clarke contends, would result in a “relativistic” and “irrational” argument that 
supports the views of the “new realists”. Rather than allowing for an understanding of how 
these might first be shaped by material structures, he explains, it allows for the construction of 
“objectivity” on discursive structures rather than being shaped by material structures. 
Consequentially, the identity of actors and the social and political contexts within which they 
operate would appear as though they were formed through discourse only177. As such, class 
struggle becomes “a particular form of struggle within and between discourses”, he notes. Class 
struggle, then, turns into a discursive struggle, the dynamism of which allows continuous 
displacement of one discourse by another. For Clarke, posing struggle in such a manner means 
that it is “centred on consumption, rather than production, on individualism, rather than 
collectivism, on pluralism, rather than corporatism, and on democratic anti-statism, rather than 
socialist anti-capitalism”178.  
 
Clarke’s argument is valid when presented as such. The emphasis certainly should not be 
placed on the political and ideological functions of the state, nor on the political and ideological 
dimensions of class struggle. Rather the ideological and the political constitute, alongside the 
economic, moments in capital accumulation; forms of social relations of production. On the 
other hand, Gerstenberher argues that the interests of classes are not constituted as an “outcome 
                                                          
177 Simon Clarke, “The State Debate”, in Simon Clarke (ed.), The State Debate, p. 19. 
178 Ibid. 
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of exploitative relations” between these classes but rather as an outcome of “the public 
discourse about these relations” as well179. Namely, class relations are “never merely 
‘economic’ relations, they are political and cultural relations as well”180.  This is a position we 
agree with to an extent in the sense that public discourse does not turn into the defining factor 
in the reproduction of class struggle.  
 
Since the theoretical foundations of OM are rooted in Marx’s work181, this argument will be 
supported with a brief account of Marx’s engagement with discourse and the role of ideas in 
shaping class struggle in capitalist society. The question underlying our endeavour is: how does 
the production of ideas figure in the process of the reproduction of the material conditions of 
domination of the TCC and the struggle against it? But before that, we will quickly review 
approaches to discourse analysis in which discourse is viewed as predominant over other 
aspects of life in order to make sense of Clarke’s stand and draw the line between these 
approaches and our critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach.  
 
3.2.2. Orthodox Approaches to Discourse Analysis: The Return to Marx 
Most approaches to discourse analysis assign supremacy to the role of ideas over other aspects 
of social life. This will be shown through a brief review of three approaches to discourse 
analysis: The interpretive discourse analysis (IDA), the discourse historical approach (DHA) 
and the Discursive Intuitionalism approach. IDA intends to explain what discourse is and what 
priorities it gives to what dimensions of social life. Its significance derives from realising the 
                                                          
179 Heide Gerstenberher, “The Bourgeois State Form Revisited”, in Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn and Kosmas 
Psychopedis (eds.), Open Marxism: Dialectics and History, p. 152. 
180 Ibid. p. 135. 
181 See Werner Bonefeld et al (eds.) Open Marxism: Emancipating Marx Volume III (London: Pluto Press, 1995); 
Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.) Open Marxism: Dialectics and History, Volume 
I; Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn and Kosmas Psychopedis (eds.) Open Marxism: Theory and Practice Volume 
II (London: Pluto Press, 1992).  
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value attached to social meanings of concepts and categories in public policy and the resulting 
social actions built upon them. In his review of approaches to discourse analysis, Fischer 
explains that, for IDA, the meanings of social practices are “not directly observable”, therefore 
these have to be examined through “reflection and interpretive analysis”182. This approach 
focuses on analysing “the expression of social meanings” based on actors’ values and beliefs. 
It seeks to comprehend the meaning of a social action by acquiring a social knowledge of the 
issue under investigation through interpretation. For IDA, events and actions must be 
understood “in relation to the subjective meanings, motives, or purposes” that prompted such 
actions or events in the first place183.  
Similarly, DHA places the emphasis on the role of ideas and its influence over the material 
foundations of social practices and actions. As noted by Fisher, it regards the problems faced 
in the political system as political discourse problems which have to do with “the manipulation 
of signs and symbols” by politicians and decision-makers as rational actors instead of viewing 
them in relation to the economic structure of society184. It contends that political action “is 
shaped and controlled by the discourses that supply it with meaning”. Moreover, these 
discourses are presumably distanced and disconnected from the economic foundations of social 
formations and produced only in the realm of ideas185. As noted by Fisher, for DHA, ideas 
“constitute the world as humans know it, understand it, and guide their actions”186.    
                                                          
182 Frank Fischer, “Interpreting Public Policy: Normative Frames and Methodological Issues”, in Frank Fischer 
(ed.), Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 
2003), p. 139. 
183 In particular, the focus should be on the actors holding the meaning, motive, and purpose, Ibid. pp. 141-2. 
184 For an explanation about DHA and other approaches of discourse analysis see Jason Glynos et al, “Discourse 
Analysis: Variations and Methods”, ESRC National Centre for Research Methods, NCRM: 014 (2009), pp. 1-41. 
For an argument against the positioning of the objective social factors (social structures; class, gender, etc.) over 
the subjective factors (social-psychological contexts of the actors involved) in demonstrating the influence of the 
social context on language and discourse, see also Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, “Critical Discourse Analysis: 
History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology”, in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds.), Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (London: Sage Publication Ltd, 2009).  
185 Frank Fischer, “Constructing Policy Theory: Ideas, Language, and Discourse” in Frank Fischer (ed.), 
Reframing Public Policy, p. 23.  
186 Ibid. p. 24. 
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For both DHA and IDA, political discursive interaction “reflects and reinforces an ideology, a 
subject, and a reality”. Consequently, it is ideas and concepts that provide social and material 
actions with meaning. Thus, their approach to discourse analysis seeks to show how actions, 
practices and objects become socially constructed. Actions acquire particular meaning 
depending on the political struggle between individuals in society, rather than class struggle187. 
Hence, for both approaches, discourses form the ground on which “political struggle takes 
place”188.  
The arguments of both IDA and DHA are derived from their appraisal only of the role of ideas 
and actions taken in the political and ideological spheres. They both neglect the socio-economic 
context within which institutions exist and value only the individual, thereby isolating him or 
her from the social relations within which, and by which, his or her actions are shaped. These 
social relations may never be only material but they are never only ideational either. Ideas play 
a significant role within institutions but those institutions exist within a social material structure 
as well and their objectives are very often directed to influence or change that structure, a fact 
at which IDA and DHA turn their back. Struggle is not political or ideological without relation 
to the economic structure and social relations among its classes. Social meaning must be seen 
as conditioned and shaped by class struggle. What is called political struggle is a form of class 
struggle that manifests in the political sphere.   
It is on the material production and conditions of exploitation that the power of the TCC is 
founded. Therefore, what we intend to tell here is a history that, to use Marx’s words, “does 
not explain practice from idea”, but one that “explains the formation of ideas from material 
                                                          
187 Frank Fischer, “Public Policy and Discourse Analysis”, In Frank Fischer (ed.), Reframing Public Policy, p. 73. 
188 In this sense, discourses allow for the analysis of power relations and the social actions and practice that 
(re)produce them.   
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practice”189. In the German Ideology Marx argued that only once a class becomes the “ruling 
material force” in the society, it turns into a “ruling intellectual force”. On such basis, one can 
argue that the TCC’s ideas are currently the “ruling ideas”, since they have control over the 
material means of production of social life, they gain “control at the same time over the means 
of mental production”190.  
 
As maintained by Marx, language and “thought” do not occupy “a realm of their own”, they 
are mere “manifestations of actual life”191. Thus, the WEF’s discourse of competitiveness can 
be seen as, to use Marx’s words, the “ideal expression of the dominant material 
relationship…of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas 
of its dominance”192.  But first to establish its intellectual domination, besides its material 
superiority, Marx argued that the ruling class has to “represent its interests as the common 
interest of all the members of society”, and, thus, its ideas as the common ideas of the society193. 
As will be demonstrated in Chapters Five and Eight, this fact is quite true in the case of the 
WEF that seeks to present competitiveness standards as being in the interests of all states and 
their societies. It seeks to make them universal standards of practice. Therefore, the discourse 
which carries these ideas is of great relevance here. The ideas of the WEF have gained 
considerable universality through the prevalence and global scope of its discourse and 
language194. Language for Marx is “practical consciousness”; a materialisation of conscious 
                                                          
189 Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, The German Ideology, p. 50. 
190 Ibid. p. 60, For more details about Marx’s discussion of philosophy and language see also pp. 491-2 
191 Ibid, pp. 492-6. Marx critiqued the discourse used by Saint Sancho especially his emphasis that words are the 
essence of history.    
192 Ibid. p. 60.  
193 Ibid. p. 62.   
194 In his discussion of the validity of the comparison between money and language, Marx contended that language 
and ideas are not two separate things as prices and commodities. Rather, language and ideas run and work together. 
More specifically, language “does not transform ideas, so that the peculiarity of ideas is dissolved and their social 
character runs alongside them as a separate entity”, Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of 
Political Economy (London: New Left Review, 1973), pp. 162-3.  
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class interests; a way to perform conscious social actions; and a channel through which class 
struggle is fought out195. 
 
In an account that attempts to benefit methodologically from Marx in developing a critical 
analysis of discourse as a part of the critique of capitalism, Fairclough and Graham argue that 
social life cannot be reduced to language, nor that language can be removed from “material 
existence”196. Marx’s critique of capitalism, they note, was built on “an historical, materialist, 
critical understanding of language”. However, they stress that language as an element of 
discourse was not treated by Marx as “a separate or independent ‘thing’” but as one factor in 
the production of social life197. Fairclough and Graham consider Marx’s political and economic 
writings as “engaging in a form of discourse analysis”. Their work focuses on the idea that the 
analysis of the capitalist system “is incomplete without a significant element of language 
critique”. That is, capitalism should not be seen only as an economic system in which 
production is centred on solid commodities but also as a system centred on the production of 
knowledge and information. These both should be seen as “inevitably” being “produced, 
exchanged and consumed” as a discourse. When diffused and operationalised, discourse serves 
to incorporate “different scales of economic activity”198.  
 
In this approach, Marx’s engagement with classical political economy is considered as an 
analysis and a critique of “the discourse of political economists”. The argument they advanced 
                                                          
195 As Marx put it, language “is as old as consciousness”, it is “practical consciousness that exists also for other 
men”. Language “like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men”. 
Marx asserts that wherever exists a “relationship” between men, language and consciousness both exist for him, 
Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, The German Ideology, p. 42. 
196 What is more, they affirm that “Marx’s method includes elements” of the current CDA, Norman Fairclough 
and Phil Graham, “Marx as Critical Discourse Analyst: the genesis of a critical method and its relevance to the 
critique of global capital”, Estudios de Sociolinguistica, 3: 1, (2002), pp. 187-8. 
197  V.N. Volosinov, Marxism and the philosophy of language (London: Seminar Press, 1973), p. 19, For a 
grammatical critique of Hegel by Marx and Engels see Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, The German Ideology, 
pp.21-26. 
198 Norman Fairclough and Phil Graham, “Marx as Critical Discourse Analyst”, pp. 185-7. 
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is simply that Marx had built his work on critiquing the texts produced by classical political 
economists and the language they used. Marx’s critique, Fairclough and Graham stress, 
represents a critique of the “failure in the discourse” of classical political economy; it attacks 
the inadequacy of understanding and theorising the social relations of production in the 
discourse of classical political economy199. Therefore, there is a process of “recontextualisation 
and interdiscursive appropriation of existing (past) discourses” in Marx’s work, they argue. It 
follows that discourses are developed and shaped along the development of the system of social 
relations of production200.   
 
While many Marxists would argue that language and consciousness are categories which 
belong to the realm of ideas, Marx treated them as constitutive parts of the social “material 
processes” of production201. Thus, from this reading of Marx, Fairclough and Graham build an 
approach in which language is viewed as “an element of the material social process which is 
dialectically interconnected with other elements”. Hence, the production of our social life 
depends on more than material production. Social life is produced in economic and non-
economic spheres; it is “based within the articulation together of diverse elements and aspects 
of sociality into relatively stable configurations”. Language and discourse are essential parts of 
these configurations202.   
                                                          
199 From a critical discourse analytical perspective, Marx’s critique of classical political economy is a “critique of 
the connectivity in its texts: semantic relationships between words, argumentative relationships between 
propositions, temporal relationships between processes, syntactic relationships between and within sentences, 
relationships between what is asserted and what is presupposed, etc.”, Ibid. pp. 211-16. 
200 See for example their explanation of his work “the eighteenth Brumaire of Louise Bonaparte”, Ibid. p. 221 
201 It is in the German ideology that Fairclough and Graham believe Marx’s character as a discourse analyst 
appeared first. They see the German Ideology as a critique of the “ideological conceptions of the relationship 
between language, consciousness, social life, and ‘civil society’ ”. According to them, Marx saw language and 
consciousness as “aspects of the social production process which are inherently bound up in the totality and 
materiality of human experience”, Ibid. pp. 199-200. 
202 Ibid. p. 187. 
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Similarly, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, Laclau and Mouffe assume that this articulation 
of different elements of social life is performed through discourse. Discourse should be taken 
to constitute “a moment in the material production and reproduction of social life” and, 
therefore, analysing “the social ‘work’ done in texts” serves as a “significant focus of a 
materialist social critique”203. In Fairclough and Graham’s view, discourse analysis in this way 
should be seen as an analysis of “the form and contradictions” of capitalism and “the forms of 
resistance and struggles for change which are developing in response to it”204. Therefore, it 
should be noted that the analysis and critique of language is an approach which examines 
language not “as an abstract system of signs” but as “a substance of changing material 
circumstances and practices”. Language should be conceived of as both “product, producer, 
and reproducer of social consciousness, which in turn is in a reciprocally causal relationship 
with the whole of the human experience”205.  
 
Fairclough’s and Grahams’ critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach treats the structure, 
policies and activities which form the heart of neoliberalism as comprised of more than ideas 
or discourses, they treat them as being entrenched in a “material character”206. To put it 
differently, these are material realities that include neo-liberal ideas and discourse. In 
agreement with Fairclough and Graham, Volosinov affirms that the social relations of 
production determine the type of discourse used among social actors207. Language and 
                                                          
203 Although articulation for them is a hegemony achieved through hegemonic discourse in and through the 
cultural and linguistic domains, they are advocates of the Poulantzas idea of the autonomy of the political or the 
state from the economy.  They oppose what they claim to be economic reductionism in orthodox and neo-Marxism 
currents. Articulation for them does not mean representation of interests defined economically but “the result of 
political construction and struggle”, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
Towards a Radical democratic politics (London: Verso, 2001, 2nd Edition), p. 65, for a critique see Peter Ives, 
Language and Hegemony in Gramsci (London: Pluto Press, 2004) pp. 160-1.  
204 Marx and Marxism and critical discourse analysis share the focus on the critique of capitalism, Norman 
Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (London: Longman, 1995), p. 304.  
205 Ibid. p. 316.  
206 Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis: Methods for Advanced Students 
(London: Routledge, 2012), p. 82.  
207 V.N. Volosinov, Marxism and the philosophy of language (London: Seminar Press, 1973), p. 11, p. 19. 
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discourse functions like ideological signs but they always have “some kind of material 
embodiment“, he affirms. Creating social meaning through discourse is a “practical material 
activity”208. 
 
With every change that occurs in social life, CDA theorists believe that semiosis exist as part 
of the process of change. Social life, in this view, is mainly practices of all sorts (political, 
economic, cultural and so on) connected together; and each of these practices has “a semiotic 
element”. However, in line with Marx, Fairclough argues that what distinguishes all of these 
practices in their totality is that they are “practices of production” in the sense that “they are 
the arenas within which social life” in which all of its aspects is shaped209. Thus, discourse 
conveys “diverse representations of social life” based on the positions of the actors producing 
it in the capitalist society which determines their representation210. For example, to be in the 
capitalist class or the working class has a great impact on the discourse produced, the discourse 
of the WEF is different from the discourse of the World Social Forum211. Thus, the social 
relations of producing realities “are partly discoursal in nature” and discourse “is partly social 
relations”212.  
 
Discourse analysis in our case is mainly concerned with discourse as a means to control or, 
more correctly, direct the actions of others. That is to say discourse mainly functions to produce 
consensus among the actors whose actions are the targets of the discourse213. As stated by Van 
                                                          
208 Ibid. p. 11.  
209 He explains social practices as including the following elements; “productive activity, means of production, 
social relations, social identities, cultural values, consciousness, semiosis”, Norman Fairclough, “The Discourse 
of New Labour: Critical Discourse Analysis”, in Margret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, and Simon J. Yates (eds.), 
Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis (London: Sage publication Ltd, 2001), p. 234. 
210 Ibid.  
211 Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse as Interaction in Society”, in Teun A. Van Dijk (ed.), Discourse as Social 
Interaction 2 (London: Sage Publication Ltd, 1997), P. 11. 
212 Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research, (London: Routledge, 2003), 
p. 25. 
213 Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse as Interaction in Society”, pp.18-9. 
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Dijk, discourse works as “the medium by which ideologies are persuasively communicated in 
society” and thus, a medium for reproducing power and domination of one group over 
another214. In each domain of social life ideology constructs “domain-related beliefs” that in 
turn shape the beliefs of certain group members who adopt this ideology. More specifically, 
members of groups acquire an ideology and reproduce it through “discourse comprehension, 
sharing, abstraction and generalization”215.  
 
Equally important here is to realise that any discourse signifies a “social plan” in practice. The 
discourse and the plan it bears are always “situational”. That is, it is embedded within a specific 
historical context. With every situation there is associated a particular ideology, and therefore, 
every discourse reflects the ideology characteristic of the historic-social situation to which it 
belongs216. The type of discourse dominant in institutions like the WEF is established on the 
present reality with a claim upon the future. It is, to use Rossi-Landi’s words, an ideological 
“intra-historical” discourse as opposed to “extra historical” which is based on the past and 
conservative in nature. The intra-historical discourse of the WEF concerns itself with “what is 
to be done” [emphasis in original]217. The language and discourse of the WEF change when 
the conditions of the world economy change218.  
Moreover, the importance of ideology in our research lies in the fact that, as explained by 
Mumby and Clair, discourses are central to the very existence of institutions. They are the 
“principal means by which organization members create a coherent social reality that frames 
                                                          
214 Ibid. P. 25. 
215 Ibid. P. 31. For the perception of language as “ideologized as a product and ideologizing as an instrument”, see 
Ferruccio Rossi-landi, Language as Work and Trade: a Semiotic Homology for Linguistics and Economics (South 
Hadley, Mass: Bergin and Garvey, 1983), P. 95. 
216 Ibid. P. 95. 
217 Ibid. pp. 103-5. 
218 For more details about language as capital and commodity see Rossi-Landi, Ibid. pp. 46-52 and pp. 165-6.  
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their sense of who they are”219. However, that is not to say that the process of creating social 
realities in organizations is a non-conflictual one. Realities and meanings are created and 
developed partly through discursive interactional process among the members of groups or 
organizations220.    
All social institutions are viewed by Fairclough as “ideological-discursive formations”221. They 
are formations produced, sustained, maintained and changed by struggle between different 
groups within them. Each formation has its own discourse which is embedded within its own 
ideology that is, in turn, signified by the discourse itself.  Institutions as ideological-discursive 
formations shape the actions of their members and, thus, their interaction with members of 
other groups. What characterises such formations is their “capacity to ‘naturalise’ ideologies, 
i.e., to win acceptance for them as non-ideological ‘common sense’” 222, as neo-Gramscians 
would argue as well.  
For CDA, the discursive practices set the rules of behaviour for actors; they also provide 
“standards of assessment” and thereby influence actors’ interpretations of the problems they 
encounter and limit the range of options available to solve them through legitimising some and 
de-legitimising others. This is evident in the WEF’s competitiveness that is presented to states 
and market actors as the only desirable option. It should be noted, however, that it is not 
                                                          
219 Dennis K. Mumby and Robin P. Clair, “Organizational Discourse”, in Teun A. Van Dijk (ed.), Discourse as 
Social Interaction 2, p. 181, Ideology builds groups’ representations of their “criteria of membership”, practices 
and objectives, norms and values, “relative social position to other groups”, and the social resources they hold , 
Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse as Interaction in Society”, pp. 26-7. 
220 Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, p. 22. Also, CDA‘s reliance upon social structure and the role they 
play in discourse and language formation has attracted critics from many discourse analysis schools, of particular 
importance is Discourse historical Approach (DHA), for more details see Jason Glynos et al, “Discourse Analysis: 
Variations and Methods”, p. 18  
221 Norman L. Fairclough, “Critical and Descriptive Discourse Analysis”, Journal of Pragmatics, 9 (1985) pp. 
739-763. 
222 Here our position bears similarity to some extent with Gramsci’s ideas of common sense and hegemony but 
does not flow from it.   
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institutions who drive political change but “it is their discursive practices that shape the 
behaviours of actors who do”223. 
 
Social institutions such as the WEF perform specific roles. They figure as a “pivot” between 
the “social formation” and “the particular social event or action”. However, Fairclough stresses 
that the relation between social formations, social institutions, and social actions or events is a 
two-way dialectical relation224. Hence, changes and actions are dialectically determined225. It 
follows from this point that social institutions simultaneously facilitate and constrain the 
actions of their members, but deciding what actions are facilitated and what actions are 
constrained depends on the changes in the nature of social struggle within which institutions 
exist. Fairclough believes that the struggle within institutions is a reflection of class struggle in 
general, and that, most importantly, “ideological and discoursal control of institutions is itself 
at stake” in this struggle. Social institutions are ideological institutions within which the 
maintenance of domination of one ideology requires “discoursal power” which in turn “exists 
alongside economic and political power”226. The dominance of one group’s ideology leads to 
seeing its norms not as ideological norms but more as institutional norms. As a result, a certain 
ideological representation of a certain reality emerges as a straightforward display of reality227.  
 
                                                          
223 Frank Fischer, “Constructing Policy Theory: Ideas, Language, and Discourse”, p. 28. From a socialist 
constructivist perspective, the creation of meaning is fundamental for turning preferences into actions because 
meaning creation helps catalysing support for particular action as well as immobilising counter-actions. Ideologies 
represent in significant part a basis upon which social meanings are constituted. Following from that, political 
discourses which are based on the creation of social meaning concerning an issue are discourses derived from 
ideologies, Frank Fischer, “Public Policy as Discursive Construct: Social Meaning and Multiple Realities”, pp. 
56-8 
224 Social formation is taken to mean a social, economic, and political system, the capitalist society is a 
representation of such formation. Here, social formation is considered as the “the highest level of social 
structuring” while Social events or actions are viewed as located at “the most concrete level” of social 
restructuring, Norman L. Fairclough, “Critical and Descriptive Discourse Analysis”, p. 747 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid. pp. 750-2 
227 Ibid. p. 754 
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Discourse in institutions, for Schmidt, facilitates policy change. It serves to “overcome 
entrenched interests and institutional obstacles to change by altering perceptions of interest and 
showing the way to new institutional paths”228. In fact, this is mainly the case of the WEF’s 
discourse of competitiveness which is directed at facilitating a change in states’ policies229. 
Moreover, by looking at the way the UK has responded to the imperative of competitiveness, 
in Chapter Eight, we can see how adopting a discourse of competitiveness facilitated changes 
in social and economic policies long entrenched in the institutional structure of the country.  
 
Now, how does discourse work in practice to trigger policy change? Schmidt answers the 
question using the following logic. There are two types of discourse that are formed in different 
ways and each of them plays a different role. The first is what she calls “communicative 
discourse” which takes place “in the political sphere”. It involves every actor attempting to 
present, deliberate, and legitimise ideas to the general public. However, the communicative 
discourse gets communicated to the general public only after having been developed and agreed 
on in the institution producing it.  When it is still being formed, Schmidt calls this discourse 
“coordinative discourse”230. The totality of the two discourses Schmidt calls “discursive 
institutionalism”; this describes the operationalisation of discourse within an institution and 
beyond to their target outside of the institution itself231.   
                                                          
228 Vivien Schmidt, “Does Discourse matter in the Politics of Welfare State Adjustment?” Comparative Political 
Studies, 35: 2 (2002), pp. 169-70. 
229 Ibid. 190 
230 Schmidt defines coordinative discourse as consisting of actors involved in “policy construction”; the making, 
explanation, and justification of a policy and the idea behind it. Communicative discourse, on the other hand, 
includes “other political actors as well, including members of opposition parties, the media, pundits, community 
leaders, social activists, public intellectuals, experts, think-tanks, organized interests, and social movements”. 
These parties of the communicative discourse “communicate their responses to government policies, engendering 
debate, deliberation, and ideally, modification of the policies under discussion”. It is also accompanied by the 
response of the general public, Vivien Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism: the Explanatory Power of Ideas and 
Discourse”, Annual Review of Political Science, 11 (2008), p. 310. 
231 Schmidt puts forward the claim that “simple polities” such as the UK and New Zealand have stronger 
communicative discourse than “compound polities” such as Germany and the Netherlands which have stronger 
coordinative discourse, Ibid. p. 312. 
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Actors use discourses to deliver a message to specific audiences about a specific state of affairs 
and try to view a certain course of action as legitimate through the inclusion of legitimate values 
in its discourse. For example, economic growth is advanced by the WEF as a goal to be 
achieved through applying competitiveness standards, and then states tend to recognise it and 
accept it as legitimate because economic growth is publicly recognised as legitimate value. The 
discourse of the WEF carries certain representations of the group’s belief of how particular 
events or problems should be comprehended and dealt with, or what social practices are 
necessary to better serve the group’s interests. Hence, the discourse of the WEF is ideologically 
controlled whereby its discourse-informed events and practices reproduce its ideology232.  
In analysing the discourse of competitiveness as a form of managing capital-labour relations 
by the state, we mainly rely here on the version of CDA introduced by Fairclough in light of 
Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism.  For Isabela and Norman Fairclough, discourse is built 
on “practical argumentation” which takes the form of a chain of “circumstantial premises” that 
represent “the context of action” and “goal premises” that once turned into “reality” it becomes 
“the context of action’ of another action. Argumentation and deliberation employ “particular 
representations (descriptions, narratives, explanations)” of an issue and these representations 
intend to shape actions and their outcomes in specific ways233.  
 
This methodology we believe will help us explain how the discourse of competitiveness works 
in relation to state policies. Therefore, to empirically analyse political discourse we should 
focus on the analysis of the “practical argumentation” characteristic of the text that is being 
                                                          
232 Important for our research here is to understand that what ideologies do not do, however, is that they “do not 
immediately tell each social member how to act in each situation”; they, more generally, “serve groups to develop 
shared, general and mutually coherent representations for large domains or major problems of social and cultural 
life, Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse as Interaction in Society”, p. 27. 
233 Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis, pp. 3-6. 
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analysed. This will include an analysis of the representations of reality in the text and 
incorporation of the latter into an analysis of the practical argumentation aspect of the text234. 
 
To this end, we employ Norman and Isabel Fairclough’s discourse analysis framework which 
is conducted in the following order: An analysis of the circumstantial premises, goal premises, 
value premises and a claim for action. Then we need to look at the text as containing practical 
reasoning or deliberation to examine the indication of alternative proposals suggested by the 
actor and how they are evaluated in comparison to others. Also, we will consider the means 
specified in order to achieve the goals. One more point should be kept in mind throughout our 
analysis. It is that discourses of the WEF and the concepts they employ should be understood 
within their historical context: they are not fixed but conditioned upon the dynamics of class 
struggle235. More specifically, we see this as being derived from the dynamism of the system 
of social relations of production based on the changing conditions and nature of class struggle. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented an Open Marxist account of the socio-economic developments 
of the global economy that have precipitated the transformation in the mode and form of the 
management of capital-labour relations at the transnational level. These developments have 
manifested in the shift from a Keynesian structure of the state to one that is predicated on a 
monetary structure in late 1970s and early 1980s. Moreover, I have argued that such a 
                                                          
234 This is mainly because “ways of representing the world enter as premises into reasoning about what should 
we do”, Ibid.  pp. 86-7. 
235 However, I do not agree with them that nowadays in society there are more differences than similarities among 
social actors. However, I agree with their argument that every discourse has scale and time limitations and, thus, 
policy change is fixed only partially and temporarily due to the “surplus of meaning of ‘the social’” in our society 
which makes it difficult for any discourse to permanently articulate social practices “as moments of a stable 
articulatory structure”, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp. 50-2 and pp. 
71-2.  
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transformation of the form of state management of the national economy was made necessary 
by the changing conditions of class struggle at that time. Economic recession, high 
unemployment rates, and fiscal crisis accompanied with public spending laid huge pressure on 
capital’s ability to reproduce itself at the global market. Therefore, the rise of neoliberalism 
was based on the state’s inability to create profitable conditions for capital given its struggle to 
contain labour within capital’s limits. The power of trade unions acquired during the golden 
age of rapid economic growth and high employment had to be minimised in order to sustain 
global accumulation of capital, which the state attempts to immobilise within its borders 
through offering an attractive business environment. Thus, market freedom and natural rates of 
employment took precedence over state intervention.   
Moreover, these and later developments, I have argued, will only be fully comprehended when 
we take into consideration the role of the discourse associated with them. That is, the rise of 
neoliberal policies, associated with the Monetarist doctrine, should be also analysed through 
the discourse that signify its ideas. Discourse is one form of class struggle alongside the 
political and the economic. Discourse is not to be viewed as dominant over the political and 
economic forms of class struggle. However, it is a moment that exists simultaneously with the 
political and economic moments; it is one element in the re/production of the capitalist social 
relations of production and its underlying class antagonistic relations. The point is, in order to 
adequately assess the power that the WEF, as a representative of the TCC, on the state, we need 
to be able to evaluate the influence its competitiveness discourse has on the state. In order to 
do that, we need to account for the role of discourse in the form of the state’s management of 
capital-labour relations. For this purpose, I have made a preliminary attempt at developing an 
Open Marxist approach to discourse analysis based on a brief discussion of Marx’s treatment 
of discourse. The framework adopted above will add to OM’s explanatory power in such a way 
that it will cement its theoretical bedrock against other theories.  
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In the next chapter, we will turn to providing a historical and Open Marxist analysis of the 
WEF as one site of the TCC. By looking at its structure, role and relationship with the state and 
other actors, we will offer a comprehensive empirical case study of one of the most influential 
global policy groups that in theory represents an important manifestation of the existence of 
the TCC.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
The World Economic Forum: An Agent of the TCC Par Excellence  
 
In the previous chapter it was shown how and why OM could enhance its explanatory power 
through a critical engagement with the role of ideas in analysing the role of the state in the 
reproduction of class antagonism and the capitalist social relations of production. More 
specifically, it was argued that class struggle manifests itself in discoursal-ideological form 
alongside the political and economic forms as established within OM thus far (which of course 
are never free from discursive-ideological struggle). However it was maintained that assuming 
a discoursal form, class struggle needs not to be viewed as being determined by ideas and the 
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discourses that uphold them. Rather, class struggle as a driving force for the development of 
capitalism is reproduced via the articulation of material and non-material social processes – 
discourse, then, is an element of the reproduction of social life. It is an element that is 
interconnected with other material elements. As such, class struggle is not reduced to a struggle 
between discourses as Clarke would argue. Discourses figure as a moment in the reproduction 
of class struggle.  
Thus, the analysis of the rise of neoliberalism will become more comprehensive when the role 
of the discourse that is carrying the neoliberal ideas is taken into consideration. Neoliberalism, 
as a mode of containing labour within the limits of capital, rose when the Keynesian mode of 
managing the relationship between the working class and the capitalist class had reached its 
limits in the 1970s. Intensified struggle between the capitalists and the labourers led to capital 
being unable to reproduce itself, thus requiring an intervention from the state to maintain 
capital’s continued accumulation. Neoliberalism and its competitiveness invention are 
essentially a new form of managing capital-labour relations by the state, a new mode through 
which the global circuit of capital is maintained.   
This chapter shows how the TCC attempts to project its power through ideas and discourses 
alongside material power that essentially forms the heart of its discursive power. It will focus 
on the WEF as an active and influential global policy group representative of the TCC. It 
embodies one among other policy groups of the TCC as outlined in Chapter Two: nevertheless, 
as this thesis demonstrates, a particularly important one. Specifically, the WEF signifies a case 
where Sklair’s, Robinson’s and Carroll’s perception of the TCC materialises in its most explicit 
way. The Forum’s transnational class composition, its engagement with state officials, 
professionals, ideologues and the media make it an interesting case study. Moreover, it 
constitutes an adequate target for analysis given its role in the making of the current discourse 
of competitiveness prevailing in today’s global governance and national policymaking as a 
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means for managing states’ national economies. Most states have engaged with the discourse 
of competitiveness and, arguably, the majority of them have started to conduct their economic 
management along its standards. Competitiveness has become the modus operandi of national 
and transnational policymaking. This I will discuss in Chapter Eight of this thesis.  
The academic literature on the WEF as a global policy group is practically threadbare. Thus 
far, the Forum has attracted little interest from academia, making the findings of this study 
particularly important and timely. TCC scholars have referred to the topic only in a cursory 
manner. Inevitably then, the Forum has stayed as a focus for media reports, which have barely 
gone beyond the Forum’s most celebrated event – the Davos Annual Meeting. On the other 
hand, other global policy groups such as the ICC, ERT has enjoyed more sustained academic 
analysis236. There is certainly much to study and learn about the WEF: its organisational 
structure, global representation of members and participants, the global scope of its activities, 
and most interestingly its wide-ranged publications originating from being an expertise 
community with regard to global governance.  
The questions we attempt to answer in our chapter are the following: what is the significance 
of the structure of the Forum as a global policy group of the TCC? What is its agenda and role 
in contemporary global governance? What is the relationship of the Forum to the dominant 
discourse of globalization? How the state figures in this context and what role does it perform? 
Section one of this chapter is concerned with providing a brief overview of the course of 
                                                          
236 Examples of prominent works on other policy groups are: Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, “Transnational Class 
Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists”, New Political 
Economy, 5:2 (2000), pp. 157-181; Michael Nollert and Nicola Fielder, “Lobbying for a Europe of big business: 
the European Roundtable of Industrialists”, in Volker Bornschier (ed.), State-Building in Europe: The 
Revitalization of Western European Integration, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). On the ICC 
see: Volker Schneider, “Global Economic Governance by Private Actors: The International Chamber of 
Commerce” in J. Greenwood and H. Jacek (eds.), Organized Business and the New Global Order (New York: St 
Martin’s, 2000), Dominic Kelly, “The International Chamber of Commerce”, New Political Economy, 10: 2 
(2005), pp. 259-71;  Brian Hocking and Dominic Kelly, "Doing the business? The International Chamber of 
Commerce, the United Nations, and the Global Compact", in Andrew Cooper, John English and Ramesh Thakur 
(eds.), Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy? (New York: United Nations University Press, 
2002).  
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development of the WEF by looking at the major steps taken by the Forum since its launch. 
The focus here is on how the WEF has developed from being only an annual meeting of 
European business leaders at Davos into a global organisation holding, additionally, regional 
meetings, running many activities and managing and cooperating with various communities 
throughout the year. The second section seeks to shed light on the Forum as a discursive 
formation as well as being a business organisation. An important manifestation of the influence 
of the WEF today derives from its engagement with disseminating knowledge worldwide 
through the multiple channels it has created. The final section will touch briefly upon the 
Forum’s discourse on the role of the state in an age of neoliberal globalisation. Such an account 
will help us set the foundation for the coming chapters which engages with the adoption of 
competitiveness as a mode of national management of capital-labour relations.  
4.1. Overview of the Forum: TCC Characteristics  
 
Celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Centre D’etudes Industrielles (CEL) in Geneva in 1971, 
Klaus Schwab, who was then a Harvard graduate and a member of CEL, convened the 
European Management Symposium under the supervision of the Swiss government. It brought 
together European business leaders to discuss the challenges facing European companies at 
home and in the global market. After the conference Schwab received a legal authorisation 
from the Swiss government to organise the conference on a yearly-basis. In 1972, the 
symposium was turned to a Forum, the European Management Forum (EMF) with an original 
endowment of approximately 28,000 US dollars provided by its attendants237.  
                                                          
237 Jean-Christophe Graz, “How powerful are Transnational Elite Clubs? The Social Myth of the World 
Economic Forum”, New Political Economy, 8: 3 (2003), p. 329. The first two meetings were attended by 450 
and 300 CEOs of major companies, respectively, see Klaus Schwab, “The Predictions of Davos-Man”, The 
Economist, November 21, 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/theworldin2011/2010/11/predictions_davos-
man_klaus_schwab (accessed December 1, 2011).  
 95 
 
According to Schwab, the EMF began as “a two-week management course” to teach American 
management techniques to European businesses238. These techniques were based on 
establishing a “greater distance between management on the one hand and government and 
labor on the other” in order to maintain a level of flexibility and dynamism necessary for 
improving their positions against competitors239. In this sense, the EMF should be essentially 
viewed as an endeavour by European businesses to obtain a leading role “independent of the 
traditional nation-state level European tripartite government-management-labour relationship” 
that was entrenched in Europe’s economic policymaking in the aftermath of WWII. In doing 
so, European businesses would be able to project themselves as powerful actors at the European 
and global levels240. From the start, the European question of competitiveness was one that is 
rooted in containing labour within the limits of capital the absence of which was seen to hold 
them back on the global market. European governments were under pressure to redefine their 
relationship to both capital and labour along the American style characterised with flexible 
management and efficient labour market regulations.    
At its inception, the Forum defined itself as “an independent, self-financing, not-for-profit 
Foundation, aligned with the strategic needs of the top decision-makers of European 
business”241. The official document published by the Swiss government then determined the 
objective of the foundation as aiming “to promote events that serve a closer cooperation of the 
international, and in particular the European industry” and oriented to identifying “role models 
                                                          
238 Klaus Schwab, Interview with Simon Hobbs, CNBC Business, the CNBC Europe Programme: The Leaders, 
March 2008, http://www.cnbcmagazine.com/story/klaus-schwab/378/ (accessed November 21, 2011). 
239 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, The World Economic Forum: A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global governance 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 93. 
240 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, “Shar-pei or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? The World Economic Forum from Le Défi 
Americain to the Bill-Bill Summit”, Paper presented to the International Studies Association 2001 Annual 
Conference, 21 February 2001, See also Klaus Schwab, “Klaus Schwab: Man at The Summit”, Interview with 
Pranay Gupte, Pranay Gupte Blog , 2011, http://pranaygupte.blogspot.com/2008/01/klaus-schwab-man-at-
summit.html (accessed 10 November 2011).   
241 EMF, “Institutional Brochure”, 1975, quoted in WEF, The World Economic Forum: A Partner in Shaping 
History, (Cologny: World Economic Forum, 2009), p. 21.     
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and concepts for responsible and successful management”. For this objective, the Forum 
commenced management programmes in research, training and education on a European 
level242. Thus, it should be noted that rather than being only a personal project of Schwab’s, 
who has been the Forum’s president since it was founded and who has therefore attracted 
endless criticism, such a decision conveyed more of a European response to economic 
challenges of the time, mainly the challenge of global competitiveness. Hence, the Forum 
sought to facilitate the restructuring of their businesses in order to effectively respond to new 
developments in the European and global markets, which was manifest essentially in the 
increasing competitiveness of non-European companies.   
Explaining the decision of turning the Symposium into a yearly event, Graz believes that the 
CEI realised that in order to be successful, the event had to offer something “beyond the 
dissemination of the latest management techniques of the USA throughout the European 
entrepreneurial culture”. Therefore, the CEL’s strategic decision was to create a “loose and 
informal framework of strategic business planning”243. As “a European think-tank”, the WEF 
was committed to get to “grips with what Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber had called 'Le Defi 
Americain' - the perception that US companies were taking over the world” the embodiment 
of which materialised in the penetration of the European market by American capital, its 
financial market in particular. This fact confirms with Gill’s and Van der Pijl’s arguments with 
regards to the formation of the Atlantic Ruling class influenced by the expansion of American 
businesses into Europe244. The establishment of the Forum, therefore, was triggered by a 
                                                          
242 Hans-Peter Tschudi, Federal Councillor, Head of the Department of the Interior 1959-1973, quoted in WEF, A 
Partner in Shaping History, p. 6. See also Kirsten Lundberg, “Convener or Player? The World Economic Forum 
and Davos”, Kennedy School of Government: Case Program, 2004, p. 4.  
243 Jean-Christophe Graz, “How Powerful are Transnational Elite Clubs?” p. 330. 
244 William Keegan, “Seeing the World from Davos”, The Guardian, January 28, 2007, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/jan/28/worldeconomicforum.davos2007 (accessed March 13, 2012). 
This penetration of American capital into Europe can be ascribed to the concentration and centralization of capital. 
As Poulantzas explains, the number of American bank branches established in Europe rose to 52 in 1967. He 
believes that the increasing American investments in Europe is due to the concentration and centralisation of 
capital where most of these investment originated from “the most concentrated branches and sectors in the United 
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growing concentration and centralization of capital in Europe and the US. The latter’s 
penetration into Europe took advantage of uncompetitive European businesses and, as Mandel 
puts it, was perceived as an extension of American power into Europe245.  
The WEF became a membership organisation in 1976 with a strict policy of “exclusivity” put 
in place for the sake of enhancing its image as a ‘quality organization’. That is, its recruitment 
strategy became based on integrating only pioneering companies distinguished by their growth 
rate, innovation and dynamism246. According to the Forum, a member company “is a global 
enterprise with more than 5 billion US$ in turnover”. Members are described by the Forum as 
“influential”, “talented”, ”powerful”, “innovative”, “inspiring”, and “committed to making the 
world a better place”247. When the Forum’s members reached a thousand in 1994, the decision 
was taken not to exceed this number and the focus shifted instead to refining “the quality of 
membership” and its “regional and industrial diversity”248. At this stage, the Forum has formed 
its corporate core, TNCs that constitutes the driving force of the TCC project in maintaining 
its hegemony.    
 
As noted by Garelli, a former Managing Director of the WEF, the strategy of enforcing quality, 
exclusivity and attendance by invitation has been inspired by the conviction that “the success 
                                                          
States” and were directed into industries with “a high degree of concentration, and they thereby contribute to 
accelerating the pace of concentration”. Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, p. 52-3.  
245 Ernest Mandel, late capitalism, p. 326. 
246 The companies involved in these meetings and activities are those that dominate the world economy; ‘the 
Forum continued to be selective, inviting only the CEOs of major companies’, WEF, A Partner in Shaping 
History, pp. 13, 41. 
247 WEF, Members, http://www.weForum.org/members (accessed December 13, 2011). WEF, “The World 
Economic Forum: Entrepreneurship in the Global Public Interest,” Promotional Brochure, (2005).  In its 2004-
2005 annual report, the Forum describes the quality of its members as follows: 60 percent of its members are 
global companies with an annual turnover of 4 billion, 30 percent are companies that dominate their region 
although smaller in turnover than the first group, and last 10 percent is occupied by companies that have 
contributed to their market innovatively like Google, WEF, Annual Report 2004/2005 (Cologny: World Economic 
Forum, 2005), p. 21.  
248 WEF, A Partner in Shaping History, p. 121, If the expansion of the forum to Asia, to China and India in 
particular, means anything, it represents a recognition from the Western capitalist states of the increasing power 
of this region. It, moreover, signifies the transnationality of the WEF and the extending core of the TCC to an 
expanding Triad region as discussed earlier in Gill’s and Van der Pijl’s account of the TC.   
 98 
 
of Davos will depend on the quality of the audience more than the quality of the program”249. 
The type of membership and participation within the Forum has enabled the latter to have a 
“de facto position of power” and provided it with “the capacity to bring about change in society 
at large”, Graz maintains250. Hence the Forum has a unique characteristic and originality 
compared to other organizations of the same kind. For Lundberg, Schwab’s invention was to 
realise a “need no one thought existed”. That is, the need for an “informal, top-level and 
confidential” platform for dialogue among world political, business and civil society leaders251.  
There are a number of layers and roles to the WEF’s participant. In addition to its foundation 
members, the Forum has established partnerships with “some of the world’s leading corporate 
citizens” that provide vital “leadership in support of the Forum’s mission”: financially, 
intellectually, and organizationally. That is, besides its foundation members, the Forum has 
strategic partners, industry partners, technology pioneer partners as well as fast-growth 
partners. These partners lead the activities, initiatives, and projects of the Forum. Moreover, 
they provide “intellectual guidance” through their advisory roles252. As for the strategic 
partners, given their support to the Forum, they are “granted the opportunity to have a much 
more direct say in planning the agendas of Forum summits, initiatives and other events”253. On 
the other hand, industry partners include companies that “are actively involved in the Forum's 
mission at the industry level”. Their importance for the Forum rests on the fact that they 
                                                          
249 Stéphane Garelli, quoted in Kirsten Lundberg, “Convener or Player?” p. 7. 
250 Jean-Christophe Graz, “How Powerful are Transnational Elite Clubs?” p. 326. 
251 Kirsten Lundberg, “Convener or Player?”, p. 1 
252 WEF, “Strategic Partners”, http://www.weforum.org/strategic-partners (Accessed May 28, 2011). 
253 For instance, a CEO of a strategic partner company can decide to join a Forum mission to a certain country 
and demand the inclusion of particular topics to be discussed with actors of interest to him in this specific country. 
These partners also participate with Forum’s staff in planning the Davos annual meeting and also the regional 
summits, Geoffrey Allen Pigman, A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global governance, p. 26. The Forum’s 
regional Summits are: the World Economic Forum on East Asia, the World Economic Forum on Africa, the World 
Economic Forum on Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, and the World Economic Forum on 
Latin America. Its regional and country meetings reached 17 meetings a year. Industry-based activities: energy, 
construction, food and agriculture, financial services, communication, information technologies, etc., 
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represent an indispensable source of information and advice on challenges facing industries254. 
In this way, Carroll’s interlocking corporate directorships took place at the WEF, which turned 
the latter into an active business community.    
Besides its members and partners, the Forum interacts with world governments and other 
groups described by the Forum as “participants” and “communities” whose participation in 
Forum activities is determined by either being a beneficiary of the Forum’s activities or by 
being able to influence the objectives and the strategic interests of its members255. Overall, this 
multiple and functional network of communities and actors makes the Forum, in Klaus 
Schwab’s words, a “big cocktail party” that serves as an “intellectual as well as a social 
cocktail”256.  
 
According to Pigman, the Forum’s engagement with invited politicians and civil society leaders 
is derived from its strategic objective of establishing the foundations of the global business 
environment through “diplomatic interactions”257. The variety of actors included and involved 
in the Forum’s activities represents, Pigman contends, its deliberate attempt to achieve “global 
legitimacy”258. Such comprehensive but, at the same time, exclusive nature of the Forum in 
terms of membership and participation, makes it anything but difficult to depict the Forum 
other than as an “elite: the elite of politics, business, NGOS, thinkers, personalities and Nobel 
                                                          
254 WEF, “Industry Partner Groups”, World Economic Forum, http://www.weForum.org/industry-partner-groups 
(accessed December 15, 2011). WEF, “Strategic Partners”, World Economic Forum, 
http://www.weforum.org/strategic-partners (Accessed May 28, 2011). WEF, “Entrepreneurship in the Global 
Public Interest”. 
255 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global governance, p. 17. These invited guests are 
chosen by the Forum’s staff for each meeting “based on the topics to be discussed and who is likely to make the 
most useful contributions to the discussions” Ibid. p. 45. 
256 Klaus Schwab,” I, Klaus”, Weird Magazine, 7: 12 (1999), p. 2. 
257 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global governance, p. 54. For a critical view see 
David Smith, and William Lewis, “Corporate Big Shots Swagger at Davos”, The Sunday Times, January 30, 2005, 
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/article129589.ece  (accessed on January 11, 2012).  
258 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global governance. p. 72. 
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prizewinners”259. However, this self-proclaimed exclusivity has been undermined throughout 
the years as a result of continuous expansion of the Forum’s participants and communities, 
which attracted criticism from both within and outside the Forum as will be discussed later.   
 
Indeed, the continuing expansion of its activities and communities has been a major hallmark 
of the Forum’s history. As it was essentially established to respond to the challenges and 
difficulties faced by European businesses, the core of the Forum’s annual meeting agenda, its 
membership and activities have been influenced by global socio-economic and political 
developments from 1971 up until now. That is, the Forum has developed to become concerned 
with more than the competitiveness of the European industry. Today, it is engaged in constant 
attempts to open up new social, economic, political and environmental areas for discussion, 
debate, and development through collective participation, cooperation and innovation. Most 
importantly, it seeks to set up new rules and formulate economic reform policies that respond 
to changing global economic conditions. Furthermore, it integrates many actors from all over 
the world as stakeholders in the management of the global economy. This includes states, trade 
unions, civil society organisations, media figures, and so forth. The Forum’s objective, then, 
has shifted to maintaining the global competitiveness of companies as well as states.  
In 1975, the Forum made its first global move by inviting the Mexican Minister of Commerce 
and industry to participate in its annual meeting against the background of the economic 
difficulties in Mexico in early 1970s. In the same year, the Forum launched a cooperation 
programme with the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in order 
to create opportunities for investment projects between developing countries and Davos’s 
members and participants260. It then established the Arab-European Business Cooperation 
                                                          
259 Mike Moore, A World without Walls: Freedom, Development, Free Trade and Global Governance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 223,  
260 WEF, A Partner in Shaping History, pp. 21-24. 
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Symposium in 1976 and the Latin American-European Business Cooperation Symposium in 
1977. In 1979, it invited China to its Davos annual meeting and created the China-Europe 
Business Leaders Symposium in 1981. After that, it incorporated India in 1984, followed by 
Japan a year later261.  
Moreover, in the first decade of its life, The Forum organized business visits to several 
countries in Europe. This was eventually developed into country-Forums with the aim of 
bringing together the business community of Davos with the political and economic leaders of 
these countries. As illustrated by Lundberg, these meetings generally involved domestic and 
transnational companies, government and political leaders, academics and trade unionists262. 
In 1982 the Forum began holding what it called the Informal Gathering of World Economic 
Leaders (IGWEL) as a flexible platform for business and government leaders to exchange ideas 
and opinions on world political and economic challenges. The IGWEL is represented by heads 
of governments and their ministers of economy, trade, finance, technology and so on263. Its 
informal nature helped in increasing the number of politicians attending its meetings every 
year. In 1985, the Forum’s Industry Partnership was launched and developed to the Industry 
Partnership Programme in 2004. Then, the Forum initiated a plan to incorporate the most 
innovative and dynamic small and medium size enterprises in its membership and activities, 
which led in 2007 to the creation of Global Growth Companies (GGC). Besides, the Forum 
created the Forum Fellows community that include academics, media figures, artists and 
scientists264.  
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Considering this ongoing expansion, which has made the Forum more a global than a European 
organisation, and the fact that it has become concerned with economic policy in general rather 
than only management techniques, the EMF changed its name to the WEF in 1987. Today, the 
WEF is defined as “an independent international organization committed to improving the state 
of the world”265. Changing the name, as stated by the Forum, was “timely and necessary” so as 
to reflect its increasing globality266. It meant that, according to Graz, “the core organisational 
and commercial basis” of the WEF ended its reliance on “management experts paid to offer 
their knowledge to business leaders”. From 1987 onward, the WEF’s members started paying 
annual fees in return for being provided with the chance to network and exchange worldviews 
with other members and participants. It is in this context, Graz contends, that the Forum “has 
increasingly mingled management scholars with consulting professionals, columnists, high 
proﬁle CEOs and political leaders”267.  
This concentration and centralization of knowledge and expertise at the Forum, accrued by 
virtue of the involvement of several actors, has served to establish further communities in turn. 
For example, the Forum created the Forum of Young Global Leaders in 1992 that is composed 
of people who hold influential positions in their professions268. It also founded the Community 
of Technology Pioneers which encompasses small companies that have impact upon the 
development of their industry through technological innovation269. In the environmental field, 
the Forum initiated the “Green Globe 21”, an initiative that both benchmarks and provides 
certification for the travel and tourism industry. Also, the Forum started the publication of the 
Environmental Sustainability Index that measures the ecological responsibility of 100 
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countries270. Moreover, it set up the International Business Council in 2002 which acts as its 
advisory council and contributes to the formulation of the annual meeting agenda271. More 
importantly, in probably one of the most significant expressions of its accumulated knowledge, 
the Forum began producing its renown Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) besides other 
reports such as the Global Governance Report, the Transition Report, and the Digital Readiness 
Report. The publication of these report, then, is significant in that it represents one channel 
throughout which the power of the ideas of the WEF can be projected into and distributed 
within business and government circles. The Forum’s competitiveness discourse would 
probably have had little impact had it been left behind the doors, so to speak, at Davos. The 
publication of the GCR represents an active manner in which the discourse is communicated 
to the world outside the WEF. Here it has initially been coordinated through interaction with 
various stakeholders. This we will discuss in more detail in Chapters Six and Eight.   
What is more, in appreciation of the role of the USA in the global economy, the World 
Economic Forum USA was created in 2006 to be the headquarter for the Global Industries 
centre of the Forum that is responsible for framing and implementing the Industry Partnership 
Programme272. Another strategic move in the same year, which also reflects the increasing 
economic role of China, was the launch of the World Economic Forum China. In 2008, The 
Global Agenda Councils was constituted as the intellectual boost for the Forum’s activities. In 
addition, the Forum today sponsors numerous initiatives that involve various actors and which 
have different objectives, examples of which are: the Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative, 
the Corporate Performance Initiative and several others273. In what follows we will engage with 
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the existing literature on the WEF in order to show how its developments, structure and role 
have been perceived thus far.     
According to Pigman, the main objective behind such strategic shifts in the structure of the 
WEF is to create suitable platforms for all types of stakeholders of the global economy to 
interact. Eventually, meanwhile, it “increases the value of their contribution to the overall 
multi-stakeholder dialogue” which underpins the Forum’s ostensible mission to improve the 
state of the world. He argues that in light of it being a host for this wealth of activities, 
communities and initiatives should be understood in light of the Forum being an “ideas- 
generating platform” 274. They all facilitate the operationalization of those ideas. The Forum’s 
discourse on competitiveness in particular, therefore, should be perceived accordingly. This 
fact is facilitated by three main characteristics, he explains. First, they all “involve public-
private partnerships”; second, they all “embrace a multi-stakeholder approach to achieving 
their goal”; and third, they all “involve the Forum in some sort of a catalytic or enabling 
role”275. This multiple-activity nature of the Forum provides its members and participants with 
“multiple chances to renew personal relationships, to exchange ideas, and to forge an ongoing 
association with the Forum”276. 
 
Generally speaking, the variety of issues and activities that the Forum engages with has, 
according to Van der Pijl, turned it into becoming “the most comprehensive transnational 
planning body operative today”277. However, although being involved with the WEF yields 
many advantages to members and participants, Graz argues that the huge size and enormous 
activities of the Forum induce the “risk of defection of participants disappointed by the 
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atmosphere of a besieged and overcrowded fortress”278. Similarly, Pigman points out that some 
of its members have criticized the Forum for “trying to run too many panels altogether, with 
quantity often substituting for quality and fewer opportunities for the informal networking”279.  
 
Perhaps such criticism is most relevant to the Forum’s Davos annual meeting than anything 
else. As outlined above, At the beginning, Davos was considered by the Forum as ‘not enough’ 
to achieve its mission. Now, Davos is seen by its members and participants as well as the media 
as the most important activity of the Forum. It is a platform, I would suggest, that is most 
representative of the WEF as part of the TCC. Davos, in the Forum’s words, is the place where 
“participants can recharge their intellectual batteries, take the ‘global pulse’ in all fields, and 
create the basis for real leadership”280. Reflecting this multi-stakeholder dogma, which we will 
be discussed in the next section, the Forum portrays its annual meeting as follows: “of the 2,000 
participants at an Annual Meeting, one in 100 will be a head of state, one in 30 will be from an 
NGO, one in 15 will be an academic and one in 10 will be an editor from media”281.  
This meeting has expanded in reach and scope to the extent that the Forum now uses the 
concept of “the internationalization of the Annual meeting” to describe its distinctiveness282. 
As stated by Dhruv Sawhney, Managing Director of Triveni Engineering when introducing 
Schwab at the 2005 India Economic Summit, Schwab created “a United Nations of business, 
political and other global leaders of civil society”283. The annual meeting receives the lion’s 
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share of the Forum’s resources and effort given that it forms the most strategic platform for 
raising its publicity and, thus, its influence. Its significance derives from being a stage for 
enhancing the “take-home value” for its participants through intensive and extensive “update 
sessions” on the current global and regional issues and developments284. Moreover, for 
Lundberg, the importance of Davos originates from its ability to offer all stakeholders the 
chance to: make “contacts at the highest level” with business and political leaders, gain 
awareness of new trends in various fields, and engage in creative and diverse programmes285. 
Through Davos, “a shared sense of discourse – or common cognitive map – not just among 
attendees, but the rest of the global elite” is created286.  Davos is a place where new trends are 
set out by “trend-setters”287. More specifically, Graz argues that the annual meeting is a stage 
where all participants are eager to improve “their inﬂuence on some policy process288. Davos 
for Schwab is an “attention-getting business”289. For its critics, it represents, “the convention 
of the global party of capital…the investors’ protection Party”290.  
Davos is not everything that the Forum has to offer, but it is, as noted by Graz, “the World 
Economic Forum for a week every winter”291. In addition to its annual meeting, the Forum runs 
regional and country-based meetings. The regional meetings are intended for strengthening the 
relationship between Davos’s participants and regional business actors292. Country-based 
meetings like the India Economic Summit are designed to pool together business leaders and 
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their stakeholders in the country293. Moreover, the Forum’s industry-related activities are 
intended to bring together “the best minds and most important decision-makers worldwide in 
a specific field”294. This would include key decision-makers, politicians, clients, suppliers and 
experts in a given industry. According to Beder, the aim of the multiple meetings policy of the 
Forum is to “network, hold private discussions, share information and ideas, foster alliances 
and plan strategies for achieving common corporate goals”295. In contrast, for Schwab, it seeks 
to “launch and to test new ideas and finally to stimulate a consensus on priorities”296. 
From all of the above, one can see how the WEF truly embodies all the components of the TCC 
as outlined in Chapter Two. Its TCC nature is evident, first and foremost, in its self-depiction 
as an organisation that brings together business, political, academic and other leaders of society 
in order to “shape global, regional and industry agendas”; an organization that is “tied to no 
[...] national interests”297. The TCC’s main components, as discussed by Sklair and Robinson, 
are present at the Forum’s organisational, political and intellectual domains. The world’s major 
TNCs, its one thousand members, form the heart and the active agency of the WEF; the 
governmental representation at Davos and other meeting and activities constitutes its 
globalising politicians; its economic expertise communities whether businesses or economists 
make up its globalising professionals; and the heavy presence of media and other civil society 
communities form its elite of consumerists.  
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However, it should be noted that representation of members and participants of the Forum is 
still centred in advanced western economies, which confirms Carroll’s argument of the 
Western-Limits of the TCC outlined in Chapter Two. For example, the Global Agenda 
Councils established in 2009 are structured as follows: First, in terms of their stakeholder 
representation: 32% business actors, 32% academia, 15% NGO, 9% international organization, 
7% government, 3% for non-business actors and 2% media. Second, in terms of regional 
representation: 35% from North America, 31% from Europe, 20% from Asia, 6% from sub-
Saharan Africa, 4% from Latin America, and 4% from Middle East/North Africa298. This has 
to do with the fact that capital, even though it has accumulated in every region of the world, is 
concentrated and centralised in transnational companies of western origin, and indeed in the 
western region of the world more generally. They principally represent the active agents of the 
Forum. When it comes to governmental representation, meanwhile, this is also explained by 
the fact that states are not identical in terms of their relation to global capital, they are 
differentiated in terms of their role in the management of class struggle and the social relations 
of production, which define the level of the accumulation of capital within their jurisdiction. 
Now that we have seen how the WEF evolved from its somewhat provincial and inauspicious 
beginning in the 1970’s to an important part of the TCC, the next section of this chapter seeks 
to map out the underlying philosophy that informs the Forum’s organisational structure and 
that determines its level of interaction with its non-corporate communities and participants.  
 
 
4.2. The WEF as a Discursive Formation: A Multi-Stakeholder Governance Platform 
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According to Lundberg, in order to create an efficient and effective professional business 
platform, Schwab created a Forum “to offer business executives the opportunity to speak 
directly to those who influenced their world”299. This mission was commenced as early as the 
1974 Forum’s annual meeting with the invitation of European government leaders. As the 
Forum developed, the stakeholders’ list grew to include environmental activists, media leaders, 
trade unionists, scientists, artists and civil society organizations. Schwab’s aim was to turn the 
Forum into a “broker as well as host a neutral party [by] assembling those who”, in his view, 
“ought to know one another”300.  
 
In essence, the WEF was founded on a multi-stakeholder approach to business management. 
Its core idea is that, in order to be successful and profitable, a company has to take into 
consideration serving the needs of all of its stakeholders301. In today’s organisational structure, 
the WEF is quite conducive to such an objective where its meetings and activities have one 
common purpose: “to allow top managers of corporations to interact with all their 
stakeholders”302. Schwab’s idea was based on the stakeholder theory that he developed 
throughout his academic life. It considers the company as “a community, with a number of 
social groups connected directly or indirectly”: to it and upon them its profitability is 
predicated. This includes the state and all other groups that affect, and are affected by, the 
company. Schwab explains the idea further by stating that: “each individual is embedded in 
societal communities in which the common good can only be promoted through the interaction 
of all participants – and business success is also embedded in this interaction”. Hence, the main 
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idea of Davos and the wider Forum’s communities was to create a stage that is meant to serve 
this purpose – to enable all actors to develop and prosper as new focus of a successful business 
management303.  
For Schwab, business leaders have to respond to the “economic, ecological and social 
demands” of the society. He points out that a stakeholder theory is adopted at the Forum in 
order to affirm that businesses “cannot command as they please” and that they are “liable not 
only to one but to various stakeholders”. Therefore, success in the long-term is conditioned 
upon “trust of all the relevant interest groups”304. As illustrated by Pigman, Schwab’s approach 
is built on the belief that although stakeholders are different entities, “they may all have a stake 
in a particular issue or situation specific to their location or focus”305.  Initially, Schwab 
believed that by adopting a multi-stakeholder approach, European businesses would be more 
able to enhance their competitiveness through improving their efficiency, a model that is at the 
core of US-style of management306. With the expansion of the Forum, this principle serves its 
global members and participants, although of course to varying degrees.  
 
A multi-stakeholder approach to global governance has become perceived as a systemic 
prerequisite fundamental for improving the competitiveness of global businesses and the 
preservation of capital accumulation, which is the driving force for economic and social 
development. The Forum’s key motto, “entrepreneurship in the global public interest”, is based 
on the belief that “economic progress without social development is not sustainable, while 
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social development without economic progress is not feasible”307. Thus, the Forum’s role, 
Schwab and Smadja, the Forum’s former General Director, argue, is to “facilitate dialogue and 
discussion among all of the major stakeholders of the world economy [...] to advance issues 
from ‘just talk’ to real solutions”308. This fact has made the Forum “different from anything 
that came before it”309. In its code of ethics, the Forum introduces itself as “the foremost global 
multi-stakeholder organization”310 that seeks to cater for the interests of all stakeholders311. 
Bridging various interests of society defines the heart of the Forum’s mission, argues 
Schwab312. Yet, the main stakeholder prevalent in the Forum’s discourse and activities is 
political decision makers. This fact has made the Forum a political organisation of global 
governance313.  
  
The multi-stakeholder approach of the Forum facilitates the generation, exchange and 
dissemination of ideas and the creation, coordination and communication of discourses. It also 
provides the channels for their operationalization. Through the annual and regional meetings it 
holds and the numerous initiatives it undertakes, the Forum represents a social space were 
ideas, perspectives, and agendas are shared and discussed, where some are supported and others 
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are reconstructed314. The WEF’s is an agent in the “development of major public discourses” 
and in the formulation of global political, economic and social practices315.  While it has similar 
features with other global policy groups, he notes, the Forum’s differs from them in being “a 
knowledge institution” and in that its story is one “of the power of words, ideas and 
discourse”316. More importantly, he also correctly argues that the power held by its members 
and participants have provided the Forum with “a shaping influence”, through the discursive 
formation process resulting from the interactions of all those involved, on the “linguistic and 
ideational terrain upon which social forces and political and economic actors must operate”317. 
That is, the multi-stakeholder approach entrenched in every practice and activity of the Forum 
creates a kind of discursive effect which leads to reconstituting the members’ and participant’s 
identities, interests, and actions according to the norms and values dominant in the Forum. This 
fact have become most obvious in the neoliberal discourse of competitiveness, which is 
influenced significantly by the WEF as will demonstrated below in Chapter Eight.  
 
In terms of the Forum’s public image, meanwhile, we see that there are two contrasting 
narratives regarding the role of the WEF in a changing global society and that each of them has 
a plausible foundation. The first narrative portrays the Forum as an organization that embraces 
multiple participants and ideas and directs its corporate members to see themselves and their 
activities best served when they operate to uphold an “entrepreneurship in the global public 
interests”.  On the other hand, the second narrative depicts the Forum as “a cabal of wealthy 
elites” from private and public sectors that meet to shape the contours of the global economy 
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in a way that is intended to serve the interests of TNCs and governments of industrialized states 
“at the expense of consumers, the environment, the poor, and local or non-global culture”318.   
 
It is true, it is argued, that during the first two decades of its life, the WEF was concerned 
mainly with advancing the interests of its member companies. These interests were, and still 
are, associated with public policies that are conducive to their profit maximisation in an 
integrated global production system and global market. He points out that the critics’ image of 
the WEF’s neoliberal discourse is that it leads only to framing macro- and microeconomic 
policies, putting in place favourable regulatory framework and free market economic principles 
in the way that the WEF wishes319. In this view, the annual meeting of the Forum, the regional 
and country-based meetings, its roundtables and task force discussions are all intended to serve 
as “venues in which ideas and policies designed to benefit large firms and governments are 
legitimated and consecrated”. In this sense, “the Forum’s public information face” represents 
merely an attempt by its founders to ascribe legitimacy to its mission while utilising its 
activities as venues for business deals320. 
 
The legitimacy of the Forum, for Graz, is related not to its discourse or practices as much as it 
is related to the outside perception of the influence of the Forum which makes it hard “for it to 
pretend to a legitimate role in the shaping of world-wide issues in the future”321. That is, 
although the Forum has always tried to emphasise the human, social, environmental aspects of 
development, which helps giving corporate-led globalization a “human face”322, the Forum saw 
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economic growth only as the way to enforce all of these aspects. It is conceived as the 
precondition for achieving other objectives in different fields since “market-based solutions” 
are “central to how the WEF seeks to guide partnering in that direction”323. In this view, the 
Forum has sought to “recast the legitimating narratives of capitalist globalization” and to 
safeguard companies under the title “entrepreneurship in the public interest” –while in reality 
the Forum stands as “Mecca of hyper-liberalism; the capital of globalization”324. 
 
In contrast to Graz’s argument, as I argue in this thesis the legitimacy of the Forum also derives 
from the power of its discourses, whether on competitiveness, growth, environment, gender or 
financial security. As Fougner rightly states, there is a great potential for the members and 
participants of the WEF to bring about the materialization of the “WEF’s governance 
discourse” in the form of “governmental practice”325. This has become more evident today than 
ever in the embeddedness of its discourse of competitiveness within national policy-making. 
However, that is not to say that the discourse of competitiveness adopted at the national level 
is a mere materialisation of only the WEF’s discourse. Rather, it is to suggest that governmental 
practices have indeed become informed by its discourse on competitiveness to some extent.  
Moreover, although many, such as Carroll, affirm that the activities undertaken by the WEF 
serve mainly the interests of its TNC members, which differentiates it as “the most 
paradigmatic example of neoliberal structuralism”326, Pigman argues that the Forum’s 
members have become, relatively, more concerned not only with maximizing business profit 
but also with embracing policies that “would shape the nature of the global marketplace in 
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practice of world domination by capital’, José Corrêa Leite, and Carolina Gil, The World Social Forum: Strategies 
of Resistance (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005), p. 77.  
326 William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 43.  
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various ways that both benefited the firms and created public, social benefits as well”327. For 
him, the Forum debates that globalisation discourse rather than defines it328. He believes that 
the discursive interaction informed by the multi-stakeholder approach has affected both the 
members and the participants of the Forum. That is, during the 1990s and 2000s the Forum has 
changed in a way that reflects more commitment to social alongside economic development329. 
For example, the idea of globalization the Forum had promoted since its start has been 
redefined and restructured at the beginning of the 2000s in order “to re-legitimate it for the 
many for whom it had lost credibility”330. The fact that that Forum included its critics such as 
trade unionists and environmentalist as stakeholders is seen to have triggered such a shift, their 
participation has led to a change in the public information output of the Forum331. The various 
social, environmental and cultural initiatives of the Forum reflects to some extent Pigman’s 
conviction.  
 
Looking at the overall picture, evidence maybe yields support to the arguments of both its 
critics and adherents. But Pigman concludes that what is certain about the Forum is that its 
multi-stakeholder approach is “one of the central forces challenging the notion of markets and 
firms ruling untrammelled over other social forces and interests”332. Pigman is not alone in his 
view. Graz agrees and contends that the Forum and other global policy groups could serve as 
a “useful milieu” for everyone who is concerned with amending capitalism along sustainable 
and cosmopolitan lines333. It is a platform where the concerns of everyone are incorporated. As 
noted by Faux, Davos is “not the place for secret conspiracies”. On the contrary, it is “the most 
                                                          
327 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global governance, p. 94.   
328 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, “Shar-pei or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?”  
329 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global governance, p. 4. 
330 Ibid. p. 96. 
331 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, “Shar-pei or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?”  
332 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global governance, p. 152. 
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visible symbol of the virtual political network that governs the global market in the absence of 
a world government”334.  
 
Perhaps, one should always remember that that the WEF is by definition a private organisation 
that, first and foremost, pursues the interests of its members. Thus, public-private partnership 
should be seen as a manifestation of the Forum’s conviction that these interests are better served 
when taken alongside those of other stakeholders. From that, the argument that the discourses 
and practices of the WEF have overwhelmingly helped in shaping globalisation along a 
neoliberal doctrine has little, if any, originality. To a great extent, the version of globalization 
advanced by the Forum represents the prevailing project of the TCC which, according to 
Robinson, has been built on “twin dimensions”. The first is market liberalization and the 
constitution of “a new legal and regulatory superstructure for the global economy”. The second 
is the integration of national economies to global market through policies of internal 
restructuring335. Both dimensions, argues Robinson, would help creating “the overall 
conditions for the profitable renewal of capital accumulation through new globalized 
circuits”336. However, as argued earlier, the renewal of capital accumulation at the global level 
is a precondition for existence of capital at the national level. In order for the state to manage 
capital-labour relations nationally and to sustain the national circuit of capital and maintain it 
efficient labour market, it needs to intervene in the maintenance of capital accumulation on the 
global market since the state only exists as a moment in its circuit. As I argue throughout the 
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thesis, it is in the second dimension that I am interested in since it corresponds with the aims 
of the Forum’s discourse of competitiveness. 
 
Regarding the first dimension, the Forum treats this as no secret. That is, the Forum itself 
celebrates being a platform that facilitated the negotiations leading to the creation of the WTO 
in 1995 and the initiation of the Doha round at its 2004 Annual meeting337. Through its 
initiatives338, the Forum has succeeded in “aligning the interests of its member firms” with 
those of some international organizations like the WTO.  The agricultural task force which was 
an initiative undertaken by the Forum in collaboration with the WTO in 2003 is a case in point. 
It aimed at overcoming the obstacles for the liberalization of trade in agriculture as a condition 
to achieve economic development in developing countries. This task force was constituted of 
many Forum members who operate mainly in developing countries and has interests in the 
liberalization of the agricultural sector339.  Based on that, Van der Pijl is right to argue that the 
concept of control prevailing in the Forum is “solidly neo-liberal”; focused on competitiveness 
and eliminating whatever blockages hindering capital from full accumulation340.  
                                                          
337 The importance of the WEF in pushing forward the discourse of globalization and its practices is made clear 
by the Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh opening address at the 2009 annual meeting when he said: “if one 
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revitalize the Doha Development Agenda of global trade negotiations. Moreover, trade ministers gathering at 
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This image of the Forum is confirmed by Schwab and Smadja themselves when announcing 
the structural reforms underway at the WEF. They note that the overall picture today is that 
globalization has established “the supremacy of the market in an unprecedented way”; financial 
capital has humbled governments, reduced the power of trade unions, and made everyone 
vulnerable to the rule of the market341. For that reason, they argue, the Forum has launched a 
self-assessment process to measure its influence in this regard. Following the 2008 economic 
and financial crisis, Klaus Schwab states that there has been “a gradual erosion” of the 
“communitarian spirit” in the business world over recent years which triggered the current 
economic crisis. The reason behind this is that “the enterprise has transformed from a 
purposeful unit to a functional unit”, it has turned from providing common goods and services 
for the public into being concerned only with maximising profits and shareholder value in the 
short term. Therefore, from 2007 onward, the WEF has placed more emphasis on creating 
shared norms and values between all stakeholders to cope with the new challenges342.  
 
However, Schwab’s story does not alter much of the content of the Forum’s discourse on 
international competitiveness, which although recently has started to incorporate social and 
environmental norms, as will be highlighted in Chapter Six, it is still strictly driven by a call 
for economic competition in a way that leaves no room in reality for accounting for social and 
environmental sustainability by the state. However, this aspect of the Forum’s discourse is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. In the next section, we will elaborate briefly on Robinson’s 
second dimension, internal restructuring of the state, through an outline of the Forum’s 
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discourse on the role of the state and how its competitiveness discourse relates to this 
dimension.  
 
 
4.3. The Transformation Imperative: The State in the WEF’s Discourse 
 
In order to make sense of the arguments made by critics regarding the influence of the WEF, 
and the power of the TCC in general, the role of discourse that carries the ideas of this ruling 
class needs to be examined. Robinson’s second dimension of internal restructuring of the state 
would only make sense when the discourse of competitiveness underpinning neoliberal 
capitalist globalisation is tested in relation to its influence on the national policymaking of the 
state. As discussed thus far, it is evident that the state has figured in theory and practice in the 
formation of global policy groups such as the Forum. But what needs to be done in order to 
establish a comprehensive account of its role in relation to these groups is to map out not only 
its involvement in their activities but also the way it is depicted in their discourse. In relation 
to the former, it has been explained in depth so far. The latter will be elaborated a little more 
in this section. This will be done only concerning the Forum’s direct discourse on the role of 
the state outside of the GCR – which constitutes the topic of Chapter Six.        
The involvement of state officials in the Forum’s activities has gradually increased throughout 
the course of the Forum’s development. In fact, it reached its peak in 2009 with the eruption of 
the global economic crisis. As pointed out by the WEF, the 2009 annual meeting was attended 
by 40 heads of government, more than 100 trade ministers, and almost all major international 
organizations343. Since promoting public-private partnerships has become a general norm 
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underlying the Forum’s activities, its stakeholder project included not only states but also 
international organizations such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank and World Trade Organisation. This fact stands in contrast with the argument of the 
Forum’s critics such as Graz’s that the WEF “is institutionally cut off from the formal public 
institutions of the global economy”344. For example, Kofi Annan used the Forum as a platform 
in 1999 to launch the UN Global Compact calling upon companies, members of the Forum and 
others, to follow shared environmental, anti-corruption, human rights and labour standards. 
More recently, the Forum has started a new type of practice to improve their interaction with 
governments. It initiated what has become a custom based on granting the leaders of 
international organisations such as the G8 and G20 a room in the opening session of the Davos 
annual meeting as a way of providing support to their missions, which would help integrating 
all stakeholders into focusing on the global agenda rather than only corporate one. More 
importantly, for the aim of assisting the adaptation of the global economic organisations to the 
contemporary global economic environment the Forum launched the Global Redesign 
Initiative in 2010345. This points to the fact that the role of international organisations is as 
significant for the WEF’s mission of improving the state of the world as the role of the states, 
both are expected to restructure their priorities accordingly.    
 
For the Forum, the states and their international organizations “will continue to play a central 
role in global decision-making”. However, if they are to play an effective one, they have to 
adapt themselves to current conditions of the global economy and its resulting business and 
societal needs. States and international organisations have to convince themselves that they 
                                                          
344 According to Graz, this separation is what creates both strength and weakness of the Forum, Jean-Christophe 
Graz, “How Powerful are Transnational Elite Clubs?” p. 328. 
345 Klaus Schwab and Claude Smadja, “Join Forces to Solve the Shareholder-Stakeholder Equation”, International 
Herald Tribune 31 January 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/31/opinion/31iht-edklaus.t_0.html (accessed 
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constitute one “part of the wider global cooperation system that the world needs”346. Such an 
idea, argues Fougner, has penetrated both states and their international organisations as a result 
of the “cross-fertilization of ideas” characteristic of the multistakeholder approach of the 
WEF347. This characteristic has enabled the Forum “not only to problematize the conventional 
inter-state conception of world politics”, but, most importantly, also “to responsibilize” its 
members, states and other non-state actors, “in relation to global problems, and guide global 
problem-solving efforts towards multi-stakeholder partnering and market-based solutions”348. 
This ‘responsiblization’ policy is what turns the Forum into a private institution with a public 
agenda. Moreover, this new policy of the Forum applies also to trade unions within the nation-
state who, according to Schwab, have to respond to the new competitive economic conditions 
through redefining their “role and priorities if they want to protect the interests of working 
people while not creating obstacles to job creation”349. 
 
In order to fulfil these system-generated requirements, Schwab and Smadja assert that “action 
at the international level has to be complemented at the national level”. In order to achieve 
economic growth, the state has to “create or strengthen the institutional and regulatory 
framework required for the functioning of a free market economy integrated in the global 
system”350. The “mounting backlash” against globalization and “the social returns of global 
capitalism” can only be addressed when governments reorient their policies to focus on 
educating and training their people, upgrading their infrastructure, using fiscal incentives to 
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attract businesses and adjusting social policies within their nations351. That is, the state has to 
reconstruct the domestic structure of managing the relationship between capital and labour in 
a way that secures the accumulation of capital and yields the state with the economic and social 
conditions necessary to keep the social relations of production intact. The responsibility of 
governments, in the Forum’s view, is to “reinvent their role in order to help their citizens to 
meet the requirements of an ultra-competitive society shaped by the knowledge economy”; 
governments have to escape the left-right dichotomy and must work towards providing a 
“compassionate government” outside the old model352.  
 
Achieving sustainable economic growth from the perspective of the Forum needs more than 
business self-regulation. It requires governmental cooperation in framing what Schwab and 
Smadja call “authoritative regulations that guarantee” adequate social, and environmental 
standards. Yet, this is not to argue for the old model of state interventionism. Rather, the 
Forum’s approach rests on the belief that “the days of the all-powerful nation-state are long 
gone” and it is the role of business leaders to step in to help “develop a multi-stakeholder 
approach that works for the world in large and their business in particular”353.  Thus, in order 
to enable business to do so, the main role of states is to reconstruct the way they work. More 
specifically, in order not to avoid the risk of being excluded from significant economic 
opportunities, states need to reorganise their priorities. Their focus should become concerned 
with helping to “balance conflicting interests and make sure that the most vulnerable groups in 
society get protection and assistance” 354. 
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These internal restructuring imperatives take place effectively through the Forum’s discourse 
on competitiveness, as will be shown later in the thesis. The GCR is an important discoursal 
power through with which the state engages to respond to the national-specific needs of 
managing class struggle. The GCR was designed to serve as “a useful benchmark for 
governments around the world to monitor their performance based on economic as well as 
social criteria”. In the Forum’s eyes, the GCR has become an “indispensable tool that many 
countries employ to identify reform priorities”355.  
 
The publication of GCR is one significant way through which the desired responsibility and 
role of the state is reconstructed. Since its very first year, 1979, it was seen as a milestone in 
the development of the Forum. For Pigman, it represented “a key step toward the realization of 
Schwab’s objective of transforming the Forum from being primarily about organizing 
conferences into an organization that leverages fully its knowledge-generating capacities”356. 
According to Blanke, Chief Economist and Member of the Management Committee at the 
Forum, through the report “the whole point has always been to provide a platform for dialogue 
among all stakeholders on what needs to be done within and by countries in order to provide 
high and rising living standards for their citizens”357. As explained by Dreznek, states need to 
have “a business perspective on things and to have an international perspective on things and 
to have a tool for international comparison358.  
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357 Jennifer Blanke, Interview with The Author, July 10, 2013.  
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Although Pigman has not systematically analysed how the GCR influences the state, he is 
partly right in stating that the GCR pushes states into a race of “competition to be competitive” 
and play a “key role in generating and shaping the discourse of economic and social 
development and growth that the Forum wants to advance”359. The GCR lays out the ground 
for governments to conduct their territorial economic space in the spirit of market actors or 
what Fougner terms “states as competitors”360. As a method of benchmarking themselves, he 
affirms states become constituted as “competitive entities driven not by internal socio-political 
processes, but rather by global standards of conduct...supportive of private sector economic 
activity...to normalize a neoliberal vision of free-market capitalism”361. Through the report, 
states are being urged to undertake neoliberal economic reforms in order to enhance the 
competitiveness of their economies and achieve sustainable economic progress. However, he 
stresses that the point here is not that “the imperatives of the global economy” have forced 
states and other actors to act in certain ways, but rather that it is the “dominant globalization 
discourse” of the WEF that gave rise to the idea that the state should function in this manner in 
order to become prosperous in the global market362.  
The reality pertaining the Forum and other global policy groups is that they perform as “a form 
of the socialisation of the conduct of class struggle on the part of the bourgeoisie” as Van der 
Pijl argues363. Their policies and practices in relation to class struggle are modified by states’ 
involvement. His view of global policy groups as forming platforms for “developing common 
strategies and adjusting the hegemonic concept of control in response to resistance and other 
challenges” seems to capture much of the truth pertaining the Forum364. However, in our view, 
politicians’ involvement in the Forum simply shows that the Forum has not only been used as 
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a business platform to support their agendas. Rather, Pigman is right to argue that it also has 
been utilised by politicians as “a platform to speak out publicly through the media on major 
policy debates underway at home or in global arenas”365. If “the iron logic of the power of 
collaboration is inescapable” for businesses, as Schwab argue366, it is definitely inescapable for 
the state too. In light of our Open Marxist approach, the state is involved in the socialisation of 
the conduct of class struggle in the global economy because it exists as a political node in the 
global accumulation of capital. The domestic reproduction of capital-labour relations requires 
the state to take part in the management of transnational capitalist relations of production. The 
state’s involvement in the Forum’s activities contributes to the coordination of its 
competitiveness discourse. Whether it adopts the same exact standards at the national level of 
policymaking is a matter of further research. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the WEF effectively represents a materialisation of the TCC 
where its structure, activities and communities include all the components of the TCC as 
outlined by Sklair, Robinson and Carroll. I have demonstrated how the WEF was established 
in 1971 as a European organisation that aims to respond to the challenges facing European 
businesses and then have evolved to become today a global policy group that is a seen as a 
“phenomenon of our times”367. Given this evolution, it was established that the WEF has 
become an influential organisation capable of projecting its ideas and discourses outside its 
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walls given its multi-stakeholder nature. Such a characteristic of the Forum enriches it with the 
ability to form, coordinate and communicate discourses through collective participation, 
cooperation and innovation of various actors. The Forum in this sense constitutes a discursive 
formation where ideas and their discourses are exchanged, debated and finally formulated.  
 
I have also argued that the WEF’s discourse of competitiveness represents an important tool 
for channelling its influence to state and business actors both within and outside the Forum. 
This tool is founded on the Forum’s material structure, effectively its TNC members, which 
yields the Forum with publicity, attractiveness and credibility most importantly for state 
leaders. The GCR serves as a medium of communicating the Forum’s competitiveness 
discourse to these actors. However, what is weakly established in the argument made by the 
Forum’s critics’ is how the internal national restructuring process takes place in reality. Many 
states have adopted competitiveness as their modus operandi today, especially in the western 
world, and discourse has in some cases triggered a political debate concerning the national 
competitiveness ranking. However, there has been no credible and concrete evidence so far of 
the influence that WEF has over national policymaking. This task is at the core of this research 
in order to assess the argument considering the power of the TCC and its policy groups.  
 
Before turning into providing a detailed analysis of the GCR as an influential tool of 
channelling the WEF’s discourse of competitiveness, in the next chapter, I will review the 
debate on competitiveness in order to situate the Forum’s version of the discourse among other 
discourses and to assess its influence in comparison to other discursive organisations. This 
review will also give an idea of the state is placed in relation to the discourse and what is the 
influence of the latter over it.   
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Chapter Five 
The Politicisation of Competitiveness: The Role of Globalising Professionals  
 
In the previous chapter I have mapped out the structure of the WEF as a TCC site, based on the 
definition of the TCC in the literature. The chapter showed that the WEF includes the main 
components of this class: TNCs, globalising politicians and professionals as well as the 
consumerist elites. Each of these components, the TCC theorists assume, perform certain, but 
complementary, tasks in pursuit of the Forum’s interest. I argued against this position in 
relation to the second component, globalising politicians. The latter I maintained take part in 
the Forum’s activities as a response to the need of managing the relationship between capital 
and labour on the global market, as global capital flows across and beyond the state’s political 
borders.  
As demonstrated in the analysis, the Forum emerged as an attempt to recover the 
competitiveness of European industries. Capital accumulation and the realisation of profit came 
under a challenge in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Labour power which was reflected in 
inflexibility and wages detached from productivity levels, coupled with an undesirable levels 
of welfare spending, put European business profitability and their competitiveness under 
mounting pressure versus other competitors. To such a situation and in order for capital to be 
able to reproduce itself, the state responded by changing the form of managing capital-labour 
relations within its borders thereby supressing labour power and initiating a phase of state 
restructuring process away from the Keynesian model. This change yielded capital with better 
accumulation conditions, allowing it to reproduce itself globally. Hence, it ushered a stage of 
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global concentration and centralisation of capital and influence which materialised in the 
formation and growth of global organisations like the WEF.  
Today, the WEF represents a major contributor to global governance discourses in various 
fields. The variety of actors involved in its activities allows it to function as a powerful 
discursive formation that coordinates ideas and discourses and communicates them to the rest 
of the world, to businesses, the states and the rest of the society. I argued that the discourse of 
competitiveness embodied in the GCR is the channel through which the Forum projects its 
power. It is one of its influential discursive contributions through which it attempts to 
restructure the way states manage their economies. However, using the OM framework 
outlined in Chapter 1, I argued that; first, the involvement of the state in the activities of the 
Forum should not be seen as indicative of aligning its interests with those of the Forum as is 
the case made in most of the literature on international competitiveness which I discuss later 
on in this chapter. It rather should be viewed as an imperative to manage the conditions of class 
struggle beyond the state borders, a necessary task to the reproduction of class antagonism and 
the capitalist social relations of production within the state’s jurisdictions. Second, I argued 
that the engagement with neoliberal competitiveness discourse represents a form of the state’s 
management of capital circuits and class struggle rather than an imposition on the state by the 
Forum, an argument Neo-Gramscians and Structural Marxists make. States do not adopt the 
discourse as it is designed by the Forum, and its globalising professionals, but adjust it to their 
own socio-economic conditions in order to preserve the social order rather than endangering 
it. However, this is not to say that the Forum’s competitiveness discourse has no impact on the 
state restructuring process, but to emphasise that the management of class struggle nationally 
determines the extent of this impact. Discourse is a form of class struggle and a sphere with 
which the state engages with other actors such as the Forum and its globalising professionals 
 129 
 
in order to reproduce the capitalist social relations of productions within its jurisdictions. This 
will become clearer in this chapter.    
The first section of this chapter seeks to establish what international competitiveness is by 
looking at the work of prominent globalising professionals such as Stéphane Garelli and 
Michael Porter who are considered authorities on the subject and who have, most importantly, 
established the WEF’s competitiveness discourse in the GCR, although they differ greatly in 
their accounts today. Indeed, their work and role within the Forum has informed most of the 
debate on international competitiveness and the role of the state under neoliberal globalisation.  
Using Open Marxism, the second section will engage critically with the debate on the discourse 
of international competitiveness in order to highlight its limitations and propose an alternative 
approach on how to assess the impact of the competitiveness discourse on the state. The latter 
task I argue is conditional upon a thorough analysis of competitiveness reports published by 
global, and other, policy groups in order to offer a perspective that is not based solely on 
rankings and the political debates it generates. The overall argument underlying this chapter is 
that states adapt competitiveness standards to their own national environments because their 
relationships to global capital are not identical. Competitiveness standards are defined by the 
conditions of social relations of production characteristic of their own economies. Thus, the 
WEF’s competitiveness discourse is far from hegemonic and the influence of globalising 
professionals is limited to the conditions of class struggle within each state.     
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5.1. Defining Competitiveness: The role of Globalising Professionals  
 
Today, improving the competitive position of a country in the world economy is seen as “the 
best way to assure the most efficient governance of the world economy and the highest level 
of social well-being”368. This all depends on a role of the state different from that it assumed 
until the 1970s. Competitiveness has become a heated political topic today. It had risen in the 
1980s due to “the political problematisation of the state” attributed to its failure in maintaining 
sustainable growth and employment levels369. According to Kantola, since then 
competitiveness has transformed “the political imaginaries and political governance”370. It has 
brought about “a reconfiguration of politics” as people knew it where institutional democracy 
has had to respond to “the forces of globalisation and flexible capitalism”. As such, the 
traditional issues around which political discussions revolved increasingly lost their meaning, 
since providing businesses with a profitable environment has preoccupied statesmen and 
impacted on the way the state is being restructured “along the logic of the competition”371. As 
a result, competitiveness “proposes a new political imaginary, a theory of political community” 
and changes the way we should understand the state372.  
The creation of competitiveness agencies, indicators and ratings has underlined these 
developments within the state373. The publication of rating competitiveness indicators triggered 
                                                          
368 Group of Lisbon, Limits to Competition (London: MIT Press, 1995), p. 89. 
369 Anu Kantola, “Transforming political imaginaries: the uses of competitiveness”, University of Helsinki, 
Working Paper 3 (2006), pp. 15-6. 
370 Ibid. p. 1. 
371 Ibid. p. 20. 
372 Ibid. p. 22.  
373 Ibid. p. 2. 
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“a host of political discussions over a given county’s listing”374. As noted by Blanke describing 
the GCR:  
For many governments it is an important part of their toolkit in thinking about competitiveness issues and 
how to improve. Of course companies sometimes use the results to understand the situation in countries 
they may not know very well and where they are thinking of investing. But we have also seen that 
companies use the report’s results as a conversation starter with governments in order to discuss the 
challenges they are facing and to see how things could be improved375.  
By publishing the competitiveness report annually, the WEF’s objective is to provide 
businesses with “a practical and comprehensive strategic tool” to inform their policymaking376. 
In and through these agencies and reports, states began to “(re)constitute and act on themselves 
and their populations as competitive and entrepreneurial ‘place-sellers’ in a global market for 
investment”377. Since the competitiveness of a nation is mainly assessed by numbers, it follows, 
then, that democracy becomes also measured by numbers such as growth rate and employment 
rate which are brought about by the existence of profitable businesses within the nation’s 
borders. These numbers, to use Rose’s words, are “integral to the problematizations that shape 
what is to be governed, to the programs that seek to give effect to government and to the 
unrelenting evaluation of the performance of government that characterizes modern political 
culture”378. Thus, competitiveness has become a source of legitimacy to the political system 
today379.  
                                                          
374 Ibid. p. 9.  
375 Jennifer Blanke, Interview with the Author, July 10, 2013. 
376 Klaus Schwab and Xavier Gilbert Preface, World Economic Forum, World Competitiveness Report 1992 
(Geneva: IMD and the World Economic Forum, 1992).  
377 Tore Fougner, “The State, International Competitiveness and Neoliberal Globalisation: Is There a Future 
Beyond ‘the Competition State’?”, Review of International Studies, 32: 1 (2006), p. 181. 
378 Nikolas S. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), p. 199. 
379 Rose perceives democratic power as a “calculated power” in which numbers are “intrinsic to the forms of 
justification that give legitimacy to political power in democracies”. Numbers are “integral to the technologies 
that seek to give effect to democracy as a particular set of mechanisms of rule”, Ibid. p. 200.  
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Garelli and Porter can be considered the founders of competitiveness as an academic discipline. 
They are both still seen as key authorities on competitiveness today. Their contribution is most 
pronounced in the discourses of global policy groups, the WEF in particular. It is also evident 
within academic circles. Both scholars have taken part in designing the competitiveness 
discourse of the WEF. While Garelli is no longer associated with the Forum, he participated in 
the Forum’s early efforts aimed at creating an approach to competitiveness for the purpose of 
measuring the performance of European industries since early 1980s. On the other hand, Porter, 
since 1998, is still an advisor of the WEF’s competitiveness network that publishes the GCR 
and his contribution is centred on establishing the microeconomic foundations of 
competitiveness – Porter’s contribution will be discussed in detail in Chapters Six and Seven.  
According to Garelli, the idea of national competitiveness came from the WEF in the mid-
1980s after having focused only on firm competitiveness since 1979 when its publications of 
the GCR commenced380. Garelli was the pioneering figure with whom the WEF started the 
publication of the GCR. He took part in a WEF project led by Thomas Rauschenbach of the 
Forum to study the competitiveness of nations as early as 1985. However, later in 1988 when 
Garelli became a member of the International Institute of Management Development (IMD), 
the competitiveness project of the WEF was carried out in cooperation between the two 
institutions until mid-1990s. Then, each institution started reporting independently on 
competitiveness. However, both of their projects have engaged with studying how nations 
compete to enhance their living standards.  
Although the focus of this thesis is not on the IMD’s discourse on competitiveness more 
generally, this is also of great interest, I will nevertheless consider Garelli’s contribution to the 
development of their competitiveness discourse since his footprint on the WEF’s discourse is 
                                                          
380 Stéphane Garelli, “Competitiveness 20 Years Later”, in Institute for Management Development (ed.), The 
World Competitiveness Yearbook 2008 (Lausanne: IMD, 2008), pp. 30-1. 
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considerable today in the GCR. Both Garelli and Porter are truly globalising professionals in 
the way defined in the TCC literature. Both scholars are committed to the idea of international 
competitiveness and their work has precipitated a huge debate on competitiveness and 
contributed to its spread and politicisation among businesses but also political leaders. This 
section will outline their definition of competitiveness and the framework of action they have 
set for businesses and states alike. Most of the ideas discussed here form the ground of the 
GCR that will be studied in the next chapter.  
Generally speaking, competitiveness is a concept that lacks a proper theoretical foundation. 
Despite “widespread acceptance of its importance”, Porter and Ketels argue, competitiveness 
“remains a concept that is not well understood”. In order to overcome such a problem, there is 
a need to identify the real “sources of a nation’s prosperity”. A nation’s prosperity is 
“determined by the productivity of its economy, which is measured by the value of goods and 
services produced per unit of the nation’s human, capital and natural resources”. Specifically, 
productivity is what permits high wages, high currency value and returns on investment as well 
as high living standards in a country381. Competitiveness, then, should be measured in 
productivity terms at the national level382. Garelli agrees with Porter and Ketels’ definition and 
argues that prosperity is derived from the nation’s productivity in utilising “its human, capital 
and natural resources”383. 
The theoretical ground for the study of competitiveness is provided in the work of classical 
economists such as Smith, Marshall, and Ricardo. Its essence is explained by Garelli. He notes 
that  
                                                          
381 Michael E. Porter and Christian H. M. Ketels, “UK Competitiveness: moving to the next stage”, DTI and 
ESRC, 3 (2003), p. 7. 
382 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, Harvard Business Review, March/ April (1990), 
p. 76. 
383 Stéphane Garelli, “Competitiveness 20 Years Later”, p. 30. See also Brian Snowdon and George Stonehouse, 
“Competitiveness in a Globalised World: Michael Porter on the Microeconomic Foundations of the 
Competitiveness of Nations, Regions, and Firms”, Journal of International Business Studies, 37: 2 (2006), p. 165. 
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In the competitiveness mindset, the law of comparative advantage implies that a nation, firm, or individual 
should not focus automatically on activities it can perform better or cheaper than its competitors, but, 
rather, on those where its relative advantage is larger.  
 
The concept comparative advantage, then, is built on two assumptions. First, a nation, a firm 
or a person should “specialise” in products that are unique and not available to their 
competitors. Second, they should devise a strategy that “maximises the relative advantage 
between competitors” because “being number one is not such an enviable position if number 
two is very close behind384.  However, for modern economists national prosperity is “created, 
not inherited”. Today prosperity derives from innovative businesses rather than from only a 
country’s natural recourses, labour, or capital as classical economists established385. According 
to Porter, competition today is focused on “the creation and assimilation of knowledge”. 
Whether in the form of skills or technology products, the latter has played a key role in 
restructuring the relationship between capital and labour since about the 1970s.  
 
On a micro level, Garelli notes that competitiveness is business’ ability to successfully manage 
its relationship with various contexts that surrounds the enterprise. As such, being “efficient” 
is not “enough” if the company “cannot deal appropriately with its national, international and 
sectorial surroundings”386. Ultimately, competitiveness is “the ability of entrepreneurs to 
                                                          
384 Stéphane Garelli, Top Class Competitors: How nations, firms, and individuals succeed in the new world of 
competitiveness (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2006), p. 33 and p. 35.  
385 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, p. 73. Garelli notes that knowledge is “perhaps 
the most critical competitiveness factor” and an important condition to maintain competitiveness and “to compete 
in world markets”. This importance grows as the country moves up on the economic ladder. Garelli, 
“Competitiveness of Nations: the Fundamentals”, in Institute for Management Development (ed.), The World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 2000 (Lausanne: IMD, 2008), p. 47. 
386 Stéphane Garelli, “What is World Competitiveness”, World Economic Forum (eds.), World Competitiveness 
Report 1990 (Geneva: IMD and the World Economic Forum, 1990), p. 5. 
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design, produce, and market goods and services, the price and non-price characteristics of 
which form a more attractive package than that of competitors”387.  
What nations should realize is that competiveness is “like a race. It’s not just about you running 
faster today than you did yesterday; it’s about you running faster today than all the others in 
the race”388. It follows that competitiveness is “about benchmarking one’s performance with 
others today, and not with oneself yesterday”389. In addition, Garelli assures that to be 
successfully competitive is not enough because “what really matters” is “being different”. The 
underlying principle of the theory of competitiveness is that “success is about differences”. 
This is based on the notion that competitiveness “thrives on maximising the positive difference 
(or comparative advantage)” [emphasis in original] between competitors, be it a nation, a firm 
or a person390.  Yet, the “frames of comparison” of nations should be changed to one that is 
focused on comparing one’s performance with a comparable competitor in a fixed timeframe 
and then “seek to maximise their advantage”391. Thus, significant to international 
competitiveness is the comparison tool countries use to measure their improvement, the 
benchmarking tool. It should measure the performance of one country against others in a certain 
period and at a similar stage of economic development as is the case in the GCR, an approach 
formulated by Porter, and discussed in detail below.  
 
For Garelli, the analysis of competitiveness should be focused on the microeconomic level 
because it is the enterprise that creates wealth, the national environment only hampers or 
encourages business investment and success. Therefore, any ranking of nations’ 
                                                          
387 Then the GCR was published in collaboration with the IMD and Garelli co-authored its reports with Schwab, 
Ibid. p. 8. 
388 Stephane Garelli, Top Class Competitors, p. 22. 
389 Ibid. p. 24. Nations have to choose the “right comparison basis, i.e. the right race to win, and defining the 
objective, i.e. by how much to win”, these are fundamental to competitiveness. Ibid. p. 25.  
390 Ibid. p. 26. 
391 Ibid. p. 28.  
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competitiveness should be read in terms of their capacity “to create and maintain an 
environment that sustains the competitiveness of enterprises”392. Therefore, the desirable and 
successful role of the state is to offer an environment compatible with sustainable value 
creation at the micro level. Accordingly, the competitiveness strategy of a nation “has to 
correspond with the model of competitiveness in which its firms can thrive”393. He emphasises 
that the competitiveness of firms and nations are two sides of the same coin. Particularly, 
nations are the agents that carry out the transformation of this economic added-value “into 
tangible signs of prosperity for people”. He argues that the “fate of firms, nations, and people 
is…intertwined, and cannot be managed separately”394.  
However, Garelli rightly argues that a “single ‘recipe’” for competitiveness is not applicable 
to every country. Countries need to adapt competitiveness policies to their national 
environments. Competitiveness policies can only be successful “when they balance the 
economic imperatives imposed by world markets with the social requirements of a nation 
formed by history, value systems, and tradition”395. This, specifically, has to do with the 
relationship between the state, labour and capital operating within the country. As we have 
seen in Chapter Three, the relationship between the three is defined according to the conditions 
of the relationship between labour and capital and the nature of class struggle, which defines 
the way states manage their national economies.  
Garelli’s international competitiveness framework outlines how nations should compete to 
improve their competitiveness. This framework consists of four forces. The first he calls 
                                                          
392 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, pp. 77. 
393 Stephane Garelli, Top Class Competitors, pp. 65-6. 
394 Stephane Garelli, Top Class Competitors, Ibid. p. 3. Ezeala-Harrison perceives the role of firms in relation to 
competitiveness as related to microeconomic “necessary conditions” while the role of the state is concerned with 
maintain the “”sufficiency conditions” of competitiveness, they both are significant for sustainable 
competitiveness. Fidel Ezeala-Harrison, “On the Competing Notions of International Competitiveness”, Advances 
in Competitiveness Research, 13: 1 (2005), pp. 82-83.  
395 Stephane Garelli, “Competitiveness of Nations: the Fundamentals”, Institute for Management Development (ed.), 
The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2003, P. 704. 
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“attractiveness vs. aggressiveness”. For example, the country’s rate of inward FDI is a sign its 
attractiveness while its export of FDI and other products produced nationally or globally can 
be seen as an indicator of its aggressiveness. As will be shown in the competitiveness debate 
below, most of the competition between countries is centred on the latter aspect, they compete 
“to attract or retain enterprises”396. He asserts that countries have to balance their performance 
in both areas in order to compete successfully. The second force is “proximity vs. globality” 
which constitutes two main features of today’s national economies. The first, incorporates all 
the traditional industries that are close to the consumer where the added value is utilised in the 
country. It is normally marked with protectionism and is less cost-effective and, thus, less 
competitive397. On the other hand, the global economy is mainly composed of globally oriented 
firms and is marked – at least theoretically – with openness, effectiveness and price-
competitiveness398. Its added value is provided through the accessibility of the end-user to its 
products in the global market399. The economy of globality prospers by “exploiting the different 
comparative advantages of nations world-wide” that form its global management of a mobile 
value chain400. Garelli pays great attention to this second force given its importance to a state’s 
ability to construct a socially sustainable competitiveness profile.  
For Garelli, globalisation led to the expansion of the economy of globality.  As a result nations 
and firms have to deal currently with a “two-tier economy”. They both have to “identify clearly 
                                                          
396 Stephane Garelli, “Competitiveness of Nations: the Fundamentals”, The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000, 
p. 48. WEF, The World Competitiveness Report 1994 (Geneva: IMD and the World Economic Forum, 1994), p. 
18. 
397 Traditional activities include “crafts; social and personal services, such as doctors and teachers”, administrative 
activities include “government and justice”; and consumer support activities include “after-sales service and 
customization, Stéphane Garelli, “Competitiveness of Nations: the Fundamentals”, The World Competitiveness 
Yearbook 2000, p. 49. 
398 Ibid. In Western Europe, more than 65% of the GDP comes from the economy of proximity and the rest from 
the economy of globality. Large countries mainly depend on their economy of proximity despite the fact that the 
attention is increasingly directed to the economy of globality. In smaller countries the economy of globality is 
more dependent on. Ibid. p. 50.  
399 Stéphane Garelli, Top Class Competitors, p. 103.  
400 Stéphane Garelli, “From Competitive Enterprises to Competitive Societies”, in WEF (ed.), The World 
Competitiveness Report 1995 (Geneva: IMD and World Economic Forum, 1995), pp. 8-9.  
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which competitiveness strategy applies to which part of the economy”401. When the economy 
of globality starts to invade areas which used to be a part of the proximity economy, the danger 
of social tension rises in the nation given the close link traditionally established between people 
and the social benefits provided by this economy. This is the case regarding the health and 
education systems as well as the unemployment schemes. This possibility is exacerbated with 
the rise of competitiveness as a strategy of policy making. To avoid the rise of social tension, 
then, states need to balance their competitiveness policies to meet both the needs of private 
actors and the public at large402.  
 
The third force is “assets vs. processes”. In other words it’s about production rather than 
ownership of /control over natural resources. Countries are considered more competitive when 
they are efficient in the “transformation processes” of turning assets into products that prove 
competitive on the market403. The role of the state is to provide channels conducive to such 
efficient transformation processes.404 Countries and companies that are flourishing in the 
transformation process are more capable of survival during economic crises405. Essentially, 
then, competitiveness is “the ability of a country or a company to, proportionally, generate 
more wealth than its competitors in world markets”406. 
                                                          
401 Stéphane Garelli, Top Class Competitors, p. 105. 
402 Ibid. Garelli distinguishes between two types of countries in this regard. The first is the Anglo-Saxon that is 
driven by an “entrepreneurial spirit” that adopts “a hyper-competitive” approach and the second is the continental 
European group that values social cohesiveness by taking into consideration national stability and the 
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competitive than countries such as Singapore, Japan and Switzerland which are poor in resources. The latter 
countries rely essentially on the “transformation processes”. Stéphane Garelli, “Competitiveness of Nations: the 
Fundamentals”, The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000, p. 50. For more details see also “The World 
Competitiveness Formula”, in WEF (ed.), World Competitiveness Report 1993 (Geneva: IMD and the World 
Economic Forum, 1993), pp. 30-34.  
404 Klaus Schwab and Xavier Gilbert Preface, WEF, World Competitiveness Report 1992. p. 2.  
405 Stéphane Garelli, “At the core of competitiveness”, in WEF (ed.), World Competitiveness Report 1992, pp. 4-
7.  
406 WEF, The World Competitiveness Report 1994, p. 18.  
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The final force is “individual risk taking vs. social cohesiveness”. Garelli highlights the 
distinction between two economic systems; one that “promotes individual risk and one that 
preserves social cohesiveness”. The first is characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon countries where 
the importance is given to “risk, deregulation, privatization and the responsibility of the 
individual through a minimalist approach to the welfare system”. The other system is mainly 
European which appraises “social consensus, a more egalitarian approach to responsibilities 
and an extensive welfare system”. Countries must strike a balance between risk taking and 
social cohesiveness in order to achieve sustainable competitiveness407.  
 
Thus, the adequate level of competitiveness that a country should reach without endangering 
its survival and that of businesses, Garelli contends, “depends very much on the ability of a 
country to develop what could be called a "competitive society”. A competitive society is one 
that finds “a dynamic equilibrium between wealth creation on one side and social cohesion on 
the other”. More importantly, this dynamic equilibrium “does not necessarily mean economic 
efficiency at all costs in all areas. Actually, it may even imply ... a conscious decision on the 
part of people to accept a certain level of inefficiency”. Moreover, this society competently and 
“actively manages all the facets of its competitiveness, from infrastructure to education” and 
the ability to reach “a subtle balance between proximity and globality”408. A balance between 
the generation of “revenues and technology” and the provision of “employment and social 
cohesion” which should take into consideration a quick responsiveness to changes409.  
 
From the above, an efficient role of the government is enhanced by: minimizing its intervention 
in the economy in the sense that it should only intervene to create an environment supportive 
                                                          
407 Ibid. See also Stephane Garelli, “Competitiveness 20 Years Later”, p. 34. 
408 Stephane Garelli, “From Competitive Enterprises to Competitive Societies”, p. 6. 
409 Focusing only on the economic side of competitiveness and “maximising efficiency” is similar to “training an 
athlete with only muscles, but without brain and soul)”, Ibid. p. 11.  
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of business competitiveness. Be it social, political or economic, this environment should be 
“predictable” in order to reduce uncertainty and risk for businesses; it should ensure flexibility 
in adapting to changing global economic conditions; and, it should guarantee a fair, equal and 
just society in which the interests of all are protected. Given that competitiveness has become 
a major component of a state’s policies, Garelli notes that the role of the latter has not become 
“bigger or smaller”, it is “simply different ...new domains of responsibility are developing ... 
prior responsibilities are being redefined”410. That is, competitiveness changes “the rules of the 
game” and leaves countries, companies, and people with no choice but to adapt to its dynamics, 
a process which according to Garelli “is sometimes painful”411. Overall, competitiveness 
policies are challenging for policy-makers since they require the creation of a “policy-making 
structure” that accounts for the short-termism which distinguishes the political system and the 
long term pursuit of prosperity412. While this is perhaps true in most states, a challenge evident 
in the UK case where national competitiveness as an approach to policy making has yet not 
developed as a robust and long-term structure as I will show in Chapter Eight.  
 
While Garelli’s understanding of international competitiveness is quite holistic and takes into 
account the social, economic and political dimensions of competitiveness and presents a 
detailed account of the best way of their articulation, Porter’s account is less so. His take on 
the matter is oriented more towards the success of the enterprise in the competitiveness game 
without accounting for the social foundation of competitiveness. The latter is supposed to be 
strengthened only when the national environment becomes supportive of business success.  
 
                                                          
410 Stéphane Garelli, “Competitiveness of Nations: the Fundamentals”, The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2003, 
p. 708.  
411 Stéphane Garelli, “Is Competitiveness Unfair”, in WEF (ed.), The World Competitiveness Report 1994. p. 13. 
412 Christian H. M. Ketels, “Michael Porter’s Competitiveness Framework—Recent Learnings and New Research 
Priorities”, J Ind Compet Trade 6 (2006), p. 132. 
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As stated by Ketels, the competitiveness imperative has forced policy-makers to identify the 
sources of their nation’s competitiveness and formulate their policies accordingly. He suggests 
that Porter’s competitiveness framework, discussed below, is useful to respond to such a 
challenge413. A competitive state is defined by Porter as “the nation in which the essential 
competitive advantages of the enterprise are created and sustained”. It is the locus where the 
strategy of the firm “is set”, where its “core product and process technology is created and 
maintained”, and where “the most productive jobs and most advanced skills are located”414. In 
the past governments were only “in charge of improving competitiveness through policy 
decisions and incentives” and firms “competed in the marketplace and took their environment 
as given”415. Currently, however, nation-states are operating within a new global economic 
framework which has emerged from three major “revolutions”. First, is the globalisation of the 
economy with its accompanying legislative development; second, technological advances; and 
third the revolution in management and the rise in corporate Managers’ productivity. These 
three changes combined have altered “drastically” the economic mechanisms and “the rules of 
competitiveness”416. Competitiveness no longer only concerns trade between states, FDI has 
also become a crucial factor in economic growth.  
 
As maintained by Porter, competitiveness should not be understood as a policy in itself. Rather, 
it should be seen and used as “a strategic objective to organize individual policies”. Porter sets 
out four main “attributes” for every nation necessary to enhance its ability to provide a 
favourable conditions for companies in a way conducive to constant innovation, improving 
                                                          
413 Ibid. p. 119. Ketels concludes that Porter’s diamond is adopted mainly by centre-left governments while center-
right governments “tend to be more skeptical”.  This is in part because of their disagreement about “the appropriate 
role of government”. More to the point, Porter’s diamond is seen by the left as a justification for government 
intervention while for the right it justifies harmful government policies, Ibid. p. 134.  
414 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, p. 77. 
415 Michael E. Porter and Christian H. M. Ketels, “UK Competitiveness: moving to the next stage”, p. 30.  
416 Stéphane Garelli, “Is Competitiveness Unfair”, pp. 8-9. Garelli notes that understanding competitiveness in 
trade terms has its roots in Ricardo’s theory of Comparative Advantage. Stéphane Garelli, “Competitiveness 20 
Years Later”, p. 30. 
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their competitive advantage and adapting to change. The first is “factor conditions”, which 
refers to the nation’s possession of factors of production, such as skilled labour or sophisticated 
infrastructure. Second, the “demand conditions” for the firm’s products and services. Third, 
the “related and supporting industries” which is embodied in the existence of the necessary 
supplier industries that the firm would need to excel417. Fourth, the “firm strategy, structure, 
and rivalry” which is influenced by the country’s regulations on start-ups, management, finance 
as well as the conditions of domestic competition.  All together, these attributes form the 
national environment in which “companies are born and learn how to compete”418. 
Independently and collectively, these attributes, according to Porter, constitute “the diamond 
of national advantage, the playing field that each nation establishes and operates for its 
industries”419. Thus, states with the strongest diamond are the ones that will be more 
competitive420. The value of the diamond becomes greater when it is also used by firms as a 
tool to help making the right investment decisions to enhance their competitive advantage421.  
 
However, even though Porter’s framework for government action calls for its intervention to 
uphold the competitiveness of the nation through helping firms to improve their competitive 
advantage, it does certainly not call for a direct involvement in this endeavour: the role of the 
government is “an indirect, rather than a direct, role”422. Its “proper” role is to act as “a catalyst 
and challenger; it is to encourage — or even push — companies to raise their aspirations and 
move to higher levels of competitive performance”423. In particular, to gain competitive 
advantage, the role of the government within the competitiveness diamond must focus on 
                                                          
417 The supporting and related industries are explained in what Stéphane Garelli terms “Clusters”. They constitute 
“islands of competitiveness”, Stéphane Garelli, Top Class Competitors, p. 55. 
418 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, p. 78. 
419 Ibid. p. 77. 
420 A. J. Smit, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations: is Porter’s Diamond Framework a New Theory that 
explains the international competitiveness of countries? Southern African Business Review, 14: 1 (2010), p. 121.  
421  Ibid. p. 124. 
422 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, p. 87. 
423 Ibid.  
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upgrading the education and health systems, infrastructure, establishing the link between 
industry and universities and so on. It must avoid intervening in the financial and labour 
markets through employment protections or capital control. Moreover, the government should 
implement environmental, safety and product standards and enforce anti-trust laws424. 
Therefore, increasing competitiveness manifests itself through “high and increasing levels of 
productivity and innovation” which results from two “mutually reinforcing” contexts; the 
macroeconomic (political, legal, and social) context and the microeconomic (firm-level)425. 
The role of the government is required in both fields. Since it is only firms, and the way they 
compete, that should be counted as the ultimate foundation of competitiveness, an effective 
macroeconomic foundation is “necessary for achieving competitiveness, but not sufficient”426. 
Thus, the emphasis should be on the microeconomic conditions as they constitute the source 
of prosperity. Of great significance here is the aspect of labour market regulations which seems 
to be occupying much of the politics and policymaking surrounding competitiveness, 
especially when the latter is defined in terms of the productivity of labour and capital as 
outlined above.      
Moreover, in Porter’s framework the role of the government differs at each point of the 
country’s economic development, from factor-driven, to investment-driven and innovation-
driven economy. Therefore, the government need to carry out the task of being a facilitator of 
achieving the leaps from one phase to the next. The failure to do so results in stagnating 
competitiveness. What this upgrade entails is an acceptance on the part of the government of 
“less control over critical elements of the competitiveness agenda”. Hence, the delegation of 
power to regional and local institutions becomes essential.  Moreover, Porter and Ketels argues 
                                                          
424 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, Ibid. p. 88. Examples of the anti-trust policies 
are: anti-mergers, anti-alliances, and anti-collusive behaviour. Examples of managed trade are agreements that set 
quantitative limits on marketing.   
425 Michael E. Porter and Christian H. M. Ketels, “UK Competitiveness: moving to the next stage”, p. 18. 
426 Ibid. p. 19. 
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that “the most important shift will come from the need to give others, mainly in the private 
sector, the leading role in competitiveness efforts and in identifying priorities for action”. A 
strong government grip over the competitiveness agenda will “make success less likely” and 
will force out “private sector leadership and runs the risk of picking bad priorities”427. The 
social, economic and political characteristics of each country impacts differently on the 
performance of firms operating within the country, which results in different “patterns of 
competitiveness” in every country428. This is what Ades et al call structural competitiveness429, 
which entails that “no nation can be competitive in everything”430.  
 
Finally, for Porter and Ketels, what makes governments important on another level is the 
legitimacy aspect of the competitiveness policies, “without government involvement, 
initiatives lack legitimacy and they fail to address those competitiveness issues government 
policy can directly affect”431. Giving precedence to market forces has to be facilitated through 
socialising competitiveness into society. The privatisation of state-owned companies and 
welfare cuts are prime examples where the role of the government is significant in legitimising 
the primacy of market rules, although the latter has represented one of the most heated debates 
within western democracies.     
Garelli’s and Porter’s frameworks draw on similar perceptions with regard to what constitutes 
the core of international competitiveness. For both, wealth is created by firms rather than 
countries. Hence, the latter compete not for value creation but for creating the conditions for 
its production through the provision of competitive national environments. While Garelli’s and 
                                                          
427 Michael E. Porter and Christian H. M. Ketels, “UK Competitiveness: moving to the next stage”, Ibid. p. 44. 
Brian Snowdon and George Stonehouse, “Competitiveness in a Globalised World”, p. 166. 
428 Stéphane Garelli, “Is Competitiveness Unfair”. pp. 8-9. 
429 For more details on structural competitiveness, see Alberto Ades, Mark Carney, and Rafael Di Tella, 
“Competitiveness and the New Industrial Policy”, in World Economic Forum (ed.), The World Competitiveness 
Report 1995 (Geneva: IMD and World Economic Forum, 1995), p. 325.  
430 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, pp. 77. 
431 Michael E. Porter and Christian H. M. Ketels, “UK Competitiveness: moving to the next stage”, p. 30. 
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Porter’s accounts of the adequate role of the state share similarities, they differ in the 
importance they ascribe to its role in preserving the social foundation of competitiveness; they 
both build their frameworks on a combination of macro and microeconomic foundations, but 
Porter’s account seems to favour an approach that places the sustainability of international 
competitiveness on a solid microeconomic framework that accounts for freeing the market, 
both labour and capital, from state’s control. The discussion that follows in the next section has 
emerged in response to competitiveness discourse spread by public and private international 
institutions that, in turn, were heavily preoccupied with the ideas of experts, economists and 
academics who created the discipline of competitiveness beginning in the 1980s. This is not to 
argue that Garelli and Porter are the only figures but that their work has gained undue influence 
as globalising professionals.          
 
 
5.2. The Competitiveness Discourse and the Neoliberal Rationality of the State 
 
The literature on the impact of international competitiveness on state policies does not diverge 
much from the arguments made in the TCC literature, by Robinson, Sklair, Gill or Van der Pijl. 
Except for few accounts, such as Cerny’s and Kantola’s, most of it centres on depicting the 
state as being captured by global capital and, thus, that it seeks to serve its interests by adapting 
their economies to the neoliberal discipline of competitiveness. The state implements standards 
of competitiveness, thus, in the interest of one class and at the expense of the rest. Such an 
understanding bears the same problematic, as in the case of the TCC, concerning the role of 
the state in a capitalist society. It is manipulated, instrumentalised or its role is determined by 
the economic structure, assuming the separation of the two. Perhaps, to some extent this has to 
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do with taking globalisation to be a quantitative change rather than a qualitative one, which is 
even weakened more by the lack of a deeper empirical analysis of how states indeed respond 
to the competitiveness discourse as a new capitalistic imperative. As argued earlier, whether it 
is the WEF, other policy groups or international institutions, their influence on state 
policymaking is undoubted, but to what extent the reality confirms such undue influence is 
another matter which we approach in Chapter Eight.      
 
As in the case for some economists, the whole discourse of state competitiveness has no 
grounds in reality, it is a term that concerns enterprises only. Krugman is one the most critical 
voices with regards to international competitiveness. He believes that competitiveness in 
reference to a country’s success in achieving a certain position in the world economy is a mere 
“hypothesis” and that competitiveness “as a practical, empirical matter” is dangerous. For him, 
the logic of competition between firms cannot be applied equally on countries because the 
bottom line for the former is more critical than the other. For firms, being uncompetitive has 
the exact meaning as being “unsustainable” which essentially leads to ceasing to exist. In 
contrast, states do not disappear if they fail to be competitive and their economic problems 
should not be all attributed to their failure in competition. Given that, he maintains that 
international competitiveness is an “illusive” concept432. The main point in Krugman’s 
argument is that “the obsession” with competitiveness has turned to be “dangerously” 
destructive of economic policies. Competitiveness has become a “metaphor” and “rhetoric” 
used by “world leaders” to “provide a good way either to justify hard choices or to avoid 
them”433. It is dangerous because it leads to wasteful government spending, it could trigger 
protectionist behaviour and it could cause “bad public policy on a spectrum of important 
                                                          
432 Paul Krugman, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession”, Foreign Affairs, 37: 2 (1994), pp. 30-31. 
According to Harbour, Director of Belfast’s Centre for Competitiveness, “at the end of the day countries don’t 
compete, companies do”, Bob Barbour, Interview with The Author, Belfast, February 11, 2014. 
433 Paul Krugman, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession”, p. 41. 
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issues” such as welfare programmes and environmental sustainability. Once the doctrine of 
competitiveness is adopted in a given country, its political leaders become committed to it and 
“their commitment inevitably sets the tone for policy-making on all issues, even those which 
may seem to have nothing to do with that doctrine”434. Krugman states that despite the 
globalisation of trade, our living standards are “overwhelmingly determined by domestic 
factors rather than by some competition for world markets”435.  
Similarly, Aiginger argues that national competitiveness is an elusive and meaningless 
concept436. He favours a definition of competitiveness that centres on the “ability to create 
welfare’’ within the country in order to enhance living standards437. Defining it as such would 
prevent turning it into a zero-sum game438. He contends that using the term competitiveness 
“instead of welfare or living standards” shifts the focus to “the economic aspects of welfare, 
those related to the market process”, those that “can be influenced by economic strategy and 
policies”439.  
Both arguments are perhaps valid ones, especially when looking at the discourses of 
competitiveness adopted within different contexts. For example, the Group of Lisbon advances 
an understanding of competitiveness as a zero-sum game. Its underlying principle is that the 
society today is “engaged in a technological, industrial, and economic war at the global level; 
hence the main objective is to become strong enough to defeat the competitors”440. With such 
a conception the argument is that “the greater the competitiveness of a firm, region, or country, 
the greater will be its chance of survival”441. Not being competitive enough means “exclusion 
                                                          
434 Ibid. p. 42.  
435 Ibid. p. 34.  
436 Karl Aiginger, “Competitiveness: From a Dangerous Obsession to a Welfare Creating Ability with Positive 
Externalities”, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 6: 2 (2006), pp. 161-2. 
437 Ibid.  
438 Ibid. 
439 Ibid. p. 171.  
440 Group of Lisbon, Limits to Competition, p. 93. 
441 Ibid. p. 94. 
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from the market, the loss of mastery over the future, and submission to the domination of the 
stronger”. The socioeconomic well-being of the state and its citizens, and more, “the autonomy 
of a region, the security and independence of a country or a continent are all dependent on the 
degree of competitiveness”442. To a significant extent triggered by such discourses, many 
countries have institutionalised competitiveness, albeit in varying manners.  
However, the Group realises the setbacks of such representation of competitiveness. 
Competitiveness turns countries into “Homo competitors”; it “reduces the entire process of the 
human to the perceptions, motivations, and behaviour of Homo economicus as Homo 
competitor”. Accordingly, with unfettered competitiveness comes economic and social 
segregation where the competitive and the uncompetitive, whether people, firms, or states, are 
discriminated from each other443. Moreover, the very ideology on which competitiveness rests 
“either ignores or devalues cooperation, or it instrumentalizes it to its own logic”444. When the 
state or the firm become dependent on “the logic of monthly reports”, or become measured 
against each other, published by some specialised agencies or international organisations, “the 
myopic intent of shareholders” prevail445. Since it ascribes value to the “excellence” of policies, 
competitiveness “maintains and strengthens structural inequality among regions and within and 
across countries”446. Competitiveness in its current form suffers great weakness; it is “unable 
to reconcile social justice, economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, political 
democracy, and cultural diversity in today’s world”447.  
                                                          
442 Ibid. pp. 94-5. 
443 For a similar account, and more emphasis on the societal consequences of the neoliberal discourse of 
competitiveness see William Davis, The Limits to Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the logic of 
Competition (London: Sage, 2014).  
444 Group of Lisbon, Limits to Competition, p. 98.  
445 Ibid. p. 101. See also Alberto Ades, Mark Carney, and Rafael Di Tella, “Competitiveness and the New 
Industrial Policy”, p. 352.  
446 Ibid. Guy Standing presents a very interesting account on the social impact of competitiveness, especially in 
the area of employment, see pp. 132-154, Guy Standing, The Precariat: the New and Dangerous Class (London: 
Bloomsbury Academia, 2011).  
447 Group of Lisbon, Limits to Competition. p. 105. 
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The bottom line is that there are “structural limits” to extreme competition. These limits appear 
when competition is “overruling” in the form of “economic distortion; socioeconomic 
inequalities” inside and between states, in the form of “the marginalization of large parts of the 
world”; or in the form of “the concentration of power in largely unaccountable economic units”, 
like TNCs. Competition between states for global market shares has the same consequences. It 
leads to “global economic wars”. Furthermore, it “exacerbates the inability of national 
authorities to address the right priorities at the right national and global level”448. That 
international competitiveness is dangerous, when taken in Porter’s way, perhaps has roots in 
reality, especially in relation to welfare programmes in western democracies. But to argue that 
the concept is itself meaningless contradicts the implications of its institutionalisation within 
the state.  
Fougner’s analysis of the power of the competitiveness discourse is an interesting one. He 
advances an instrumentalist account of the state in relation to the new competitiveness 
conditionality. He argues that with the rise of this discourse the state is “constituted and acted 
upon as a flexible and manipulable market actor”. Using competitiveness policies to promote 
its attractiveness to foreign and national capital turns the state into a “commodified” state where 
“statesmanship is transformed into salesmanship – not in the old ‘trade mission’ sense of 
promoting the products and services of ‘national’ firms in external markets, but in the sense of 
selling the state as a location to globally footloose capital and firms”. In this way, the state 
develops into a “competitor and entrepreneur operating in a global ‘market for investment’”449.  
 
Moreover, such competition between governments has tamed them in a way that they have 
become oriented towards the production of “goods that owners of capital can use if they invest 
                                                          
448 Group of Lisbon, Limits to Competition. p. 99.  
449 Tore Fougner, “The State, International Competitiveness and Neoliberal Globalisation”, p. 180. 
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within the policy domain of the government”. This orientation, with the accompanying 
economic policies and institutional framework, are now perceived as immobile “factors of 
production”450. This logic elicits a competition between businesses themselves for the use of 
these “publicly provided goods“451. As stated by Fougner, the most certain thing about 
competitiveness is that its discourse “works politically to (re)produce the state as a competitive 
entity on a continuous basis” 452. 
 
Before the 1980s, competitiveness as a governmental problem was centred on the question of 
“how to improve the capacity of ‘national’ firms to compete with foreign ones”. Hence, 
international competitiveness was seen as a gear for directing states policies “towards the 
perceived needs and well-being of national firms with an international orientation”453. 
However, when the world economy shifted from an “‘inter-nationalist’ to a ‘globalised’” one, 
it transformed the meaning of international competitiveness454. As such, the focus shifts from 
the capacity of national champions to compete with foreign ones for shares of the product and 
services markets to the ability of the state to “compete with other states for shares of so-called 
footloose investment capital”. Hence, the governmental problem that accompanies such a 
conception is centred on making not firms but the state more competitive455. Implied in such 
an account is the fact that capital becomes global and, hence, enjoys a “(re)locational freedom” 
the preservation of which is crucial for the neoliberal global governance, it is maintained by a 
“neoliberal rationality of government”, Fougner argues456.  
 
                                                          
450 Stefan Sinn, “The Taming of Leviathan: Competition Among Governments”, Constitutional Political 
Economy, 3: 2 (1992), p. 178. 
451 Ibid. p. 179.  
452 Tore Fougner, “The State, International Competitiveness and Neoliberal Globalisation”, p. 166. 
453 Ibid. p. 172. 
454 Ibid. p. 173.  
455 This, according to Fougner is “irrespective of how a so-called competitive state can subsequently be claimed 
to make firms located on its territory more competitive”, Ibid. p. 175.  
456 Ibid. p. 177.  
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Moreover, although ascribing the agency in embedding the competitiveness discourse to 
international organisations (IOs), Cammack presents a more compelling account informed by 
the capitalist social relations of production. He argues that this (re)locational freedom featuring 
the emergence of capitalism as a global hegemonic system has necessitated the emergence of 
global regulatory institutions like the WB and the IMF457. Today, the latter play key roles in 
institutionalising the principles of competitiveness and, in doing so, they strengthen the 
competition state, the aim of which is to maintain a “competitive global capitalist economy”458. 
The role of both institutions has arisen from the recognition that “a genuinely global capitalist 
system” is inherently contradictory and needs to be addressed at the transnational level by 
autonomous actors versus an individual state or capitalist interests. Instead of seeing the state 
as a circuit manger and a political form of class struggle, he, contradictorily, argues that this 
autonomy is possible given “the institutional distance of the government from the social class 
control”459. In order to lay out an “optimum configuration” to strengthen competitiveness in 
the global market, the role of these institutions is key. This, Cammack calls the “logic of 
accumulation/realisation”. Another reason for the need for autonomous institutions has to do 
with the need to reproduce the hegemony of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, which has to 
be secured with consent. This he calls the “logic of legitimation”. In this way, both 
accumulation and legitimisation are upheld by social and political means460.  
 
In light of this account, Cammack considers the WB project of reducing poverty by half in 
2015 to be most relevant to strengthening global competitiveness. That is, it seeks to create a 
flexible and efficient “global labour market in which the existing proletariat will ‘float’ easily 
                                                          
457 Paul Cammack, “The Governance of Global Capitalism: a New Materialist Perspective”, Historical 
Materialism, 11:2 (2003), p. 40.  
458 Ibid. pp. 37-39. 
459 Ibid. p. 41. 
460 Ibid. pp. 41-2. 
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in and out of work, and the ‘latent’ proletariat … will be ‘freed’ and fully proletarianised”, and 
ready to be exploited by global capital461. Correspondingly, the governance established is one 
in which each state becomes an agent dedicated to promoting “a regime of competitiveness 
within each state and across the world market as a whole”462. Hence, competitiveness should 
be seen as a global project imposed on workers, capitalists, governments and international 
institutions alike by the global system of capitalism463. Therefore, IOs, through their 
internationally accepted function in setting the general framework of economic policies, seek 
to create a new global order where labour is contained within capital limits, and where states 
are constitutive of the “dynamics of competitiveness on a global level”. Therefore, his 
argument is that states pursue competitiveness both within their countries and within others’ 
too464. From that Cammack infers that there exists an attempt to create a “convergence club” 
characteristic of the contemporary global political economy; a club in which states are deemed 
“simultaneously the objects and the agents of convergence”465. This club is marked with four 
chief aspects constitutive of the “politics of convergence”466. Firstly, the recognition of the 
need to develop the “appropriate policy choices” in order to maintain competitiveness.  
                                                          
461 The creation of a “reserve army of labour available on a global scale at a rate of US$1–2 per day” which the 
World Bank attempts to achieve, among other things, save the whole system on the one hand, and secure the 
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states especially from the beginning of 1990s such as the OECD’s Going for Growth initiative and the EU Lisbon 
Summits should be seen not only as projects seeking to endorse global competitiveness are “class projects aimed 
at reasserting the power of capital over labour”, Paul Cammack, “The Politics of Global Competitiveness”, Papers 
in the Politics of Global Competitiveness, Manchester Metropolitan University, 1 (2006), pp. 5-6.  
462 Paul Cammack, “Global Governance, State Agency and Competitiveness: the Political Economy of the 
Commission for Africa, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 8: 3 (2006), p. 346. Good 
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legitimacy of the public institutions that support markets”, World Bank, World Development Report 2002: 
building institutions for markets (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 99. 
463 Paul Cammack, “Global Governance, State Agency and Competitiveness”, p. 346.  
464 Paul Cammack, “The Politics of Global Competitiveness”, p. 1. He gives the example of the role of the EU in 
this respect through the “Lisbon Process”. Of the regions where the Lisbon Process is functioning is Latin 
America. The Lisbon process (council) reflects “deliberate ‘Lisbonisation’ of policy-making in the region, Paul 
Cammack, “Competitiveness and Convergence: the Open Method of Co-ordination in Latin America”, Papers in 
the Politics of Global Competitiveness, University of Manchester, 5 (2007), pp. 4-7. Cammack also points out 
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of competitiveness, Ibid. p. 8.   
465 Paul Cammack, “The Politics of Global Competitiveness”, p. 4. 
466 Cammack identifies the EU rather than the US as the centre of the formulation and dissemination of the politics 
of global competitiveness. 
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Secondly, using benchmarking tools in order to systematically measure performance. Thirdly, 
the realisation of the importance of national states as “the agents responsible for implementing 
change”. Lastly, “the insistence that a key part of the task” is for the state to “shape public 
opinion to the logic of global competitiveness”467. Cammack argues that “the political economy 
of global competitiveness is simultaneously systemic and state-centred”, it has to be established 
globally in order to be functional at the national level468. 
 
Cammack concludes that it is “class relations, or class struggle, which shapes both domestic 
and global politics”469. The governments of the advanced capitalist states promote 
competitiveness within and beyond their borders because they “believe that the disciplinary 
forces that global competitiveness will unleash are vital to the continued sway of capital over 
labour in their own economies, and to the continued pressure on capital to seek to be ever more 
competitive”. While more plausible compared to the others, his account seems contradictory 
arguing that the government is distant from social class control while at the same time rooting 
international competitiveness in class struggle. Also, it presupposes an alignment of states’ 
interest with those of capital for the control of labour. It is true that class struggle shapes the 
politics of competitiveness, but what the state does in relation is a management of that struggle 
in the interest of preserving the social order rather than maintaining the “sway” of capital and 
its hegemony over labour.  
 
Harvey’s analysis of capitalism is useful for capturing the essence of competitiveness. He states 
that the capitalist mode of production has three key laws. First, capitalism is a “growth-
                                                          
467 Ibid. pp.2-3. 
468 Ibid. pp. 4-5. 
469 Cammack states that it is important to start from “this insight” in order to understand our contemporary world. 
He affirms that only a “renewed classical Marxism” can do that. However, it must be “more rather than less 
‘classical’ in its orientation ... more rather than less focused on the themes of accumulation and the realisation of 
value through capitalist exploitation”, Ibid. p. 13. 
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oriented” system. Its subsistence depends on economic growth as capital accumulation and 
profit realisation are only achievable through growth. The “corner stone of capitalism's 
ideology” is that growth is “both inevitable and good”. Hence, crisis is “defined as lack of 
growth”470. The second law is class struggle and the exploitation of labour, they both lie at the 
core of economic growth as it is predicated upon “labour control, both in production and in the 
market place”. And finally, capitalism is a dynamic system based on “leap-frogging 
innovations” in the pursuit for profit by individual capitalists, which in turn is triggered by “the 
coercive laws of competition”. Innovations in technology and the organisation of production 
alter the conditions of class struggle and, therefore, the conditions of the labour market. It is 
equally important, Harvey argues, that we realize that crisis can be avoided only if these 
organizational and technological changes are met with a change in the “regulatory system”, 
namely the political system and its apparatuses471.   
It is this logic that made the position of the state “problematic”, Harvey notes, as it is “called 
upon to regulate the activities of corporate capital in the national interest at the same time as it 
is forced”, also in the name of national interest, to deliver a “'good business climate' to act as 
an inducement” to transnational capital, and to prevent “capital flight to greener and more 
profitable pastures”472.  
Strange considers the “structural changes” that occurred in the world economy since the 1980s 
as having “fundamentally changed” the nature of competition between states. That is, the global 
economy has experienced two shifts. One is a shift in the factors of production from land, 
                                                          
470 David Harvey, The Conditions of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1990), p. 180. Harvey points out that to reach a steady rate of growth and preserve the 
system, there are political, social and ecological consequences. These consequences are elaborated in greatest 
details in the debate about the first and the second contradictions of capitalism, See James O’Connor, “On the 
Two Contradiction of Capitalism”, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 2: 3, 1991, pp. 107-9. See also, James 
O’Connor, “Is Sustainable Capitalism Possible?”, In Martin O’Connor, (ed.), Is capitalism Sustainable?: Political 
Economy and the Politics of Ecology (London: The Guilford Press, 1994). For more information about the social 
and political consequences see Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1976).      
471 David Harvey, The Conditions of Postmodernity, p. 180. 
472 Ibid. p. 170.  
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labour and capital to technology and second from producing for national markets to servicing 
the need of the global market473. Specifically, the imperative of being competitive for states is 
derived also from the fact that production factors have acquired free mobility status due to the 
spread of neoliberal policies474.  
 
It was territories that constituted the main target for state competition in the past as they 
represented pools of exploitable resource crucial for national wealth creation. Today, states 
compete for a share in the global market. Territory, Strange contends, is “no longer the major 
determinant of success in the competition between states”475. However, unlike Harvey, her 
analysis is centred on a separation between the state and the market. The structural change in 
the global economy shifted the power from the state to the market. The new competition 
environment has made states less powerful in relation to mobile capital where they have to 
“often offer greater inducements, waive more rules and demands, to a foreign firm to enter its 
territory than it will to a native one to stay”476. Namely, this structural change in the rules of 
competition made states “hollow, or defective, institutions” because their ability to tax and 
regulate has simply declined477. Her account, although has some truth to it in terms of the 
impact of the above shifts on the state’s management of the economy, takes no consideration 
of the relationship between capital and labour as a determinant of the changes in the global 
economy and the rules of competition. Neither does it take an account of how this relationship 
is related to the state. Competitiveness has not turned the state into a “defective” or “hollow” 
entity, it rather is a form of political management of the class antagonisms of the market.  
                                                          
473 Susan Strange, “The Defective State”, Daedalus, 124: 2 (1995), p. 63.  
474 Herbert Giersch, “Schumpeter and the Current and future Development of the World Economy”, in Helmut 
Frisch (ed.), Schumpeterian economics (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 59.  
475 Strange, “The Defective State”, pp. 55-6.   
476 Ibid. p. 60. For a similar account see John Stopford, and Susan Strange with John S. Henley, Rival states, Rival 
Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 1, p. 66 and p. 
215.  
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Stopford rightly argues that the way in which states devise their competition strategies has 
become affected by “the emergence of new forms of global competition among firms”. The 
investment in technology and new management techniques has affected the way companies 
choose their investment territory. Their decision will go to countries that offer greater return 
on investment. Therefore, the state constantly adapts to forms of competition pursued by 
businesses478. The demand for a profitable investment environment affects the way 
governments manage their economies in order to attract investment. Primarily, “the 
administrative capacity” of both states and firms “has now become an important determinant 
of who can gain most from the changes in the world economy”479. In this way, a competition 
state is an “outward-looking” one, a state with a “greater reliance on the private sector” which 
transfers the state from being an “owner of public enterprises to being a regulator and partner 
of dynamic private enterprises”480. States had to turn themselves into “entrepreneurs to make 
their economies more responsive”481. Competition led both the state and enterprises to 
restructure their relation to the labour market, the former in order to help capital reproduce 
itself in an economy based on technological innovation by adapting the labour market through 
flexibility and skills as will be demonstrated in Chapters Seven and Eight.   
Cerny also offers a plausible account that situates the global changes within the microeconomic 
sphere of governance.  His “competition state” explains well the new state “problematic” that 
results in a change in its “architecture”482. Primarily driven by “the greater density and 
complexity” of global economic and political interconnectedness, the state reacts to these new 
                                                          
478 John Stopford, and Susan Strange with John S. Henley, Rival states, Rival Firms, p. 1. 
479 Ibid. p. 2. 
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conditions in either a “traditional” or an “innovative” way, he states. However, he perceives 
this change to be prompted by “international factors”, which shape the objectives and strategies 
of states to the extent that all “the games which they play, and the way that those games are 
clustered, are to a greater and greater extent transnational games by definition”. Yet, contrary 
to the common belief that the transnationalization of the state leads to the weakening of national 
identities, he contends that they are in fact “strengthened at the same time by the rigors of 
competition”483.  Rather than causing a decline of its power, Cerny argues that these changes 
have led to the “emergence of the state as a commodifying agent”. Within the new global 
context, the state “is having to act more and more like a market player, that shapes its policies 
to promote, control, and maximize returns from the market forces in an international setting”484. 
For Cerny, what is important about the new state architecture is that it is grounded in 
“microeconomic interventionism”, which is revolves around the “operationalization of 
‘industrial policy’”, rather than on a macroeconomic one. That is, the new interventionism of 
the state is effectively a response to new “competitive conditions” of the global market rather 
than emanating from the pursuit of preserving and developing national strategic industries, 
which used to be the source of a nation’s comparative advantage. More importantly, this 
development impelled an adjustment in the core of national politics to become more concerned 
with managing the economy in a way conducive to success of the enterprise at the expense 
“maximization of welfare within a national society”485.   
Similarly, Palan et al argue that the state is not in decline with the rise of neoliberalism, but it 
is responding to new global conditions by formulating competition strategies aimed at 
                                                          
483 Ibid. p. 220.  
484 Cerny argues that the new role of the state as a competition state was characteristic of the period so called 
primitive capitalism and the mercantilist era. Ibid. p. 230.  
485 This according to Cerny will have considerable “ramifications for liberal democracy”, Ibid.  p. 205 and p.  222.  
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enhancing their competitive advantage in the global economy486. For them, this 
institutionalization of competitiveness within the state system represents the salvation of the 
state from its “Fordist contradictions”487. The latter, as argued in Chapter Three, was 
characterised with inflexible and protected labour market that reached its limits early 1970s 
and manifest in slow economic growth and high unemployment rates. Building on that they 
argue that globalization is a “qualitative” change rather than quantitative488. Above all, they 
point out that although a convergence towards one model of the competition state is underway, 
there is no “single universal model of a competition state emerging”. States do not pursue the 
same policies as they don’t have identical priorities given that their class struggle conditions 
are different and thus their relationships to capital and labour are unique.  
Palan et al contend that every state integrates to the world economy selectively. This selectivity 
is a way of shielding themselves from undesired exposure to external forces. This is not a 
strategy employed by an inward-looking or a protectionist state. On the contrary, it has been 
deployed by open economies with “extensive liberalization” programmes489. The “shielder” 
states reach this position by: 
 
dualizing their economies and integrating with the world market ... while compensating for the regressive 
impact of unfettered market forces. The latter is principally achieved by protecting specific sectors of their 
economy and by employing the welfare state as a massive distribution mechanism of the benefits such 
openness can yield490. 
                                                          
486 Ronan Palan, Jason Abbott and Phil Deans, State Strategies in the Global Political Economy (London: Printer, 
1996) p. 6, There are three phases in the relationship between capitalism and the “territoriality” of the state. In the 
earlier phase, capitalism “was truly transnational, largely dis-engaged from the state-system”.  What followed is 
a phase in which capitalism “increasingly takes on a ‘national’ form ... this phase reached its zenith around the 
1870s”. After that a third phase starts where the capitalist enterprises “burst their national boundaries and became 
... increasingly global”. The extension of the latter phase signalled in the developments of the 1970s is “what we 
call globalization”.  Ibid. pp. 17-9.  
487 Ibid. p. 19. 
488 Ibid. 
489 Ibid. p. 105.  
490 For its opponents, welfare is seen as “essentially internal arrangements, introverted, and if anything, oblivious 
to the demands of an increasingly competitive world market”. Ibid.  
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This is despite the fact the welfare policies were seen as hindering rather than enforcing 
international competitiveness, he later notes. This dualism has generated “a surprising mixture 
of competitiveness and innovation combined with a commitment to preserve tradition and 
cultural values”491. The shielder-state model is mainly a European model, exemplified in the 
German and Swedish systems, and still present in some of Anglo-Saxon countries, albeit to a 
lesser extent.  
 
The implication of this depiction of the state is that any crisis of the system signifies the 
“growing incapability” of the shielder-model states to balance “competitiveness with this 
commitment to preserving ‘tradition’”, the latter understood in relation to Garelli’s economy 
of proximity. This “incapability” appears as a pressure “emanated from a growing divergence 
between capital and labour – undermining the very compromise which is at the heart of these 
societies”492. Rather than being a “coordinated response” to global economic changes, the 
competitive strategies of the competition state, which constitute “the infrastructure of 
globalization”, have evolved as a “result of localized responses, largely determined by local 
conditions, specific socio-economic compromises, sectoral interests and so forth”. The 
competition state, therefore, “may only survive as long as states do not seek to revolutionize or 
destroy the system but merely to manoeuvre within it”493. This is exactly the argument towards 
which this thesis is oriented. Although the competitiveness discourse of the WEF, especially 
with its focus on the microeconomic foundations of competitiveness, aims to establish a 
competition state that is built on the dismantling of the welfare state as an obstacle for growth 
and higher living standards, no state has so far taken this extreme. Many of the state’s policies 
                                                          
491 Ibid. p. 107. 
492 Ibid. p. 118.  
493 Ibid. p. 121.  
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have changed, but it is the socio-economic conditions of the nation that defines its response to 
the competitiveness imperative494.  
 
The point is that international competitiveness has not been applied as argued above in the 
discourse. That is, states have actually developed localised responses to competitiveness. In 
order to solve the economic, political and social difficulties, competitiveness has been 
readjusted to the national structure of the relationship between labour, capital, and the state. 
For example, in Germany, Kantola states, competitiveness “has been used to unite the nation 
on the tripartite level as a way to continue the German model of tripartite national consensus”. 
Thus, addressing problems of unemployment, economic growth and so on is done on a tripartite 
basis495. Building on this, he argues that globalisation involves “an increasing homogeneity 
between social institutions and norms” because states are now required to “harmonize” these 
institutions to attract capital496.  
 
The engagement of nations in competitiveness strategies is closely linked to their role in 
enhancing the prosperity of their people497. The state’s central role in relation to 
competitiveness is to guarantee “that the value created by firms will, in one way or another, 
contribute to the prosperity of people”. This role is a “delicate” one which “cannot be tilted 
excessively one way or the other without running the risk of social destabilisation”498. As 
pointed out by Garelli, state policies are always changing according to the changes taking place 
in the society. For example, “if the population demands more social welfare and protection, it 
                                                          
494 For an account of the impact of the competitiveness of global policy groups on social protection in the EU, see 
Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, “European unemployment and transnational capitalist class strategy: The rise of the neo-
liberal competitiveness discourse” in Henk Overbeek (ed.), The Political Economy of European Employment 
(London: Routledge, 2003), p. 114.  
495 Anu Kantola, “Transforming political imaginaries”, p. 15. 
496 Ibid. p. 17. 
497 Garelli defines prosperity as “a combination of income, standard of living, and quality of life”, Stéphane 
Garelli, Top Class Competitors, p. 58. 
498 Ibid. p. 114.  
 161 
 
can have a direct impact on the taxation of enterprises or on labour legislation”. On the other 
hand, if companies focus their business operations outside the country, this impinges on state 
revenues, employment rates and skill development in the society. In both cases competitiveness 
is affected499. In an evaluation of how much learning is done on the part of the government 
regarding international competitiveness, Dreznek of the WEF notes that:  
the government is recognising increasingly and probably more openly the interconnection between the 
different areas of policies; economic policies have an impact on social policies and on environmental 
policies and that actually you need to have a realistic approach to all of this in order to be able to balance 
them in a way that provide higher wellbeing, to increase well-being of the population500.  
Therefore, to increase their competitiveness, states need to “systematically” analyse how their 
policies, legislations and regulations impact upon the growth of their economy. Besides, a 
“strongly competitive” state is one that takes on “a certain degree of partnership between local 
business and the government” in devising its strategy of competitiveness501. Garelli argues that 
“a permanent, open, and efficient relationship between the business community and 
government policy makers is essential for competitiveness”. Government, business and labour 
leaders should develop “a system of industry sector agreements which guarantee a conflict-free 
environment for a certain number of years until they are renegotiated” like that in Germany, 
Switzerland, and Sweden. Thus, achieving competitiveness largely depends on the states being 
successful at answering the following question: “What is the most suitable relationship between 
business and labour for the development of competitiveness?”502.  
 
                                                          
499 In the 1970s, a “change in the value system of the population in most industrialised nations” forced states and 
firms to be “sensitive to new issues such as social welfare, environmental protection, gender, racial, and minority 
discrimination, diversity, and work–life balance”, Ibid. pp. 114-5. 
500 Margareta Drzeniek, Interview with The Author, October 16, 2013. 
501 Stéphane Garelli, Top Class Competitors, p. 81. 
502 Ibid. p. 83.  
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Indeed, it is to this question that states adhere when designing their competiveness policies. By 
definition, their role in the management of class struggle dictates their approach to international 
competitiveness. The discourses they design and communicate to the public are manifestations 
of the conditions and the intensity of class struggle as well as to maintain the reproduction of 
capital within their economies. Their competitiveness policies are designed in a way that would 
immobilise mobile global capital within their jurisdiction by offering the best investment 
environment that allows continuous exploitation of labour and reproduction of capital. States 
respond to the competitiveness discourse as a way of managing this relationship between 
capital and labour. They each have a distinct relationship with global capital on this basis.      
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the competitiveness discourse designed by the globalising 
professional of the WEF, as a TCC site, have informed the academic debate on international 
competitiveness. Although this discourse is a medium through which the TCC attempts to 
communicate its power, as argued in Chapter Four, I have shown, however, that there exists no 
fixed theoretical approach to international competitiveness. Rather, there are multiple 
approaches that share a degree of common ground, yet diverge in their account of the optimal 
framework for achieving sustainable competitiveness. That is, while all discourses of 
competitiveness responsiblize the state with a certain role in order to maintain its international 
competitiveness in a global capitalist system and, thus, maintain continuous capital 
accumulation, their consideration of the importance of the social foundation of competitiveness 
vary. While Garelli calls for a role of the state that strikes a balance between economic 
efficiency and social cohesion significant for the sustainability of competitiveness, Porter sees 
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this target realised by solely focusing on the microeconomic foundations of competitiveness 
that is best achieved by freeing the economy from state intervention that accounts for catering 
beyond the competitiveness of the enterprise. Based on that, there exists no one hegemonic 
competitiveness discourse and the WEF’s discourse is one among other national and global 
discourses. There has been no evidence to support the argument, made in the academic 
literature discussed above, that the role of the globalising politicians of the TCC, state managers 
here, is complementary to that of globalising professionals of the Forum. While the WEF could 
be perceived off as a powerful policy group given the type of audience it attracts and the 
activities it holds, the interests of its attendants and participants are not identical. The interests 
of TNCs, globalising professionals and the consumerist elites seem to be more convergent 
whereas the interests of state managers are derived from their role and responsibility of 
reproducing and managing capital-labour relations nationally and on the global market. Thus, 
they are not part of the TCC or a member of the Forum. Rather, they have to engage with its 
activities and discourses as a form of managing class struggle within its jurisdictions.     
Also, I have demonstrated how these two positions on competitiveness are reflected in 
theoretical and empirical studies in the debate on the impact of the discourse of international 
competitiveness on the state’s social and economic policies. Most of the debate perceives the 
discourse to have impacted negatively on the state, turning it into a market player that is 
manipulated and instrumentalised by global market forces such as the WEF. Specifically, that 
the changes in the global economy that accompanied the rise of neoliberalism have activated a 
change of the role of the state targeted at maintaining the hegemony of capital over labour 
necessary for a competitive global capitalist system. The WEF’s discourse is probably meant 
to perform this function. However, I argue against such a depiction of the impact of the global 
competitiveness discourse on the state. The adoption of competitiveness standards by the state 
is a response to the need of reproducing class struggle in their home economies, which is 
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achieved through the management of capital-labour relations beyond the state political 
territories. The latter allows the reproduction of social relations of production within their 
jurisdictions. Therefore, state managers adapt competitiveness standards to the national 
conditions of the relationship between capital and labour, their competitiveness standards are 
a product of these conditions. Thus, there is no convergence in the ways states respond to the 
competitiveness challenge. Most importantly, I have pointed out that rather than deriving the 
influence of the discourse from national political debates over competitiveness rankings, an 
adequate analysis should firstly engage critically with the competitiveness reports published 
by global policy groups such as the GCR of the WEF. Such an undertaking provides a more 
accurate account of reality by pointing out the difference between what these reports try to 
achieve on the one hand and how states actually respond to the competitiveness challenge in 
reality. It is to this end that we turn in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Six  
The Global Competitiveness Report: The Discursive Power of the WEF 
 
The previous chapter illustrated how the discourse on international competitiveness has 
become embedded within academic as well as national political debates. Globalising 
professionals of the TCC such as Garelli and Porter have had a greatest influence on the content 
of the debate through their role of developing the, yet, most sophisticated theoretical framework 
of international competitiveness. Moreover, their contribution is of significant importance in 
the way it has shaped the WEF’s competitiveness discourse, which has turned it into an 
authority on the topic today for both business and state leaders. I have argued that, today, the 
Forum’s power originates from being not only an expertise community but also from being a 
discursive formation that seeks to project its influence through its competitiveness and other 
discourses. While this influence cannot be denied, outlining the Forum’s structure and the roles 
played by both globalising professionals, on behalf of the Forum, and globalising politicians 
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suggests a conclusion different from the one assumed in the TCC and international 
competitiveness literatures. There exists no complementarity of tasks or interests between 
TNCs, professionals, politicians and other groups involved in the Forum’s activities. Simply, 
the state does not constitute a part of the TCC although it has always influenced its development 
through the national management of the circuits of capital as well as the global accumulation 
of capital.              
More importantly, the academic debate on international competitiveness lacks the empirical 
depth necessary to solidify its findings. That is, rather than basing the discussion on how much 
influence the competitiveness discourse has on the state’s policymaking, an adequate analysis 
requires a closer engagement with the discourse itself as produced by its agents. The 
engagement with the GCR’s discourse provides fertile ground for a thorough analysis of the 
role of the state in relation to the international competitiveness discourse. It also allows an 
extension of the current debate, which is largely shaped by deterministic and instrumentalist 
depictions derived from country rankings in competitiveness reports. That is, changes and 
developments in national policy-making is a mere reflection of state rankings and the Forum 
and other institutions reporting on international competitiveness determine the nature and scope 
of these changes and developments. They instrumentalise the state through their reports. 
However, from an Open Marxist perspective, I have contended that the competitiveness 
discourse is a moment of class struggle, a form of the management of capital-labour relations 
by the state aimed at the reproduction of the social relations of production. Therefore, its 
adoption of a competitiveness discourse represents a form of management of that struggle and 
a response to the imperative of maintaining the circulation of capital within its jurisdictions 
necessary to the reproduction of both capital and labour.  
As will be shown in Chapter Eight, governments have begun to internalise the WEF’s 
discourse, among other discourses, into its evidence-informed policy-making process. 
 167 
 
However, this by no means indicates that the Form’s discourse as a whole becomes internalised 
within the state. Rather, each state responds to the discourse selectively and this selectivity is 
conditioned by the national conditions of class struggle. Thus, a closer analysis of both the 
GCR and the competitiveness discourse internalised by the state will allow for a useful 
comparison to be drawn between the two, thus highlighting the extent of influence the WEF’s 
has on the state. It illustrates more clearly the role of politicians as circuit managers and reveal 
more of the dynamics that characterise the process of reproducing the social relations of 
production within state jurisdictions.  
This chapter takes stock of the GCR as a discursive holder of the Forum’s power and a tool of 
its power projection. It intends to analyse the (re)configuration of the role of the state within 
the WEF’s GCR competitiveness discourse between 1979 and 2014 in order to be able to 
highlight the development occurred in the Report since its inception. Firstly, it places the GCR 
within the historical context of its emergence and examine the imperatives leading to its 
publication. By doing so, it will highlight how the accumulation of material power resulted in 
the birth of ideational power at the Forum that is manifest in the production of the GCR. 
Secondly, it sheds light on the main components of the report and the developments it has 
undergone in terms of coverage and methodology. As it will be shown, these developments 
were brought about by more concentration of material and ideational power underpinned by 
changes in the socio-economic national and global conditions.  
Finally, the chapter will narrow down the focus to mainly map out the way in which the state 
has been attributed certain responsibilities within such discourse. This will be done through 
analysing the role of the state within; 1) The factors of competitiveness designed by the Forum 
as a ‘formula for national prosperity’; 2) the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
methodological frameworks underpinning such formula. By doing so, the chapter will identify 
the role ascribed to the state within the competitiveness discourse produced by the WEF itself 
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and, thus, differentiate between what the discourse entails specifically and what the academic 
debate has made of it thus far. As I will show in Chapter Eight, the role of the state as depicted 
by the Forum’s discourse is different from the one assumed by the state in practice, which again 
confirms the OM assumptions of the thesis and refutes those of other accounts viewing the 
state as being instrumentalised by capital or reducing its functions to mainly being determined 
by the economic structure of the capitalist society.   
It will argue that the WEF’s discourse clearly draws a framework for state action that is 
considered necessary for maintaining its international competitiveness. However, it will be 
demonstrated that its discourse has shifted from the orthodox framework, which is 
macroeconomic-oriented, to another that is based on embedding competitiveness within the 
society through emphasising the need for microeconomic reforms as the source of the nation’s 
prosperity. This highlights that such a shift represents a focus on the responsibility of the state 
in containing the labour power and guaranteeing its flexibility as a necessary condition for 
sustainable economic growth.    
      
 
6.1. The GCR and the Making of the Discourse on Competitiveness  
 
Since its early years and mainly in response to the economic and social developments and 
challenges faced Europe in the 1970s, ‘being competitive’ was the central aim and buzzword 
that has preoccupied the Forum’s members until today. Competitiveness will undoubtedly be 
central to its agenda in the future as long as capitalism and its contradictory mode of production 
dominate the global economic system. While the Forum’s annual meetings were set to discuss 
the challenges facing the European economies and their companies, solving Europe’s problems 
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necessitated more than one annual meeting at Davos503. In addition to expanding the networks 
with business, state, and trade unions leaders, in 1979 the WEF took the decision to capitalise 
on its accumulated economic, business and social knowledge generated by its experts, members 
and networks. It initiated a series of reports on the competitiveness of European industry that 
by the mid-1980s has changed to reports on international competitiveness504. Later on, its 
coverage stretched beyond Europe and its competitors extended to include more economies.   
Until the late 1980s, the GCR was a special and private service provided by the Forum to its 
members to present them with an opportunity to take a snapshot of the global economy and the 
competitiveness status of its individual national economies. This was seen as vital for their 
strategic planning, investment decisions, and their very survival. Given the Forum’s desire to 
project its influence through its discourses outside its annual meetings and summits, the GCR 
has been made available for free to all the interested parties. States, companies, trade unions, 
NGOs, academics, business research centres have become consumers of such knowledge for 
various reasons, which will be explored further in Chapter Eight. As noted by Schwab, at the 
inception of the GCR, competitiveness had not yet gained much attention worldwide. 
Therefore, when looking back today one can tell that the GCR “truly broke new ground”505.          
The GCR was first called the Report on the Competitiveness of the European Industry. It was 
changed in the mid-1980s to Report on International Competitiveness and was only named the 
Global Competitiveness Report in 1996. This change reflects a strategic shift in the Forum’s 
life from being a European organisation founded primarily to solve Europe’s problems to 
becoming a global organisation concerned with the health and competitiveness of global 
                                                          
503 At the heart of the problem was an information gap that stemmed from outdated management techniques put 
at play in Europe’s enterprises since the end of WWII. This drawback was regarded responsible for a declining 
competitiveness and thus a sluggish economic growth in European countries.  
504 The Forum cooperated with multiple public and private organizations for the compilation of the collected data; 
the OECD, the European Commission, and WHO, to mention a few.   
505 Klaus Schwab and Juan Rada, “Preface”, in WEF (eds.), The World Competitiveness Report 1991 (Geneva: 
The World Economic Forum, 1991). 
 170 
 
capitalism as a whole in order to maintain continued economic growth and capital 
accumulation506. The first report was produced in 1979 on the tenth anniversary of the Forum 
and was meant to serve “as the background document” for the 1979 annual meeting theme; 
“An Agenda for European Business Leaders: International Cooperation, Productivity and 
Social Commitment”. These three objectives were the catchwords of the time and were seen 
by Davos’s participants as “vital ingredients” of the competitiveness of European businesses.  
In short, enhancing competitiveness necessitates business experiences to be exchanged and 
cooperation to be established among Europe’s chief executives507. The social, economic, and 
political environments of a country interplay in the background; they define the way those 
executives interact and form a basis on which corporate present and future strategies are 
formulated. This background is determined to a great extent by the nature of class struggle that 
defines the state’s approach to economic management and thus the country’s relationship with 
global capital. Therefore, the priority for the European economies and enterprises, as stressed 
in the first report, should be given to answering key questions such as; what is the competitive 
position of their economies and industries? How can they stay competitive in relation to 
competitors? And how can they become competitive in the first place? These questions were 
seen as crucial because failing to answer them would put the future of Europe in risk as 
maintained in the reports. The circumstantial premises within which these questions were 
raised were characterised by “new international economic order, industrial restructuring, 
technological breakthroughs, and leaps in social expectations”508. All of these conditions 
                                                          
506 Until 1989, the GCR was distributed to the Forum’s members and participants of the Davos Symposium. 
However, it was also sold to other interested but non-member companies for 1800 Swiss francs (1126 US dollars 
then). 
507 Klaus Schwab, “Preface”, in EMF (eds.), The Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry 1979 
(Davos: European Management Forum, 1979).  
508 EMF, “Introduction”, in EMF (eds.), Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry 1979, p. 4 
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necessitate a new course of action on the part of the state and thus a new form of economic 
stirring of the economy.  
The WEF emerged as a response to this new environment and challenges of which the lack of 
knowledge on competitiveness seemed highly problematic. To this end, “in autumn 1978, the 
idea to produce a study on the competitiveness of European industry was crystallized from 
earlier brainstorming within the Forum, and the project was given the green light for execution 
during 1979”509. Schwab notes that publishing competitiveness reports serves as a dynamic 
base for “thinking about global competitiveness” and “may help to launch the necessary actions 
leading to a less protectionist world”510 that rose as a serious challenge both in and outside 
Europe during the 1970s and 1980s.   
The first competitiveness report covered 16 countries, compared to 148 in 2014. It was planned 
to examine the “competitive situation” of industries in those countries with an intention of 
drawing a comparison between them and the rest of the world in future reports in order for 
Europe to benchmark itself against its competitors511. The challenge at its commencement was 
to investigate the factors that constitute the competitiveness of Europe. Such a challenge was 
deemed existential for Europe’s survival as evident in the following statement from the first 
report: “our future will depend on our competitiveness, on our ability to discern the elements 
that will determine competitiveness tomorrow and on the rapidity with which we can formulate 
appropriate practical measures”512.  
 
                                                          
509 Ibid. p. 92.  
510 Klaus Schwab, “Preface”, in WEF (eds.), The EMF’s Report on International competitiveness 1985 (Davos: 
World Economic Forum, 1985), p. 3. 
511 These countries are: Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Switzerland, Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and Finland.  
512 EMF, “Introduction”, The Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry 1979, p. 4 
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The information gap to which the Forum has attempted to respond does not only apply to the 
lack of innovative business management techniques or the waning competitiveness of 
European companies. Rather, it is also genuinely linked to threatening shortcomings of all 
European stakeholders. As stated ubiquitously in the reports, governments in Europe fell far 
short from providing the necessary conditions which would make European companies more 
competitive on the global market. More specifically, the embedded Keynesian welfare system 
in Europe represented a serious obstacle to a competitive Europe. Hence, the ‘big governments’ 
of the time were blamed for the sinking of European economies and, therefore, this out-of-date 
governance structure had to be dismantled. Moreover, trade unions then had an excessive 
bargaining power in corporate governance, which affected the management of the European 
enterprise negatively. That is, the rigidity of the European labour market in terms of wage 
bargaining, inflexibility and unskilled labour force endangered the profitability of business and, 
hence, the sustainability and competitiveness of European companies deemed as the source for 
growth, prosperity and higher living standards. It is principally these reasons that required a 
new course of action on the part of the government that the GCR attempts to deliver.  
Despite Schwab’s belief that it is the creative entrepreneur that survives and succeeds even 
within less favourable national environments, the final judge is the market-place. Schwab 
argues that “the non-competitiveness of enterprises in countries at the top of the ranking may 
imply an unnecessary waste of resources and indicate to governments that structural changes 
should be facilitated”.513 These changes, as will be discussed below, are more necessary at the 
microeconomic levels than the macro since the former is primarily where class struggle has to 
be managed in a way that enable capital to reproduce itself.  
                                                          
513 Klaus Schwab, “Preface”, in WEF (eds.), the EMF’s Report on International competitiveness 1985, p. 3. 
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The Forum believed that these problems were not entirely realised by politicians nor by trade 
unionists. Change was felt crucial by businesses while governments and trade unions were 
reluctant to employ structural changes. When considering the larger picture, the Forum’s 
revolutionary project has focused on bringing all three main parties together and on bridging 
the three gaps in order to overcome Europe’s challenge. The fundamental backwardness in 
Europe was reflected in the lack of awareness of the significance of stakeholders’ partnership 
and collaboration. The GCR speaks primarily to such deficiency and seeks to raise the 
necessary awareness among all stakeholders that a successful and profitable business is a 
competitive and sustainable business, one which brings about growth, employment and 
prosperity to all. Thus whatever hinders the creation of such environment should be eliminated. 
The politics of consensus were deemed a failure and the power of labour had to be reduced.  
Ten years from 1979, Schawb and Abell celebrated the Forum’s triumphal approach 
represented through the GCR when they stated that “as more and more corporate leaders 
recognize the influence of the economic and political environment, and as political leaders 
strive to provide the most fertile ground possible for corporate success, this report provides a 
valuable frame of reference”514. By 1985, the Forum believed that the GCR had become a 
“well-known and appreciated tool for assessing the opportunities and drawbacks of various 
national business environments relative to the other key players in the international 
competitiveness race”515. This reveals that the GCR is taken to be a framework for action and 
a practical ground of judging the soundness of such actions. It is the national environments and 
the governmental actions that the GCR is set to correct and it is the mindset of national 
                                                          
514 Klaus Schwab and Derek Abell, “Preface”, in WEF (eds.), the World Competitiveness Report 1989 (Geneva: 
World Economic Forum, 1989).    
515 EMF, the EMF’s Report on International competitiveness 1985,p. 17 
 174 
 
policymakers that it longs to ameliorate in order to produce such soundness and readiness. It is 
here where the heart of the GCR project lies.  
In the next section I turn to the Forum’s definition of the GCR and its factors of 
competitiveness. Moreover, I will shed light on the changes that these factors have undergone 
from 1979 until 2014. My primary objective is to map out the role ascribed to the state in the 
composition of each factor in order to reach an understanding on how integral the state is for 
enhancing national competitiveness from the WEF’s perspective.       
 
 
 
6.2. Competitiveness Formula: the State’s Framework of Action  
 
GCR is not an academic study based on rigorous economic laws. Nor does it set out to test a theory. Rather, 
it identifies - on the basis of the FORUM's unique contacts with industry and on the basis of lengthy 
consultations with business experts - those factors which have a significant determining influence on 
competitiveness and appraises each country's performance on these factors to arrive at a final 
competitiveness516.  
 
The study of competitiveness as a management model essentially relied on surveying the 
opinions of business leaders and experts both within and outside the Forum. However, as will 
be shown in the methodology section, this preliminary claim that dates back to 1980, has 
changed considerably in recent years. The GCR has become heavily centred on academic input 
                                                          
516 Michael de Verteuil et al, “Introduction”, in EMF (eds.), Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry 
1980 (Davos: European Management Forum, 1980), p. 5.  
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derived from the “rigours economic laws” that the Forum claim to avoid517. Factors of 
competitiveness have principally become the artefact of academic research.  
 
Nonetheless, this is not to say that competitiveness has changed with this academic 
transformation. In the beginning, it was concerned with the “survival of the free-enterprise 
system” and it still is very much so today518. Although the accumulated knowledge on 
competitiveness that flows from structural developments within the global economy have 
induced changes into the methodology, the Forum’s competitiveness has always been about 
international competitiveness, not regional or city-level competitiveness519. As stated by the 
Forum in 1990, the GCR is a “multidimensional analysis of how national environments are 
conducive or detrimental to the domestic and global competitiveness of enterprises operating 
in those countries”520. International competitiveness is a function of efficiency, productivity 
and excellence of entrepreneurs ˗˗ this was the case in the late 1970s, and it is today and will 
most likely be so in the future. 
 
It should be also noted that the methodological changes underlying the development of the 
GCR did not break with the Forum’s existential dogma, which is stakeholderism.  In 1989 
Goestchin rightly argued that “present and future competitiveness is certainly a consequence 
of the calibre of people, of the politico-social milieu and of the physical environment”521. Still, 
this cannot be seen as separate from the fact that “competitiveness comes in layers”, according 
                                                          
517 This will showed in greater details in the methodology section of this chapter.   
518 EMF, “Introduction“, in EMF (eds.), Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry 1980, p. 4.   
519 The WEF’s Global Agenda Council of Competitiveness, inspired by the GCR, initiated a study on city 
competitiveness but the main focus of the Forum is still national competitiveness. Regional and city 
competitiveness studies are common practices nowadays, examples in the UK are Cardiff’s Centre for 
International Competitiveness that publishes reports on Regional Competitiveness and the Economist Intelligence 
Unit that produces reports on Global City Competitiveness.     
520 WEF, “Introduction”, the World Competitiveness Report 1990 (Davos: World Economic Forum, 1990), p. 8. 
521 Pierre Goestchin, “Competitiveness Development in Europe”, in WEF (eds.), the World Competitiveness 
Report 1989, p. 47.  
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to Garelli. Competitiveness is built on the sectorial, national and international layers. 
Competitiveness is determined by the ability of the enterprise to manage its interaction with 
these layers522. Indeed, it is this feature of the study of GCR at the Forum that distinguishes it 
from other studies of competitiveness.  
Modifications introduced into the methodology of the GCR and its definition of 
competitiveness are matters that should be perceived in relation to the changing social, 
economic and political global environments from 1979 to the present day. This contextualising 
is necessary in order to improve our understanding of the adaptation of the GCR’s factors of 
competitiveness. The effects of these changing environments are registered within the 
methodology in two ways: firstly, the integration of up-to-date academic research on economic 
growth and competitiveness, and secondly, through the changes in businesses’ perceptions of 
these environments523. It is also registered in the emphasis of the microeconomic foundations 
of competitiveness over the macroeconomic ones as the ultimate source of competitiveness. 
The pressing social, political and economic realities of the 1980s, that is, high unemployment, 
the threat of protectionism and the need for maintaining the competitiveness of the European 
countries in the world economy, made the study of competitiveness indispensable for the 
Forum524. To a large degree, these reasons continue to form the backdrop against which such a 
study is justified today. 
 
6.2.1. Factors of Competitiveness 
 
                                                          
522 Stephane Garelli, “What is World Competitiveness”, in WEF (eds.), The World Competitiveness Report 1990, 
p. 5.  
523 Since its inception the Forum believed that part of competitiveness is “a perception” and “no study on it can 
claim to be fully scientific, WEF, World Competitiveness Report 1989, p. 9.  
524 WEF, “Introduction”, the EMF’s Report on International Ccompetitiveness 1985, p. 6.  
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Factors of competitiveness are defined and affected by the activities of governments, 
businesses and labour and have a significant impact on their interactions with the social and 
economic, and political conditions in society. These pillars represent inputs, arguably, available 
at the disposal of all the actors of a certain national economy.  However, the government is left 
with the lion’s share of responsibilities compared to other actors. These inputs can be utilised 
to generate profitable outputs—growth, employment and higher living standards. Nevertheless, 
varying levels of productivity exist at which the utilisation of such inputs occurs, which is 
reflected in variable degrees of competitiveness for individual national economies. From the 
Open Marxist perspective, this has much to do with the nature of the relationship between the 
state, capital and labour and, thus, the level of labour flexibility and exploitation taking place 
in the economy.    
 
Some of these inputs are conditioned by the global market such as capital flows while other 
inputs are produced mainly nationally such as labour market regulations. The impact of some 
of the criteria included in the factors is felt only in the long-term, such as spending on R&D 
and education, while the impact of changing labour cost and productivity, for example, have 
more direct effect. Some of these criteria can be controlled by the enterprise and others are far 
from its control like natural resources.525 The relative importance of these inputs differs among 
countries depending on their level of economic development and their value changes over time. 
For example, with globalisation the value given to education, information technology, or labour 
skills and flexibility has most certainly augmented.  
 
                                                          
525 Augusto Lopez-Carlos et al, “Politics and Institutions Underpinning Economic Growth: Results from the 
Competitiveness Indexes”, in WEF (eds.), Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006, pp. 3-5.  
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More importantly, factors of competitiveness have become thought of as the levers for policy 
reform and with which competitiveness becomes “the conduct of well-conceived economic 
programs” rather than a “volatile phenomenon”526. Yet, this does not mean that “a country can 
necessarily grow rapidly if it reorients its policy to score high on the criteria listed in the Global 
Competitiveness Report”. Neither does this re-orientation represent a guarantor for economic 
growth. Rather the GCR and its drivers of competiveness are “helpful to know which variables 
have been most strongly correlated with recent growth rates” and also to “help identify specific 
impediments to growth”527. The GCR is a guide that provides “useful diagnostic insights” for 
growth potential528.   
 
A quick glimpse at these factors will enable us to see the logic of their groupings. I will present 
the factors in their historical development in order to highlight the continuity and change they 
have endured. A holistic picture of the components of the factors will be presented to explain 
their role in building up the competitiveness of nations, and most importantly to grasp a sense 
of how is the state being situated within each factor.  
 
6.2.1.1. The First Competitiveness Formula, 1979-1991  
Despite some terminological changes, the following factors were presented as principles of 
international competitiveness in 1979 and effectively remained the same until 1991; 
 
1) Dynamism of the Economy   
                                                          
526 Klaus Schwab, “Preface”, in WEF (eds.), The World Competitiveness Report 1997.  
527 Peter K. Corneluis, Jennifer Blanke and Fiona Paua, “The Growth Competitiveness Index: Recent Economic 
Developments and the Prospects for Sustained Recovery”, in WEF (eds.), Global Competitiveness Report 2002-
2003, p. 18.  
528 Joseph R.D’ Cruz, “Diagnosing National Industrial Profiles”, in WEF (eds.), the World Competitiveness report 
1989, p. 192.  
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2) Industrial Efficiency and Cost of Production  
3) The Dynamics of the Market 
4) Financial Dynamism  
5) Human Resources  
6) The Role of the State  
7) Infrastructural Dimension  
8) Outward Orientation   
9) Forward Orientation  
10) Socio-political Consensus and Stability529.  
 
1) The Dynamism of the Economy  
Considered as “the first prerequisite of industrial competitiveness”530, it assesses the dynamism 
of the economy as a determinant of the level of investment in the country. Specifically, this 
factor surveys transparency, efficiency and stability of the country’s legal and administrative 
frameworks in enforcing the rule of law and contracts and protecting property rights. These 
features affect investment decisions and determine the ways in which the benefits and costs of 
development policies in the country are distributed. To reach such an assessment, it measures 
the performance of the economy in terms of short- and medium-term GDP growth prospects, 
which depends largely on: the adequacy of the government’s monetary and fiscal policies, 
                                                          
529 In 1985, although factors remained largely the same, the terminology was slightly altered.  1. Dynamics of the 
Economy. 2. Industrial Efficiency. 3. Dynamics of the Market. 4. Financial Dynamism. 5. Human Resources. 6. 
State Interference. 7. Natural Endowment. 8. Outward Orientation. 9. Innovative Forward Orientation. 10. Socio-
Political Consensus and Stability. For further information on their composition see the EMF’s Report on 
International Competitiveness 1985.  
530 EMF, “Tables and Commentary”, the Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry 1979, p. 17.  
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productivity and value-added within the economy, capital formation, and private 
consumption531.  
The state is present here through its active role in providing an adequate macroeconomic and 
regulatory framework. This consists of the growth of domestic capital formation required for 
long-term competitiveness; free competition in the domestic market, which is necessary to 
improve the economic performance of the country and the strengthening of competitiveness in 
domestic companies abroad532. In short, this factor denotes the evolution of the overall 
macroeconomic environment of a country, which is principally made by the government 533. 
As stated by Sala-I-Martin of the Forum;  
 
The government cannot provide services efficiently if it has to make high-interest payments on its past 
debts. Running fiscal deficits limits the government’s future ability to react to business cycles. Firms 
cannot operate efficiently when inflation rates are out of hand. In sum, the economy cannot grow in a 
sustainable manner unless the macro environment is stable534.       
 
In 1996, this type of assessment was done under the civil institutions factor535. The 
innovativeness of this factor under the new formula came from its response to changing social 
and environmental conditions where the government’s role was extended to the following: 
guarantee a level of compatibility between environmental laws and corporate competitiveness; 
                                                          
531 Other criteria that reflect the economic strengths of a country are; industrial performance, production 
performance in selected industries, performance of key sectors of industry, tertiary sector performance, the size 
and growth of the service sector, and public infrastructure. On the basis of the results of this assessment the report 
provides economic forecasts in terms of the likelihood of a near-term recession and the future evolution of GDP.  
532 WEF, the World Competitiveness report 1989, p. 192, WEF, The World Competitiveness Report 1992, p. 13.  
533 How to read criteria included in this factor? Per-capita GDP is taken as an indication of the sophistication of a 
country’s economy.  If manufacturers have a large share in the GDP, this signifies the fact that the economy is 
geared towards the need of the industry. When the volume of trade is large, it means the country’s economy is 
sound. The growth of a country’s GDP reflects an increasing dynamism of the economy and signals a future 
positive status of the country. 
534 Xavier Sala-I-martin et al, “the Global Competitiveness Index 2013-2014: Sustaining Growth, Building 
Resilience”, in WEF (eds.), the Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014, p. 6.  
535 For further details on the methodology used in 1996, see the “Methodology section” by Fredrick Hu, Head of 
the Research Team, in WEF (eds.), the Global Competitiveness Report 1996, pp. 36-39.  
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prove an adequate adaptability to new economic challenges; tackle corruption; preserve the 
security of people and property, as well as ensuring political stability.   
In the 2004-5 formula, the criteria composing this factor were grouped under two new factors: 
institutions and macroeconomic environment. With regards to institutions, its newness 
originates from the importance ascribed to institutions, especially during and after the 2007-8 
financial crisis. As stated by Sala-I-Martin, institutions have a crucial role in “further 
solidifying the fragile recovery, given the increasing role played by the state at the international 
level and for the economies of many countries”. Economic growth is conditioned upon the 
approach adopted by the government towards freedom and efficiency of market forces. 
Therefore, everything that stands in the way of a free and well-functioning market economy 
has to be minimised. Thus, the key role of the government is to reduce bureaucracy and red-
tape, abolish overregulation, enhance transparency and credibility by fighting corruption and 
increasing its honesty about public contracts, and to manage public finance properly so as to 
preserve the confidence in the national business environment 536.   
 
2) Industrial Efficiency  
 
This concerns the efficiency and productivity with which economic and human resources are 
utilised within the economy. It principally covers all corporate cost structure. The role of the 
government is to ensure the following through corporate and income taxes: regulation of the 
labour market in terms of the adjustment of wages to productivity levels, the length of the 
working day, and social contribution requirements of employers and employees. All of these 
                                                          
536 The institutions considered here cover also private, coporate, institutions. They have to maintain good 
governance in terms of honestly, transparency and avoiding mismanagement and fraud in order to ensure trust 
from investors and consumers, Xavier Sala-I-Martin et al, “The Global Competitiveness Index 2013-2014: 
Sustaining Growth, Building Resilience”, p. 4-5.  
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bear largely on corporate profit, investment, cost of living and inflation. In sum, flexible 
regulations of the labour market influence corporate profitability and thus the rate of 
investment537.   
 
3) Dynamism of the Market 
 
This factor reviews the wealth, structure and the sophistication of the national market. The 
national market conditions, along with the strategies deployed by companies, are at the centre 
of analysis in this factor. The premise shaping the composition of this factor is that companies 
operating within the national economy need to be subjugated to national market forces in the 
first place in order to improve their international competitiveness. Accordingly, the government 
is accorded greater responsibilities in four main areas. Firstly, the government has to put in 
place and enforce a set of effective anti-trust policies in order to secure free market competition. 
Secondly, it has to lift all price controls and leave price determination to the laws of the market. 
Thirdly, the liberalisation of public procurement is significant to allow efficiency and 
transparency. Finally, the government has to minimise sales tax because national prosperity is 
measured in per-capita consumption.    
 
With the methodological update of 2004-2005, some of criteria and focus adopted in the 
dynamism of the market were grouped under a new factor: Goods Market Efficiency. By then, 
the GCR still placed a great emphasis on market freedom as a fundamental part of the struggle 
to competitiveness. The frequency with which terms like ‘free’ and ‘healthy’ market 
competition are repeated and the role assumed by the government as outlined above are of 
                                                          
537 EMF, “The Major Components of Competitiveness”, in the EMF’s Report on International Competitiveness 
1985, p. 41.  
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particular significance. With the new methodology adopted in 2004, Sala-I-Martin contented 
that embracing the same discourse necessary:  
 
Healthy market competition, both domestic and foreign, is important in driving market efficiency… The 
best possible environment for the exchange of goods requires a minimum of government intervention that 
impedes business activity. For example, competitiveness is hindered by distortionary or burdensome taxes 
and by restrictive and discriminatory rules on foreign direct investment (FDI)—which limit foreign 
ownership—as well as on international trade538. 
 
4) Financial dynamism  
This factor focuses on the level of development in the country’s financial environment, its 
banking system and stock market. It studies the financial market effects on private consumption 
and saving behaviour and considers whether or not savings and other financial resources are 
channelled to the most productive investments with the highest expected profit. This factor is 
centred on evaluating the heavy hand of the government in relation to its fiscal, financial, 
monetary and regulatory policies. In particular, it investigates the severity of monetary policy 
with regard to money supply; government debt and budget deficit and their impact on interest 
rates and the resulting government interference in the financial market; the effectiveness of the 
financial regulatory framework, with respect to yielding an efficient and smooth credit 
allocation, financial stability and investor protection; and finally the freedom of capital 
mobility within and across borders. In short, the government has to set up a stable, efficient, 
flexible and credible national financial framework, one that meets the needs of businesses.  
5) Human resources 
                                                          
538 It also depends on demands conditions like buyer sophistication and customer orientation, Xavier Sala-I-martin 
et al, “The Global Competitiveness Index 2013-2014: Sustaining Growth, Building Resilience”, p. 6.  
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This factor examines the structure and the education level of the population. It looks into the 
competitive advantages of a country’s workforce in terms of skills, motivation, flexibility, age 
structure and health. Investment in the provision of health services and basic education is 
regarded crucial for increasing the quality and efficiency of the workforce, which in turn 
facilitates the efforts of companies to upgrade their value chain towards the production of 
capital-intensive products539. The role of the state centres on delivering health services and 
spending on basic and higher education and training in order to increase the capacity and skills 
of the workforce to respond to the changing requirements of the production system and the 
needs of a competitive economy. Its influence is also evident in the marginal tax rate on 
personal income. The principles, criteria and ideas adopted here form the centre of analysis for 
factors such as health and primary education, higher education and training in the 2004-5 
formula.  
6) The Role of the State 
Designating one separate factor to the study of the role of the state makes considerable sense, 
but also comes with little surprise when surveying the responsibilities of the state within all the 
other factors. This factor assesses the extent to which state policies are conducive to the 
competitiveness of enterprises working in the country. It focuses on the flexibility of the 
government in adapting its economic policies to the changes in the global economic 
environment.  
The state’s involvement in the economy is measured through: national debt, official reserve, 
government’s share of total expenditure and employment, control of industry, the legislative 
and regulatory environment, efficiency and transparency, environmental protection, 
                                                          
539 Ibid.  
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agricultural policies, monetary and fiscal policies, tax rates and social security contributions 
imposed on business, nature of the competitive environment, socio-political stability in terms 
of the popular support for government policies, justice and security. The critical argument here 
is that, on the one hand, little state interference means more competitiveness. However, on the 
other hand, the state should also intervene in the economy to provide predictable 
macroeconomic and social conditions in order to minimize external risk. This factor was 
developed into the ‘government’ factor in 1996, which added to the government’s 
responsibilities an emphasis on the quality and efficiency of government services and 
interventionist policies of taxation, regulation, and spending. 
7) Infrastructural Dynamism  
This factor analyses the development of infrastructure in terms of quality and quantity, self-
sufficiency in energy and raw materials, consumption and procurement. It lays a heavy weight 
on the government in serving the needs of business through the provision of adequate and 
efficient infrastructural projects, taking into consideration its future needs and through 
effectiveness in managing the use and allocation of public energy resources and 
procurement540. A well-developed infrastructure is regarded as a condition to economic growth. 
The same principles are reiterated under the same factor in 1996 and 2004.  
8) Outward orientation  
Expressed also in terms of ‘internationalisation’ and ‘openness’ in 1991 and 1996 respectively, 
this factor is founded on the principle that firms and their operating environments must be 
internationally-oriented. In short, this is the presence of a country’s enterprises in foreign 
markets as exporters and investors, which signal their potential competitiveness. Yet, it also 
                                                          
540 This factor was replaced with the Natural Endowments factor in 1985 with the aim of studying the availability 
and efficiency of its utilisation by the economy. However, infrastructure was brought back in again in 1991.  
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means national receptiveness to imports and inward investment that adds a necessary level of 
pressure for these enterprises to maintain or enhance their competitiveness. Furthermore, trade 
legalisation in the country should be conducive to developing long-term competitiveness.  
Based on this, the desirable role of the government is to support the internationally-oriented 
activities of companies and enhance the integration of the national economy to the global 
market. Specifically, the state plays an active role through; exchange rates, trade protectionism, 
providing incentives for investment abroad, trade liberalisation, government support for 
corporate procurement abroad in addition to foreign partnership and allowing foreign majority 
shareholdings in national enterprises. However, the government’s promotion of exports though 
subsidies for example is considered counterproductive and a source for trade distortion and a 
cause of ineffectiveness in the world economy”541.  
 
However in 1996, openness, as a substitute for internationalisation and outward orientation, 
began to profoundly extend its attention to the impact of governmental practices regarding the 
opening up the national economy and fostering the links with the global market. Its role 
stretched to the following areas: boosting its support to international activities of companies in 
the long-term through trade policies; undertaking sufficient measures to promote regional trade 
integration; minimising the exchange rate volatility in the short-term, reducing the severity of 
immigration laws with respect to the prevention of the employment of foreign skills, improving 
the equality of investment incentives for foreign and domestic investors; guaranteeing equal 
accessibility of capital markets to both domestic and foreign companies; enhancing government 
regulations in relation to the freedom of foreign investors' in acquiring corporate control in 
domestic companies and allowing foreign companies to bid on public sector contracts. 
                                                          
541 WEF, “The Major Components of Competitiveness”, in EMF’s Report on International Competitiveness 1985, 
p. 68.  
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9) Forward Orientation  
Also called ‘technology’ and ‘technological readiness’ in 1991, 1996 and 2004, this factor 
examines the scientific and technological capacity of the country regarded as a prerequisite for 
sustainable prosperity. It is considered “the key to the future” and the foundation of 
“tomorrow's competitiveness”542. It is through long-term objectives, innovativeness in products 
and services, production technology and management, R&D, training of human resources and 
patents that a country can reach sustainable competitiveness and growth.  
Towards such aim, “governments must encourage these endeavours … and foster the 
regeneration of the business community”543. Governments improve the country’s competitive 
position in this regard through financing R&D and facilitating and promoting research 
collaboration programmes between businesses and universities, supporting the firm’s 
endeavours to redeploy resources from declining to high-growth sectors, and most importantly, 
the protection and generation of property rights home and abroad and expanding public support 
for the creation of new-technology enterprises.  
10) Socio-political stability:  
A country’s socio-political stability was and still is a chief concern for the business community. 
This factor assesses political stability, industrial relations, and the reliability of the judicial 
system, the threat of nationalisation, general prosperity and employee’s satisfaction as well as 
corporate credibility. The government’s role is to maintain political and social stability. This 
can be achieved through; unemployment benefits, distribution of income and property, 
enhancing confidence in the administration of justice and the system in general, preventing an 
                                                          
542 EMF, “Tables and Commentary”, p. 75.  
543 WEF, “The Major Components of Competitiveness”, the EMF’s Report on International competitiveness 1985, 
p. 66.  
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arbitrary expropriation of personal/corporate assets, guaranteeing the security of individuals 
and their property, and balancing political power in terms of parliamentary control of the 
government544. This factor has inspired the composition of other factors in 1991, 1996, and 
2004 as we will see below. However, the role of the government has changed in relation to 
employment benefits, as the latter was seen disruptive to labour market flexibility in later 
reports.  
 
6.2.1.2. The 1991 Competitiveness Formula 
The 1979 formula was modified in 1991 and reduced to an eight-level criteria. However, the 
major change has to do more with discourse than with essence545. The only factors that are 
relatively new in 1991 are the ‘management’ and ‘people’ factors. Therefore, we will focus on 
these two here.  
 
1) Domestic Economic Strength  
2) Internationalization  
3) Government  
4) Finance  
5) Infrastructure  
6) Management  
7) Science and Technology  
                                                          
544 Also measured is: people’s confidence in the political system and government policies, the material well-being 
calculated in purchasing power and the working time needed to purchase certain goods, and the extent to which 
workers participate in the management decision making process.  
545 Domestic economic strength remained unchanged, Internationalisation replaced outward orientation, 
government replaced the role of the state, finance replaced financial dynamism, infrastructure replaced natural 
endowments, and science and technology substituted forward orientation. The management factor and people 
factor combined criteria from multiple factors included in the previous list (the ten-factor formula).  
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8) People 
The ‘management’ factor borrows most of the criteria from the ‘industrial relations’ ‘the 
dynamism of the market’ and ‘socio-political stability’ factors of 1979. It investigates the 
extent to which an enterprise is managed in an innovative, profitable and responsible manner. 
Therefore, it looks into: the quality of management, public credibility of Managers, customer 
orientation and product and service quality, business efficiency and flexibility in responding to 
changes in the business environment, ability to harness new opportunities implement 
competitive strategies, enterprise productivity, labour-cost and productivity, corporate profit, 
workers compensation levels, labour abstention, safety at work, social responsibility, industrial 
relations and wage levels546.  
 
The ‘people’ factor reiterates most of the criteria included in the previous ‘human resources’, 
‘industrial relations’, and ‘socio-political stability’ factors. That is, it specifically focuses on 
the evaluation of the availability and qualifications of labour, the quality of the educational 
structure of the country in terms of meeting the demands of a competitive economy, the 
employment structures, workforce attitude in terms of labour flexibility and industrial relations, 
the country’s quality of life547.  
 
6.2.1.3. The 1996 Competitiveness Formula   
In 1996, another shift occurred in the factors as a result of the academic turn in the Forum’s 
endeavour towards identifying the reforms required for Europe and the world in order to build 
                                                          
546 A good number of criteria are borrowed from ‘the dynamism of the market’, ‘socio-political stability’, 
‘innovative forward orientation’, and ‘industrial efficiency’ factors. 
547 Domestic economic strength, people, and infrastructure constitute the economy of proximity while 
internationalisation, management, technology, and finance form the economy of globality. These two economies 
we discussed in our fourth chapter.   
 190 
 
a model for sustainable competitiveness. Jeffery Sachs, an economist of Columbia University, 
joined the Forum’s research efforts and introduced the Competitiveness Index under which 
eight factors were grouped in the following way548:  
1) Openness  
2) Government 
3) Finance 
4) Infrastructure  
5) Technology  
6) Management  
7) Labour  
8) Civil Institutions   
In 1996, in addition to ranking countries on each factor of competitiveness, the Forum 
introduced four “performance indicators” to enhance its assessment of national 
competitiveness. These indicators are: GDP, population, GDP per capita, and GDP as a share 
of world GDP549. Specifically new here is the designation of a specific factor for labour to 
examine the efficiency and competitiveness of domestic labour market. However, it repeats 
many of the factors included in the ‘industrial relations’ and ‘socio-political stability’ factors. 
The main point highlighted here is that flexible labour market with low labour tax and smooth 
industrial relations support economic growth. This factor forms the basis of the ‘labour market 
efficiency’ factor in 2004.    
                                                          
548 In the methodology section of the report, Fredrick Hu the Head of the research team notes that among the eight 
factors of competitiveness five of them which are: openness, government, labour, finance and civil institutions 
proved by evidence to be more important for economic growth compared to the other three factors: infrastructure, 
technology and management. The latter are more “elusive” because it is harder to measure their effect let alone 
the long term feature of such effect. Fredrick Hu, “Methodology”, in WEF (eds.), the Global Competitiveness 
Report 1996, p. 37.  
549 It is important to note that these indicators point to the effects of a fast growing economy and not the causes of 
economic growth. 
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6.2.1.4. The 2004-2005 Factors of Competitiveness 
  
Finally, in its latest major methodological shift the WEF adopted a twelve-factor formula for 
competitiveness in 2004. This time, the change is primarily the invention of two American 
economists, Xavier Sala-I-Martin and Michael Porter. Factors of competitiveness now include:  
 
1) Institutions 
2) Infrastructure 
3) Macroeconomic environment 
4) Health and Primary Education 
5) Higher Education and Training 
6) Goods Market efficiency 
7) Labour Market Efficiency 
8) Financial Market Sophistication 
9) Technological Readiness 
10) Market Size 
11) Business Sophistication 
12) Innovation550.     
Most of these factors effectively replicated the criteria, principles and the state responsibilities 
outlined above. Consequently, there will be little discussion outside a select few of the above 
twelve factors. Within the ‘labour market efficiency’ factor, efficiency and flexibility of the 
                                                          
550 These factors were slightly formed differently in 2004 but they were finalised in this way in 2007. To give an 
idea, here is the 2004 version of the twelve-factor formula: 1. Institutions. 2. Physical Infrastructure. 3. 
Macroeconomic Stability. 4. Security. 5. Human Capital. 6. Goods market efficiency. 7. Labour Market efficiency. 
8. Financial Market Efficiency. 9. Technological Readiness. 10. Openness and Market Size. 11. Business 
Sophistication. 12. Innovation.  
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labour market have become the buzzwords, which to some extent reflect the microeconomic 
shift of the focus in the report. These two, coupled with the appropriate incentives given to 
workers, are necessary requirements to reach effectiveness in the use of labour within the 
economy. It was stressed that the labour markets: 
must therefore have the flexibility to shift workers from one economic activity to another rapidly and at 
low cost, and to allow for wage fluctuations without much social disruption… Efficient labor markets must 
also ensure clear strong incentives for employees and efforts to promote meritocracy at the workplace, and 
they must provide equity in the business environment between women and men551.  
 
The ‘market size’ factor is studied in relation to the impact the size of the market could have 
on productivity given its effect on economies of scale. The ‘business sophistication’ reviews 
the quality of a country’s overall business networks, given its importance in enhancing business 
efficiency and increasing its opportunities for innovation in products and process. Moreover, 
the presence of business cluster and the quality of the national business environment reduces 
the cost of entry for new firms. The other side of the coin is derived from the sophistication of 
firm operations and strategies with regard to branding, marketing, distribution, advanced 
production processes, and the production of unique and sophisticated products552. The 
‘innovation’ factor was ascribed great importance since 1979553. This is evident in the 
following statement by Sala-I-Martin:  
 
                                                          
551 Xavier Sala-I-Martin et al, “The Global Competitiveness Index 2013-2014: Sustaining Growth, Building 
Resilience”, p. 7. 
552 The national business environment and the sophistication of business operations and strategies are the basis of 
Michael Porter’s Diamond framework which we will explain later in the methodology when discussing the 
microeconomic foundations of competitiveness. For more information see also, Ibid. p. 8. 
553 Innovation was stressed as a solution to fluctuating exchange rates in the European market in general whereby 
some companies could relief the pressure caused by disadvantageous price environment. Innovative upgrade is 
considered the source of rise in output, productivity, employment and exports, EMF, “Competitiveness in 
Perspective”, the Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry 1979, pp. 10-12.  
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Although substantial gains can be obtained by improving institutions, building infrastructure, reducing 
macroeconomic instability, or improving human capital, all these factors eventually run into diminishing 
returns. The same is true for the efficiency of the labor, financial, and goods markets. In the long run, 
standards of living can be largely enhanced by technological innovation554.  
 
In short, innovation is central to achieving higher productivity and thus sustainable 
competitiveness and growth. When productivity is enhanced, it impacts positively upon the 
population’s living standards. It is seen as an important condition on which competitive 
advantage rests today555.  Its attainment requires; high-quality inputs, such as highly skilled 
and an educated labour force; the presence of supporting context for investment in soft assets 
and competition among companies for this type of investment; effective demand conditions 
that leads companies to predicting future needs and improving the quality and sophistication 
of products and services; and finally, the presence of suppliers and related industries that fosters 
the flow of ideas and skills and turn technology into practice556. Within such a context, the state 
is expected to perform the following tasks: effectively protect property rights; retain scientists 
and engineers; offer tax credits for the R&D in the private sector and to maintain an effective 
competition policy. In addition, the government plays a leading role through subsidising R&D 
and procurement of advanced technology products 557.   
 
                                                          
554 Xavier Sala-I-Martin et al, “The Global Competitiveness Index 2013-2014: Sustaining Growth, Building 
Resilience”, p. 8. 
555 Innovation is understood in terms of the transformation of knowledge and expertise into new products and 
process as well as services.  Michael E. Porter, “Innovation Capacity and Prosperity: the Next Competitiveness 
Challenge”, in WEF (eds.), the Global Competitiveness Report 1999, pp. 54.  
556 Countries are ranked on an Innovation Index based on one main distinction; the source of company’s 
technology, imitation or pioneering. The national innovative capacity is measured through the national innovative 
capacity index designed by Porter and Scott Stern of Northwestern University. For more details, see Michael E. 
Porter and Scott Stern, “National Innovative Capacity”, in WEF (eds.), The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-
2002, pp. 102. The correlation between economic growth was also examined in Warner’s Creativity Index, see 
Andrew Warner, “Economic Creativity”, in WEF (eds.), The Global Competitiveness Report 2000 (Davos: WEF, 
2000), pp. 29-37.   
557 For a detailed account see Michael E. Porter and Scott Stern, “National Innovative Capacity”, pp. 102-118.  
 194 
 
However, the twelve-factor, and the resulting ranking, have been contextualised differently in 
the report. Beginning in 2001, Porter introduced a new innovative ground into the methodology 
that was later strengthened by Sala-I-Martin. Countries were divided into three stages of 
economic development. Based on this invention, factors of competitiveness obtain varying 
levels of importance for different countries. Thus, a country’s stage of economic development 
defines which factors are more critical to maintain its competitiveness. Consequentially, this 
affects the country’s economic priorities558.  
 
There are mainly three stages of economic development that need to be taken into account 
when measuring international competitiveness today. First, the resource-based stage, low-
income countries, where growth is achieved through the utilisation of unskilled labour and 
natural resources. This stage is characterised by low productivity and low wages where 
companies compete on price and basic products. Therefore, maintaining competitiveness 
depends on meeting the criteria outlined in the first four factors of the twelve-pillar formula. 
The second stage is efficiency-driven, middle-income countries, in which integration to the 
global economy is achieved through FDI, outsourcing, and joint ventures. During this stage, 
investment centres on the adoption and harnessing of global technologies into domestic 
production. Countries at this stage are marked by rising productivity and wages and rising 
product quality. Thus, competitiveness is improved by doing well on the next six factors. The 
third stage is innovation-driven, high-income countries, where growth is sustained through the 
use of sophisticated technology and innovation. At this level, wages are usually high and 
continuous innovation becomes crucial. Therefore, ‘business sophistication’ and ‘innovation’ 
                                                          
558 Differences in the levels of economic development were the main reason why the Forum Ranked the OECD 
countries separately from the newly industrialising before 1994, see EMF, “Methodology”, The EMF’s Report on 
International competitiveness 1985, p. 206.  
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are considered the most important for countries situated in this stage559. To add more clarity to 
this idea, the argument put forward by Porter et al is particularly significant: 
 
Seeing economic development as a sequential process of building not just macroeconomic stability but 
also interdependent factors such as quality of governance, societal capacity to advance its technological 
capability, more advanced modes of competition, and evolving forms of firm organizational structure, 
helps to expose important potential pitfalls in economic policy. To evolve successfully through different 
levels of development, key parts of the economic environment must change at appropriate times. Lack of 
improvement in any important area can lead to a plateau in productivity and stalled economic growth
560
.  
 
Therefore, countries that fail in improving their competitiveness when they cannot overcome 
challenges in one stage of development, will also fail to upgrade to the next. Successive 
upgrading from one stage to another “often requires new ways of organizing governments, 
markets, and enterprises…shifts in both macroeconomic policy and microeconomic business 
structure are necessary”561. Therefore, the role of the government has to be adjusted to 
accommodate certain priorities at each stage. At the factor-driven stage, the government has to 
offer political and macroeconomic stability, to guarantee free and open market, to provide basic 
health care, and competitive exchange rate that supports exports. In the second stage, the 
government has to constantly improve infrastructure and regulatory conditions like tax, 
customs and company laws in order to help integrate the country into the global market. The 
                                                          
559 Stages and factors: basic factors efficiency factors  innovation-driven 
Factor-driven  60%  35%   5% 
Transition to stage 2 40-60%  35-50%   5-10% 
Efficiency-driven  40%  50%   10% 
Transition to stage 3 20-40%  50%   10-30% 
Innovation driven 20%  50%   30% 
Allocating countries is done based on two criteria: GDP per capita and exports of natural resources out of overall 
exports. For more info see Xavier Sala-I-Martin et al, “The Global Competitiveness Index 2013-2014: Sustaining 
Growth, Building Resilience”, pp. 10-11.  
560 Michael E. Porter, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and John W. McArthur, “Executive Summary: Competitiveness and stages 
of economic Development”, in WEF (eds.), The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, p. 17.  
561 Ibid. p. 18.  
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government has to deliver a universal secondary education and tertiary education and a flexible 
labour market. At the final stage, the government has to foster high rate of innovation through 
collaborating with private sector in R&D, higher education, improved capital market and 
regulatory framework and to support the start-up of high-tech enterprises.  
 
In short, what distinguishes this latest phase of methodological change is the way in which the 
role of the government is perceived nowadays. Michael Porter’s statement below reflects such 
development:    
The literature suggests that, within normal parameters, the overall size of government (and implicitly the 
level of taxes) is less important than the way government spends money (government efficiency) and the 
way taxation is structured (distortiveness and bureaucratic burden of taxes).562 
 
All the factors of competitiveness are connected and mutually enforce each other. They are all 
designed to measure various facets of the cost-structure of doing business in a certain country. 
The main cost that cannot be afforded within neoliberal capitalism is one that results from a 
minimal role of the state in the traditional sense. That is, from all of the above analysis, it is 
very difficult to imagine the whole entire formula of competitiveness working without an 
active, but specific, role for the government.  
 
 
6.2.2. Methodology and Factors: A changing formula for a changing world  
 
Since its launch, the GCR has always been more than a mere ranking of countries based on 
their performance at the factors believed to determine their competitiveness as many academics 
                                                          
562 Michael E. Porter et al, “Moving to A New Global Competitiveness Index”, in WEF (eds.), The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2008-2009, p. 46.  
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and policymakers may believe. This popular perception suffers from the lack of a thorough and 
critical analysis of the GCR. As we have discussed in Chapter Four, the report has embodied 
an arena for debating wide array of issues concerning various aspects of the global economy. 
It has particularly served as a locus where ideas pertaining to the study of international 
competitiveness has been tested and reconfigured over time. This in turn has resulted in 
paradigm shifts in the methodology designed to measure it. The methodology has undergone 
several major and minor amendments that are reflected the changing perceptions of 
competitiveness and the optimal ways of its assessment. This mirrors the continuously 
reflective mindset held by the Forum’s competitiveness experts as well as its receptiveness to 
the latest academic innovation in the fundamentals of economic growth.     
 
At first, competitiveness was mainly concerned with industrial competitiveness defined as “a 
measure of the immediate and future ability of industrialists to design, produce and market 
goods whose various price and non-price attributes combine to form a more attractive package 
than those of similar products offered by competitors”563. The task was to “select only those 
criteria of competitiveness that have a bearing - direct or indirect – on an industry's ability to 
compete internationally”564. In collaboration with academics, business experts and the Forum’s 
participants overall, the GCR studies the factors that lead enterprises within a country to 
become more competitive compared to other countries. Achieving this is made possible 
through building a welfare-like national environment for enterprises as the agents responsible 
for delivering welfare to people.    
 
                                                          
563 EMF, “Competitiveness in Perspective“, Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry 1980, p. 12. For 
more details on this account of competitiveness see the same page.  
564 EMF, “Methodology”, Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry 1979, pp. 92-3.  
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A few years later, in recognition of the increasing role that other economic sectors playing in 
GDP growth, the 1985 the GCR’s focus of competitiveness was extended to cover all 
entrepreneurs instead of the industrialists only565. Moreover, competitiveness has become 
defined in both present and future terms. This goes in line with the Forum’s approach that a 
country’s ranking should “be viewed not only as a reflection of present competitiveness but 
also as an indicator of the basic soundness and longer-term ability of industry in the survey 
countries to remain or become competitive”566.  
 
As has been pointed out earlier, the selection of the factors and their criteria was originally 
based on cooperation between the Forum and its contacts. This consists of members, 
participants and networks, in short, mainly business leaders. However, the Forum’s expansion 
of its consultation spheres and cooperation with academic experts has paved the way for the 
(re)construction of a substantial part of the methodology. Similarly, the data from which the 
methodology is constructed has widened to include a wide variety of sources with national 
governments and IOs accounting for most of the hard data and a smaller amount of data 
provided by private organisations such as Institutional Investor. Moreover, the Forum derives 
over one-third of data from the executive opinion survey that it conducts annually in 
collaboration with partner institutes all over the world567. Over time, however, the survey data 
has become the basis of more than half of the criteria constituting the pillars of 
competitiveness568. In the following sections, I will shed light on the macroeconomic and 
                                                          
565 The definition of competitiveness changed into: “the immediate and future ability of, and opportunities for, 
entrepreneurs to design, produce and market goods and services within their respective environments whose price 
and non-price qualities form a more attractive package than those of competitors abroad or in domestic markets”, 
EMF, “Introduction”, The EMF’s Report on International competitiveness 1985, p. 6.  
566 Ibid. p. 7.  
567 Given the double-sourced data, each country’s competitiveness was evaluated on two scoreboards: the 
competitiveness scoreboard and the executive business confidence scoreboard.  Until the early 1990s, due to the 
lack of uniform statistical data and the different bearing certain criteria have on different countries such as 
population growth, countries covered were divided into two groups: industrialised and newly industrialising.  
568 This executive opinion survey takes the form of questionnaires sent to business leaders within each country to 
evaluate the country’s performance on certain criteria. Respondents were mainly companies’ chief executives, 
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microeconomic foundations of competitiveness through an analysis of the various indices 
developed within the GCR to enhance the assessment of international competitiveness. The 
aim of such an endeavour is to strengthen our analysis of how the state has been ascribed 
various responsibilities in the international competitiveness discourse. More specifically, I will 
assess the implications of the prominence of microeconomics within the GCR with respect to 
the role of the state and its form of managing the capital-labour relations. This shift towards 
microeconomics underlies the focus on the labour factor as the most important determinant of 
competitiveness, specifically with regards to flexibility and skills.  
 
6.3. The Academic Turn in the GCR: the Macro- and Micro-economic Foundations of 
Competitiveness 
 
The adjustments applied to the factors of competitiveness outlined above mirror deeper 
underlying methodological shifts. This is due in large part to the incorporation of new 
theoretical and academic research on the topic. However, these changes should also be 
understood as attempts to capture the developing meaning and aspects of competitiveness 
influenced by conditions of the social relations of capitalist globalization. Namely, these shifts 
are reflective of the nature of class struggle, its severity and antagonism that drives capital 
accumulation as a source of growth.  
 
At the inauguration of the report, the drivers of competitiveness were identified generally 
without being grounded on solid academic foundations. Starting in 1996, the factors of 
                                                          
bankers, experts on industry, and heads of foreign-owned subsidies of MNCs. Namely, respondents rated the 
countries they operate within. Survey data are relied upon when hard data are unavailable for all or some countries. 
By 2007 survey data accounted for more than half of total number of the data used, 79 out of 113 variables. 
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competitiveness have become derived and analysed according to macro- and micro-economic 
theories. A group of American academics joined efforts with the WEF’s competitiveness 
research team, which signalled the beginning of ‘the academic turn’ in the Forum’s mission. 
Consequently, beginning in 1996, the factors of competitiveness were subsumed under 
competitiveness indexes constructed on macroeconomic and microeconomic principles. The 
most important of these indices are the Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI) and the Current 
Competitiveness Index (CCI). The two were given separate but mutually reinforcing tasks. 
Defined as “the set of institutions and economic policies supportive of high rates of economic 
growth in the medium term”, GCI is set up to expose the speed at which a country’s improves 
its growth potentials. The second index is defined as the “set of institutions, market structures, 
and economic policies supportive of high current levels of prosperity”569. Its objective is to 
elucidate the sustainability of such growth570.   
 
In effect, these indices imply that “there are several paths to economic success”571 for all 
countries, as discussed in the previous chapter. Both, however, are important at explaining the 
level of a country’s accumulation of physical and human capital. The introduction of the GCI 
and CCI is thought to be more elaborate at providing “a more revealing picture” of the status 
of a country’s international competitiveness. That is, the GCI identifies the growth factors and 
                                                          
569 Michael E. Porter, Jeffrey D. Sachs and John W. McArthur, “Executive Summary: Competitiveness and Stages 
of Economic Development”, pp. 14, 16.  Both indexes measure the rates of growth and prosperity with taking into 
account the country’s level of development. See Peter K. Corneluis, Jennifer Blanke and Fiona Paua, “The Growth 
Competitiveness Index: Recent Economic Developments and the Prospects for Sustained Recovery”, p. 8, John 
W. McArthur and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Growth Competitiveness Index: Measuring Technological Advancement 
and the Stages of Development”, The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, p. 32.  
570 Understanding sustainability further is enhanced through the environmental sustainability index introduced in 
2000 by further by Esty and Porter to measure how/whether the current environmental standards are harmful for 
businesses, For more details on the analytical framework shaping the ESI, see Daniel C. Esty and Michael E. 
Porter, “Measuring National Environmental Performance and its Determinants”, in WEF (eds.), The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2000, pp. 60-75. See also Daniel C. Esty and Michael Porter, “Ranking national 
Environmental Regulation and Performance: A Leading Indicator of Future Competitiveness”, in WEF (eds.), The 
Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, pp. 78-100.  
571 Andrew Werner, “Economic Creativity”, The Global Competitiveness Report 2000, p. 28.  
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the CCI specifies the causes of prosperity at any time. In the next two sub-sections we will 
analyse these indices and their implications for the role of the state in improving the national 
competitiveness.  
 
 
6.3.1. The Growth Competitiveness Index: the macroeconomic foundations of 
competitiveness 
 
Jeffrey Sachs, Frederick Hu and Andrew Warner represent the first-wave academics, which 
contributed to enhancing the credibility of the GCR. Their contribution manifests itself through 
developing the Competitiveness Index (CI) constructed based on macroeconomic drivers of 
growth. Its purpose was to measure countries’ growth potentials in the medium-term and to 
provide a snapshot of the current strengths and weaknesses of an economy in comparison with 
others. In addition to CI, Sachs and Hu constructed two more related indices. The Growth Index 
(GI), which combines the factors of competitiveness with the country’s per capita income-level 
to measure potential for growth in the medium-term, and the Market Growth Index (MGI), 
which combines the GI and the size of the economy in order to rank countries according to 
their contribution to the overall world economic growth572. The latter serves to draw 
businesses’ attention to the locations of a potential rise in market demands573. In the report, 
countries were ranked on the three indexes and their competitiveness signifies their ability “to 
                                                          
572 The growth index, is compiled of three components: the economic creativity index which measures the 
“effective transfer of technology”, the finance index that analyses the efficiency of the financial system and rate 
of investment and saving, and the international index that measures the country’s integration with the world 
economy, see Michael Porter, “The Microeconomic Foundations of Economic Development”, in WEF (eds.), The 
Global Competitiveness Report 1998, p. 40. 
573 Jeffrey D Sachs and Andrew M Warner, “Why Competitiveness Counts”, in WEF (eds.), The Global 
Competitiveness Report 1996, p. 11, It is important to note that since the new competitiveness index introduced, 
the report does not account for short term shocks, financial panics, change in export prices that may lead to 
recessions or crisis. 
 202 
 
achieve sustained high rates of economic growth, as measured by the annual change in gross 
domestic product per person”574. 
  
In 2000, Sachs and John McArthur of Harvard Business School designed the GCI to replace 
the CI. The new index measures the factors that lead to a high rate of GDP growth. It combines 
three sub-indexes: 1) Technology index. 2) Public institutions index. 3) Macroeconomic 
environment index. They evaluate the level of technology advancement in an economy, the 
quality of its public institutions and its macroeconomic conditions respectively575. That is, as 
discussed earlier, technology as the lever through which sustainable growth can be achieved. 
Without it, capital accumulation will reach a level beyond in which its reproduction becomes 
more difficult. Public institutions are fundamental in terms of the transparency and efficiency 
of government spending, protection of property rights, enforcement of contracts and objective 
resolution of legal disputes. Macroeconomic stability, made through fiscal and monetary 
stability and also the stability of financial institutions, is crucial for growth in the short, medium 
and long term576. Given that a great deal of space has been devoted to the analysis of the 
macroeconomic factors thus far, hereafter the analysis will focus on the microeconomic 
foundations of competitiveness as they represent a fundamental shift in the GCR 
competitiveness discourse. This is of particular interest to the analysis as it ties directly with 
                                                          
574 Frederick Hu and Jeffrey Sachs, “Executive Summary”, in WEF (eds.), The Global Competitiveness Report 
1996, p. 19.  
575 Since innovation is considered to have played the major role in the medium-term growth for the core economies 
(innovation-driven economies), ½ of the weight in the GCI is placed on the first sub-index and ¼ for each of the 
other two indexes. For the non-core economies, 1/3 of the weight is ascribed to each sub-index.  The distinction 
between core and non-core economies is based on Warner’s economic creativity index that distinguish between 
countries in which growth is stimulated by innovation and those who depend on technology diffusion, For a clearer 
idea on the methodology, see John W. McArthur and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Growth Competitiveness Index: 
Measuring Technological Advancement and the Stages of Development”, pp. 39-40, and for the components of 
each index see pages 41, 46, 48. And for an updated version of the Growth competitiveness index see Jennifer 
Blanke and Augusto Lopez-Carlos, “The Growth Competitiveness Index: Assessing Countries’ Potential for 
Sustained Economic Growth”, in WEF (eds.), The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005, pp. 3-18.   
576 The function of the indices drivers varies depending on the level of countries’ economic development. 
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the form of capital-labour management the state is currently performing in the most advanced 
economies. 
 
6.3.2. The Current (Business) Competitiveness Index: Bringing Microeconomics to the 
Fore 
Since 1998, Michael Porter has strengthened the academic re-orientation of the GCR through 
advancing another foundation for international competitiveness. His contribution manifests 
itself in the incorporation of microeconomics into the study of competitiveness. That is, based 
on microeconomic principles Porter established the CCI. The bottom line of Porter’s argument 
is that “a stable political context and sound macroeconomic policies are necessary but not 
sufficient to ensure a prosperous economy”577. He argues that for competitiveness to be 
sustainable, microeconomics should be given as much weight as macroeconomics, if not more, 
and reforms should be applied at both levels. In other words, the national economic 
environment is made conducive to competitiveness when macroeconomics and 
microeconomics complement each other.  
 
Porter’s Index is based on what has become known as Porter’s Diamond, outlined earlier, is 
comprised of two sub-indexes: the sophistication of company operations and strategy index 
and the quality of the business environment index578. This division is based on the assumption 
that within a microeconomic framework, it is the level of sophistication with which a firm 
                                                          
577 Michael Porter, “The Microeconomic Foundations of Economic Development”, The Global Competitiveness 
Report 1998, p. 38.  
578 This index is devised through mainly adding microeconomic-related questions to the executive opinion survey 
but also based on hard data, questions were based on Porter’s Diamond, Michael E. Porter, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and 
Andrew M. Warner, “Executive Summary: Current Competitiveness and Growth Competitiveness ”, The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2000, p. 16. 
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competes in terms of its operations and strategies, and the quality of the national 
microeconomic business environment that matter. Therefore, the productivity, and hence, 
growth of the national economy rests on the sophistication of labour skills and flexibility as 
well as technologies obtained by companies579. 
 
Porter’s framework is interesting to this research for two reasons. The first has to do with the 
role ascribed to the state within such framework and the second has to do with the implications 
of making microeconomics the ultimate source of competitiveness (which will be examined in 
the following chapter). The role that the government assumes within this context, Porter 
maintains, is focused on improving the quality of the national business environment. This is 
mainly because this environment affects the types of operations and strategies adopted by the 
firm. However, it doesn’t mean that what the state does at the macroeconomic level is less 
important. The state has to perform two complementary roles at both levels.    
 
The national business environment that represents areas for desirable state actions is composed 
of four factors: factor conditions, the context for firm strategy and rivalry, demand conditions 
and supporting industries580. The factor-conditions are partly shaped by governmental policies 
through: physical and technology infrastructure, labour training, tariff liberalisation; intensity 
of local competition, legal barriers to entry, government subsidies, bureaucratic red tape, 
judicial independence and stringency of environmental regulations and openness of public 
sector contracts. The demand conditions are influenced by the openness of the economy, the 
                                                          
579 In 2006, Porter et al developed the CII and introduced measures of the impact of three context dimensions on 
competitiveness: political stability, logistical location, neighbouring countries, and natural resources. The 
objective is to identify gaps between prosperity and microeconomic competitiveness. For more details on the 
methodology, see Michael E. Porter, Christian Ketels and Mercedes Delagado, “The Microeconomic Foundations 
of prosperity: Findings from the Business Competitiveness Index”, in WEF (eds.), The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2006-2007, pp. 71-2. 
580 Michael E. Porter, “Microeconomic Competitiveness: Findings from the 1999 Executive Survey”, in WEF 
(eds.), The Global Competitiveness Report 1999, pp.31-2.  
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regulatory standards applied, government procurement and openness to imports. Changes in 
these variables cause variation in GDP per capita growth and, thus, in national income581.  
Therefore, improving this environment is attained through ameliorating the infrastructure, 
enhancing institutions, providing skilled and flexible labour and offering better incentives to 
businesses. However, businesses also play a role in improving the national business 
environment when they support education, help to enhance infrastructure, strengthen their 
innovative capacity, establish linkages with universities, build clusters and when they have a 
good corporate social responsibility profile, although the last of these roles is notoriously low 
in the set of priorities. 
In addition to what businesses can do in relation to improving the national business 
environment, the sort of responsibilities assumed by the state, as outlines above, will facilitate 
the introduction of more advanced and sophisticated business operations and strategies. Thus, 
businesses will become able to upgrade from working within a comparative advantage 
framework that is based on cheap labour and natural resources, and which has become the 
weakness itself, to performing sophisticated production processes and producing unique 
products. Hence, they will reach a competitive advantage stage. When a firm upgrade their 
strategies and operations, it feeds back into improving the business environment through, for 
example, developing higher quality supplier and sophisticated buyers and also through 
demanding more effective government and institutions.  
With microeconomic factors considered, the definition of competitiveness becomes centred on 
productivity growth in the national economy, for which labour flexibility and skills are integral 
in order to allow higher level of profit through more exploitation. The reason being, Porter 
contends, that productivity “sets the wages that can be sustained, the returns to invested capital, 
                                                          
581 Michael E. Porter, “Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the Business 
Competitiveness Index”, in WEF (eds.), The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005, p. 42.  
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and the surplus (after costs) generated by a nation’s physical resources”582. Building on this, 
competitiveness improves when productivity rises. And that latter happens when “the nation 
improves its capabilities at the microeconomic level”583. Microeconomic conditions explain 
variation in overall national productivity, wage levels, and also differences in growth of GDP 
per capita584.   
Porter concludes that international competitiveness, defined in terms of productivity, becomes 
sustainable only when the political, macroeconomic and microeconomic environments 
improve altogether585. While, as shown by the outlined factors, macroeconomics is by and large 
the responsibility of the government, microeconomics should be addressed by both 
governments and businesses586. Thus, from a microeconomic perspective, the GCR analyses 
“how individual national environments affect the competitiveness of enterprises operating in 
those countries”. The main role of the enterprise is to coordinate “its internal efficiency with 
the national environment in which they operate”587. 
What Porter’s framework implies is that the convergence on macro reforms has been deeper 
than that on micro reforms. Without the latter, negative repercussions should not be surprising 
in the long-run because economic progress goes without social benefits, such as those obtained 
                                                          
582 Productivity “must encompass both the value (prices) that a nation’s products command in the marketplace 
and the efficiency with which standard units are produced…value productivity”, Michael E. Porter, “Measuring 
the  Microeconomic Foundations of Economic Development”, in WEF, (eds.), The Global Competitiveness Report 
1998, p. 39.  
583 Ibid. p. 40.   
584 Porter argues that it arguably accounts for 81% of the differences among countries in GDP per capita and wage 
levels. Michael E. Porter, Christian Ketels and Mercedes Delgado, “Measuring the Microeconomic Foundations 
of Prosperity: Findings from the Business Competitiveness Index”, The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-
2008, p. 68.  
585 Michael E. Porter, “Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the Microeconomic 
Index”, The Global Competitiveness Report 2002-2003, (pp. 23-45) 
586 Most related variables to productivity growth are the following: the intensity of competition, buyer and supplier 
quality, business information availability, intellectual property protection, and measures of R&D; that is at the 
national business environment level. At the company level, innovation capacity, staff training, breadth of 
international markets and senior management professionalism. Also access to finance, buyer sophistication.  
587 WEF, “Executive Summary”, in WEF (eds.), The World Competitiveness Report 1990, p. 22.  
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from breaking monopoly, building a better education and training systems588. Thus, the 
desirability of reforming the microeconomic structure of a country’s economy originates from 
the fact that such reforms are closer to the public than macroeconomic ones. This is so given 
the way it impacts the standards of living and the change it triggers in business image through 
decreasing the cost of living and increasing the quality of products and services589. It is only 
when firms become competitive that higher wages and sustainable capital’s profit are possible, 
notes Porter. Therefore, a nation’s prosperity rests mainly, but not solely, on its microeconomic 
performance.  
Porter’s emphasis on microeconomics suggest that the inclusion of microeconomic reforms 
within the overall economic reforms can serve as a remedy for the problem of high 
unemployment, based on labour market flexibility, and can also enhance the standards of 
living. He cites the problem of developing countries as explained according to this premise as 
well. It is their focus only on the IMF structural adjustment policies that has not helped their 
economies to grow and their living standards to improve. In a way, Porter reduces the heart of 
the problem to capitalism, the emergence of global anti-capitalist movements and the failure of 
governance at the microeconomic level. This reductionist stand is recapped in the following 
statement by Porter;  
If there is to be continued momentum for economic reform in nations around the world, there is a pressing 
need to move to the next level of thinking. Approaches based heavily on macroeconomic adjustment and 
centered largely on financial markets are producing a backlash that erodes consensus for global economic 
progress and foments national policies that are fundamentally self-defeating. Protests in Seattle and at the 
World Bank meetings should be a wake-up call that economic reform must move beyond approaches that 
                                                          
588 Michael E. Porter, “Microeconomic Competitiveness: Findings from the 1999 Executive Survey”, The Global 
Competitiveness Report 1999, pp. 40-1. Building on that, it is the un-competitive microeconomic environment in 
the East Asian countries hit by the 1997-8 crisis made their economies more vulnerable than other economies with 
suitable microeconomic standards.  
589 Michael E. Porter, “Measuring the Microeconomic Foundations of Economic Development”, The Global 
Competitiveness Report 1998, p. 57.  
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are now standard. Macro-driven adjustment policies without aggressive micro reforms provide an opening 
to those who criticize the market economy and global capital markets as negatives for the social 
development of countries
590. 
 
Therefore, prosperity and higher living standards are mainly defined in terms of the prosperity 
and productivity of the firm ˗˗ the competitiveness of the nation is the competitiveness of the 
firms operating within its borders. In such a way, microeconomics become more prominent 
than macroeconomics. A further implication of this is that when macroeconomic reforms are 
pushed to the backstage, the responsibility of the state come to be centred on the welfare of the 
enterprise rather than of its own people since it is on the success of the latter that productivity, 
prosperity and growth are conditioned. It is no longer that state that provides welfare to its own 
people. It is rather the enterprise that is held responsible for people’s welfare. Porter points out 
that the difficulties that face governments and societies as a result of implementing 
macroeconomic reforms, such as cutting public expenditure and rising interest rate, could be 
relieved only by concurrently applying microeconomic reforms. This argument is made clearer 
in the following quote by Porter:  
breaking up local cartels and monopolies can lower the cost of food, housing, electricity, telephone 
services, and other costs of living. Regulatory reform can rapidly begin to ease inefficiencies, reduce 
pollution, raise product and service quality, and improve unsafe practice… bold steps to improve education 
and training are particularly important, because they offer the hope for a better life for children. If citizens 
see businesses reforming themselves and having to confront tough competitive challenges, they will be 
more willing themselves to live with personal sacrifice and less likely to side with anti-reform interest 
groups. The political will and public support to make real economic changes is elevated
591.      
                                                          
590 Michael E. Porter, “The Current Competitiveness Index: Measuring the Microeconomic Foundations of 
Prosperity”, in WEF (eds.), The Global Competitiveness Report 2000, p. 55.  
591 Michael E. Porter, “The Current Competitiveness Index: Measuring the Microeconomic Foundations of 
Prosperity”, p.55.  
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In such a fashion, unemployment, inflation, slow economic growth, recessions, crises and all 
the undesirable outcomes of unfettered market economy find their roots in an uncompetitive 
microeconomic environment. The failure is not the responsibility of the enterprise, it rests 
mainly on the shoulders of the government that proved incapable of improving the national 
business environment and implementing microeconomic reforms. The lack of such reforms 
would lead to unsatisfactory returns on investment which would mean in turn slow growth and 
perhaps austerity cycles since businesses would shift attention elsewhere. On such a basis, 
convergence needs to take place on the microeconomic level not only on the macroeconomic 
one in order to create new opportunities for business and enhance their internal efficiency, 
which results in increasing the returns on the capital invested. Once the latter is realised, the 
way is paved for higher levels of GDP, higher wages and rising living standards for people.   
 
The separation between the GCI and BCI ended in the latest methodology change of 2005. The 
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors were grouped into one index, the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI). What distinguishes the GCI is the fact that it’s ranking is built 
on the micro- and macroeconomic factors and that it takes into consideration countries’ stages 
of economic development592. Moreover, this shift brought with it a singular definition of 
competitiveness, one that is primarily centred on productivity. Competitiveness is “the set of 
institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country”593. The 
centrality of productivity to international competitiveness reflects the weight that is given to 
                                                          
592 It, however, was not implemented practically until the 2006-2007 GCR.  It was primarily introduced in order 
to overcome some of the, important, shortcomings in the growth competitiveness index attributable to changes in 
the dynamics of competition in the global economy. For more details on the differences between the GCI and 
GCI’ see Augusto Lopez-Carlos et al, “Politics and Institutions Underpinning Economic Growth: Results from 
the Competitiveness Indexes”, pp. 3-37.  
593 Xavier Sala-I-Martin and Elsa V. Artadi, “The Global Competitiveness Index”, in WEF (eds.), The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2004-2005, p. 51.  
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microeconomic variables in the new GCI. Productivity determines the rate of investment 
returns and growth rate, citizen’s income level, and the sustainability of a country’s prosperity. 
This shift in the emphasis towards microeconomic reforms in order to enhance the country’s 
competitiveness, which is defined in terms of productivity, connotes that the GCR has placed 
the responsibility not only on the state but also on labour that is required to adapt to changing 
economic conditions through more flexibility in the labour market. This is suggestive of a role 
of the state that is centred on the management of labour within its jurisdiction in a way that 
allows capital accumulation to circulate through its economy. Thus, the WEF’s discourse of 
competitiveness has become oriented towards a role of the state that is centred on the 
embeddedness and socialisation of competitiveness into the society as an imperative for 
achieving economic growth, higher employment and living standards. It is this embeddedness 
that will allow greater productivity and sustainability of growth. Thus, competitiveness has 
become centred on a specific form of the management of capital-labour relations within the 
state. Flexibility in the labour market has become integral to this management and it is the task 
of the state to deliver in this regard.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that while the influence of the WEF is perhaps visible in various ways 
and through multiple means, such as Davos’s annual meeting and other activities, this influence 
becomes more visible through an analysis of its discourse of competitiveness developed by its 
globalising professionals. Although this discursive power has its roots in the Forum’s wealth 
structure, it is also entrenched in its power of ideas as a discursive institution and a host for 
networks of state and non-state actors. The GCR is an instrument for the projection of that 
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power that seeks to uphold the interests of the Forum’s capitalist members. The state, its 
institutions and ways of functioning as well as its needs are being produced and reproduced 
continuously through the discourse of competitiveness as a neoliberal imperative. Such a 
process is sought to be triggered through GCR and its factors of competitiveness as well as its 
competitiveness indices. Nevertheless, this is not to say that such a process occurs only through 
the WEF’s version of the discourse. It is rather to note the influence its discourse has on the 
state given the distinctive nature of the relationship between the Forum and all states 
participating in its activities which was discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Five.  
What this chapter adds to the aims of this research is a more thorough analysis of the 
competitiveness discourse as produced by its agents. Such an engagement with the discourse, 
through the GCR, makes the nature of the discourse clearer. The responsibilities ascribed to 
the state in the capitalist society according to the TCC are revealed. Also, the nature of the 
WEF’s discursive power is more elaborate now. As a result, it is only by doing this that a better 
understanding of the adoption of international competitiveness standards by the states is 
possible. Furthermore, the extent to which the Forum is capable of projecting its influence over 
national policy-making can be discerned and measured more confidently. Eventually, a better-
informed contribution can be made to the TCC and the international competitiveness 
literatures.     
 
Moreover, this chapter has focused on discussing the Forum’s increasing emphasis on the 
microeconomic foundations of competitiveness which signals a worrying move towards 
changing the meaning of competitiveness thereby making the society responsible for its own 
prosperity, higher living standards and welfare. The latter rewords are being conditioned upon 
building a society that is more competitive and less dependent on the state’s welfare, and a 
workforce that is more productive and highly flexible. In this regard, the state is made 
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responsible for corporate welfare as a means for enhancing people’s welfare. In order to do so, 
the state’s role is to embed competitiveness within the society that needs to accept certain 
sacrifice in exchange for its welfare that is delivered by the market.  
 
In addition to further enhancing our understanding of the nature of the Forum’s competitiveness 
discourse, this shift deserves a detailed attention given its social, economic and political 
implications in the society today under neoliberal globalisation. It is also important given its 
implication for the nature of the relationship between the state, labour and capital and the form 
of their management. Thus, rather than focusing on the orthodox policies of competitiveness, 
macroeconomic policies, which reveal little about the influence of the discourse, the focus will 
shift on the microeconomic policies and the embeddedness of competitiveness in the society. 
That is, labour market and welfare policy reforms are made by most advanced states today in 
order to decrease the dependency on the state for welfare, curb its old-fashioned intervention 
in the market and enhance the flexibility and productivity of its labour force. However, in the 
international competitiveness debate, the argument is made that these reforms are conducted 
as a matter of responding to the needs of global capital at the expense of labour. The OM 
framework underpinning this research contends otherwise. Labour market flexibility and 
welfare reforms are policies that form part of the management of capital-labour relations within 
the state. Through reforming welfare and labour market regulations, the state aims to maintain 
the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production in a manner that allows capital to 
circulate and reproduce itself within its jurisdictions while also catering for preserving the 
social order within its borders. It is to these points that the analysis will turn in the next chapter.    
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Chapter Seven 
 The Social Embeddedness of Competitiveness: The Welfare State and the Competitive 
Society  
 
In the previous chapter it was argued that discerning the extent to which the competitiveness 
discourse of global policy groups shapes state national policies, reflecting their power in 
relation to the state, requires an engagement with the discourse itself as produced by its agents, 
the GCR of the WEF here. Specifically, while it is perhaps true that the discourse of 
competitiveness has started to influence state policy-making and the debate around policy 
reforms, I argued that it is an uneasy task to determine the scale of its influence within the state 
without a thorough analysis of the discourse. Therefore, the above engagement with the GCR 
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allows a more robust investigation to be carried through regarding the claim, made in the TCC 
and international competitiveness literatures, that the WEF’s competitiveness discourse 
determines the nature of the state restructuring process today, that it has power over the state, 
or at best that the state and its globalising politicians are part of the TCC and function in a way 
that serves its interests. When this step is followed by an analysis of the state’s own 
competitiveness discourse in Chapter Eight, it will be possible to locate the agency of change 
in state policy-making, whether it lies in a transnational capitalist class as argued in the 
scholarly work discussed above or in the socio-economic national conditions of each country 
as this thesis contends from an Open Marist perspective. Hence, the above engagement makes 
it possible to assess whether the state’s globalising politicians are members of the TCC and 
whether they perform a complementary task to that of the globalising professionals who 
designed the GCR to serve the interests of TCC as the previous chapter showed. As such, the 
ground is furnished for an assessment of the viability of OM and its explanatory power.   
 
Thus far, I have showed how the WEF’s discourse indeed seeks to prescribe a certain role for 
the state in the management of the national economy, through the factors of competitiveness in 
the GCR and the position of the state in relation to each of them. Moreover, I have explained 
that there is a greater advantage accrued by comprehensively accounting for the Forum’s 
discourse prior to engaging with the UK’s competitiveness discourse. In order to do so, I have 
highlighted the shift in the Forum’s discourse towards emphasising the microeconomic 
foundations of competitiveness rather than being concerned only with the orthodox 
macroeconomic ones. The implication of this shift finds its weigh in the growing emphasis 
today on the state implementing micro alongside macroeconomic reforms; it is crucial for 
business profitability to reform the welfare system and labour market regulations as it facilitates 
greater productivity through more exploitation of labour. What this communicates is a message 
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that corporate welfare is the priority and the means to deliver social welfare to people. It is by 
enabling enterprises to increase their productivity that economic growth and higher 
employment levels can be sustained. Accordingly, for the Forum the state has to socialise 
competitiveness into society and to embed the idea that welfare is provided by the enterprise, 
not the state.   
 
Many advanced capitalist states have initiated a process of microeconomic reforms since the 
1980s. Yet, this is not simply a result of the power of the WEF or other policy groups. As will 
be shown in the analysis of the British case, a current of similar ideas has been underway within 
the circles of political debate in the UK long before the GCR made its case for the 
complementarity of micro and macroeconomic reforms. The argument that I advance here is 
that since welfare reforms have been at the centre of public debate in most advanced economies 
recently, analysing the Forum’s stance on the welfare state would help in drawing the right 
conclusion between its discourse and the change already occurring within the state regarding 
social welfare. In doing so, the case will be made for a better understanding of the role of the 
state and its managers in the capitalist society, of the dynamics of policy change taking place 
in welfare and labour market reforms, of the agency driving such change whether it is a TCC 
or the struggle between capital and labour domestically, and of the role of the WEF’s discourse 
regarding the management of circuits of capital within national economies.         
 
This chapter will focus on the GCR’s discourse on the welfare state. It seeks to map out how it 
is portrayed as an obstacle to the international competitiveness through its distortive impact on 
the macro and microeconomic foundations of competitiveness. Specifically, the discourse 
signifies the idea that reforms at the microeconomic level have become necessary in order to 
cement economic growth and recovery in times of crisis. Therefore, irresponsible fiscal and 
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monetary policies, embodied mainly in wasteful welfare spending, cause inflationary pressure 
and deprive businesses from the opportunity to be provided with a suitable business 
environment that could be delivered through diverting public funds into areas such as 
upgrading education and infrastructural systems. Moreover, excessive welfare policies lead to 
a rigidity in the labour market, which undermines the productivity of the enterprise and, thus, 
undermine the economy’s potential for growth, higher employment and living standards. 
Hence, transforming the welfare state constitutes a second phase of strengthening the basis of 
international competitiveness.  
The first section of this chapter discusses the neoliberal foundation of the WEF’s 
competitiveness discourse. The second section will highlight the discursive attempt made in 
the GCR aimed at transforming the welfare state as an obstacle to strengthening the 
microeconomic foundations of competitiveness. It will show that such transformations have 
become perceived as a necessary step towards consolidating the basis of neoliberal 
competitiveness. The third section will demonstrate the shift in the Forum’s discourse from 
discrediting state spending overall, to a stand where it is evaluated based on its conduciveness 
to business productivity and prosperity. This chapter will conclude that the operationalisation 
of the Forum’s discourse of international competitiveness today is conditional upon the 
transformation of the welfare state that stands as an obstacle for the creation of a competitive 
society, one that accepts business competitiveness as source of prosperity.   
 
 
7.1. The Embeddedness of Competitiveness as a Neoliberal Ideology 
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There are challenges that must be overcome and obstacles that are ought to be eliminated prior 
to making competitiveness socially embedded. Porter’s “competitive society” is a major 
prerequisite project that is important to facilitate the social embeddedness of competitiveness 
and the creation of a competitive state from the WEF’s point of view. In order to achieve that, 
the welfare state, in its traditional ‘excessive’ form, represents an outdated structure that must 
be transformed. Indeed, international competitiveness and welfare are thought of, in discourse, 
as mutually exclusive doctrines where the rise of one leads to the weakening of the other ˗˗ 
when unbalanced, the welfare state burdens the macroeconomic policy of the state and weakens 
its microeconomic competitiveness. But, since the essence of welfare has assumed a distinct 
meaning within the WEF’s competitiveness discourse in relation to welfare’s core source, 
improving microeconomic competitiveness yields higher welfare to citizens brought about by 
higher rates of economic growth. This requires the state to prioritise reforms at the 
microeconomic level.  
 
The current attempt at the transformation of social welfare that is manifested in governmental 
discourse and practice in many advanced economies should not be conceived of independently 
from the rise of microeconomic competitiveness as a policy doctrine and an alternative source 
of welfare in countries where macroeconomic-generated welfare have become seen unsuitable 
for a dynamic and competitive economic environment. This to a great extent the position of the 
Conservative party in the UK. When microeconomics becomes pursued as the ultimate source 
for rising living standards, economic growth and competitiveness, social welfare becomes 
conditioned upon corporate welfare rather than a welfare delivered by the state through 
macroeconomic means. This is arguably the case because the welfare provided by the state has 
proved harmful to the economy and businesses operating within it. Thus, survival is a matter 
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that necessitates the transformation of the traditional welfare programmes inherited from the 
post-war social and economic settings.  
 
This endeavour to abolish the entrenched social welfare state has crystallised discursively in 
the WEF’s GCR. Since the early 1980s, in an effort to construct a world-model for sustainable 
economic growth, the GCR preoccupied itself with resolving the controversy over the social 
welfare programmes deep-rooted in the governance of western capitalist economies. In its 
discourse, the welfare state stands as an obstacle to improving international competitiveness, 
especially in a context marked by inflation and recession like that of the 1980s and post-2008. 
Thus, the neoliberal project of minimising the social and economic role of the state launched 
in the 1980s was facilitated, as well as strengthened, by a process of systematic discursive 
transformation of social welfare systems. Although this had already began in late 1970s, more 
solid reforms were required.   
 
The state is significant to the project of operationalising and socialising competitiveness as a 
state policy. Today, to “become attractive magnets for investment and technological diffusion”, 
McArthur and Sachs argue, national policymakers have to do everything that falls upon their 
shoulders.  Their inability to do so gets punished “far more harshly than in the past”. That is, 
“when the business environment is poor, skilled workers and capital simply ‘pack up their 
bags’ and leave for a more promising location”594. In order to strengthen its competitiveness, 
the state has to complete its macroeconomic reforms through stabilising its fiscal and monetary 
policies. The welfare state has represented an obstacle to such an endeavour in the Forum’s 
discourse. Claude Smadja, the former general director of the WEF, bluntly argues for a role of 
                                                          
594 John W. McArthur and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Growth Competitiveness Index: Measuring Technological 
Advancement and the Stages of Development”, p. 30. 
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the state conducive to the embeddedness of competitiveness and remodelling the society to 
adjust itself to its rules. He states that: 
  
The discussion of governments [sic] role in modern society is not about big versus small government. We 
know that the era of big government is over. The real issue today is how to make government efficient and 
relevant when it comes to promoting economic activity while helping the population adjust successfully to 
a new, more demanding, less predictable environment595.  
 
An ‘efficient’ government with a ‘relevant’ role that fits within changing economic and social 
landscapes, one that Schwab and many in the Forum has always called for, is one with a social 
welfare programme as light as possible. A macroeconomic role of the state which accounts for 
the social consequences of free market economy through welfare policies curtails the 
competitiveness of the capitalist enterprise and hence prevents the capitalists from realising 
satisfactory level of capital accumulation and profit. This eventually will lead to capital flight, 
job loss and low economic growth. The non-competitiveness of an enterprises working within 
a certain national economy would simply “imply an unnecessary waste of resources and 
indicate to governments that structural changes should be facilitated”, according to Schwab596. 
Macroeconomic-generated social welfare arguably drives capitalism into crises in the long-run 
because of its effects that are characterised by inflation and low productivity. The recession of 
the 1980s is a commonly cited as evidence of such an effect of welfare policies. Therefore, 
recessions, inflations and crises should be escaped through shifting the focus from social 
welfare to corporate welfare that would naturally trickle down into social welfare through its 
promising societal rewards engendered in higher rates of economic growth, employment and 
living standards. In both domains, macro- and micro-economic, the state is expected to act to 
                                                          
595 Claude Smadja, “Beyond Statistics”, The Global Competitiveness Report 1996, p-31.  
596 Klaus Schwab, “Preface”, EMF’s Report on International Competitiveness 1985, p. 3. 
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reach these ends; it has to curb and minimise its welfare programmes on the one hand, and 
promote and maximise corporate welfare through supporting a microeconomic-led approach 
to competitiveness on the other, an approach that is based on the constant enhancement of 
labour productivity.   
Such adaptation of the role of the state is placed at the centre of the Forum’s neoliberal 
discourse. In 1979, the first competitiveness report signalled the commencement of this long-
term project. It stated that: 
 
there is no denying that the State has a crucial role to play in a modern industrial economy. But in order 
for this to be a positive role, the public sector should compete as little as possible - certainly as fairly as 
possible - with private enterprise for human and financial capital and, of course, for revenue. Government 
is inherently less efficient than private enterprise in the provision of goods and services. It should confine 
its economic activities to those that the private sector cannot or is unwilling to take on597.    
 
This call for rolling the state’s economic activities back forms the heart of the rise of 
neoliberalism in the 1980s and points to the direction to which the state’s restructuring process 
is being taken in the Forum’s competitiveness discourse. It rests on questioning the efficacy of 
the state’s economic activities and assumes its responsibility for slow economic dynamism and, 
thus, furnishes the grounds for a course of action that legitimises a greater role for private 
enterprise. In the 1980 GCR, this orientation was given more solid ideological grounds when 
the report, under a section titled Competitiveness and Underlying Economic Ideology, argued 
that:  
 
                                                          
597 EMF, “Tables and Commentary”, p. 54.  
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the more a country's economy lays stress on the unfettered development of free enterprise the more its 
industry is competitive in the pursuit of markets at home and abroad. Free enterprise, moreover, usually 
coincides - but does not need to - with the private ownership of the means of production. Our Report 
confirms that the prevalence of this combination, or at least a trend in that direction, is generally highly 
conducive to a superior level of competitiveness598.  
 
Thus, it is clear from the outset that the competitiveness of the GCR is unquestionably a 
neoliberal paradigm. It is centred on problematising the public ownership of the means of 
production, which rests on the assumption that only the private capitalist enterprise is capable 
of functioning efficiently. Thus, national economies should be reengineered accordingly in 
order to foster this endeavour.  States should deprive themselves from their power as economic 
agents and assign such power only to private capitalist enterprise that is capable of generating 
wealth, welfare and maintaining continuing capital accumulation. When this is ignored, 
countries would eventually end up with stagnating competitiveness and, at best, slow economic 
growth. Over-staffed state-enterprises, which are normally associated with entrenched 
bureaucracy, in addition to budget deficit and inflation are blamed for low levels of 
competitiveness in Europe. In 1985, the report ranked Italy 21st out of 28 countries. The 
justification for this ranking was based on the structure of the Italian state that “must be 
regarded as the great culprit in preventing a very resourceful economy from becoming more 
competitive internationally”. Specifically, the bureaucratic state structure of Italy made its 
welfare programme quite ineffective. France ranked 19th in the same year, which is another 
example where the impact of structural inefficiencies was discerned, especially the lack of free 
market spirit. In was highlighted in the case of France that “the government's plan to offset the 
slack in private-sector investment and employment by expanding the newly nationalized 
                                                          
598 EMF, “Europe’s Competitive Challenge“, Report on the Competitiveness of European Industry 1980, p. 18.  
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companies is not working in the face of large losses”. Nationalisation of industries, banks and 
services created a state monopoly and raised the cost of finance. Furthermore, an essential 
shortcoming of the French economy is worsened by an overemphasis on the welfare system 
and rigid labour market regulations. These features of the French state depicted “the dismal 
picture of France's gravely impaired competitiveness”599, in the Forum notes. Conversely, the 
United States was ranked 1st for reduced government interference, especially in relation to 
labour market regulations.  
 
Reducing state ownership of the means of production, which essentially means less government 
intervention and more economic efficiency, is therefore welcomed in many instances in the 
GCRs. The 1985 report applauded the Irish and British governments’ move towards 
privatisation in the mid-1980s. In 1984, the Irish government denationalised the public-owned 
shipping industry and a more extensive programme was underway under the Thatcher 
government in Britain with the objective of selling what was worth of $14.6 billion US dollars 
of state-owned enterprises by 1990. However, the report warned that “while these examples of 
denationalization may signal a welcome trend towards a hands-off policy of governments vis-
a-vis the economy, there remain many instances of regulatory interference”600. This is another 
important obstacle highlighted in the GCR following the emphasis on the indispensability of 
the free market economy, which will be discussed in detail later. In 1980, the report praised the 
conversion toward free market economy made in several European countries. It honoured the 
fact that an increasing number of countries in Europe then were presenting:  
 
                                                          
599 WEF, “Competitiveness Profiles of Major Countries”, EMF’s Report on International Competitiveness 1985, 
p. 37.  
600 EMF, “The Major Components of Competitiveness”, p. 78.  
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the happy picture of moving towards the unfettered context of free enterprise/private ownership. Sweeping 
changes in government or policies have made this orientation possible. Thus France and Britain are 
strongly de-emphasizing the Role of the State both as a producer and as a rescuer of ailing concerns601.  
 
Such triumphant representation of political and economic shifts in Europe is reflected in the 
GCR’s assessment of the countries covered. The deregulatory framework introduced by the 
Thatcher government was seen as a boost to the country’s financial dynamism; the road to an 
increased government efficiency and the country’s overall competitiveness602. The business 
leaders in Britain were then, the report points out, “highly appreciative of the absence of price 
controls, of cross-border financial flows, domestic investments and deregulation”603. In the US, 
one of the GRC’s usual top competitiveness runners, the country has its share of the credits in 
the report, which was based on the high confidence placed in the system by the enterprises 
working in the country. Besides reducing the government’s regulatory interference in the 
economy, the US recovery of 1982 was primarily stimulated by “big tax breaks” and “a new 
realism in wage agreements”. This resulted in higher returns on capital investment as well as a 
respectable level of job creation that is ‘free of strict work rules’604. The measures that 
governments were encouraged to take by the Forum in the 1980s extend to income and 
corporate tax. As early as 1985, the report stresses the need for governments to be “very careful 
in adopting fiscal policies which may deter investment and jeopardize the international 
competitiveness of their national corporations”. It notes that “whatever the pay levels and other 
working conditions”, income tax “can spoil it all and demotivate people”605.  
 
                                                          
601 EMF, “Competitiveness and Underlying Economic Ideology“, Report on the Competitiveness of European 
Industry 1980, p. 19.  
602 WEF, “Competitiveness Profiles of Major Countries”, p. 36.  
603 EMF, “The Executive Business Confidence Scoreboard”, in EMF’s Report on International Competitiveness 
1985, p. 20.  
604 WEF, “Competitiveness Profiles of Major Countries”, p. 33.   
605 EMF, “The Major Components of Competitiveness”, 76. a little more will be said later on in this chapter in 
relation to the importance attached to fiscal policy by the report 
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Regarding corporate taxes, the GCR introduces a bright image of governmental tax policies in 
response to the 1980s recession. It notes that when businesses in Europe demanded to be 
relieved from their tax burden as it was putting them at a disadvantageous position against their 
competitors, governments in the UK, Germany and Switzerland responded “positively to these 
demands”. For example, in the UK corporate taxes were lowered from 52 to 50 percent while 
the government also promised to reduce it further to 35 percent by 1986/1987606. 
 
Reviewing the evaluation of Asian countries in the GCR also allows the observation of such a 
trend. Hong Kong is depicted as “the only economy in the modern world that is closest to the 
laissez-faire capitalism Adam Smith would have favoured” which reinforces its international 
competitiveness607. “Even China”, the report maintains, made impressive steps in the right 
direction. By mid-1980s, the Chinese economy has become much-less central and more 
market-oriented economy. In China, “the scope of governmental participation in economic 
activities substantially curtailed, and economic decision-making powers devolved to 
individuals, enterprises and localities”.608 Conversely, Japan stood at the other end with its 
controversial trade system. Japan’s protectionist policy in the agriculture sector was evaluated 
unfavourably in the report in relation to its state interference and the well-being of its people. 
It was seen as “one drag on Japan's economic efficiency”. A drag that was expected to bring 
about “a protectionist foreign backlash against growing Japanese trade surpluses and the 
wholesale conquest of certain market segments”, primarily from the US and Europe609. 
Although the report recognises the balancing effect of subsidies against governmental taxes, it 
holds that “countries with high subsidies ultimately hurt their own competitiveness, by 
                                                          
606 Ibid. pp. 53-4. 
607 Fredrick Hu, “East Asia Record of Success”, The Global Competitiveness Report 1996, p.34. (pp. 32-5), see 
also Michel Mirshak and Amy Webster, “Factors Affecting Competitiveness”, The World Competitiveness Report 
1989, p. 25. 
608 Fredrick Hu, “East Asia Record of Success”, p.34.  
609 EMF, “The Major Components of Competitiveness”, p. 34.  
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preserving outdated structures at the expense of worthier sectors with more potential for growth 
and prosperity”610.    
 
In short, the GCR’s neoliberal state restructuring aims to decrease the effects of the “the heavy 
hand of the government”, which has a strong bearing on businesses and the country's 
international competitiveness611. However, in the GCR the government intervention manifests 
in various ways and produces different outcomes. While its role in India was seen as 
catastrophic and responsible for the country’s lack of competitiveness612, in the case of the 
South-East Asian model of public governance, the GCR holds a different account where state 
intervention is not discredited similarly. In 1985, the GCR contended that the South Korean 
economic growth is “further helped by a state which interferes in the economy not so much as 
a bureaucratic regulator but more as a strong partner for business to promote Korean exports 
— in short, a leaf has been taken from Japan incorporated”613. The latter, however, was 
previously criticised for the lack of governmental support of start-up companies, strict rules 
imposed on the mobility of labour, unfair competition for public procurement, and the lack of 
managerial autonomy in public-owned enterprises614. Yet, in the 1990s, the GCR showed a 
noticeable admiration of the high ranking attained by East Asian countries in the report, 
including Japan with its motivated workforce and supportive state policies. The high 
competitiveness profile of these economies was then ascribed to the unmatched performance 
on multiple factors with a special focus on the small size of the government and labour market 
flexibility. The latter were seen as the most crucial factors behind the seemingly prolonged 
competitiveness in the region, at least until 1997-8.  
                                                          
610 Ibid. p. 78.  
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613 EMF, “The Executive Summary”, in EMF’s Report on International Competitiveness 1985, p. 15. 
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Germany, Sweden and other continental and North European countries are examples where the 
state is still an active agent in the economy and where trade unions enjoy a role in management 
decisions but also take sacrifices in the name of competitiveness and adopt flexible strategies 
during recession. As noted by the 1985 GCR, among the factors that underpin Germany’s 
competitiveness, ranked 4th in 1985, are “the severity of antitrust laws and their application, 
the absence of trade protectionism, and labour participation in guiding enterprises through 
social or economic storms and calmer waters”615. However, Germany was perceived to still lag 
behind in few areas according to its business community. The “competitive weaknesses” of the 
German economy are “almost entirely due to unfavourable ‘framework conditions’, e.g. high 
taxes and labour-market rigidities, which have depressed earnings, productivity advances, 
corporate self-financing capacity and investments”616. In 1996 Germany ranked only 22nd out 
of 49 economies, which was blamed on labour market rigidities and the extensive welfare 
programmes. “Germany, together with many of its EU partners, ranks especially poorly in 
government and in labour market flexibility”, notes the report in 1996617. One of the few praises 
the report gave the German government at the time was the commitment it had, and arguable 
still does, to continuous upgrading of its infrastructure. It is one of the economic activities of 
the state that is relatively excluded from criticism by businesses as a sort of non-inflationary 
and productive investment. The private sector, according to the Forum, “can only meet some 
of a country’s infrastructure needs, and there will continue to be a role for the government even 
under the most privatised regimes”618. The position of Germany has become more favourable 
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617 Frederick Hu, Jeffrey D. Sachs “Executive Summary”, The Global Competitiveness Report 1996, p.17.  
618 Eric Bridgen, “Infrastructure and the Competitive Economy: A Fundamental Requirement”, The World 
Competitiveness Report 1993, p. 280.  
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towards the end of 1990s with more labour flexibility and less harmful welfare that were 
strengthened later by the Hertz reforms introduced in 2002.  
By mid 1990s, the GCR celebrated the results that many countries achieved through the 
implementation of neoliberal restructuring policies. In 1997, Sachs stated that: 
 
The rapid growth of recent years may be viewed as the payoff to a decade of worldwide economic 
reforms…government have taken important strides to open national economies to international trade and 
finance; to privatize state-owned enterprises and to invite competition in sectors formerly off limits to the 
private sector; to get high rates of inflation under control; and to improve physical infrastructure to enhance 
the ability of the national economy to participate in global trade. The result has been rising growth in 
reforming economies and rising growth in the world as a whole619.  
 
In his contribution to the competitiveness discourse of the GCR, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the 
former French minister of industry and foreign trade, depicted the state restructuring process 
that has been underway since the 1980s as a necessary rehabilitation. He states that it is 
necessary to respond to “the need to limit and control the shifts in the economy”. For Strauss-
Kahn, the government must only “compensate for market deficiencies and…reduce the 
uncertainties which are burdening corporations and slowing their development….in the context 
of market uncertainty, government can guarantee continuity”620. Indeed, this rehabilitation 
process is centred on making the government “a full-fledged economic partner”, with a role 
that is “being one of mediator”. By so doing, he argues, the government “contributes to 
strengthening the global competitiveness of the economy, a condition that is necessary for 
                                                          
619 Jeffrey Sachs, “Competitiveness: the Year in Review”, The Global Competitiveness Report 1997, pp. 12.  
620 Dominique Strauss-Khan, Former Minister for Industry and Foreign Trade, France, “A New Industrial 
Coordination”, The World Competitiveness Report 1993, pp. 273-4.  
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economic survival”621. This state restructuring project and the concomitant to the 
(re)prioritisation of policymaking are part of what the Forum describes as “dynamic thinking 
about global competitiveness”622, to which the GCR is a “valuable frame of reference”623.      
In sum, the GCR’s neoliberal competitiveness discourse is one that builds on simply less state 
intervention in the economy in the old fashion way. This anti-statist approach was reconfigured 
later on in the discourse through demanding interventions that serve the interest of the 
enterprise and its competitiveness. The Forum’s discourse on the welfare state as part of its 
discourse of international competitiveness embodies a new demand over the state that is 
deemed necessary to strengthening the neoliberal foundation of competitiveness. In the next 
section, an analysis of the Forum’s position on social welfare is provided that highlights the 
way it is perceived to affect competitiveness and, thus, what the state should do in relation to 
their inherited social welfare programmes in order to strengthen and preserve the international 
competitiveness of their national economies.   
 
7.2.  Strengthening Neoliberal Competitiveness: The Discursive Reconfiguration of the 
Welfare State 
 
The GCR’s competitiveness discourse goes beyond calling for a necessary restructuring of the 
state’s role in the economy and transforming its policies and priorities on a macroeconomic 
level. Its state restructuring discourse is contingent upon transforming the social welfare system 
dis-embedding it socially through political means. This has been made an imperative given its 
                                                          
621 Suppiah. Dhanabalan, “Building an Efficient Economic Environment”, The World Competitiveness Report 
1993, p. 274.  
622 Klaus Schwab, “Preface”, EMF’s Report on International Competitiveness 1985, p. 3. 
623 Klaus Schwab and Derek Abell, “Preface”.  
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perceived paralysing effects on the international competitiveness of the state, its harmful effects 
on the fiscal and monetary stability of the economy as well as labour market flexibility in 
particular.  
In the 1997 GCR, Jeffrey Sachs presented a year review of the status of world competitiveness. 
In his discussion of the factors determining its dynamics, Sachs positioned the government at 
the centre of the competitiveness framework. Firstly, for him, economic growth should be 
considered to be principally an outcome of global reforms of governmental economic policies 
ranging from the opening up national borders to international trade and finance, privatizing the 
public sector and promoting competition, to controlling inflation and upgrading infrastructure. 
Thus, a backward governmental profile in these respects is responsible for weakening 
competitiveness and, hence, would generate only slow economic growth, if any. To put it 
differently, bad governance manifests partly in bad governmental practices, particularly in 
relation to the rule of law and independence of the judiciary system as well as the effectiveness 
of legal system in terms of contract enforcement. The absence of these policies is usually taken 
in the report as the reason behind the failure of the post-communist transition economies to 
achieve steady growth rates. This framework of governmental action set by the Forum may 
sound very familiar by now, but the list of backward governmental practice is not confined to 
the above areas only. It is extended in Sachs’s view to cover social welfare policies which he, 
and many at the Forum, argue is central to bad governance624. It is seen as counterproductive 
and destructive to business productivity and competitiveness.   
 
                                                          
624 Jeffrey Sachs, “Competitiveness: the Year in Review”, pp. 12-18. Social spending on welfare programs in the 
1970s and early 1980s accounted for a considerable part of governmental public spending and GDP (7 % of GDP 
in the UK, 14 % the US in 1982). 
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As we mentioned earlier, the report has always valued the socio-economic governance structure 
put in place in the East Asian countries compared to those adopted in many advanced capitalist 
countries. Governments in these countries are partners with private enterprises and mediators 
in times of class conflict and uncertainty. But what matters most is, compared to the western 
advanced economies, their small size due to the fact that they have “avoided some potential 
pitfalls of social security and welfare schemes adopted in Western Europe”, Hu points out625.  
This being the case, the tax burden on private investment and the public is usually low, which 
arguably incentivises more capital investment and motivates people to work. Disciplined fiscal 
policies and low budget deficit led these countries to be more successful at providing their 
economies with stable macroeconomic environment and better national saving rates and capital 
availability626. Moreover, the dynamism in the Asian economies is seen as sustainable because 
“an emphasis on self-help is preferred to having generous state welfare programmes”627.  
In some of the Nordic countries like Denmark, the GCR regarded austerity policies in the mid-
1980s to have been influential in restoring its international competitiveness “after many years 
of steady erosion of its international competitive position through overemphasis on the welfare 
state and heavy budget and balance-of-payments deficits”628. Nowadays, austerity has become 
a common governmental strategy to counter the inflationary pressure, resulting partly from 
social spending, and restore fiscal instability.      
The social welfare state is principally rejected on the grounds that it slows down economic 
growth and hinders sustainable competiveness. This is largely due to high social spending 
which results in higher taxes on businesses and thus less profit, and as a result, less capital 
accumulation. When the competitiveness of a country is defined by the wealth generated by 
                                                          
625 Fredrick Hu, “East Asia Record of Success”, p.33.  
626 Ibid. p.34.  
627 Suppiah Dhanabalan, “Building an Efficient Economic Environment”, pp. 272-80.  
628 EMF, “The Executive Summary”, EMF’s Report on International Competitiveness 1985, p. 13.  
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the private enterprises, welfare policies produce structural deficiencies in the economy 
primarily represented in fiscal instability and demotivated, and ‘inflexible’, labour market. The 
result is less economic dynamism and lower, or at best unsustainable, competitiveness which 
naturally yields lower rates of economic growth and hardens recovery during crisis times.  
In a section titled The Welfare Trap, the 1985 GCR explained how welfare policies affect 
competitiveness. It argued that social security contributions, paid by employers and employees, 
“drive up the total fiscal burden in many countries to such hard-to-bear levels”. This situation 
was felt by many governments in Europe which forced them to consider capping their social 
spending. The UK government was one of the first governments in Europe to plan a 
streamlining of its social security budget that reached over 39.5 billion pounds in mid-1980s, 
30 % of the total government spending which benefits 20 out of 56 million citizens. The plan 
then was made to restructure social security and the welfare programmes in order to support 
only “the truly needy”629. A pattern in this direction can be also discerned in Britain nowadays, 
as will be shown in chapter Eight. The following statement on the assumed negative social 
impact of welfare programmes represents one side of the argument used in the GCR against 
welfare:  
A poorly paid man has no incentive to earn more. If he did, not only would he pay more tax, but he would 
also lose benefits available to those with less than a certain income. If he has a family, he is even better off 
stopping work altogether because he would collect more in dole money and supplementary benefits630.   
 
Thus, by implementing social protection policies, the state contributes to its own un-
competitiveness and vulnerability in the global economy, and potentially drive its economy 
towards a recession. Labour market inflexibility caused by strict social protection rules, 
therefore, is a state-made problem and impinges on business profit and economic growth. When 
                                                          
629 EMF, “The Major Components of Competitiveness”, p. 78.  
630 Ibid.  
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the US social security spending increased in the early 1980s to a level close to that of European 
states, the GCR considered it an alarming and dangerous move. Social protection schemes, 
inherited from the 1960s, such as “food stamps, Medicaid and Medicare, aid to poor families 
with dependent children, old-age pensions and disability grants” have drifted out of control and 
amounted to 42 % of the government budget631. However, the Reagan administration’s attempt 
to bring the budget deficit down was perceived positively. As argued by the Forum, “a key 
plank in President Reagan's bid to bring down the huge budget deficit is to reduce this income 
transfer payment portion”632. But overall, this structural imbalance of the US economy 
persisted towards the mid-1990s. The 1996 GCR viewed the 4th place scored by the US in the 
ranking as being caused mainly by of “its moderately high rates of government spending and 
taxation, its relatively low rate of national saving”, according to the US business community.  
 
Moreover, Sachs and Warner conducted a study on the fiscal and economic costs of the social 
welfare programs that were fashionable, and still in some, European countries. Through their 
study, they highlighted the channels through which welfare programs hinder Europe’s 
competitiveness and economic growth. These are mainly three: inflexible labour markets, high 
government expenditure and state-provided pensions.   
In figure 1 they presented their argument regarding the effects of the social welfare state on 
competitiveness. As pointed out in the diagram, the main argument made here is that a large 
social welfare state leads, in the long run, to high unemployment and low economic growth. 
One direct result of welfare programs, which is significantly related to the microeconomic 
foundations of competitiveness, is inflexible labour market, which leads to low employment 
growth and would “eventually lead to high unemployment”. As mentioned above, people 
                                                          
631 Ibid. 
632 Ibid. 
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would arguably opt for unemployment in exchange for welfare benefits and business would be 
discouraged from hiring workers given the social security burden placed on them. The second 
effect of welfare policies is high government expenditure which is financed by higher taxes on 
income and profit. This, they contend, would create “serious economic distortions and can lead 
to ‘tax resistance’ (tax avoidance, tax evasion and political opposition to increased taxation), 
which in the end result in chronic deficits and low rates of government saving”. The third 
outcome appears through generous pension spending provided by the state which discourages 
the young generation from saving for contributing towards their own future retirement benefits. 
And, Sachs and Warner state, “depending on what happens to the dis-saving of older 
generations, this can reduce overall rates of private saving”633. Their analysis, they argue, can 
apply everywhere in Europe. They conclude that all the problems that Europe faced in the 
1980s and 1990s were “closely related to the ambitious social welfare states of Europe”634.  
 
From Sachs point of view, there is a recognizable difference between the Anglo-Saxon 
countries and the continental European ones. However, today more convergences can be 
observed than divergences. The former is characterised with a more flexible labour market and 
smaller social welfare states which translates into higher rate of employment and more 
successful job generation635. As the report points out, government spending amounts to 50% 
of GDP in Europe and 39 in Anglo-Saxon and 29 in the Enterpot countries. Hence, according 
to Sachs, Europe’s competitiveness challenge steams from the: 
 
fiscal policy and labor market policy related to the extensive social welfare state put in place in the EU 
countries in past generation … Europe’s social welfare system has substantially increased labor market 
                                                          
633 Jeffrey D Sachs and Andrew Warner, “The Social Welfare State and Competitiveness”, p.20.  
634 Ibid. p.26.  
635 Jeffrey Sachs, “Competitiveness: the Year in Review”, p. 15.  
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rigidities through regulations that limit the flexibility of wages, employment and working within 
enterprises636.  
 
While some, like Garelli and Palan et al, believe that conditioning competitiveness on getting 
rid of social welfare in the manner argued here would impact on social cohesion through 
widening inequality and deepening the division between the rich and the poor, Warner 
disagrees with this assumption and holds an oppositional view. He maintains that contrary to 
the common belief that pursuing competitiveness leads to rising unemployment and income 
inequality, evidence from the ‘executive opinion survey’, that is the opinion of the business 
community in all the countries covered in the report, suggests no causal relationship between 
the two. Indeed, a more competitive country would have a gradual, although slow, rise in 
employment and equality compared to a less competitive country, he adds637. That is all taken 
with the assumption that there is no direct relationship between rising income gap and cuts in 
government spending, as evident in countries that experienced cuts and those that have not to 
the same extent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
636 Ibid. 
637 Andrew Warner, “Income Distribution and Competitiveness”, The Global Competitiveness Report 1998, p. 30-
37.  
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Figure 1: The effect of the social welfare state on competitiveness, Sachs and Warner, 1996.  
 
In 1985, the GCR drew on a survey conducted on welfare and social security nets in the US by 
Louis Harris. The survey resulted in the following conclusion:  
 
If the unprecedented numbers of jobless have not yet exhibited major overt discontent (by rioting, for 
example), it is only because of the cushion provided by extensive social-security nets built up during the 
years of heady economic growth. Now these nets are becoming wider-meshed to prevent their total 
collapse. Already there is widespread talk in Europe about the ‘new poor' — the longer-term unemployed 
who are reduced to welfare benefits and charity. Their number cannot swell much more if social turmoil is 
to be avoided638.  
 
This conclusion is repeated by a wealth of academics in the 21st such as Guy Standing in his 
seminal work on the Precariat and the threat of social unrest as a consequence of 
competitiveness polices. It also ties strongly to the widening gap between rich and poor, also 
highlighted in the same report where it states that the current “income and wealth differentials 
may not threaten political stability, but they are apt to erode social consensus”, considered vital 
for sustainable competitiveness639.  This shows what value should be placed on the social role 
of the state and questions the gradual dismantling of the welfare system while unemployment 
is still high. However, the Forum’s take is that welfare policies could be helpful at time when 
social consensus is endangered. The solution is to make the regulations of the labour market 
flexible in order to get people out of welfare and into work which is the source of welfare.  
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Claude Smadja, the Forums former managing director, illustrates the potential social and 
structural consequences that would be brought about by implementing competitiveness policies 
while turning a blind eye on the society640. According to Smadja, and in contrast with Warner, 
people and politicians should realise that improved competitiveness does not necessarily mean 
less unemployment. This fact explains the “pervasive feeling of insecurity throughout 
industrialized countries” among the jobless and those at work since the latter also have insecure 
jobs and stagnating wages.  That is, economic liberalization and technological innovation leads 
to increasing jobs being lost which brings social dislocation to the open and, hence, endangers 
the very foundation of competitiveness. This danger, Smadja notes, is magnified when one 
considers the shrinking political power of trade unions and the influence of workers and the 
rise of shareholders’ interests at the expense of stakeholders. Since welfare policies are thought 
to have hindered the competitiveness of many industrialized countries, the solution he suggests 
is to have a sort of welfare that does not hold back competiveness and growth. Every social 
model, in order to achieve competitiveness, has to focus on continuing its upgrade of its 
knowledge and information base. A model in which individual responsibility is valued over 
social and cultural advantages provided by the state. Spending on welfare should not deprive 
these areas from the necessary fund for its improvement. Similarly, in the 2014 GCR Corrigan 
argues that in order for welfare programs to be justifiable, it “needs to be well balanced and 
affordable”641. Whilst it is certainly true that welfare helps preserving the cohesion of the 
society and brings stability to the economy, it is not enough for the ‘Forum’s boys’642. Welfare 
programmes must take into consideration the increasing cost of businesses.   
 
                                                          
640 Claude Smadja, “Beyond the Statistics”, in the World Economic Forum (ed.), The World Competitiveness 
Report 1996, pp. 28-32.  
641 Gemma Corrigan et al, “Assessing Progress Towards Sustainable Development”, in the World Economic 
Forum (ed.), The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015, p. 61.  
642 We do realise that not all the contributors to the Forum’s discourse of competitiveness are males, the term ‘the 
forum’s boys’ is used to draw a parallel to the ‘Chicago boys’.  
 237 
 
Thus, the rewards of competitiveness must be shared with the rest of the population in order 
for competitiveness to be sustainable, however, not through the preservation of welfare 
programs. Achieving this objective, according to Smadja, entails that competitiveness has to 
be more than a state project that aims to achieve economic growth and more than a corporate 
target to increase capital accumulation and profit. To strike a balance and compensate for some 
of the structural changes carried with competitiveness policies, both the state and the 
corporation need to cooperate. On the part of the government, rather than spending on welfare, 
it has to be efficient at “helping the population adjust successfully to a new, more demanding, 
less predictable environment”, Smadja argues643. The government creates a environment that 
is conducive to competitiveness for business and, through social and economic policies, which 
adjusts its population to such an environment. A manifestation of this today is the emphasis 
placed on education and training, labour market flexibility and welfare reforms. This argument 
is at the heart of the role of the state in achieving the social embeddedness of competitiveness. 
“Such policies can only be effective if they secure the workforce and society at large to prepare 
to withstand the impact of globalization by having the means to compete effectively in the 
world economy”.  
 
This obviously indicates that the legitimacy of competitiveness as an institutionalised 
economic and social strategy can be established only when it is legitimised politically. 
Competitiveness has to be socially embedded in order to be sustainable. But, the enterprise is 
not without its responsibilities in this regard. “In some case”, Smadja argues, the concerns of 
the working class by the enterprise should be addressed if social disarticulation is to be avoided 
– a possibility whose implications in reality, and its timing and form, however, remain unclear. 
Some at the Forum suggest that the role of the private enterprise is to step into the education 
                                                          
643 Claude Smadja, “Beyond the Statistics”, P. 31.  
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market alongside the state and take a leading role in educating people to upgrade their skills to 
fit the needs of the new economy, with particular emphasis on education for technology644. 
Thus, the adjustment to the unpredictable environment of competitiveness is facilitated through 
education and being well-equipped to compete in the labour market for jobs rather than living 
on state welfare.   
Furthermore, when the state’s spending is directed towards productive arenas, such as 
education, that will improve the quality of human capital required by the market. But, first the 
demand for more skilled workers is conditioned on the status of the microeconomic 
environment in the country. Privatisation of state-owned enterprise does not increase prosperity 
automatically because efficiency has to be increased in the enterprise which in turn depends on 
the quality of business environment (factor conditions, demand conditions, related and 
supporting industries and the context for frim strategy and rivalry)645. What can be inferred 
from this is that the level of economic growth required for solving the structural problem of 
unemployment and growth sustainability is largely a matter of microeconomic restructuring. 
Otherwise, progress attained thorough macroeconomic reforms is only an “illusion”, as Porter 
stresses646. To him, current failure that manifests in austerity and social disappointment in 
living standards and jobs has one sole explanation -- failure in understanding the indispensable 
and supplementary role of micro reforms.  
 
The fact that some roles of the government are harmful to business activities and capital 
accumulation have become common sense in most countries. Crises have resulted in harsh 
lessons to be learnt. It has become increasingly clear that governments and businesses have to 
                                                          
644 See Macha Levinson, “Education for Technology or Technology for Education: the Dilemma of the New 
Economy”, The Global Competitiveness Report 2000, pp. 86-91.  
645 Ibid. p. 26, for the allocation of countries into economic stages see pages 27, 33, 34. 
646 Michael E. Porter, “Building the Microeconomic foundations of prosperity”, p. 20.  
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strictly play a ‘positive role’ in order for reap the benefits of globalization. The government 
“must set the right rules and incentives and make the public investments needed for a 
productive economy”647. It has to find ways to “mobilize the involvement of companies, 
educational and research institutions, and others through persuasion, incentives, and 
leadership” because competitiveness depends on “countries’ ability to build effective 
collaborative structures for delivering sustained upgrading of microeconomic 
fundamentals”648. Only then can the microeconomic competitiveness of the country “translate 
the opportunities created by the macroeconomic, political, legal, and social context and the 
endowments of natural resources and geographic location into prosperity”649.  
 
Legitimating competitiveness has become part of the state rehabilitation approach adopted by 
the Forum. Preparing the society to “withstand” the economic effects of globalization becomes 
very important with the shrinking power of trade unions, as there is a declining emphasis on 
welfare polices as a solution to social inequality and unemployment. The government, 
Levinson stresses, has to reform itself in an effective way so as to be best equipped to solve 
rising social tensions resulting from globalization. Societies must be integrated into the global 
political economy through mechanisms that allows sharing the benefits of globalization. The 
proposed integration will mainly take place, she asserts, through improving people’s education 
to generate the economic performance needed to reach competitiveness and to bridge the 
current gap between the two650. Governments should be able to predict the needs of business: 
“with the world in such a rapid flux of change, government policies must be nimble and quick, 
                                                          
647 Ibid. p. 22-23.  
648 Michael Porter, Christian Ketels and Mercedes Delgado, “The Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: 
Findings from the Business Competitiveness Index”, p. 72.  
649 Ibid. p. 53.  
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able to adjust not only to current requirements but to the emergent requirements of future 
industries and society”651.  
 
In sum, the Forum has always laid a considerable emphasis on the transformation of the 
extensive welfare policies still at play in many advanced capitalist economies. Extensive social 
welfare policies are seen as a double-edged sword. Although they may have a stabilising effect 
on the economy through protecting the poor, ill, and unemployed, their destabilising effects 
surpass the stabilising ones. That is, welfare state policies accelerate the cost and inflexibility 
of labour as well as increase the fragility of public finance and macroeconomic policies. 
Moreover, they “can hamper the incentives to work, innovate, and excel”, as restated by the 
2014-2015 GCR. Box 1 presents typical WEF survey questions that are used to measure the 
flexibility of labour market and how social security regulations are imposed by welfare 
spending figure in this regard.  In the early 2000s, the Forum’s discourse on welfare almost 
disappeared and the focus shifted to evaluating the adequacy of the government’s fiscal and 
monetary policies through measuring the direction of its funds and its impact on the 
productivity and profitability of the enterprise. To analyse this shift, we turn in the next section.  
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7.3. Productive Versus Wasteful Public Spending  
 
In 1998, the GCI adopted a more sophisticated approach to the issue of public spending, most 
critical to the role of the state in the solidification of microeconomic competitiveness. Rather 
than designing an index that captures public spending, the focus shifted to measuring public 
waste based on the assumption that some types of public spending are productive and beneficial 
                                                          
652 Table is taken from the 2001-2002 Report, Peter K. Cornelius and Young Zhang, “Labour Markets in Europe: 
Performance, Reform and Perception”, p. 149.  
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to businesses while others are wasteful and harmful, i.e. extensive welfare, corruption and 
favouritism. The below variables were adopted as part of the waste index, which is a part of 
the Macroeconomic environment index of the GCI653:  
 
 Extent of distortive government subsidies 
 Diversion of public funds 
 Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians654 
The rationale for this step is justified by Sala-I-Martin, who quite rightly contends that “within 
government expenditure, wasteful and productive spending are bundled together”. Thus, 
separating the two is necessary “to capture just the ‘bad’ part”. The point stressed by the report 
is that only moderate government spending is good, a low or high spending are both bad for 
growth. He explains that “the idea is that useful public spending tends to increase the 
productivity of private firms, which leads to larger aggregate economic growth”. Nonetheless, 
public spending is seen harmful when it is financed by taxation which, as usually argued by 
businesses, has “a tendency to lower the private after-tax productivity of firms, which, in turn, 
lowers the rate of economic growth”. Conversely, the waste index recognises the disadvantages 
of small government; “if the size of the government is too small, taxes are low, but the 
beneficial side of public spending is insufficient”. This fact applies to property rights 
protection, the infrastructure and so forth. In short, governments need to strike a balance 
between being too small and too big. When it is small, in Sala-I-Martin’s words, increasing 
productive public spending by the government “would lead to a larger growth rate as the 
benefits from more productive public spending would more than offset the extra costs of 
                                                          
653 As we outlined in the previous chapter, the GCI was composed of three sub-indexes: The public Institution 
sub-Index, The Macroeconomic Environment subindex and the technology subindex. So the role of the state is 
also measured in the other indexes but to avoid repeating will focus only on the second one.  
654 Xavier Sala-I-Martin, “Executive Summary”, in the World Economic Forum (ed.), The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2003-2004, p. xiii.  
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taxation”. In the opposite case, although high public spending could have its own benefits, “the 
distortions caused by all the taxes needed to finance it would more than offset the benefits”. 
The solution, then, is to cut spending and bring down the size of the government to stimulate 
economic growth. Thus, the purpose of the index is to find out what is the “optimal size” of the 
government in each country. “There is a size of public spending (as a fraction of GDP) for 
which the growth rate of the economy is the largest”655.   
 
The financial crisis of 2007-8 signified a practical challenge to this view because of the 
resulting increased state intervention in the economy. Governments all over the world have 
attempted to compensate for market failure through various means, which encouraged many in 
academic and business circles to speak of the return of Keynesianism656. The crisis represents 
another turning point whose influence on the Forum’s discourse of competitiveness should not 
be ignored. It represents a threshold where the discourse received more momentum in order to 
avoid any backlash against the embeddedness of competitiveness within national economies 
and their societies as a result of the crisis. Once again, the state is called upon to act in the name 
of international competitiveness and sustainable economic growth. Its intervention, in many 
advanced economies, to shield the economy from sliding into more disastrous levels was not 
condemned by the Forum in terms of its necessity in a context of volatility and uncertainty. 
However, it was perceived as a result of unsatisfactory levels of competitiveness. The Forum’s 
GRC Reports, from 2008 to 2014, presented identical lines of circumstantial premises of the 
world economy within which the capitalist enterprise is operating and upon which the state 
must act. The opening statement of each report presents a set of circumstantial premises based 
                                                          
655 The Macroeconomic environment index includes: macroeconomic stability subindex and government 
subindex. , Jennifer Blanke, Fiona Paua and Xavier Sala-I-Martin, “The Growth Competitiveness Index: 
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on certain value premises and aimed at achieving a group of goals premises through 
legitimating a claim for action.  
 
Phrases such as “a time of multiple shocks to the global economy”, “rising inflation worldwide 
and the consequent slowdown in demand in many advanced economies” 657 have dominated 
the Forum’s discourse in the years following the crisis. These and other phrases were used to 
portray the fatality of the situation. Upon such representation of reality, the Forum has put 
forward the course of the right action to achieve the goal of transcending the crisis. It was the 
state and its policymakers that are challenged to act in order to drag their economies out of the 
crisis, and it was through consolidating their international competitiveness that such goal is to 
be achieved. Governments, in the wake of the crisis, were seen as “struggling with ways of 
managing these multiple shocks intelligently while preparing their economies to perform well 
in an economic landscape characterized by growing volatility” 658. When they stepped in and 
took actions aimed at easing out the financial and economic impact of the crisis in order to 
stimulate economic recovery and lift their economies out of recession, the Forum alarmed 
against the scope and scale of the governmental interventions and the measures deployed. 
These measures: banks bailouts, nationalisation, monetary and fiscal interventions, have 
brought up the question of the ‘optimal size’ of the government back again to the centre of the 
debate. What is stressed in response to these developments is not state intervention in this 
outdated and harmful manner but state intervention through strengthening the competitiveness 
of national economies as the ultimate goal to which governments must strive. As argued by 
Sala-I-Martin et al, it is only “competitiveness supporting economic environment can help 
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national economies to weather business cycle downturns and ensure that the mechanisms 
enabling solid economic performance going into the future are in place”659.  
 
Moreover, in 2011 the Forum perceived the economic recovery of the world economy as facing 
“a number of significant and interrelated challenges that could hamper a genuine upturn”. It 
stressed the need for a different action than the one taken. In order to effectively respond to 
such challenges policy makers are again viewed as not entirely competent enough to be able to 
manage these challenges while not losing sight of ways to sustain the performance of their 
economies in an “increasingly difficult and unpredictable global landscape”660. What the 
governments in most advanced economies have done in terms of stimulating the economy 
through more spending have eased the growth recovery and counterbalanced the recession. 
However, the soaring budget deficit and public debt, characteristic of most advanced 
economies and resulting partly from the stimulus plans and banking bailouts employed by 
governments, call for an urgent action on its part. What concerns the GCR mostly is the harmful 
impact these issues can have on the level of economic productivity, which is considered at the 
heart of the Forum’s microeconomic approach towards sustainable competitiveness and 
growth. As argued by Sala-I-Martin et al, when fiscal flexibility decreases, interest rates rise, 
and taxes will be driven up as a consequence of uncontrolled budget deficit and public debt. In 
other words, the government will not be able to sustain growth unless it spends on education, 
health and infrastructure. Also, the ability of the government to provide future stimulus 
packages will be minimised as a result. Moreover, future investment will be affected by rising 
interest rates on finance accompanied with rising taxes aimed to service debt repayment, which 
will drive savings up while pushing investment down. The ensuing vicious circle will produce 
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lower growth rates in the long run661. Therefore, their course of action was discredited as being 
not adequate enough to maintain a sustainable economic recovery. 
 
According to Sala-I-Martin, “any exit strategies must be complemented by competitiveness-
enhancing efforts aimed at improving the potential for growth in the medium to longer run, 
which will in turn help to eliminate fiscal imbalances”662. The Forum’s twelve-formula 
competitiveness approach was seen as the answer to these turbulent conditions. What is 
distinctive about the Forum discourse on competitiveness, in the eyes of its proponents and in 
the context of the crisis and the strive for a sustainable recovery, is what it can offer to 
policymakers in all states; a “platform for dialogue among government, business, and civil 
society that can serve as a catalyst for productivity-raising reforms, with the aim of boosting 
the living standards of the world’s citizens”663. So the state is again demanded to steer its policy 
making to pre-crisis limits. In combating such a complex and challenging situation, the GCR 
provided the following prescription to the G20 leaders meeting in Toronto in November 2011:  
The challenge will be to implement fiscal adjustment without undermining the frail economic recovery in 
the shorter term. Although this may seem politically painful, recent research shows that governments that 
implement painful budgetary reforms tend to be rewarded politically. Fiscal consolidation will have to be 
accompanied by structural reforms in order to increase overall competitiveness. By sending a signal, these 
reforms can mitigate the negative effect of fiscal tightening on short-term growth, but they will also 
enhance growth in the longer term, which in turn will improve the fiscal position664.  
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The nature of these structural reforms are explained by Sala-I-Martin et al in the following 
statement:  
   
The risks to the global economic outlook remain very real. Past measures, mainly based on expansionary 
monetary policies, have helped to temporarily avoid a deeper recession and set the foundations for the 
global recovery in the short term. However, ensuring sustained growth in the long run will depend not on 
monetary policies, but on boosting the level of productivity of economies. In order to achieve higher levels 
of productivity, new actions in terms of engaging in much-needed structural reform and productivity-
enhancing investments are required. These measures are not only important, as they have always been, but 
they are also becoming urgent if we are to solidify and accelerate the recovery to create new opportunities 
and new jobs for larger segments of the population.665 
 
Growth can be revived to its pre-crisis levels. A financial meltdown as well as severe sovereign 
debt crises could be avoided once policymakers ensure their competitiveness fundamentals are 
put in place. Policymakers “must avoid complacency and press ahead with the structural 
reforms and critical investments required to ensure that their countries can provide a prosperous 
environment and employment for their citizens”666. Schwab maintains that achieving that is 
facilitated through a proper “understanding of the key factors that determine economic growth” 
upon which countries have to benchmark themselves in relation to other more or less successful 
countries when it comes to maintaining income levels and living standards. The Forum’s GCR 
and its competitiveness approach “offers policymakers and business leaders an important tool 
for formulating improved economic policies and institutional reforms”667. Building national 
economies on the Forum’s GCR tools is a condition to achieve what Schwab “quality 
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growth”668. A growth that accounts for inclusiveness and the environment, but one which is 
fundamentally established on the microeconomic-generated welfare.  
 
In sum, the forum’s discourse of competitiveness has shifted towards attempting to consolidate 
the international competitiveness of the state through encouraging a productive public 
spending, one that boosts productivity and profitability contrary to welfare spending. The new 
framework values public spending on education, training and infrastructure. This type of 
spending is assumed to trigger productivity, growth and employment. As such, instead of 
allowing spending to minimise the returns on investment through constraining social security 
rules and welfare benefits that affects profit making through taxes and less exploitation of 
labour, the demand is for spending that maximises profit and allows further exploitation 
through flexibility in the labour market. Only these reforms by the state can strengthen its 
international competitiveness and growth potentials as opposed to social welfare spending 
which is harmful to business productivity and growth prospects.  
 
 
  Conclusion  
  
With this chapter, a more comprehensive analysis of the WEF’s discourse is reached, all 
components of the WEF’s discourse were unravelled. I have made the case that this step is 
important in order to explain the sphere within which the interaction between different 
members and participants of the Forum interact. It is this discourse that is meant to shape the 
actions of all actors involved in its activities. It is aimed at setting the grounds for the sort of 
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actions desired for a smooth functioning of the capitalist economy and continuous reproduction 
of favourable conditions for capital accumulation.  
 
I have argued that the current Forum’s competitiveness discourse has been built through two 
complementary phases. The first is based on embedding an orthodox neoliberal paradigm of 
competitiveness that is focused on an opposition to the old-fashioned interventionist state. 
Whether in the form of the ownership of the means of production or overregulation of the 
market, state intervention is seen as counterproductive, inefficient and harmful to sustainable 
economic growth. The second phase is based on a reorientation of the role of the state in the 
economy towards performing activities that strengthen the productivity of its economy. 
Specifically, rather than spending on welfare, the state is required to direct its spending towards 
productive activities such as education, training and infrastructure. While the first type of 
spending is perceived to impinge negatively on the business through taxes, rigid labour market, 
inflation and less ability to generate jobs, the second is believed to be supportive of the 
productivity of the enterprise through setting up the conditions for profitmaking allowed 
through flexible utilisation of human resources. Thus, it is only when the state concentrates its 
intervention on strengthening the productivity of the enterprise that its international 
competitiveness becomes sustainable. This sustainability is conditioned upon the 
transformation of the welfare state entrenched in the structure of most advanced economies. 
Microeconomic reforms are at the heart of the socialisation of competitiveness into the society 
pursued to create a competitive society that accepts welfare to be a function of increased 
business productivity rather than a state duty.  
  
What the analysis in this chapter has revealed is that for competitiveness to work effectively 
for the TCC, it is important to target those areas of state interventions that are closer to labour, 
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to elicit a different form of management of its relation with capital. Welfare policies are seen 
as the main obstacle for a successful business and unhindered capital accumulation. From an 
Open Marxist perspective, the Forum’s competitiveness discourse has shifted towards 
emphasising state reforms that seem indispensable to avoid any disruption to the reproduction 
of capital within national economies. An entrenched welfare state presents capital with the 
challenge of containing labour within its own limits. It permits vast segments of labour to 
escape the exploitation of capital and, most importantly, hinders a further exploitation of the 
employed labour. A social welfare state is seen as a form of national management of capital-
labour relations that makes the economy unattractive to global capital and, thus, results in 
weaker ability of the state to immobilise capital within its jurisdictions. Higher taxes to finance 
welfare spending, the resultant inflexibility in the labour market, and the accompanying low 
productivity levels are some of the negative externalities that a welfare state imposes on capital.      
 
As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the Forum’s competitiveness formula has proven 
to be a tough political task in most capitalist democracies, especially in times of crisis like that 
of 2008, where the social embeddedness of competitiveness has never been strongly established 
and will never remain unchallenged. The current welfare reforms taking place in many 
advanced economies are undeniably a result of the state’s response to the development of the 
national conditions of production driven by class relations. However, the scale of such reforms 
and their capital reproduction effects vary between countries. This is due to different 
relationships of each state to global capital and varying conditions, and the state management, 
of capital-labour relations, which ultimately determine the extent of the state’s receptiveness 
to the discourse of international competitiveness of global policy groups.  
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In Chapter Eight I will analyse the response of the British state to the imperative of 
competitiveness in order to determine the influence the discourse has on its policymaking 
process. I will attempt to show to how its distinctive relationship to global capital and how its 
nature of class relations have determined the state’s form of management of capital-labour 
relations. That is, I will analyse the type of competitiveness discourse has been adopted in the 
UK and the extent to which the WEF’s discourse figures into its policymaking.     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Eight 
The Institutionalisation of Competitiveness in the UK 
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In the previous chapter it was argued that in order to comprehensively investigate the influence 
of the WEF’s competitiveness discourse, one should pay attention to the emphasis it places on 
transforming the welfare state as an obstacle hindering the macro and microeconomic 
competitiveness of the state. I argued that taking the analysis in that direction, which is missed 
in the literature, is significant for reaching a well-informed argument regarding the role of the 
WEF in the rule-making of 21st century. It was shown that the welfare state, in its traditional 
structure, is perceived to generate high unemployment and low economic growth. Specifically, 
when welfare policies are entrenched in society, they lead to labour market inflexibility, which 
in turn, affects the productivity of the enterprise and its competitiveness. Among other things, 
the Forum argues that welfare, as a form of managing capital-labour relations, increases the 
dependency of people on the state for delivering high living standards and deprives the market 
for opportunities of further exploitation of labour. Moreover, and most importantly, the state’s 
social welfare spending drives up taxes and decreases the funds available for more productive 
public investments necessary for the competitiveness of the enterprise, such as education, 
training, and infrastructure. Therefore, a crucial task for strengthening the microeconomic 
foundation of international competitiveness is to dis-embed state-led welfare from the society 
and emphasise work, productivity, enterprise and prosperity as a source for people’s welfare. 
Hence, on the one hand, the state must transform the welfare state into a system that provides 
only for those truly in need. On the other hand, the state has to guarantee an enhanced 
productivity for the enterprise through a flexible labour market structure and an adequate 
allocation of public funds, as well as an upgrading its education and infrastructure systems. In 
so doing, the macro and microeconomic foundations of the state’s competitiveness will 
function effectively to enhance the conditions of capital accumulation within the state’s 
jurisdictions. They will allow a reproduction of class relations, of exploitation and domination, 
of the capitalist social relations of production.   
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Once the WEF’s competitiveness discourse is comprehensively examined, one can assess its 
alleged influence on national policy-making more adequately. Since the sphere of interaction 
between the Forum and the state is made more elaborate now, the analysis can be developed to 
produce a more accurate understanding of the nature of change in the state’s social and 
economic policies. It will be possible to assess whether state restructuring is imposed by the 
TCC and its agents or generated by national conditions and class relations. Consequently, a 
conclusion can be drawn about the actual agency of change, class struggle or a transnational 
capitalist class, and the nature of the role of the state in the capitalist society, to serve the interest 
of the capitalist or manage capital-labour relations within and beyond its borders.  
In this chapter, I will analyse the embeddedness of the competitiveness discourse in the UK 
with a specific interest in assessing whether or not the WEF’s discourse has an influence over 
the state’s policymaking process and policy debates in the country. It will argue that while it is 
certainly true that the state policymakers have internalised a competitiveness discourse and 
become to some extent “place sellers”, as Fougner argues, the engagement of the British state 
with the competitiveness discourse has been conditioned by the specific needs of the economy 
originating from its national class relations and from the need of the state to manage these 
relations in a way that sustains the reproduction of capital within its jurisdictions. I will show 
how the UK’s competitiveness discourse has effectively been constructed as a response to the 
national conditions of capital-labour relations that reached its crisis limits towards mid-1970s, 
rather than being a response to the WEF’s discourse. The economic recession of the 1970s led 
to the decline of the productivity to an extent that capital could not reproduce itself effectively 
due to the increasing power of labour unions and rising unemployment rates in post-war 
Britain.  
Almost all states have engaged one way or another with a certain competitiveness discourse. 
However, external actors, such as the WEF, have not prescribed this engagement. This is not 
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to suggest that the Forum’s discourse has no place in British politics. Rather, the UK has 
engaged selectively with the discourse where national conditions have produced a UK-specific 
competitiveness discourse to respond to its own needs of managing the circuit of capital 
necessary to sustain the reproduction of capitalist social relations of production. The 
appearance of the WEF’s discourse within the UK’s discourse has increased throughout the 
years beginning in the first decade of the century. Specifically, the GCR has been utilised as a 
source of evidence that informed policymaking, alongside other sources such as IMD, IMF, 
and WB.  
The first section of the chapter sheds light on the politics of competitiveness in the UK with 
specific focus on the process of the internalisation of the term in political debates which started 
has started since the 1970s. It will situate the discussion within the existing debates within the 
UK that is centred on productivity, economic growth and employment in order to give an idea 
about the nature of the debate to which competitiveness has been internalised. The second 
section will analyse the institutionalisation of competitiveness in the UK. It will concentrate on 
the work of the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) as it was the first 
department that has developed the UK’s response to the need of internalising competitiveness 
and benchmarking into the policymaking process in mid-1990s. The chapter will conclude, 
confirming with the thesis’s Open Marxist framework, that the British state’s competitiveness 
discourse has originated from its own national conditions of capital accumulation, from a role 
of the state that is focused on the management of the relationship between labour and capital 
in the country. The WEF’s discourse and rankings have been utilised during such process but 
never was taken as the sole evidence and formula for national policy-making. The globalising 
British politicians are not members of the TCC or agents of the Forum as the TCC and 
international competitiveness literature argues. They are capital circuit managers who seek to 
reproduce capital accumulations, and capitalist social relations of production, within the 
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borders of their state in order to preserve the social order through enhancing employment, 
economic growth and living standards.   
 
8.1. Competitiveness: a Discursive Tool for Policy Reform  
 
Contrary to the common belief that competitiveness has become a key theme occupying the 
policymaking in the UK since the 1990s as some believe669, their engagement with the term 
dates further back. Perhaps without much variance from other advanced economies, 
governments in the UK started adopting the concept of competitiveness in policy debates as 
early as 1961. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan argued for a temporary wage pause in order 
to maintain the competitiveness of the British economy that was threatened by dawdling labour 
productivity670. Then, competitiveness was defined in productivity terms, which is still largely 
the case today. However, what has changed is the extent to which the term has penetrated policy 
debates and, most importantly, policymaking. Today, all major UK parties use the term as a 
panacea for unemployment, slow economic growth and low living standards. They differ 
nonetheless in the way they operationalise the term through institutional change, which reflects 
different understandings of economic resilience and sustainability, let alone varying 
ideological convections emanating from different perceptions of how class relations should be 
managed and how capital should be reproduced. Thus, the resulting policy reforms undertaken 
in the name of competitiveness differ and so does the impact they have on the country’s social 
and corporate welfare. This section is divided into two parts. Part one takes stock of the UK 
Conservative Party’s take on the issue of competitiveness between 1979 and 2014 with regard 
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to their discourse on the subject, the sources and obstacles to the competitiveness of the UK. 
In the second part, I will consider the Labour Party’s discourse on the same issues.  
 
8.1.1. The Conservative Turn: 1979-2014 
 The principle underlying the Conservatives’ commitment to competitiveness today has been 
set by Thatcher during her term in office. In 1980, she argued that in order for the UK to build 
a “healthy society”, she first needs to build a “healthy economy” 671. As will be discussed in 
this section, the Conservatives’ perception of a healthy society is one where duty, rather than 
right, is embedded in people’s belief and practice. The first appearance of the term 
competitiveness in policy debates in the UK came long before the WEF was founded and long 
before it started reporting on it. In 1961, Macmillan called for establishing a government body 
charged with improving the competitiveness of the British economy, which was beleaguered 
by wages running ahead of productivity672. Thus, the National Economic Development Council 
was set up in 1962 to serve as an advisory body to the government to pull Britain out of the 
recession and to plan future strategies for businesses and industries. The Council was composed 
of management, trade unions and the government representatives, which is an embodiment of 
the “politics of consensus” prevalent at the time. However, the Council was ignored by 
Thatcher and eventually abolished in 1992673. Towards the late 1960s, employment, sustained 
growth with low inflation and higher living standards have preoccupied political leaders and formed a 
large part of their campaign materials. Elections have been fought on public spending and taxes in the 
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economy and society. Therefore, state intervention to cure employment through higher public spending 
is rejected on the grounds that it is harmful to businesses and “can be the very vehicle that leads to 
losing jobs and causes bankruptcies in trade and commerce”674. The Conservative Party therefore has a 
strong belief in competitiveness entailing the reduction of public spending and taxes and rolling back 
all possibilities of its increase, especially welfare spending. Thatcher sought to build a country “where 
people are more independent of the state”. She believed that relying on the state to improve one’s 
standards of livings is wrong and brought only harm to the UK’s competitiveness as it legitimised strikes 
and business disruption. Better living standards are only delivered by rising productivity and growth 
which only businesses, not the government, can deliver675. Against a rate of three million unemployed, 
Thatcher’s persuasion that this “human tragedy” can be only solved by “getting more business” as a 
solution to the country’s employment and growth problems gave momentum to privatisation676. It was 
seen key to boosting efficiency and the motivation of employees and employers, which yields higher 
returns on work, investment and its expansion677. 
 
Thatcher criticised the labour’s class-warfare-fuelled campaigns as being outdated. She argued 
that “class warfare is immoral, a poisonous relic of the past” 678. In fact, she believed that it was 
trade unions that endangered the British economy by turning the workplace to a “battlefield”, 
which eradicates the possibility of reaching common grounds for reconciling the interests of 
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employers and employees in order to make business competitive in the global market679. 
Therefore, she demanded flexibility by trade unions in exchange for job security680. Against 
the backdrop of high government spending, inflation and the industrial situation of the late 
1970s, Thatcher contended “the real problem is that we have lived through a long period of 
increasing trade union power”. Such a situation disadvantaged businesses as wages and rights 
have become embedded in the law, as in the case of the 1974 Act where the state offered easy 
deals to unions in return for only limited cooperation681. To unions and the government she 
said, “we must create extra wealth, produce more goods and services and increase the slice of 
the cake before we can decide how that extra shall be sliced up”682. It was believed that when 
the labour market is disrupted through wage negotiations protected by institutional 
arrangements, labour costs do not adjust based on supply and demand of skills, which means 
that “adjustments take place via changes in the quantity of employment”683. 
Furthermore, Thatcher argued that taxes discourage people from work and push them to 
welfare as income attained from the latter is almost equal to the one earned by work684. In 1978, 
the number of people on national assistance reached 5 million. Thatcher went on to accuse 
Labour of being responsible for poverty because they focus “far too little on wealth creation 
and far too much or redistributing what there is”685. Therefore, unions should “bargain 
responsibly”686. They should realise that they are their own “worst enemies”, who impose 
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restrictive practices that impinge on productivity and business prosperity, which results 
eventually in high unemployment687.  
Calling for labour market flexibility has become entrenched in the Conservative politics since 
Thatcher’s arrival to power. Jobs cannot be created “without the willing cooperation not only 
of employers but of trade unions and all of the workforce” 688. She tried to convince workers 
that “it is the spirit of enterprise that creates new jobs and it is Government's task to create the 
right framework”689. Furthermore, Thatcher argued that “the great mistake” that caused distrust 
in politics had a lot to do with “too much government”690. The government should only 
intervene when market imperfections exceed the imperfections that would result from the 
intervention of the government691. Primarily, the government’s role is “to rebuild a free and 
prosperous Britain”, which, arguably, will be made easier when bargaining is distanced from 
government’s interference692. Like many Conservative leaders, Thatcher believed that the state 
should care only for a well-functioning economy and businesses. When the economy runs 
freely of any disruptions, it is simply then that everyone gets his right and will be able to 
perform his duty. She argued, “We should have far too great respect for the state to allow it to 
extend its tentacles too far”693. In addition to defence and social services, the state must focus 
on supporting the well-functioning of enterprise through: enforcing contracts, encouraging 
market competition, guaranteeing fair trade, maintaining regulation of health and safety 
standards694. Thus, the competitiveness of the UK declines as a result of the absence of “free 
                                                          
687 Margaret Thatcher, “Speech to the Conservative Party Conference”, October 13, 1978.  
688 Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, October 12th 1984.  
689 Ibid.     
690 Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, October 11th 1968.   
691 Nigel Lawson, “The economic Perils of Thinking for the Moment”, September 14, 1978, Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation. http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/114081, (accessed March 6s, 2015).   
692 Margaret Thatcher, “Speech to the Conservative Party Conference”, October 13, 1978.  
693 Margaret Thatcher, “the Ideals of an Open society”, Speech to the Bow Group, May 6, 1978. Margaret 
Thatcher Foundation. http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103674, (accessed March 9, 2015).  See also 
John Major, “Conservative Party Manifesto”, April 9, 1992, The Rt Hon Sir John Major KG CH. 
http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page86.html, (accessed March 10, 2015).   
694 Margaret Thatcher, “the Ideals of an Open society”.  
 260 
 
enterprise”695. She argued that the Conservatives are not anti-state but “the essence of a free 
society is that there are whole areas of life where the state has no business at all, no right to 
intervene” 696 . This is the main condition for realising common interest and founding a 
competitive and healthy society.  
Like Thatcher, while in power Major opposed an interventionist role of the state. For him, 
minimum wage and corporate taxes aren’t in Britain’s interest as they create the opposite of 
employment697. He contended that minimising the power of trade unions that was initiated 
throughout the 1980s is one of the reasons why the UK has become “the number one location 
for foreign investment in Europe” in the 1990s in the face of global competition698. In a speech 
to the Conservative Party conference in 1992, he stated that:  
 
Our families are growing up in a different age. They know we can't pull up the drawbridge and live in our 
own private yesterday. They know we live in a world of competition - and we can't just wish it away. 
Change isn't just coming, it's here. I want Britain to mould that change, to lead that change in our own 
national interest
699
.  
 
Therefore, to adapt to increasing global competition, Major contends that the role of the 
government is to help people leave welfare and get back to work through training, counselling 
and improving their skills. Major tried to place welfare in a framework that does not harm 
business. He called for a welfare system that provides only “a safety net” for those truly in 
need, welfare must not turn into a “way of life”. Thus, a welfare system should be affordable 
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John Major KG CH. http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page863.html, (accessed March 12, 2015).   
698 John Major, “1997 Conservative Party Manifesto”.  
699 John Major, “Mr Major’s Speech to 1992 Conservative Party Conference”, October 9, 1992. The Rt Hon Sir 
John Major KG CH. http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1208.html, (accessed March 12, 2015).   
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and cause as little burden through taxes as possible700. Welfare schemes like the Jobseeker's 
Allowance and family Scheme were therefore designed by Major’s government to help 
“curbing welfare fraud” and motivate people into employment instead of benefits. It was, and 
still today, based on the conviction that in order to enhance their living standards, “the 
unemployed have a responsibility to look for work and accept a reasonable offer”701. In order 
to build a competitive economy and create jobs, “the something for nothing culture” has to end, 
“If you don't take a reasonable offer of a job, you lose benefits.”702 
Furthermore, Cameron criticised labour’s drive for business regulations as a strategy to protect 
people in the age of globalisation and intense global competition. Regulations, he argues, 
should be “well-intentioned” in order to not to make the UK “less secure … less able to provide 
the jobs, wealth and opportunity on which well-being depends”. Thus, the optimal policy to 
protect people in a context of global competition is to “say to business: yes you should look 
after your workers, yes you should look after your community, yes you should look after our 
environment”. According to Cameron, regulations should focus on making the national 
environment “easier to start a business…to employ someone”. He notes, “We want companies 
to create their own solutions to social and environmental challenges, because those are the 
solutions most likely to last703”. In order to enhance the competitiveness of Britain, business 
must be given “the tools they need” which will help reaching a sustainable level of economic 
                                                          
700 John Major, “Text of the 1996 Budget”, November 26, 1996, The Rt Hon Sir John Major KG CH.  
http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page4286.html, (accessed March 13, 2015). 
701 John Major, “1997 Conservative Party Manifesto”.  
702 David Cameron, “Leader’s Speech”, October 1, 2008, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=153, (accessed March 13, 2015). See also 
David Cameron, “Fixing a Broken Society”, July 7, 2008, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=348, (accessed March 17, 2015); David 
Cameron, “Leader’s Speech”, October 10, 2010, BritishPoliticalSpeech.    
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=214, (accessed March 17, 2015). 
703 David Cameron, “Leader’s Speech”, October 1, 2006, BritishPoliticalSpeech.    
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=314 , (accessed March 12, 2015).   
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growth704. Therefore, he calls for reducing red tape, tax, stable banking system, skilled workers, 
effective competition regime, modern infrastructure, effective IPRs regime, and open 
government procurement.  
Thus, it can be argued that the Conservatives’ competitiveness discourse to some extent bears 
similarity with the WEF’s approach of competitiveness represented most in Porter’s 
microeconomic competitiveness approach where social and environmental sustainability are 
accounted for by market forces.  As will be illustrated below, Labour’s account is not much 
different. It does however present a more socially accountable approach to competitiveness.  
 
8.1.2. Labour Speaking the Common Language: No Power to Trade Unions 
 
“A decent society is not based on rights. It is based on duty. Our duty to each other. To all should be given 
opportunity, from all responsibility demanded” 705.   
Tony Blair, 1997. 
The continuous economic growth of 1950s and 1960s gave labour enormous power, more 
accumulation of capital led to expansion of jobs. This, in turn, led to wage rise and unions 
became powerful negotiators of employment rights and welfare. According to Glyn, this made 
industrial conflict frequently present. However, as unemployment swelled and market forces 
took precedence over state intervention in late 1970s, he argues, labour “was forced onto the 
defensive, if not into retreat”706. Productivity levels were then, and still are today, the primary 
criticism against trade unions and leftist political parties. Union power is seen as the reason 
                                                          
704 David Cameron, “Transforming the British Economy: Coalition Strategy for Economic Growth”, May 28, 
2010, BritishPoliticalSpeech. http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=351 , (accessed 
March 12, 2015).   
705 Tony Blair, “Leader’s Speech”, September 30, 1997, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=203, (accessed March 17, 2015).   
706 Andrew Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed: Finance, Globalization, and Welfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), P. 104.  
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why productivity declined in the UK. From 1979, Glyn notes, productivity started rising again 
as a manifestation of weak union power and, by implication, as a materialisation of increased 
exploitation. Higher productivity meant higher work intensity. However, when GDP per capita 
experienced slow growth in the 1990s and early 2000s (slower than 1973-9 rates), Glyn states 
it was evidence against all those who believed that “unleashing the free market would restore 
rapid growth”707. Nevertheless, this has by no means meant the resurgence of unions onto the 
offensive.  
In times of crisis, like that of the 1970s, Labour committed to collaborations with business to 
meet the demands of uninterrupted work. The Labour Prime Minister, Callaghan, expressed 
his government’s adherence to establish the right environment “to improve the international 
competitiveness” of the UK industries708. In 1998, Blair’s New Labour strategy was 
underscored by a similar commitment operationalised by upholding labour market flexibility 
and pushing back militant trade unions in order to enhance competitiveness. Blair alleged that 
businesses are “the wealth creators” and expressed his determination to “work in partnership” 
with them as “a pro-business, pro-enterprise government pursuing policies for the long-
term”709. However, he stressed that market forces cannot alone deliver a “safe society” in which 
ordinary people are protected and where power is not abused. Solidarity, cooperation and 
partnership between all stakeholders are characteristic of his government modernisation 
doctrine710.  
 
                                                          
707 Ibid. p. 151.  
708 James Callaghan, “Leader's speech”, October 4, 1977, 
BritishPoliticalSpeech.http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=175, (accessed March 
23, 2015).   
709 Tony Blair, “Leader’s Speech”, September 29, 1998, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=204, (accessed March 17, 2015); Tony Blair, 
“General election victory speech”, May 2, 1997, BritishPoliticalSpeech, 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=222, (accessed March 17, 2015).   
710 Tony Blair, “Leader’s Speech”, October 4, 1994, BritishPoliticalSpeech, 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=200, (accessed March 18, 2015).   
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Similarly, Brown and Miliband embraced an identical line of politics. In order to meet the 
challenge of fierce global competition, Brown stressed that his government will work “for all 
of society. We can't just be pro Labour we've got to be pro business too711”. Specifically, in 
exchange for reduced regulations and a flexible labour market and competition system, which 
are important to raise productivity and help businesses to compete, businesses were demanded 
to cooperate with the government and unions through training and apprenticeship schemes. 
This condition has also underlined Miliband’s regulations of public procurement712. Core to 
the Party’s campaign is the emphasis on working to achieve “enterprise for all” in return for 
“responsibility from all”, in a mission to achieve “fairness to all”. This is delivered through a 
commitment to more competition, more entrepreneurship, and more flexibility coupled with 
more long-term investment. According to Brown, these conditions are necessary given that 
nowadays “companies, indeed countries, which fail to adapt, reform and lead the way will 
simply be left behind”713. According to McKay and Rowlingson, it is this conviction that made 
Brown commit himself to only providing “full employability” rather than “full 
employment”714. That is, New Labour also believe that people’s welfare is promoted when 
their skills are enhanced to meet the skills needs of the market.  
 
Perhaps the most important turning point in labour’s politics is its stand on welfare policies. 
New Labour has called for transforming the welfare state to respond to the needs of the 21st 
century. As noted by Blair, the problem of the current welfare and benefits system is that it 
                                                          
711 Gordon Brown, “Chancellor’s Speech”, September 25, 2006, BritishPoliticalSpeech 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=277, (accessed March 18, 2015).    
712 Ed Miliband, “Leader’s Speech”, September 27, 2011, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=312, (accessed March 18, 2015). For a similar 
conditionality see Gordon Brown, “Chancellor's speech”, 1997, BritishPoliticalSpeech.   
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=268, (accessed March 19, 2015).   
713 Gordon Brown, “Chancellor's speech”, September 27, 1999, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=274, (accessed March 19, 2015).   
714 Stephen McKay and Karen Rowlingson, “Social Security and Welfare Reform”, in Martin Powell (ed.) 
Modernising the Welfare State: The Blair Legacy (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2008), p. 67 
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“still asks first not how to get people into work, but how to get them onto benefit”. Therefore, 
he argues that reforming welfare serves its “salvation”715. When created, the purpose of the 
welfare state was to “treat citizens as equals”. Today, welfare should be reformed in order to 
“treat them as individuals as well”, which necessitates replacing the “passive welfare system” 
with a “new contract” between the state and people based on the principle that “we give 
opportunity to all. We demand responsibility from all”716. For Major, it is this stand of the New 
Labour that signalled the failure of its past politics and indicated that labour has lost its 
“soul”717.  
 
Jim Murphy, the leader of the Scottish Labour Party, views welfare as mitigation of difficulties 
brought about by change in the global economy. But, he contends that welfare reforms have 
had to be undertaken in order to transform the system “from that of passive dependency to 
active engagement with the state”. That is, with the New Deal in place (since 1998), “rights 
and responsibilities embedded at the heart of the benefit design” as part of a new social contract.  
The new welfare system is established on “a something for something premise. If the 
government is to provide more support; customers to have a duty to take up that support”718. 
                                                          
715 Blair points out that Tories ended up spending more on the welfare state than anyone else. Tony Blair, 
“Leader’s Speech”, September 29, 1998. Blair had already promised in 1996 to cut state spending on welfare 
programs, see Tony Blair, “Leader’s Speech”, October 1, 1996, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=202, (accessed March 20, 2015).   
716 Tony Blair, “Leader’s Speech”, October 1, 2002, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=185, (accessed March 20, 2015). See also the 
striking similarity between labour and Conservatives on welfare reforms and the creation of a modern welfare 
system: David Cameron, “Leader’s Speech”, October 10, 2012, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=324, (accessed March 20, 2015). On the 
creation of a “responsible society” see David Cameron, “Speech on Welfare”, June 25, 2012, 
BritishPoliticalSpeech. http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=350, (accessed 
March 20, 2015). 
717 John Major, “Mr Major’s Comment’s on New labour”, April 3, 1995, The Rt Hon Sir John Major KG CH. 
http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page2057.html, (accessed March 21, 2015). 
718 Jim Murphy, "The Welfare State – Time for a Contract?", February 2, 2007,  
BritishPoliticalSpeech. http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=310, (accessed 
March 24, 2015); see also Jim Murphy, "Welfare Reform – Challenges for the next 10 years", February 12, 2007, 
BritishPoliticalSpeech. http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=309, (accessed 
March 24, 2015).   
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The new contract includes three elements: ability of the welfare claimant to engage with the 
labour market based on the belief that “all have the potential to work”; the state will arbitrate 
and mentor the contract as part of responsibility based on the conviction that “the market 
cannot, should not and will not be left unchecked”; and finally the commitment to tax payment 
in order to maintain the progressive public services provision by the state719 . Thus, in order to 
secure the citizen’s welfare, the role of the state has become centred on “maximising” his 
“opportunity”720. In the words of Paddy Ashdown, a Liberal Democratic Leader, a flexible 
labour market must be one where “individuals can see flexibility as an opportunity, not a threat” 
721. Thus, education and training, collaboration between employees and employers, standard 
payment system and worker protection as well as an effective welfare system are integral 
ingredients to the new contract. It should be noted that Ashdown was the first to mention the 
GCR in the UK policy debates where he stated cited the 1994 GCR to indicate the declining 
quality of the education system in the UK as a challenge for meeting the market needs for skills, 
“Britain was 35th out of 48”722.  
 
Although welfare was conditionality initiated by the Conservatives under Thatcher, Blair was 
more “instrumental” in its application as he extended it to more areas723. In addition to 
unemployment benefits, the British welfare system includes today housing, education and 
health724. Hence, all of these areas are incorporated under the threat of losing public welfare or 
                                                          
719 Jim Murphy, "The welfare state – time for a contract”. 
720 Gordon Brown, “Chancellor's speech”, September 9, 2003, BritishPoliticalSpeech.  
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=274, (accessed March 25, 2015). 
721 Paddy Ashdown, “Speech to the Institute of Education”, London October 17, 1995, BritishPoliticalSpeech 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=238, (accessed March 27, 2015). 
722 Ibid. See also David Steel, “Leader's speech”, September 24, 1982, BritishPoliticalSpeech 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=43 , (accessed March 25, 2015).   
723 Peter Dwyer, “the Conditional Welfare State”, in Martin Powell (ed.), Modernising the Welfare State: p. 200. 
The New Deal implemented benefits conditionality on Lone Parents, Disabled, etc. through the 2007 Welfare 
Reform Act and the Employment Support Allowance (ESA) and a revised Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), see p. 
203. See also Department of Social Security, “New Ambitions for our Country: A new Contract for Welfare”, 
Green Paper, Cm 3805 (1998)..  
724 It also has extended the category of unemployed to Lone parents with children above ten-year. 
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the constant audit of welfare state agents, which would lead eventually to the same result in 
case of non-compliance. What is considered far-reaching about New Labour’s approach to 
welfare is its attempt to build “a new type of social citizenship in which individual 
responsibility and duty take precedence over rights to welfare”725. The state sets the new 
“behavioural requirements” for qualifying for welfare726. Blair continued Thatcher’s legacy 
where the slogan of “work as the best form of welfare” was applied727. Labour, under Blair, 
effectively rearranged the system priorities “rather than creating a distinctively new set”. By 
doing so, Greener argues, New Labour has taken the paradigm of public reform initiated by the 
Conservatives “to its logical conclusion”728. It is argued that give the complexity of the system, 
more radical change is “likely to be rare”729.  
 
However, despite similarities between the two, New Labour’s version of competitiveness is by 
no means identical to the Conservative’s. The former is based on collectivism and some degree 
of social justice while the latter is centred on individualism, as noted by Neil Kinnock. To him, 
social justice must be at the heart of competitiveness. Unlike the Conservatives, this version of 
competitiveness does not reside with getting rid of workers and decreasing wages730. New 
                                                          
725 Peter Dwyer, “the Conditional Welfare State”, p. 209.  
726 He warns against the negligence of the social, economic and political causes of unemployment and poverty 
that this sort of conditional welfare may result in. Ibid. pp. 211-3. 
727 Drakeford highlighted the trend taking place in the provision of welfare in the UK. He points out the takeover 
of housing, and other services, provided by the state as a part of welfare by the private sector, he calls this “private 
welfare”. Mark Drakeford, “Going private?”, in Martin Powell (ed.) Modernising the Welfare State. p. 166. 
728 Greener explains further the nuanced difference between Labour and Conservatives. It simply comes down to 
the fact the Labour attempted to utilise market approaches to the running of public services while Conservatives 
has sought to have to implement a private sector management more thoroughly, Ian Greener, “The stages of New 
Labour”, in Martin Powell (ed.) Modernising the Welfare State, pp. 229-30; See also Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, 
“Social Democratic Reforms of the Welfare State: Germany and the UK Compared”, in Martin Powell (ed.) 
Modernising the Welfare State. 
729 Stephen McKay and Karen Rowlingson, “Social Security and Welfare Reform”, in Martin Powell (ed.) 
Modernising the Welfare State, p. 69. See also Martin Powell, “Conclusion: the Blair legacy”, in Martin Powell 
(ed.) Modernising the Welfare State, p. 272.  
730 See Neil Kinnock, “Leader's Speech”, October 2, 1990, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=196, (accessed March 21, 2015). See also his 
speech on the October 4, 1991 “Leader’s Speech”, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=197, (accessed March 22, 2015); and Neil 
Kinnock, “Leader's speech”, October 4, 1988, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=194, (accessed March 10, 2015). Kinnock 
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Labour advocates a form of competitiveness that runs hand in hand with the Social Chapter, 
Working Families’s Tax Credit, and the Minimum Wage, which have all been resisted, and 
sometimes rejected, by the Conservatives731. New Labour has tried to socialise competitiveness 
into society through state intervention whereas Conservatives have sought to leave it entirely 
to market forces. New Labour rejected the Conservatives’ claim that reducing corporate tax 
would stimulate investment and job creation. As pointed out by Wilson, funds did not go for 
investments that would lead to strengthening the economy, and was instead spent in making 
profit through the purchase of more shares732.  
 
According to McKay and Rowlingson, New Labour’s benefits spending rose 22.5% between 
1996 and 2006 but the percentage of GDP spent on social security fell from 11.9% to 
11.4%”733. Higher spending was driven by policy changes manifested in spending more on 
families with children, tax credits, pensions, disability benefits and housing benefits. New 
Labour’s approach welfare is to use it as a tool to eliminate poverty while for the Conservatives 
welfare is a form of compensation for low income734. New Labour’s implemented a strategy 
that offered “work for those who can, security for those who cannot”735.   
 
                                                          
called for an active government intervention in order to enhance the competitive position of the UK against other 
competitors especially with the completion of the single market in Europe. Investment in infrastructure, science, 
skills and education, the innovation based of the country are few of the areas where according to him government 
intervention is needed to orchestrate a strong competitiveness profile for the UK.    
731 Tony Blair, “Leader’s Speech”, September 26, 2000, BritishPoliticalSpeech. 
http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=206, (accessed March 23, 2015). 
732 Harold Wilson, “Leader's speech”, November 28, 1974, 
BritishPoliticalSpeech.http://www.BritishPoliticalSpeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=172, (accessed March 
23, 2015).    
733 Stephen McKay and Karen Rowlingson, “Social Security and Welfare Reform”, p. 55. 
734 Under the Conservative governments from 1979-1997, the Department of Social Security resorted to the use 
of the term “low income” rather than poverty because the former is “a much less emotive and politically resonant 
concept”. However, New Labour put it back at the heart of the discourse of change and modernising welfare. Ibid. 
p. 55. 
735 Ibid. p. 67 
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In sum, through the discourse of competitiveness, people have been made aware that higher 
employment is only attainable when the welfare state is reconfigured in a way that generates 
flexible labour market regulations. Such conditionality, Howell explains, means “workers must 
adjust by accepting lower wages, stingier unemployment benefits, and less secure jobs”. 
Howell realises the importance of conditionality as an external factor straining policymaking. 
However, he believes welfare reforms have been imposed by IOs as a necessary adjustment to 
the challenge of competitiveness. This has created a situation that has become “caught” 
between two imperatives; on one hand, having to answer to the pressure of “economic 
realities”, and on another hand, dealing with the social consequences that are generated by 
challenging the already socially entrenched norms736. Howell argues the neo-economic 
orthodoxy of free market economy is constructed upon a false dogma that seeks to socially 
embed a belief that rigidities of labour market, which result from welfare programs and 
employment regulations, are the cause of unemployment. Thus, “wage and employment 
flexibility in the form of lower wages and greater job insecurity”737 as a solution is inadequately 
founded. Labour market protection policies “do not necessarily produce harmful employment 
effects”738.  
 
The WEF orthodoxy seems to be identical to that of IOs such as the OECD and the IMF of 
which Howell speaks. According to the “OECD-IMF orthodoxy”, labour market institutions 
                                                          
736 However, Howell rejects such assertion and shows that strong welfare states such as Austria and Norway 
achieved lower unemployment rates than the US itself. Also countries marked by high social protection achieved 
low unemployment rates in the 1990s such as the UK and Ireland, David R. Howell, “Introduction”, in David R. 
Howell (ed.), Fighting Unemployment: The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 
2005), p. 3.  
737 Ibid. pp. 4-5. 
738 He concludes that evidence contradicts the “OECD-IMF orthodoxy” that call for radical labour market 
deregulation and warns against the high economic, social and individual costs of a retreated welfare state. Ibid. 
pp. 6-7. Baker et al, in a cross –country assessment of the OECD-IMF orthodoxy found no evidence of any 
correlation between high unemployment rates and labour market rigidities and no evidence of deregulation would 
work as a solution to rising employment rates. Dean Baker et al, “Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment: 
Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence”, in David R. Howell (ed.), Fighting Unemployment, pp. 72-118. 
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have to be weakened in order to solve the problem of unemployment. When they are strong, 
“job creation is made less attractive for employers, whereas joblessness becomes more 
attractive for workers”739. The impact of inflexibility will materialise through high wages for 
the unskilled, which would drive them out of the market. This is thought to be aggravated by 
welfare policies. Differences in the rigidities of labour market institutions explain the variance 
in unemployment rates across OECD in theory740. For economists, Howell notes, the flexible 
market is one where wages and employment match the demand of the market741. 
 
The outcome of such an endeavour to transform welfare and strengthen the flexibility of the 
labour market results in tight monetary policies and fiscal austerity in the name of correcting 
the wrongs of state intervention. This aims to push social spending and protective employment 
regulations to the very minimum742. The welfare state is considered to be an obstacle in any 
country’s venture to enhance its competitiveness as it makes it difficult to build labour market 
flexibility and high productivity levels in response to global competition and other structural 
changes emerging as a result of technological innovation and competitive market forces743. 
Therefore, the sustainability of competitiveness becomes focused on strengthening the 
microeconomic foundations of competitiveness to which extensive welfare state, and the 
resulting rigid labour market and low productivity, are an obstacle.  
                                                          
739 These institutions are centralized collective bargaining, legal minimum wages, employment protection laws, 
and unemployment benefit programs. David R. Howell and Fredrick Huebler, “Wage Compression and the 
Unemployment Crisis: labor Market Institutions, Skills, and Inequality-unemployment Tradeoffs” in David R. 
Howell (ed.), Fighting Unemployment, p. 35.  
740 David R. Howell, “Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment: An Assessment” in David R. Howell (ed.), 
Fighting Unemployment, p. 311.  
741 David R. Howell, “Introduction”, p. 20.  
742 David R. Howell, “Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment: An Assessment”, p. 339. 
743 For an argument against this conviction and for a different role of the state see analysis Per Kongshøj Madsen, 
“The Danish model of ‘flexicurity’: experiences and lessons”, TRANSFER: European Review of Labour and 
Research, 10: 2 (2004). pp. 187-207; see also Ton Wilthagen, “Flexicurity: A new paradigm for labour market 
policy reform?” WZB Discussion Paper, No. FSI 98-202, pp. 1-27, and Peter Auer and Rizwanul Islam, 
“Economic Growth, Employment, Competitiveness, and Labour Market Institutions” in WEF (eds.), Global 
Competitiveness Report 2006-2007, pp. 105-115.  
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In this section a brief picture of the sort of discourse prevalent in British politics in relation to 
the competitiveness discourse was presented. It was shown that both parties have employed 
competitiveness in designing their social and economic policymaking. However, there is a 
significant variance between the two approaches to social welfare. The Conservatives perceive 
competitiveness as a product of a well-functioning and free market economy, while New 
Labour adheres to an approach to competitiveness that that is socialised into the society through 
state intervention to maintain descent social standards. New Labour advanced a approach that 
rests on an active role of the state to promote human capital development for the unemployed 
through enhancing their skills. This picture should serve as a background to understanding the 
institutionalisation of competitiveness in the UK, which is the subject of the next section.    
 
 
8.2. The Operationalisation of Competitiveness through Policy Adaption  
 
As pointed out by Howell and Ketels, policy makers are “caught in the middle” of the 
competitiveness debate. They face an “imperative to actually ‘do something about 
competitiveness’”744. Therefore, policy makers are challenged to respond through, firstly, 
identifying what factors of competitiveness they need to in order to improve the performance 
of their economies and, secondly, what strategies should be drawn to address these factors. It 
is the aim of this section to provide a case study of how the UK has operationalised the 
competitiveness discourse through institutionalisation.  
                                                          
744 Christian H. M. Ketels, “Michael Porter’s Competitiveness Framework—Recent Learnings and New Research 
Priorities”, p. 115 and p. 119. Also see David R. Howell, “Introduction”, pp. 4-5.  
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BIS was the first state department in the UK, although not the only, to start systematically 
reporting on the competitiveness of the British economy. The BIS indicators have become an 
annual practice to measure the weaknesses and strengths of the UK economy and its position 
against its competitors745. Similar in tone to the vast majority of its publications, emphasis is 
placed on productivity as a source of outpacing its competitors. Therefore, raising productivity 
(understood as output per worker) is thought to be best crystallised through building a dynamic 
and solid knowledge-economy base746.  All papers, whether published under the Conservatives 
or the New Labour, adopted a partnership approach between business and the government to 
enhance Britain’s productivity. Business leaders are seen as important partners in shaping the 
government policies and monitoring and reviewing progress747. These reports attempt to set 
out a framework for action by both governments and business. Similar to the language used in 
the GCR, these reports all established that macroeconomic policies on their own is not enough. 
Prosperity is conditioned on “individuals and firms throughout the economy and on the 
improvements in the supply side of the economy”748. Monetary and fiscal policies, which are 
used to stimulate demand, do not produce sustainable levels of employment and growth. 
                                                          
745 The BIS department also publishes the Regional Economic Performance Indicators Report. For more details 
on the purpose of the report and the indicators used see Rebekah Paul, “Commentary on Regional Economic 
Performance Indicators”, BIS, September 2012. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/16338/12-p162-commentary-on-
regional-economic-performance-indicators.pdf, (accessed April 13, 2015)  
746 It is worth noting here that the UK has followed the practice of other countries concerning reporting on the 
competitiveness of their economies. Even the definition of competitiveness was adopted from the OECD’s 1993 
report. Thus, a brief examination of the UK governments’ preoccupation with competitiveness points to the fact 
that the UK has been more of a ‘follower’ than a leader in this field. 
747 Based on this collaboration, The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry appointed an advisory 
competitiveness council tasked with developing a competitiveness index followed by forming a Cabinet 
Committee on Productivity and Competitiveness to review the yearly performance of the UK which met first time 
in 1999 DTI, “Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge-Driven Economy”, December 1998, Cm1476, 
p. 13. The Business Forum on Tax and Competitiveness: created in July 2010 by David Gauke the Exchequer 
Secretary to the Treasury to facilitate discussion between government and business leaders (multi-national) on 
ways for improving the competitiveness of the UK’s tax system. “The forum complements wider consultation as 
part of the government’s aim to have an open and transparent approach to tax policy”.  CBI and other multinational 
corporations are members of this forum:  
748 HMSO, “Competitiveness: Helping Business to Win”, Cm 2563 (1994), p. 20 
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“Competitiveness depends on the efficiency of the real economy”749; an economy run by free 
and private enterprises.  
 
At the time when the WEF’s GCR was expanding and gaining momentum as an important 
practice for world competitiveness and was available to the public, in 1994, the Conservative 
government published the UK’s first competitiveness white paper to measure the UK’s 
competitiveness in comparison with other nations in Europe750. The initiative was taken to 
demonstrate that although the government believes in businesses as being the source of the 
country’s wealth, it is committed to being “part of Britain’s competitiveness”, as Major put 
it751. Major commenced the paper by stating that improving living standards and the quality of 
life in Britain depends primarily on creating an environment in which “companies can beat the 
best”752. Within the global circumstances characterised by “ever fiercer global competition…a 
world in which our wealth is more and more dependent on the knowledge; skills and motivation 
of our people”, economic performance will only improve when productivity and the skills of 
the workforce are enhanced753. British firms need to be competitive in order to “win business 
in home and overseas markets” and, hence, to be able to create jobs754.  
According to the Paper, government intervention in the market caused low profitability, 
hindered a proper adjustment of the local industry to changing world market conditions, 
                                                          
749 Ibid. p. 23.  
750 The comparison was drawn based on performance in real income per capita, productivity in manufacturing and 
share of world trade.  The Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee also reported on the competitiveness 
of UK manufacturing Industry since the early 1990s but its reporting was confined to manufacturing only, Ibid.   
751 John Major, “Mr Major Speech to the CBI”, CBI Conference in London, May 13, 1993, 
http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1259.html, (accessed April 28, 2015) in the same context see also Margaret 
Thatcher “Victorian Values”. 
752 HMSO, “Competitiveness: Helping Business to Win”, p. 3.  See also John Major’s Press Conference on the 
Competitiveness White Paper 1994, 
file:///E:/Thesis/Thesis/CH6/Government/DTI/Mr%20Major's%20Press%20Conference%20on%20the%20Com
petitiveness%20White%20Paper%20-%2024th%20May%201994.html, (accessed April 28, 2015); and HMSO, 
“Competitiveness: Forging Ahead”, CM 2867 (1995), p. 67. 
753 Ibid. p. 6. See also HMSO, “Competitiveness: Forging Ahead”, p. 67.  
754 Ibid. p. 8.  
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harmed productivity, shrank output growth and deteriorated living standards755. Thus, 
privatisation, reduced regulations, flexible labour markets were seen detrimental to enhancing 
the UK’s productivity gap. These conditions are seen necessary to allow “employers to deploy 
their workforce in the most efficient way” and workers “to make the most of their skills and 
experience”, they are crucial to bringing equilibrium to the labour market756. Only efficient 
labour market policies would solve productivity problem and, hence, employment757. As noted 
by the Paper, in the 1960s and 1970s wages rose regardless of productivity performance and 
cost affordability for the enterprise as a manifestation of trade unions’ power. In addition, unit 
labour cost increased compared to other competitors, which fed inflation when exchange rate 
depreciation was used to maintain business competitiveness then. Industrial relations were poor 
overall as it featured multiple disruptions and unemployment coexisted with job vacancies, 
which resulted in higher rates of unemployment over time. The latter was primarily seen as a 
failure of the welfare state.758 
The Paper embraced the strategy put in place by Thatcher to correct such inefficiencies. It 
adopted policies that ranged from encouraging good employment practice (such as 
conditioning rewards on productivity performance); improving industrial relations in order to 
essentially further protect businesses (closed shop practice and secondary actions were made 
illegal); maintaining fairness between regulations of employment rights and minimising 
business costs; reforming wage bargaining arrangements (attempts to set up a minimum wage 
were abolished then); maximising the effectiveness of supply and demand of labour through 
“competition for jobs” in order to influence labour costs, control inflation, boost output and job 
                                                          
755 Ibid. p. Ibid. p. 10.  
756 Ibid. p. 50.  
757 Ibid.  
758 Ibid. pp. 50-1.  
 275 
 
availability; and finally to enhance the quality of the workforce though education and training 
759.  
This all fits in with Major’s grand strategy of incentivising more people to leave welfare 
benefits for work in order to create a flexible labour market760. The government introduced the 
Jobseekers Allowance in 1996 to replace income support and unemployment benefits with an 
emphasis on responsibility to seek work761. It sought to stress the inseparable relationship 
between obtaining benefit and seeking employment though institutionalising the relationship 
between unemployment benefit offices and job centres. Moreover, the government put a 
conditionality element into the unemployment benefit program. Claimants must be always be 
available for work, actively seeking it and they have to accept any job offer after a period of 
time, tend job search interviews every six months, and a Restart Course or Job Plan Workshop 
when unemployment persists. It also tried to raise awareness among the unemployed of the 
consequences of failure to comply with these requirements in terms of benefits reduction762.  
As stressed by the Paper, “individuals will need to take increasing responsibility for their own 
adaptability and re-skilling throughout their lives”763. That is, growth is achieved through 
“promoting a competitive, efficient and flexible labour market” because it benefits 
“individuals, business and the whole economy”764. Therefore, it advocated less government 
constraints on negotiating working hours, annual hourly contracts, job sharing, ability to do 
multiple tasks, wider skills and incentives for education and training, wages being responsive 
                                                          
759 Ibid. pp. 51-2.  
760 Examples of patterns of flexible working arrangements cited in the report included: annually arranged working 
hours as opposed to weekly ones, teleworking and job-sharing. Such patterns were thought to have positive impact 
on productivity and labour cost from the business’s point of view. See Ibid. p. 55 for more details.   
761 Ibid. p. 57-61. 
762 It offered several services which aim to help the unemployed getting back to work such as job vacancies access, 
putting into effect a ‘back to work’ advice and counselling service,  training, encouraging employers to take on 
more long-term employment for the unemployed. Ibid. p. 56.  
763 HMSO, “Competitiveness: Forging Ahead”, p. 76.  
764 Ibid. p. 101 
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to local market demands and determined by “the performance of companies and 
individuals”765.     
The second competitiveness White Paper was published in 1995. It adopted the OECD 
definition of national competitiveness that centred on the ability of the country to enhance the 
competitiveness of its businesses and increase the real income of people in the long run766. The 
Paper measured the improvement in the economy in terms of declining unemployment, rising 
total and manufacturing output, rising productivity, falling current account deficit and lower 
inflation rate. It claimed that it is the increased flexibility in the labour market that allowed for 
unemployment to fall in first half of the 1990s767.  
Most importantly, based on the premise that “when market imperfections limit the scope for 
firms to improve competitiveness, the government may need to intervene”, the Paper 
introduced an elaborate framework for government action768. It was aimed to help the 
government collaborate with businesses to improve their competitiveness through the 
delivering a “comprehensive support to help UK companies win in world markets”769. The 
framework included: providing stable macroeconomic policies; developing open and 
                                                          
765 Ibid. pp. 105- 10. In order to strengthen its evidence-base to policy reforms and priorities in the march towards 
improving UK productivity and competitiveness, in this paper the DTI is drawing on academic studies (discussed 
at DTI conferences) to match the microeconomic evidence with its macroeconomic base765. For an overview see 
DTI, “Raising UK Productivity – Developing the Evidence Base for Policy”, DTI Economics Paper no 8. March 
2004, pp. viii-xiv. On the micro economic foundations of competitiveness approach of the DTI See also DTI, 
“Corporate Governance, Human Resources Management and Firm Performance”, DTI Economics Paper No 13. 
August 2005.  
766 HMSO, “Competitiveness: Forging Ahead”. The OECD defines the competitiveness of a nation as “the degree 
to which it can under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services which meet the test of 
international markets, while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of its people over the 
long term”, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Programme on Technology and 
the Economy, 1992. P. 237.  
767 HMSO, “Competitiveness: Forging Ahead”, p. 12. For an analysis of the two White papers see Walter Eltis 
and David Highman, “Closing the UK Competitiveness Gap, National Institute Economic Review”, November 
1995, 154:1, pp. 71-84. Also advantages of flexible and efficient labour market are measured in the declining 
number of claimant unemployment, low levels of industrial action, wages determined by productivity not 
collective bargaining, etc. HMSO, “Competitiveness: Forging Ahead”, pp. 101-103. 
768 This idea is integrated into the majority of the BIS reports to demonstrate a recognition from the government 
that it intervenes with a belief in free-market economy. Ibid. p.16 
769 The government conducts sponsorship programmes with the UK sectors of industry and commerce in order to 
understand their competitive position through an assessment of their weaknesses and strengths. Ibid. p. 48.  
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competitive markets, reforming income and corporate taxation, encouraging best practice and 
enhancing the value for money and the standards for services.770.  
In both White Papers, the government gained information on the industry through direct and 
indirect interaction with businesses and their representatives in the UK. Trade unions have been 
left out of these programs generally and the agency for reforming the government’s 
intervention is placed within collaborative schemes between the government and UK 
businesses771.  
 
8.2.1. The Labour Turn: A Better Britain, 1997- 2010  
 
BIS (known as DTI and BEER before 2006) Economic Papers outline the policymaking 
developments in the UK. As is the case of many agencies publishing on competitiveness, its 
rationale rests on a belief that “the essence of competitiveness analysis is benchmarking against 
other similar countries”772. The publication of such reports by the government is welcomed and 
encouraged by companies as a useful snapshot of the progress made in the British economy 
and highlights the further steps needed by all stakeholders to maintain and enhance its 
competitiveness. According to Rowlatt, BIS’s chief analysis, these publications aim to build a 
“better understanding of the outcomes and drivers” of competitiveness. Economic performance 
                                                          
770 It includes also low inflation, sound public finance, competitive tax rates, exchange rate stability, low budget 
deficit, low public debt, and reduced public spending (sound finance and low tax burden) which is based partly 
on reducing social security contribution which aimed then to reduce it by 4 billion a year until the end of century. 
Then tax rates on employer’s social security costs are lowered.  Turning the government from a service provider 
to a purchaser of services from private business on behalf of the public. Ibid. p .16. The factors of competitiveness 
adopted in both 1994 and 1995 White Papers are: 1. Macroeconomy (low inflation, sound finance and fiscal and 
monetary policies). 2. Education and training. 3.  The labour market. 4. Innovation. 5. Management. 6. Fair and 
open markets. 7. Finance for business. 8. Communications and infrastructure. 9. The commercial framework 
(deregulation, environmental framework, competition law, company law and corporate governance, IPRs, 
insolvency laws). 10. The business of government and public purchasing (provision of high quality public service).  
771 Above all, the government offered sponsorship work for corporate managers within the DTI and other 
departments. Other reports started publishing on competitiveness without reference to evidence from IMD, WEF, 
etc. The point is that they started realising the importance of evidence and benchmarking.  
772 DTI, “UK Competitiveness Indicators: Second Edition”, (2001), p. 7.  
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can be improved when strategies and policies across the state are successfully developed and 
monitored773.  
 
Labour started its reports on competitiveness with the 1998 White Paper, which is part of 
Blair’s initiative to modernise the economy. It represented the first attempt at building the 
knowledge foundation of the UK’s competitiveness through emphasising the imperative of 
founding a “knowledge economy” necessary for expanding business productivity and yielding 
Britain a better place on the global market774. Accordingly, for businesses, the challenge is to 
incorporate their innovative base with finance and investment as well as skilled and flexible 
workers, which will be cemented by the government’s dedication to provide a developed 
infrastructure and stable macroeconomic environment. As for the government, the challenge is 
to “create and execute a new approach to industrial policy” based on the assumption that “old-
fashioned state intervention did not and cannot work. However, neither does naive reliance on 
markets”775. Thus, with the proposed framework, the government committed itself to directing 
public funds to enhance the education and training systems and to “acting as a catalyst, investor 
and regulator to strengthen the supply-side of the economy” 776. As a catalyst, the government 
made promises to encourage new businesses. This would be primarily achieved through 
making funds available, advice service for start-ups, promoting collaboration between 
businesses within regions, backing the Confederation of British Industry (CBI)’s best practice 
initiative, and funding regional development agencies777.  
                                                          
773 Amanda Rowlatt, “Forward”, BIS. “Benchmarking UK Competitiveness in the Global Economy”, BIS 
Economics Paper No. 19, October 2012. p. vi.  
774 30-40 % behind the US, France, and Germany. DTI, “Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge-Driven 
Economy”, Cm1476 (1998), p. 10.  
775 Ibid. p. 5.  
776 Ibid. p. 6 and p. 9. The independence of the bank of England came from realising the need to sustain a stable 
macro-economic. The government, in collaboration with businesses, set a plan create the competitiveness index 
“to track British Performance and guide policy development”, Ibid. pp. 7-8.  
777 Ibid.  
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The new framework rests on promoting a new business culture that will arguably impact 
positively on the working class. It is based on flexibility, fairness and trust. It hopes to set the 
grounds for a “creative workforce” necessary for business success. This creative workforce 
enjoys minimum wage, consultation with businesses and a commitment to training on the part 
of business. These features will help to achieve “greater job satisfaction leading to increased 
productivity” 778. Yet, it should be noted that unions were given a very inactive role within the 
government’s new strategy for the UK economy. The agency was given to business and the 
government where the latter is acting on the unions’ behalf in a sort of repressive and dismissive 
manner. CBI is the agent for drawing a code of conduct at the workplace and partnership 
designed by the agency and overseen by the government with little say from unions. With 
regards to the labour market, the government would provide the legal framework that 
administers the employer/employee relationship779.    
A year later, Blair endorsed the new framework by the Modernising Government Paper. It took 
stock of the role of the government and the form of its interventions. The Paper made the 
argument that a better Britain is one that falls outside the debate over big/small government 
and interventionism/ laissez-faire. Rather, the focus is on “modernising government, better 
government, getting government right”780. It is the government’s duty to create a “healthy” 
society and “improve the quality” of life781. 
                                                          
778 Ibid. p. 47.  
779 It is a commitment to competition, liberalisation, transparency, openness, better regulations, E-commerce, 
advanced infrastructure, protection of property rights, adoption of best practice, innovative public services and 
improved delivery of public services and objectives. 
780 It should be noted that since the modernizing government paper the DTI has focused its efforts on developing 
and evidence base for policy. This is characteristic of all the DTI papers that follow here, Tony Blair, 
“Modernising Government”, Presented to parliament by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Cabinet Office by 
Command of Her Majesty, March CM4310 (1999), p. 4. For an evaluation of the modernisation doctrine in the 
UK, see Martin Powell, Modernising the Welfare State.  
781 The New Labour government aimed at reforming the way the government works through: high quality and 
efficient public services, making use of the most advanced technology in delivering the services, removing 
unnecessary regulations, encouraging innovation within government departments, granting financial incentives to 
public service staff, Tony Blair, “Modernising Government”. p. 9.  
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To meet the demands of people and businesses, the Paper announced the government’s 
intention to “re-evaluate what it is doing so as to produce policies that really deal with 
problems; that are forward-looking and shaped by the evidence rather than a response to short-
term pressures; that tackle causes not symptoms”782. Vital to achieving these goals is for 
policymaking to be inclusive, taking into consideration the interests of all who are going to be 
affected by the new policy and learning from experience and evidence783. To promote such 
practice the government’s initiative stressed the need to continue cooperation, benchmarking 
and consultation with international institutions and the private sector784. 
In the same year, DTI published its first methodologically robust study of the UK’s 
competitiveness. Driven primarily by the need to help monitoring the upgrade of the British 
economy into a knowledge-based one, the Paper laid out the UK’s Competitiveness Indicators 
designed to benchmark its competitiveness against a set of factors in relation to other 
economies785. As it explained, the motive was that “companies will choose to locate elsewhere 
if the economic environment in the UK does not support a modern knowledge economy”786. 
Generally speaking, the results of these reports are supposed to inform the DTI’s policymaking 
in meeting the target of bridging the productivity gap with competitors. Both the government 
and businesses are targeted by these reports. The first has to use the report as a guide to policies 
and priorities and the second to improve their performance in the areas highlighted in the report. 
The Paper evaluated the macroeconomic environment; businesses’ perception of the political, 
institutional and legal environments and the microeconomic environment. In the light of the 
                                                          
782 Ibid. p. 15.  
783 Public services should reflect business needs. Small Business Service will be founded to have their voice heard 
within government. The Public Sector Benchmarking Project was launched to spread business best practice 
management within public sector, Ibid. pp. 16-7. 
784 Ibid. p. 53.  
785 Setting the factors of assessment: was done in collaboration between the DTI, universities, international 
organisations and the competitiveness council of the DTI, Stephen Byers Foreword to DTI, “Our Competitiveness 
Future: UK Competitiveness Indicators 1999”, DTI, p.3.  
786 Ibid. p. 4.  
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latter, the labour market was seen to be functioning properly except for the problem of low 
skills, under-investment, and competition conditions787.  
Competitiveness was defined as “a nation’s ability to sustain high and rising standards of 
living”788. It was measured by assessing the UK’s performance in the four indicators. Firstly, 
‘the business environment’ that measures macroeconomic stability, competition, labour 
Market, business perceptions and the quality of life in the UK was examined789. Secondly, 
‘Resources’ which consists of measures of human and physical capital, finance, technology 
and R&D790 was analysed. Thirdly, ‘innovation’ was evaluated by measuring commercial 
exploitation of science and technology, entrepreneurship, diffusion of knowledge across 
borders and between firms791. Finally, ‘results’ indicated in GDP per head, productivity, 
employment and trade, and the changing structure of output792.  
What is particularly of interest to this chapter are the sources these papers utilised to build the 
evidence for policy reforms. In addition to data collected by national state and non-state 
departments, this Paper relied on data from the WEF and IMD and other IOs such as the OECD. 
That is, for measuring the quality of the government administration, management of public 
finance and the burden of regulations, the paper drew on the business surveys conducted by the 
                                                          
787 Ibid.  
788 Ibid. p.6.  
789 Measures of macroeconomic stability (growth, inflation, short-term interest rates, exchange rates), competition 
(Openness to trade and foreign investment, prices), Labour Market (Unemployment, Diversity of employment 
opportunities, Industrial action in terms of number of days lost and improved dialogue and partnership to run a 
successful business, Labour market regulation), business perceptions (Business perceptions of the institutional 
and political environment in terms of bureaucracy, regulation and to what extent do government and institutions 
support competitiveness) and the quality of life in the UK (Sustainable Development Indicators).  
790 Measures of human and physical capital (Business investment per worker, Government investment per head, 
ICT understanding in companies in terms of workers IT training to improve their performance in sectors like E-
commerce), finance (Venture capital, Second tier markets, Stock market size and turnover), technology and R&D 
(E-commerce, Business uptake and use of ICT, Government and business spend on R&D per worker, Publications 
and citations of UK research in academic journals).  
791 Measures of commercial exploitation of science and technology, entrepreneurship, diffusion of knowledge 
across borders and between firms (Business spend on innovation including R&D, UK’s patenting performance, 
Share of sales from new or improved products, Technological alliances between firms, Sources of information for 
innovation, Joint publishing by universities and industry, Entry and exit rates, Attitudes to entrepreneurship); 
792 (Share in output of knowledge based industries), Ibid. p. 7.  
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WEF and the IMD, the 1999 GCR and the 1998 World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) 
specifically793.  
Moreover, in its second edition, the UK Competitiveness Indicators expands its evidence base 
to include the UN, IMF, OECD, WEF (GCR 2000-2001) and IMD (WCY 1998 and 2000). 
Data from the WEF and IMD was used to evaluate the conduciveness of the political and 
institutional environment to competitiveness, the incentive effect of taxation, the adaptability 
and transparency of the legislative process, and the legal framework and the efficiency of 
administration. Moreover, businesses’ perception of the competitiveness and flexibility of the 
labour market was derived from the IMD and WEF794. Based on such evidence, the Paper 
praised the government’s achievements regarding labour market flexibility and the corporate 
tax system. On the other hand, as regulations were deemed less favourable according to these 
IMD and WEF surveys, the Paper set the tone for policy reforms to deliver better regulations795.  
 
In 2003, the DTI and ESRC commissioned Porter and Ketels to produce a report on the 
competitiveness of the UK.  The advice given in their paper is that the UK needs a new concept 
of competitiveness in order to overcome the productivity gap. Although the report extoled the 
UK’s performance throughout the 1980s and 1990s, which was due to macro and micro 
reforms, it highlighted the absence of consensus among policymakers on the direction of the 
necessary transition, from the efficiency to the innovative stage as the benefits of the earlier 
                                                          
793 Ibid. p. 22. An example of other Reports used as evidence in by the DTI is: UNIDO, “The Industrial 
Competitiveness of Nations Looking back, forging ahead: Competitive Industrial Performance Report 
2012/2013”, United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, Vienna (2013).  
794 DTI, UK Competitiveness Indicators: Second Edition, DTI, February (2001), p. 11. 
795 IMD informed most of the analysis, this is in addition to the OECD, IMF, UN, and other UK state departments 
such as the Department of Environment, Transport and Regions. It should be noted that governmental 
organisations are also main source of data for both the IMD and the WEF. Industrial relations data are taken from 
the ILO while labour market regulations are taken from the IMD. IMD also informed the assessment of the 
managerial skills of the resources group of indicators. DTI, “Our Competitiveness Future”, pp. 22-3.   
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stage has been exhausted796. The UK’s performance in the labour market was once again 
praised here in terms of productivity levels and getting people back to work, which has boosted 
economic performance797. The 2002 GCR was cited as a source of evidence on the weaknesses, 
improvements and strengths that characterise the economy, especially in relation to the 
microeconomic environment and the role of the government798.  
In 2003, the DTI set up a more comprehensive account of the drivers of competitiveness; 
investment, innovation, enterprise, skills and competition. However, in light of these factors, 
the DTI stressed, “A weakness in a particular driver of productivity is in itself an insufficient 
condition for government action”. Subsequently, the role of the government is solely to correct 
market failure 799. More specifically, DTI highlighted that “if the government wants to increase 
prosperity, it can adopt policies to improve labour market participation, or to raise the level of 
labour productivity”800. As noted in the its Economics Paper No. 5, the GDP growth and rising 
employment in the UK obtained in the early 2000s, the fastest in G7, is due largely to the 
flexibility and efficiency in the labour market in addition to macroeconomic stability, which 
resulted in higher employment rate. That is, welfare reforms have boosted the country’s 
employment rate through cementing the labour market with more flexibility and highly skilled 
and productive labour801. It should be noted here that the data on the flexibility of labour market 
regulations were taken from 2003 WCY while the data used for assessing the suitability of the 
                                                          
796 Michael E. Porter and Christian H M Ketels, “UK Competitiveness: Moving to the Next Stage”, DTI Economics 
Paper No. 3, May (2003), p. 3.  
797 Ibid. p. 9. The UK’s GDP per head can be decomposed into two factors: its level of labour force utilisation 
(hours worked per employee, employment rate, and labour force participation rate) and its labour productivity. 
798 See Ibid. pp.18-33. Also this is of course along citing other sources such as the OECD and IMF for data.  
799 What sort of market failure? It is divided into four categories. Externalities (property rights absence and its 
impact of investment in R&D), Barriers to entry (created by either government regulation of private practices with 
its impact on efficiency), Imperfect information and uncertainty (impact on efficient allocation of resources), 
Public goods.  DTI, “DTI Strategy – The Analysis”, DTI Economics Paper No 5, November (2003), p. 11.  
800 Ibid. p.3.   
801 DTI,” UK Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators 2003”, DTI Economics Paper No. 6, November (2003), 
p. 22.  
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political and institutional framework for business success were derived from both the WCY 
and the GCR reports of 2002 and 2003802. 
The same practice was carried on under the New Labour until 2009. All the papers published 
were centred on the same competitiveness indicators and governmental framework of action at 
macro and microeconomic levels; that is, maintenance of macroeconomic stability and 
facilitating microeconomic reforms to compensate for market failure with regard to the five 
drivers of productivity803. Most importantly, the WEF’s GCR and IMD’s WCY, WB’s Ease of 
Doing Business Report, OECD’s Product Market Regulation Indicators have become 
entrenched in the BIS’s evidence base to evaluate and inform the government’s policymaking 
with regard to each indicator804.  
 
 
8.2.2. The Conservative Turn: May 2010-2014   
 
While still not in government, in 2007 the Conservative Party’s Economic Competitiveness 
Policy Group published the Freeing Britain to Compete paper. It highlighted the illusion behind 
the labour government’s account on competitiveness arguing that the despite having reached a 
good economic performance record compared with 1930s and 1970s, the UK still lags behind 
                                                          
802DTI, “Competing in the Global Economy – The Innovation Challenge”，DTI Economics Paper NO. 7, URN 
03/1394 30, November (2003).   
803 HM Treasury and BERR, “Productivity in the UK 7: Securing Long-term Prosperity”, DTI, November (2007), 
p. 19. The IMD survey on the perception of business executives of management skills in the UK was used to 
measure management quality. Also it was used in BERR, “the 2007 Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators”, 
Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, URN 08/P39, (January 2008). Also it was used in 
BERR, “the 2008 Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators”, Department of Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, URN 09/P39 (February 2009).  
804 DTI, “UK Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators 2006”, DTI Economics Paper, No. 17. March 2006; 
BEER, “Impact of regulation on productivity”, BEER Occasional paper No. 3, (September 2008); BEER, “The 
2008 Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators”, Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 
February 2009. URN 09/P39 (2008). 
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other countries805. It blamed the New Labour competitiveness policies for causing high interest 
rates, inflation, unemployment, and a weak rise in productivity and living standards. 
Specifically, the Paper perceived welfare policies under New Labour to have impeded 
motivation to work and fed bureaucracy and led to high social spending in areas that do not 
contribute to the creation and growth of business806. It stated that the UK’s “comparatively 
strong performance in the 1990s, which was based on relatively light regulation and taxation, 
is now being damaged by their increase to a more typically European level”. Moreover, the UK 
“has fallen from 4th to 10th in the competitiveness league tables”, a ranking that was given in 
the 2006-2007 GCR807. The argument made is based on what the Paper described as “strong 
evidence” that freeing businesses to compete through low tax rates and effective regulations 
are the answer for rapid economic growth“808. Although the Paper drew on the same set of 
competitiveness indicators set under the New Labour, its conclusions were different. It 
proposed to review the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act of 1999, to opt out of the Social 
Chapter and to produce UK-specific rules on regulations of the labour market in order to 
maintain its flexibility, rather than implementing EU ones809. Moreover, their strategy draws 
on a similar evidence base, that of the WEF and IMD among other sources.  
The first BIS paper on competitiveness under Coalition government was issued in 2010. It 
sought to explain the factors that have driven the expansion of global trade and to evaluate the 
UK’s trade performance compare with other competitors in the pre-2008 context (1948-2008). 
Declining competitiveness of the UK was considered responsible for the loss in the UK’s 
market share in important overseas markets between 2002 and 2007810. The Paper drew on the 
                                                          
805 Rt Hon John Reedwood “Forward” in, “Freeing Britain to Compete: Equipping the UK for Globalisation”, 
Economic Competitiveness Policy Group, Submission to the Shadow Cabinet, August (2007), p. 2.  
806 Ibid. p. 3. and p. 9. For a more detailed account of New Labour’s ‘ten mistakes’, see pp. 10-11.  
807 Ibid.    
808 Ibid. p. 4 
809 Ibid. p. 59 
810 BIS, “UK Trade Performance: Patterns in UK and Global Trade Growth”, BIS Economics Paper No 8. 
November (2010), p. 10. 
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2009-2010 GCR to measure the UK’s score in innovation. Moreover, this report was utilised 
to compile the Innovation and Technology Index to benchmark the UK’s performance811. A 
number of conclusions were drawn from the evidence. Firstly, the UK has to build its 
innovation base to guarantee higher quality of life.  Secondly, flexible work conditions have to 
be maintained in order to respond effectively to change. Thirdly, the competition regime needs 
to be strengthened and embedded more widely812. In addition to transferring knowledge, 
spreading competitive markets and enhancing regional economies, according to the evidence 
found by the DTI, “maximising potential in the workplace” is deemed vital to government 
intervention813. In order to do so, employee involvement in the management of the skills and 
flexibility of the workplace is necessary, the Paper noted814.  
 
Moreover, BIS’s Economics Paper No. 9 confirmed the results of the Conservative report that 
economic performance made under labour was based on “unsustainable model of unbalanced 
growth” as it was mostly driven by government activity, particularly from 1999 to 2008815. 
This was primarily evident in relation to: household debt as a share of GDP which increased 
from 66% to 88%; growing public spending that rose by 29% while the economy grew by 24%; 
and a decline in business investment from 11.7% to 10.5% as a share of GDP816. Thus, to 
counter the inflationary impact of government fiscal and monetary intervention, the Paper 
                                                          
811 Factors that determine the volume of imports/exports of such products are spending on R&D, innovation 
capacity, and capacity for scientific research. Price competitiveness (depreciation of the pound) was seen as a 
significant factor in improving the UK’s competitiveness without ignoring the importance of non-price 
competitiveness factors, Ibid. pp. 64-5.  
812  Ibid. p. 29.  
813 Ibid. p.14 and p. 18. The DTI has identified sixteen policy areas that influence productivity and prosperity 
(based on the 5 drivers).  
814 Cully, M., et al, Britain at work (1999) cited in BIS, “UK Trade Performance: Patterns in UK and Global Trade 
Growth”, BIS Economics Paper No 8. November (2010), p 21.  
815 BIS, “Economic Growth: Executive Summary”, BIS Economics Paper No. 9, November (2010), For more 
details on the contribution of government activity to GDP growth in contrast to private sector, see Ibid. pp. 5-8. 
816 Ibid. p. 2.  
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called for an active private, rather than, sector role and a better management of the supply-side 
of the economy817.  
Based on this evidence, a new governmental framework for growth based on four pillars was 
set. First, providing the stability business needs: no big government, no debt, no weak financial 
services818. Second, making markets more dynamic through ensuring fair competition, 
openness, reduced regulatory burden especially in case of market failure (in the table below, 
BIS presents its evidence on regulations)819. Third, taking effective action to support business 
investment and growth through direct investment in R&D and infrastructure and encouraging 
business investment. The government has to correct market failures such as lack of finance, 
maintaining a favourable business environment; including stable and competitive tax 
regime820. Forth, supporting individuals to fulfil their potential through retaining sustainable 
levels of growth, which would encourage people to seek employment and maximise their 
productivity by upgrading their skills821. 
To be clear, the Paper emphasised that the benefit system, incentives to work, skills of labour 
and management, and the flexibility of the labour market and policies are among the most 
important factors that determine the outcome of the relationship between job creation and 
economic growth822. Differences between countries in terms of the employment/growth 
relationship are explained in terms of the structure of the labour market and its dynamics, thus, 
its responsiveness to changes in the global economy823. Precisely, strict protection for contracts 
and constraining labour mobility into other productive firms or industries was stated as 
                                                          
817 Ibid. p. 29.  
818 Ibid. p. P. 34 
819 Ibid. p. P.141.  
820 Ibid. p. 66.  
821 Ibid. p. 98.  
822 Ibid. pp. 98-9,  
823 Ibid.  
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counterproductive for productivity growth in the long-term824. Therefore, the Paper called for 
a liberalisation of the provision of regular contracts to US levels, leaving flexibility to 
negotiation between workers and employers depending on the firm needs825.  
 
With regards to the benefit system, the Paper called upon the government to ensure that the 
fact employment pays more than benefits is delivered to people. Additionally, the government 
should approach the problem of unemployment through “the policy of activation” - welfare 
should be made conditional upon willingness to work and engage with the labour market 
through training. Such policy would also help preventing a further decline in skills of welfare 
claimants, which could worsen their employment and growth prospect. It emphasised that 
“active labour market policy will help economic growth and increasing income and living 
standards of those who were previously on benefit826. In short, active policies are seen as 
important for growth and the latter is important for social welfare.  
 
In terms of evidence, according to the 2010-2011 GCR, the Paper noted, the UK has done well 
in terms of reducing the government’s regulatory burden but its competitiveness in this area is 
in decline compared to its competitors827. Moreover, it cited the GCR as evidence of the UK’s 
overall financial development and found that in spite of ranking first in this index, the UK “fell 
in some of the corporate governance rankings, for example falling from 2nd to 17th on efficacy 
of corporate boards between 2008 and 2009”828. Regarding infrastructure, the Paper built on 
the 2010-2011 GCR and its business opinion survey that revealed the ranking of the UK’s 
overall infrastructural environment in relation to its main competitors. It ranked 33rd behind 
                                                          
824 Ibid. p. 103.  
825 Ibid. p. 105.  
826 Ibid. p. 101, see also p. 59.   
827 Ibid. p. 55.  
828 Ibid. pp. 61-62. For the WEF it is the World Economic Forum (2009) Financial Development Report 
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France 4th, Germany 9th, Canada 13th, Japan 15th and the US 23rd829. Figure 23 below explains 
the evidence used830. 
 
Reporting on the performance of the manufacturing sector in the UK in 2010, the BIS built the 
major bulk of its evidence on the 2010-2011 GCR. It praised the UK’s improved performance 
(ranked 21th) compared to 2008 and 2009. Furthermore, it celebrated the ranking it achieved 
on the efficiency of labour market where it ranked 8th and called for enhancing its ranking in 
the macroeconomic environment831. 
Furthermore, in discussing the impact of the 2008-2009 recession on productivity and recovery 
in the UK, BIS built on the GCR to substantiate its evidence on the improvement achieved with 
regards to the competition regime that compares favourably with US and Germany. It states 
that “this view is also reflected in the indices of product and labour market efficiencies 
published in various issues of the Global Competitiveness Report published by the World 
Economic Forum”832. It drew on the same evidence to confirm the progress made in 
infrastructure quality; goods market efficiency; labour market efficiency833. Similar trends are 
evident in the BIS’s Growth is Our Business paper where it largely relied on the 2012-3 GCR 
to assess the UK’s business environment, in addition to other reports834.   
 
                                                          
829 Ibid. p. 78.  
830 Reports used: WTO (2008) World Trade Report, World Economic Forum (2010) Global Competitiveness 
Report 2010-11, , World Economic Forum (2009) Financial Development Report, World Bank (2010) Doing 
Business Report, World Bank (2009) Doing Business Report, World Bank (2007) Global Economic Prospects., 
World Bank (2006) World Development Report: Equity and Development. Is there a selectivity of choice here by 
the government?  
831 BIS, “Manufacturing in the UK: Supplementary Analysis”, BIS Economics Paper No. 10B, December (2010), 
p. 38. Also the OECD Barriers to Entrepreneurship Index, World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index, Industry 
Confidence Survey by CBI in addition to several other national and international sources. For a list of sources see 
pp. 42-3.  
832 BIS, “Innovation and Research Strategy for Growth”. BIS Economics Paper No. 15, December (2011), pp. xi-
xii.  
833 Ibid. p. 50 and pp. 61-2.  
834 BIS, “Growth is Our Business: A Strategy for Professional and Business Services”, BIS, July (2013).  
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Source; BIS Economics Paper No. 9, November 2010835
 
 
                                                          
835 Ibid. p. 55. The WB Ease of Doing Business also ranked the UK 10th in protecting investors and in its Report 
on the Observance of Standards & Codes, the Bank ranked the UK very highly in corporate governance. Ibid. pp. 
60-1.  
 291 
 
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, in the UK, as in many other countries, saving rates 
decreased, debt increased, poverty mounted with budget deficit as government spending rose 
and business investment declined. As a result, and according to BIS, the UK became less 
competitive and less able to meet future challenges836. In its 2011 Plan for growth paper, BIS 
and HM Treasury states that:  
Britain has lost ground in the world’s economy, and needs to catch up. If we do not act now, jobs will be 
lost, our country will become poorer and we will find it difficult to afford the public services we all 
want…our standard of living will fall …. In the last decade other nations have worked hard to make their 
economies more competitive. They have reduced their business tax rates, removed barriers to enterprise, 
invested in their infrastructure, improved their education systems, reformed welfare and increased their 
exports
837
.  
The evidence they used to substantiate such circumstances and to justify a new course of action 
derives again from the 2010-2011 GCR. Their report pointed out that while the UK ranked 4th 
in the 1998 GCR, it came 12th in 2010. Rising taxes and regulations, lack of skills and 
inadequate overall planning system are blamed for declining competitiveness as it hindered the 
ability of firms to grow and create jobs. George Osborne, in a forward to the paper, noted that 
“the facts today are staring Britain in the face. We’ve gone from having the 3rd lowest corporate 
tax in the EU-15 to having the 7th highest...In education, the foundation of economic success, 
we have slipped back. In international rankings of excellence in maths, we’ve fallen from 8th 
to 28th, in science from 4th to 16th”. Similar trends of deterioration were observed in 
manufacturing, exports838. Therefore the report called for a more balanced saving, exporting, 
high-skilled and innovative economy, competitive tax system in order to improve the UK’s 
                                                          
836 Forward by Vince Cable and George Osborne, BIS & HM Treasury, “The Plan for Growth”, BIS & HM 
Treasury, March (2011), p. 3.   
837 Ibid. p. 12. 
838 Ibid. p. 3.  
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ranking on international indicators of competitiveness and make the country one of the most 
attractive and best locations for investment. Although the openness of the UK and its labour 
market flexibility were seen as the surest signs of strength to build on future performance, the 
report called for enhancing the performance in this regard, in relation to hiring and firing 
practices and the burden of regulations which was ranked 49th and 89th by the WEF 
respectively839.  
 
One important aspect of the recovery from the 2008 economic crisis is the changes occurred in 
employment practices. More specifically, “the rise of ‘precarious’ forms of employment” that 
include: casual, short-term arrangements and zero-hour contracts840. Such a change was praised 
by the CBI as a government success in providing flexible regulations for labour market841. 
Specifically, during recession, such flexibility was recognised to have facilitated recovery 
through “the unprecedented co-operation between employers and employees through measures 
such as short-time working, hiring freezes and moderation in pay has helped to minimise job 
losses”842. During the recession, the workforce responded positively to employers’ requests to 
“take unpaid leave, to work unpaid, to work annualised hours, or consider pay reductions”843. 
In practice such an employment model is perceived to have not only protected jobs but 
positively driven growth and enhanced UK competitiveness844. These form of employment, the 
                                                          
839 Ibid. pp. 3-4 and p. 37.  
840 Ibid. p. 28.   
841 CBI, “Making Britain the Place to Work: An employment Agenda for the New Government”. Employment 
Policy Directorate, CBI, June (2010), p.1.  
842 Ibid. p. 1.  
843 CBI, “The Shape of Business: the next ten years”, Employment Policy Directorate, (2009), p. 22, Flexibility 
applies to agency workers and zero-hours contracts. However, what represents a threat to flexibility of labour 
market and the competitiveness of the UK is comes from burden employment regulations and the skills gap. 72% 
businesses assessed their employee relations climate as cooperative or very cooperative; 74 of non-unionised 
businesses judged this climate to be so while only 51% unionised said so. For more info on the scope, scale and 
structure of the survey, see pp. 7-8.  
844 Employment performance is improving due to labour market flexibility; employment rate is 70.1 % in UK 
compared to 64.1% across the EU and unemployment is at 7.9 % compared to 10.5 across the EU in 2012. CBI, 
“On the Up: CBI\Accenture Employment Trends Survey 2013”, CBI, (2013) P. 9.  
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CBI states, “are as important to many of those working on them as they are to businesses, so 
regulating them must target bad practice without demonising them”845. During economic 
recovery, the CBI holds that such labour market flexibility is a guarantee that jobs get created 
“at the first sign of demand rather than waiting for sufficient demand to justify hiring a full-
time employee before taking somebody on”. Accepting flexibility of this kind by employees is 
crucial to find jobs even in times of economic downturn, let alone cementing the 
competitiveness of British businesses846.  
In the October 2012 Paper, BIS presented a new set of competitiveness drivers: business 
environment, skills, innovation, infrastructure, trade and investment.  It drew on the GCR and 
WCY to assess the overall competitiveness of the economy with more attention given to the 
survey while the OECD and WB’s rankings were used to obtain evidence based on hard data847. 
The 2009-2010, 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 GCR and the 2012 WCY were used to provide 
evidence of the UK’s strong economic performance as it ranked 8th, and 7th on the WB’s Ease 
of Doing Business Report848. The GCR is also utilised as evidence of a supportive business 
environment, developed financial market, stable macroeconomic environment, adequate 
competition regime, flexible labour market and desirable political and institutional 
environments849.  
 
In relation to productivity, the UK Commission for Employment and Skills reported in 2014 
that declining productivity is the cause of a weak recovery in the UK due to the lack of skills 
supplied to the labour market and stringent employment regulations. The labour market is seen 
                                                          
845 Matthew Percival “Zero Hours Contracts: Encouraging flexibility that benefits employers and employees”, 
Employment & Skills Directorate, CBI, March 2014, p. 1.  
846 Ibid. pp. 1-4.  
847 BIS, “Benchmarking UK Competitiveness in the Global Economy”, BIS Economics Paper No. 19, October 
(2012).  p. 54. This paper is an update to the 2006 DTI paper No 17, and the 2008 BEER paper. Using the latest 
published data on competitiveness. More extensive use of the WEF is detected here.  
848 Ibid. pp. vii- x.  
849 Ibid. p. x. and pp. 70-76.  
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as efficient but not effective. Based on the 2013-2014 GCR, which ranked the UK 5th on the 
efficiency of the labour market and 10th overall, the Commission called for a policy intervention 
that is directed to compensate for productivity and skills weaknesses through education and 
training, but must also be cemented by employer’s involvement in these areas in order to make 
it more effective policy850.  
The WEF’s influence on policymaking in the UK has not only manifested in the 
institutionalisation process. British, mainly Conservative, leaders have participated in Davos’s 
annual meeting for several years. But notable in this regard is Cameron’s use of Davos as a 
platform for selling the UK for investors. In his 2014 speech at Davos, he said: 
All of us here in Davos know what it is that businesses need if they are to choose to locate in Europe. 
Macroeconomic stability… And above all, we need an unashamedly pro-business regulatory environment 
– with labour market flexibility, low jobs taxes and a willingness to pave the way for new business and 
new business models
851
.
 
 
 
Then, Cameron made an attempt at attracting business investment to the UK by arguing that 
his government have put in place all the necessary fundamentals for a profitable and 
                                                          
850 The UK Commission for Employment and Skills is a public organisation that conducts research on skills’ level 
in the UK and their impact on competitiveness. It encompasses members from trade unions, employers and the 
voluntary sector. Its objectives, include; maximising the impact of government employment and skills policies on 
job creation and economic growth, designing market solutions to investment in skills in consultation with 
businesses and creating an intelligence base for labour market in order to best inform businesses and people on 
available opportunities. The Commissions aims to achieve these objectives based on best practice and 
international benchmarking (most international data are taken from the OECD database), Lesley Giles, Forward 
to the UK Commission for Employment and Skills Report, “UK Skill Levels and International Competitiveness, 
2013”, Evidence Report 85, August (2014), p. i. The earlier version was produced in November 2012, Evidence 
Report 61. Few attempts were made in the 1990s by EU Commission on Competitiveness such as; Commission 
of the European Communities, “Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The challenges and Ways Forward into 
the 21st Century”, COM (93) 700 (1993) and Commission of the European Communities, “European Social Policy 
– A Way Forward for the Union: White Paper”, COM (94) 303 (1994). Nevertheless, in contrast with the UK’s 
White Papers on Competitiveness of 1994 and 1995, these two EU papers were designed in collaboration between 
EU institutions, member states, employers, trade unions and other civil institutions. All were involved in order to 
answer the following question: “what sort of society do the Europeans want?”. But both papers considered labour 
market flexibility an integral mechanism to enhance the EU’s competitiveness.  
851 David Cameron, “Speech at the World Economic Forum”, Davos, January 24, 2014.   
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/world-economic-forum-davos-2014-speech-by-david-cameron--2, 
(accessed March 14, 2015).   
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competitive business; cutting the deficit to pay off debts, keeping interests rates low, putting a 
cap on welfare spending, upgrading the education system and delivering training to people, 
creating more jobs by supporting small businesses with the necessary infrastructure and tax 
regimes and planning to cut business tax to lower than 20%852. In 2013, he delivered an 
appealing speech stating that the UK is:         
We are a global nation with global interests and a global reach, and if you think all of this is somehow an 
unashamed advert for the UK and UK business you’re absolutely right. Everything I do is about making 
sure we’re not just competing in that global race, but we’re succeeding in it853.  
Furthermore, in 2012, in the context of declining growth rates in the UK and Europe, Cameron 
argued that Europe’s lack of competitiveness is its “Achilles Heel” and noted that in order to 
move forward, the UK cut welfare bills and cost of the government, increased the pension age, 
and froze public sector pay. While he criticised the EU for increasing the burden on business 
and affecting jobs through, for example, the Agency Workers Directive, the Pregnant Workers 
Directive, the Working Time Directive, he made promises to business leaders at the Forum that 
his government will reduce red tape, review regulations, create a competitive tax regime, invest 
in infrastructure and keep spending under control while making finance available to small 
businesses. This according to Cameron, will make Britain “the best place in the world in which 
to start or grow a business”. He concluded by making the following statement: “we are a 
country that is absolutely committed to enterprise and openness. Come to Britain. Invest in 
Britain”854.  
                                                          
852 Ibid.  
853 David Cameron, “Speech at the World Economic Forum”, January 24, 2013. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-minister-david-camerons-speech-to-the-world-economic-
forum-in-davos, (accessed March 14, 2015). 
854 David Cameron, “Special Address by David Cameron to the World Economic Forum 2012 Annual Meeting in 
Davos”, January 26, 2012. http://www.weforum.org/videos/special-address-david-cameron-annual-meeting-
2012, (accessed March 14, 2015); see also David Cameron, “Prime Minister's speech at the World Economic 
Forum”, World Economic Forum, January 28, 2011, http://www.weforum.org/news/david-cameron-speech-
davos-confident-future-europe, (accessed March 16, 2015). In his speech to the Mexico G20 meeting on the 18th 
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In short, these reports are evidence of the importance ascribed to competitiveness in national 
policymaking in the UK. They represent an attempt at institutionalising competitiveness into 
forming the UK’s social and economic policies and reflect a commitment to building a 
competitive economy that is able to generate sustainable economic growth, low unemployment 
and higher living standards. Overall, the reports mentioned above are not the only ones. 
However, they are the core of the work that has been done in relation to institutionalising 
competitiveness in the policymaking in the UK in relation to building the macro and micro 
foundations of competitiveness. Perhaps a deeper engagement with the publications of other 
departments would yield equally important results. Most importantly, it has been demonstrated 
in this section that the UK has developed a national institutional response to the 
competitiveness imperative since 1994. Throughout this period, under both the Conservatives 
and New Labour, this national approach and the accompanying policy reforms have become 
informed by a rich evidence base that draws on data published by many international and global 
policy groups. Although there seems to be an increasing reliance on its reports, the WEF figures 
primarily as once source of evidence and its discourse as one element of the UK’s 
competitiveness discourse alongside other domestic and external elements.  
 
 
 
                                                          
of June 2012, Cameron delivered Britain’s achievements to the G20 leaders and all businesses on the watch for 
new opportunities, Cabinet Office, “Prime Minister's Speech at Mexico G20”, June 18, 2012. Gov. UK. 
file:///E:/Thesis/Thesis/CH6/Government/DTI/Prime%20Minister's%20Speech%20at%20Mexico%20G20%20-
%20Speeches%20-%20GOV.UK.html, (accessed March 16, 2015). For a critical argument against the EU 
regulations, see CBI, “Making Britain the Place to Work: An employment Agenda for the New Government”. 
Employment Policy Directorate, CBI, June (2010), pp. 1-15.  Caroline Spelman, Secretary of State, made the 
journey to Davos in 2011, Caroline Spelman, “Secretary of State’s speech at the World Economic Forum Young 
Global Leaders UK event”, Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, Gov. UK, December 6, 2011.    
file:///E:/Thesis/Thesis/CH6/Government/DTI/Secretary%20of%20State%E2%80%99s%20speech%20at%20th
e%20World%20Economic%20Forum%20Young%20Global%20Leaders%20UK%20event%20-
%20Speeches%20-%20GOV.UK.html, (accessed March 17, 2015). 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the UK has developed a national, and selective, response to 
the imperative of international competitiveness. I have shown that most of the elements that 
composed its competitiveness discourse are a continuation of policy reforms that were already 
underway since the 1980s. Moreover, the UK’s competitiveness discourse represents a mixture 
of macro and micro principles that inform its policymaking. However, as indicated by the 
reports analysed, the UK’s discourse has experienced a shift towards placing greater emphasis 
on the microeconomic conditions of prosperity where labour productivity is taken as the driving 
engine of capital accumulation and economic growth. The argument made in all of these reports 
is that building sustainable competitiveness in the UK primarily rests on maintaining a flexible 
labour market and continuous upgrade of the country’s knowledge base that would deliver the 
skills the market needs. Thus, public spending has become inclined more towards education, 
training and infrastructure than welfare programs. As evident in the policy debates and reports, 
traditional welfare policies are in the process of being largely dis-embedded from the society 
in favour for a type of welfare that is generated by a competitive and prosperous enterprise. 
This approach seems to be common among the political parties in the UK with a relative 
variance with regard to the operationalisation of competitiveness. While the Conservatives 
believe in market forces as the ultimate source of prosperity and social security, New Labour 
is more inclined to socialise competitiveness through maintain a certain level of state 
intervention in order to account for the social consequences of unfettered market force. Both 
parties are ultimately concerned with the reproduction of capital and labour but New Labour 
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seems to be more concerned with building a healthy society as a basis for sustainable 
competitiveness855.   
Moreover, although there seems to be an increasing use of the GCR as a supporting evidence 
underpinning the policy-making process in the UK, it is evident that the WEF appears only as 
one discourse among many, national and transnational, in the national policy-making of the 
UK. The composition of the UK’s evidence base is wide and diverse. And this should be 
understood as a reflection of national needs and conditions of capital-labour relations. As 
argued by our Open Marxist theory underpinning this research, the British state is only one 
political node in the global system of capitalism, a node that is not identical to other nodes 
given its specific relationship to capital. Its involvement in the activities of global policy groups 
such as the WEF is a form of management of this specific relationship. It originates from the 
need to reproduce capital and its exploitation of labour within its jurisdictions. Globalising 
British politicians have become place sellers, as shown in the case of Cameron, but their 
practice is derived from the conditions of their national environments that dictates a specific 
form of management of capital-labour relations and a specific relationship with global capital. 
Therefore, the evidence found in this chapter does not support the argument that state 
restructuring is an external imperative imposed by the TCC and its agents intended to maintain 
its hegemony over the state and its citizens. Neither does yield much support to the argument 
made in the TCC literature, as discussed in Chapter Two, that state politicians are part of the 
TCC and work to maintain its hegemony. Rather, the evidence found is enough only to suggest 
an overlap between national and transnational discourse of competitiveness, which reveals 
much about the global nature of capital rather than a far-reaching power of global policy 
                                                          
855 As argued by Freeman, “the war of the models”, be it American, British or Asian, “is about labour markets”. 
Richard B. Freeman, “War of the models: Which labour market institutions for the 21st century?”, Labour 
Economics 5 (1998), pp. 1–24. For an idea of the nature of welfare reforms in the US starting from the 1980s, see 
Douglas J. Besharov and Amy A. Fowler, “The End of Welfare as We Know It?”, National Affairs, (111), Spring 
(1993). 
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groups. This is, however, not to suggest the absence of elements of the WEF’s competitiveness 
formula from the British discourse, which might be seen by Neo-Gramscians as a manifestation 
of the power of the WEF as a discursive formation. The British discourse has utilised elements 
of the Forum’s, and other organisations’, discourse for the sake of managing the national circuit 
of global capital. However, these elements have been adapted to the national conditions of class 
struggle in the UK. It should also be noted that in addition to the fact that there exists no 
hegemony of one version of competitiveness over another in the UK’ discourse, the shape of 
the discourse and its components will always change depending on the changes in the nature 
of class struggle in the UK and the relationship the country has with global capital.  
The outcomes of this chapter highlights the importance of challenging the orthodoxy in the 
competitiveness debate with more robust evidence. This research has shown how Open 
Marxism has a viable explanatory power in investigating the process of the institutionalisation 
of competitiveness in the UK and, most importantly, in challenging the assumptions of the 
TCC literature that state, and its politicians, are manipulated by capital or serve the interests of 
a transnational capitalist class of which they are members. It has proven to be a valuable 
analytical framework in explaining the relationship between the state, capital and labour. Had 
they applied their TCC analysis to the British case here, Neo-Gramscianism and other theories 
would, no doubt, have to rethink the principles underlying their analysis.   
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
 
The research objectives of this thesis were two-fold. The first was to provide an alternative 
perspective for approaching the topic of the TCC and analysing the power it holds over the 
global economy and over the state restructuring process to that currently offered in the 
literature. The current approaches to the existence, structure and power of the TCC, both within 
and outside of IPE, are still incomplete in that the vast majority of the analysis has managed to 
proceed without studying the most salient manifestation of the TCC; the global policy groups, 
such as the WEF, that constitute the active agency of the class itself. Academics in IPE and 
other fields have made little effort to place them under the thorough examination necessary to 
unravel their workings and the mechanisms through which they influence state policymaking. 
This fact is evident also in the lack of a proper theorisation of how different elements of the 
‘global’ society came together to form a transnational class that occupies the apex of the power 
structure in the global economy. The literature has so far not brought a theory of the state into 
a structure of analysis in which it has assumed that the state forms a significant element and 
thus from the state a substantial part of the structural power of the TCC arguably originates. 
Why so many state actors of dynamic and competing preference have chosen to take part in the 
activities of the TCC and its policy groups consequentially remains an unsubstantiated 
assumption.  
The TCC analysis primarily yields the following conclusion: state officials are conscious of 
the interests of global capital only, at the expense of the rest of the society and other fractions 
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of national capital. Moreover, it is argued that states’ officials are members of, and identify 
themselves with, the transnational capitalist class. This, I have argued, is a highly problematic 
assumption for many reasons. Among other things, it merely connotes that, inherently, 
politicians support and reinforce the interests of the TCC in order to maintain its hegemony in 
a capitalist system. The state, then, is reduced to an agent that functions in favour of capital and 
the capitalist class in a manner that detaches it, the state, from any other interests in the society. 
Or at best the state acts as if its interests are identical with the interests of the TCC which in 
turn represent the interests of the society as a whole. Sklair’s argument, for example, presumes 
that the state is part of the TCC without introducing a conceptualisation of the state that would 
help explain why it should be considered as ‘capitalist’, or part of the capitalist class, let alone 
a proper concept of the class that can enhance the clarity of his argument856. On the other hand, 
the work of Carroll depicts the state as powerless and subject to the will of the capitalist class. 
Its non-class nature, for him, does not prevent states’ officials from aligning their interests with 
those of the capitalists. It suggests that the form and role of the state are mere reflections of the 
economic structure and that the involvement of the state in global policy groups is a 
manifestation of the structural power of capital which, through ideology, expertise, and 
economic power, influences and controls the state857.  
Such a problematic assumption is evident also in Robinson’s conceptualisation of the TCC. 
For him, the TCC, through its organised inner circle of global policy groups, is “class 
conscious” of its “transnationality” and of its project of maintaining capitalist globalisation858.  
Earlier attempts made by Van der Pijl and Gill to theorise the formation of an Atlantic and 
Trilateral Ruling Class offer a great background revealing the historical context within which 
the roots of the TCC matured. However, their accounts are embedded in more an international 
                                                          
856 Leslie Sklair, “Democracy and the Transnational Capitalist Class”, p. 144. 
857 William K. Carroll, The Making of A Transnational Capitalist Class, p. 5, p. 179 and p. 225.  
858 William I. Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism, p. 48.  
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relations approach to the emergence of the TCC which is more heavily focused on the nature 
of inter-state relations as the decisive factor in the making of the Atlantic Ruling Class than on 
the structure of the capitalist system and the role of the state in class-based capitalist society. 
Both Gill’s “Transnational Hegemony”859 and Van der Pijl’s hegemonic concept of control860 
account for the active agency of global capital which captures the state whose interests become 
then identical to those of fractions of capital and opposite to the rest of the capitalists and to 
those of labour. It is an account that is built on the somewhat unquestioned hegemony of the 
footloose global financial capital that triggers a restructuring of the state from outside. Their 
view on the formation of the concept of control on which this class is constituted is one that is 
developed as a result of the rivalry between productive and money capital more than capital-
labour relations.  
In contrast, this thesis has shown how the analysis of the power of the TCC is not a 
straightforward one. It necessitates a concept of class and, equally important, an adequate 
conceptualisation of the state and its role in the capitalist society. It has demonstrated how 
addressing the first requirement helps to situate the TCC within a more legitimate context, one 
that is not arbitrary and ambiguously founded. Thus, a concept of class makes it easier to 
determine who belongs to the TCC and thus who contributes to its hegemony and power 
projection. In doing so, I have shown that the power of the TCC originates from the imperative 
of guaranteeing the reproduction of capital on the transnational and national levels by the state. 
The inner circle of the class is constituted only by the owners of the means of production. From 
a Marxist perspective, it is only the capitalist members of the TCC that could be regarded as 
constituting a “class-in-itself” since members of a class in a capitalist society share a similar 
position in relation to the mode of production, which the state does not, simply put. Also it is 
                                                          
859 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony, p. 209.  
860 Van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, p. 272-4. 
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only the capitalist members of this class who could be seen as forming a “class-for-itself” given 
their consciousness of the interests they have in common and the ways in which they exercise 
their power towards achieving these interests in national and transnational spheres. 
Regarding the second requirement, this research has introduced an Open Marxist 
conceptualisation of the position of the state within the capitalist system in order to illustrate 
its involvement in the activities of the TCC without depicting it as part of the capitalist class or 
dominated by it, but rather as a moment in the global system of capitalism. This has provided 
a clearer sense of why and how the state is involved in the activities of the TCC and its policy 
groups instead of simply assuming that its policies and strategies are reflections of their needs. 
Open Marxism allows for viewing the state rather differently; that is, away from economic 
determinism or instrumentalisation by capital, and/or labour. As “circuit managers”, I have 
argued, states’ relation to the TCC should be seen as a manifestation of the consciousness 
of their system-determined role in managing class relations, which are global in nature, 
within their national boundaries. In that sense, what seems to be imposed through state 
restructuring by the TCC, is in reality a product of the management of capital-labour 
relations characterised by antagonism, and by struggle in and against domination in order to 
sustain the continuation of global capital accumulation. This has been demonstrated in 
relation to the assumed influence of the discourse of international competitiveness over the 
state.  
The second research objective of the thesis was then to draw attention to another problematic 
that essentially springs from the first one. It is the fact that most of the literature on international 
competitiveness assumes undue influence of the discourse over national policymaking in a 
manner that allows no agency to the dynamics of the relationships between social forces 
interacting within state jurisdictions. It simply views the state as a passive recipient of the 
discourse who applies its standards in order to preserve the hegemony of the global system of 
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capitalism dominated by a hegemonic capitalist class. The emerging literature on the WEF 
suffers from a similar shortcoming when considering the involvement of the state in the 
activities of the Forum. Although Pigman’s work is invaluable in terms of bridging part of 
the huge gap existing to date with regard to the academic research on the WEF, he falls into 
the same mistake as Robinson, Sklair and Carroll861. Specifically, he ascribed an 
unchallengeable power to the WEF as a discursive institution. To him, the fact that various 
groups, social, political, economic and cultural, take part in the activities of the Forum makes 
it possible for the Forum to shape their identities, interests and, thus, actions. In this view, 
the Forum has become an agenda setter in the global economy and a source of public 
discourses that find their way into national policymaking. This thesis agrees with Pigman’s 
position that the WEF attempts to influence state policymaking through generating public 
discourses. However, the account developed here is built on the argument that it is not 
through Davos and the multiple activities of the Forum that its power gets projected mainly, 
but through its competitiveness discourse channelled through the GCR.  
I have argued that in order to fully understand the developments in the state structure that have 
been underway since the 1970s OM needs to take into consideration the role of the discourse 
associated with the neoliberal policies that have predominated national policymaking. Our 
perception of the nature and role of discourse is rather different from that of Pigman and others 
such as Fougner862. Rather than viewing discourse as a tool of instrumentalisation by one actor 
over another, the thesis has argued that discourse is one form of class struggle alongside the 
political and the economic. Discourse is a moment that exists simultaneously with the political 
and economic moments; it is one element in the re/production of the capitalist social relations 
of production and its underlying class antagonistic relations. The point is, in order to adequately 
                                                          
861 Geoffrey Allen Pigman, A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Global governance, pp. 1-2.  
862 Tore Fougner, “Corporate Power in World Politics”, p. 105. 
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assess the power that the WEF has, as a representative of the TCC, on the state, there is a need 
to be able to evaluate the influence its competitiveness discourse has on the state. In order to 
do so, I have developed an account for the role of discourse in the form of the state’s 
management of capital-labour relations. Such an account allows for the contextualising of the 
role of ideas generated by the TCC within the economic and political dynamics of the 
relationship between the social forces that constitute them, the forces of capital and labour.  
Much of the debate on the power of the discourse of competitiveness over the state builds on 
no adequate engagement with the discourse itself. I have pointed out that rather than deriving 
the influence of the discourse from political debates over competitiveness rankings, an 
adequate analysis should firstly engage critically with the competitiveness reports published 
by global policy groups such as the GCR of the WEF. Such an undertaking provides a more 
accurate analysis of reality by pointing out the difference between what these reports try to 
achieve on the one hand and how states actually respond in reality. Moreover, I have 
demonstrated how the WEF’s discourse of competitiveness has shifted in essence to focus more 
on the microeconomic foundation of competitiveness rather than being concerned with the 
orthodox macroeconomic principles of competitiveness as assumed in most of the literature.  
Another case study was therefore necessary to test the argument. I have examined how the UK 
has responded to the competitiveness discourse since the 1990s. I showed that the UK has 
developed a national, selective, response to the neoliberal imperative of international 
competitiveness. I have demonstrated that most of the elements that composed its 
competitiveness discourse are a continuation of those that were already underway in the 1980s. 
Moreover, the UK’s competitiveness discourse represents a mixture of macro and micro 
principles that inform its policymaking. However, as indicated by the governmental reports 
analysed, the UK’s discourse has experienced a shift towards placing greater emphasis on the 
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microeconomic conditions of prosperity where labour productivity is taken as the driving 
engine of capital accumulation and economic growth. The argument made in all of these reports 
is that building sustainable competitiveness in the UK primarily rests on maintaining a flexible 
labour market and the continuous upgrade of the country’s knowledge base that would deliver 
the skills the market needs. Thus, public spending has become inclined more towards 
education, training and infrastructure than welfare programs. As evident in the policy debates 
and reports, traditional welfare policies are in the process of being largely dis-embedded from 
society in favour of a type of welfare that is generated by a competitive and prosperous 
enterprise. This approach seems to be common among the political parties in the UK with a 
relative variance with regard to the operationalisation of competitiveness. Specifically, while 
the Conservatives believe in market forces as the ultimate source of prosperity and social 
security, New Labour is more inclined to socialise welfare through more state intervention in 
order to account for the social consequences of unfettered market force. Overall, both parties 
are concerned with the reproduction of capital and labour but New Labour seems to be more 
concerned with building a healthy society as a basis for sustainable competitiveness863.   
Moreover, it has been shown that there seems to be an increasing use of the GCR as supporting 
evidence underpinning the policymaking process in the UK. Although this may suggest a direct 
influence of the WEF over the social and economic policymaking of the UK, it is evident that 
the WEF figures only as one discourse among many, national and transnational, in the national 
policymaking of the UK. The composition of the UK’s evidence base is wide and diverse. And 
this should be understood as a reflection of national needs and conditions of capital-labour 
relations. The British state is only one political node in the global system of capitalism, a node 
                                                          
863 As argued by Freeman, “the war of the models”, be it American, British or Asian, “is about labour markets”. 
Richard B. Freeman, “War of the models: Which labour market institutions for the 21st century?”, Labour 
Economics 5 (1998), pp. 1–24. For an idea of the nature of welfare reforms in the US starting from the 1980s, see 
Douglas J. Besharov and Amy A. Fowler, “The End of Welfare as We Know It?”, National Affairs, (111), Spring 
(1993). 
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that is not identical to other nodes given its specific relationship to capital. Its involvement in 
the activities of global policy groups such as the WEF is a form of management of this specific 
relationship. It originates from the need to reproduce capital and its exploitation of labour 
within its jurisdictions. Politicians have become place sellers, as was shown in the case of 
Cameron’s speeches at Davos, but their practice is derived from the conditions of their national 
environments that dictates a specific form of management of capital-labour relations and a 
specific relationship with global capital. Therefore, the evidence found does not support the 
argument that state restructuring is an external imperative imposed by global capital or intended 
to maintain its hegemony over the state and its citizens. Neither does it yield much support for 
the argument made in the TCC literature, as discussed in Chapter One, that politicians are part 
of the TCC and work to maintain its hegemony. Rather, the evidence found is enough only to 
suggest an overlap between national and transnational discourses of competitiveness, which 
reveal much about the global nature of capital rather than a far-reaching power of global policy 
groups. This is, however, not to suggest the absence of the influence of the WEF as a discursive 
formation, but to draw attention to the importance of challenges to the orthodoxy in the 
competitiveness debate with more robust evidence.   
As a discursive institution, the WEF has definitely influenced the discourse on international 
competitiveness. Nonetheless, the discourse of competitiveness is not a fixed one, it is a fluid 
concept that is in constant reconfiguration. Such a fact is related to the nature of social relations 
between the actors that interact through the discourse and construct its essence. As a discourse, 
international competitiveness derives its essence from the specific economic conditions that 
characterise each national economy.  
The findings of this research prove that OM has much to offer to the field of IPE. Among other 
things, it offers an alternative lens through which to evaluate the changing nature of 
policymaking with the state as well as its role in relation to global capital. OM holds an 
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explanatory power which is valuable in identifying the agency of change in contemporary 
capitalist global economy. By departing from class struggle as the engine driving the 
development of capitalism, it helps by drawing an account of reality that avoids being trapped 
in a deterministic, instrumentalist or a structuralist depiction of such reality. Accordingly, it 
becomes possible to deliver an analysis of the state’s restructuring process occupying academia 
that derives from the national conditions of the state rather than viewing change as a one-way 
process, imposed by transnational forces that deprive any state from the power to respond to 
national needs. As demonstrated in the British example, each nation-state has a specific 
relationship with global capital and figures only as a moment of its circulation. Therefore, each 
state experiences a restructuring process specific to its own position in relation to the global 
economy, a relation that is conditioned upon the ability of the state to manage the capitalist 
social relations of production within its borders. This fact explains the different levels of 
restructuring, different competitiveness, economic growth, employment rates and prosperity. 
The importance of the local conditions in the competitiveness of businesses and countries 
should be perceived in this context.          
 
 
 
 
Caveats and Suggestions for Future Research  
 
Given its focus on only one of several global policy groups, the ability to generalise the findings 
of this research is limited. Further research is needed to examine how other global policy groups 
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of the TCC have been formed and an investigation into their structure is required to identify 
the reasons that yield more influence to some of them over global and national policymaking 
compared to others. As was evident in the British case, the IMD’s account of competitiveness 
seems to have gained more credibility for policymakers in the UK more than the WEF. It has 
found its way into the evidence base used to inform the government’s policymaking in a more 
noticeable way compared to the Forum. Thus, an examination of the foundation of its influence 
could yield fruitful results that would help to determine what constitutes its credibility and what 
sort of channels are used to project the power of its discourse. Moreover, the research on the 
discourse of international competitiveness could be enhanced further by studying the national 
centres that conduct research on international competitiveness. Although they do not seem to 
have been influential at shaping national policymaking, their influence is maybe evident at 
different levels and for different actors.   
Other works have been carried on in relation to global policy groups and their influence over 
national policymaking such as the TC and ERT, as mentioned in Chapters One and Five of the 
thesis, therefore another step forward would be to conduct a comparative analysis of the 
structure of global policy groups which would help to evaluate the extent of their 
representativeness of the TCC. If done, this could contribute to the TCC literature and perhaps 
enrich its theoretical and empirical foundations.   
It is evident that competitiveness has been politicised through policy debate and policymaking, 
as researchers on international competitiveness have argued. However, there is a need in the 
literature to build a richer empirical account of the depth to which competitiveness has been 
internalised within the state’s policymaking. What is more, there is a need to analyse the nature 
of the discourse internalised in order to distinguish between what is nationally produced and 
what is transnationally adopted. This should also serve as encouragement for academics from 
all relevant disciplines to approach the topic in a multi-disciplinary manner. The contribution 
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of this thesis, along with the work of others, such as Rune Moller, could serve as a productive 
starting point864.    
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